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# MOLO-STATIC-001: static-file jail escape via a symlinked intermediate directory
**Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md)
In-house finding (not a public CVE), modeled on the general symlink-following path
traversal class (CWE-61, "UNIX Symbolic Link Following") that underlies many static
file server CVEs (for example nginx's historical alias-traversal advisories and
assorted CMS/static-server CVEs that rely on `O_NOFOLLOW` being assumed sufficient).
## Where
`src/runtime/static/disk_provider.cpp`, `DiskProvider::open`:
```cpp
int fd = openat(root_fd_, path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
```
`O_NOFOLLOW` only blocks the kernel from dereferencing a symlink at the **final**
component of `path`. If an **earlier** path segment is a symlink pointing outside the
jailed root, the kernel follows it transparently while resolving the rest of the path,
and `openat` succeeds. The `realpath`-based containment check a few lines below only
runs when this `openat` call fails and `follow_symlinks_` (default `false`,
`disk_provider.h`) is true, so the strict, default configuration never reaches any
containment check at all for this shape of symlink.
## Relevance
`DiskProvider` is MoloApp's jailed static-file backend, the piece responsible for
keeping `/static/*` requests inside the configured root. This defeats that jail with
a single symlink an attacker needs only the ability to place inside the served
directory tree (a common outcome of an unrelated file-upload or archive-extraction
feature elsewhere in an app, or simply a misconfigured deploy that leaves a
developer's symlink in place).
## What the check does
Builds a scratch directory with `www/escape -> outside/` (a symlink one level inside
the served root) and `outside/secret.txt` holding a marker string, starts
`build/bin/runtime_interop_server` on that root with `follow_symlinks` at its default
(`false`), and requests `GET /static/escape/secret.txt`. PASS means the jail held
(404); FAIL means the marker string came back.
## Caveats
This does not test the `follow_symlinks=true` code path's own documented TOCTOU
window (that path already states its own limitation in a code comment); it tests the
supposedly-strict default, which the code comments do not flag as vulnerable to this
shape of symlink at all.
Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.