47 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
47 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# MOLO-WS-001: WebSocket handshake has no Origin check (CSWSH)
|
|
|
|
**Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md)
|
|
|
|
CWE-1385 ("Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets"). Real-world instances of this
|
|
exact class include CVE-2024-23898 (Jenkins CLI, CVSS 9), CVE-2024-26135
|
|
(MeshCentral, CVSS 8.8) and CVE-2023-0957 (Gitpod, CVSS 8.2); the class, not a
|
|
MoloApp-specific CVE.
|
|
|
|
## Source
|
|
|
|
- [CERT/CC-adjacent writeups and NVD entries for CVE-2024-23898 and CVE-2024-26135](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-23898)
|
|
|
|
## Relevance to MoloApp
|
|
|
|
A browser attaches the page's `Origin` to a WebSocket handshake automatically and also
|
|
attaches same-site cookies, the same way it would to any other cross-site request.
|
|
If the server accepts the handshake without checking `Origin` against an allow-list,
|
|
any page an authenticated victim visits can open a WebSocket to the app and ride the
|
|
victim's session, a Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking. Unlike ordinary CSRF, the
|
|
`Sec-Fetch-Site` and SameSite-cookie defenses that `CsrfGuard` relies on for regular
|
|
requests do not automatically apply to the opening handshake unless the WebSocket
|
|
layer checks `Origin` itself.
|
|
|
|
`src/realtime/websocket/server/handshake_validator.cpp`, `HandshakeValidator::validate`
|
|
checks method, `Upgrade`, `Connection`, the key's shape, version and subprotocol; it
|
|
never reads `Origin`, and `HandshakeConfig` (`handshake_validator.h`) has no
|
|
allowed-origins field to check against.
|
|
|
|
## What the check does
|
|
|
|
This class is "a pure function of request plus config: no I/O" (the header's own
|
|
comment) and is not wired to any upgrade route in the example app today, so there is
|
|
no live server to drive it through; the check instead compiles a tiny harness
|
|
(`reproduce.cpp`) against the real `handshake_validator.cpp`/`sha1.cpp`/`base64.cpp`/
|
|
`realtime_metrics.cpp` and calls `HandshakeValidator::validate` directly with a
|
|
well-formed handshake carrying `Origin: https://evil.example`. PASS means a future
|
|
origin check rejected it; FAIL means it was accepted (`ok == true`).
|
|
|
|
## Caveats
|
|
|
|
This is not a claim that an upgrade route exists in the shipped example today; it is
|
|
a check on the shared validator every real route would have to use, matching the
|
|
header's own description of the class as I/O-free and route-independent.
|
|
|
|
Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.
|