audit
A fixed, named set of regression checks for vulnerability classes relevant to the
mechanisms MoloApp actually has (an in-house HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 server, an in-house
WebSocket/WebDAV/reverse-tunnel realtime stack, a shell-invoking CLI, in-house
crypto and an ORM), each in its own directory with where the problem lives, why it
matters to MoloApp specifically, and a check that reproduces it against real,
built artifacts. Modeled on the audit/ convention used by the doos project:
capped to the issues that target code paths MoloApp actually has, not "every CVE",
consistent with the base rule that every automated process gets a fixed, named
ceiling instead of an open-ended scope.
Most of these are in-house findings from reading this codebase, not public CVE assignments (MoloApp is not itself a CVE-tracked project); each README still cites the real-world vulnerability class it is modeled on, with sources, so the check's severity and shape can be judged against known precedent.
A check here answers one question: does this build, today, reproduce the exposure described. It is not a claim that MoloApp is unaffected by anything not listed here.
Running it
make # build/bin/runtime_interop_server, build/example/living-server, build/molo
make -C audit test # sequential
make -C audit -j8 test # concurrent, one job per check
make -C audit report # runs all, never stops, one line prefix per check
make -C audit list # names the check directories
Each check is independent, writes only under its own mktemp -d (Python checks) or
is a pure in-memory harness (C++ checks), and cleans up on exit. A check that needs
something the host does not have (an unbuilt binary) prints SKIP with the reason
and exits 0; it never reports PASS for a precondition it could not test. Every check
runs under a hard wall-clock watchdog (audit/lib/molo_audit.py's arm_watchdog, or
an alarm() call in the C++ harnesses) so a check that finds a genuine hang reports
FAIL instead of wedging the suite.
Verdicts
| Verdict | Meaning |
|---|---|
PASS |
This build does not reproduce the exposure described, under the conditions this check creates. |
FAIL |
It does. Treat as a regression; the check prints what it observed. |
SKIP |
The check's precondition was not met on this host (missing build). Not a verdict on MoloApp. |
How a check drives the real thing
Three kinds of real artifact, no mocks:
- Over a real socket, against
build/bin/runtime_interop_server(the runtime's own interop test server: real HTTP/1.1, real h2c HTTP/2, real compression, real static files, nothing stubbed) orbuild/example/living-server. These checks live inaudit/lib/molo_audit.py'sH2/h1helpers: a minimal HTTP/2 client speaking real frames, and raw-socket HTTP/1.1, both stdlib-only Python. - Through the real CLI,
build/molo, run as a subprocess against a scratch directory. - Against the real class directly, for the handful of classes (
src/realtime/ websocket/server/handshake_validator.cpp,src/realtime/webdav/server/ resource_tree.cpp,src/realtime/expose/upstream.cpp) that are pure, I/O-free logic not yet wired to any route in the shipped example (example/fw/is explicitly a skeleton still being re-bound tosrc/, per the main README). Each such check's README says so and compiles a tiny harness straight from the real.cppfile, the same code any real route would call, rather than skipping the class entirely.
What is deliberately not here
No kernel-level memory-corruption exploit code, and no check that requires outbound network access (DNS resolution, reaching a real external host) to prove its point. Everything here drives a MoloApp artifact through its real inputs inside a scratch directory or a loopback socket; nothing here targets any host other than the one running the check, and nothing here is a weaponized exploit for an unrelated target.
The list
| Check | Mechanism | Modeled on |
|---|---|---|
| MOLO-H1-001 | HTTP/1 chunked-body cap bypass via chunk-size addition overflow | CWE-190 / request-smuggling-adjacent resource exhaustion |
| MOLO-H2-001 | HTTP/2 stream-open/reset churn, no rate limit | CVE-2023-44487 "Rapid Reset" |
| MOLO-H2-002 | HTTP/2 server-triggered reset churn | CVE-2025-8671 "MadeYouReset" |
| MOLO-H2-003 | HTTP/2 empty-CONTINUATION flood, byte cap only | CVE-2024-27316 "CONTINUATION flood" |
| MOLO-H2-004 | HTTP/2 PING flood to an unread peer, no queue cap | CVE-2019-9511/9512/9515/9518 HTTP/2 DoS batch |
| MOLO-STATIC-001 | Static-file jail escape via a symlinked intermediate directory | CWE-61 symlink following |
| MOLO-CLI-001 | Shell command injection in molo new <name> |
CWE-78 OS command injection |
| MOLO-WS-001 | WebSocket handshake has no Origin check | CWE-1385 / CVE-2024-23898-class CSWSH |
| MOLO-DAV-001 | WebDAV COPY into its own subtree never terminates | CWE-674 uncontrolled recursion |
| MOLO-EXPOSE-001 | expose upstream allow-list bypassed by hostname prefix |
CWE-184 incomplete allow-list / SSRF-adjacent |