# MOLO-STATIC-001: static-file jail escape via a symlinked intermediate directory **Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md) In-house finding (not a public CVE), modeled on the general symlink-following path traversal class (CWE-61, "UNIX Symbolic Link Following") that underlies many static file server CVEs (for example nginx's historical alias-traversal advisories and assorted CMS/static-server CVEs that rely on `O_NOFOLLOW` being assumed sufficient). ## Where `src/runtime/static/disk_provider.cpp`, `DiskProvider::open`: ```cpp int fd = openat(root_fd_, path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC); ``` `O_NOFOLLOW` only blocks the kernel from dereferencing a symlink at the **final** component of `path`. If an **earlier** path segment is a symlink pointing outside the jailed root, the kernel follows it transparently while resolving the rest of the path, and `openat` succeeds. The `realpath`-based containment check a few lines below only runs when this `openat` call fails and `follow_symlinks_` (default `false`, `disk_provider.h`) is true, so the strict, default configuration never reaches any containment check at all for this shape of symlink. ## Relevance `DiskProvider` is MoloApp's jailed static-file backend, the piece responsible for keeping `/static/*` requests inside the configured root. This defeats that jail with a single symlink an attacker needs only the ability to place inside the served directory tree (a common outcome of an unrelated file-upload or archive-extraction feature elsewhere in an app, or simply a misconfigured deploy that leaves a developer's symlink in place). ## What the check does Builds a scratch directory with `www/escape -> outside/` (a symlink one level inside the served root) and `outside/secret.txt` holding a marker string, starts `build/bin/runtime_interop_server` on that root with `follow_symlinks` at its default (`false`), and requests `GET /static/escape/secret.txt`. PASS means the jail held (404); FAIL means the marker string came back. ## Caveats This does not test the `follow_symlinks=true` code path's own documented TOCTOU window (that path already states its own limitation in a code comment); it tests the supposedly-strict default, which the code comments do not flag as vulnerable to this shape of symlink at all. Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.