43 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# MOLO-H2-001: HTTP/2 Rapid Reset
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**Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md)
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CVE-2023-44487 (CVSS varies by vendor, widely rated High; the class, not a specific
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MoloApp CVE). CISA/CERT advisory, disclosed October 2023.
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## Source
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- [CISA advisory AA23-230A / the "HTTP/2 Rapid Reset" disclosure](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/10/10/http2-rapid-reset-vulnerability-impacting-web-servers)
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## Relevance to MoloApp
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A client opens a stream with HEADERS and immediately cancels it with RST_STREAM,
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over and over on one connection. Each cycle costs the server a handler dispatch but
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never counts against a concurrent-stream limit, because the stream is gone by the
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time the next one opens. This is the mechanism that drove the October 2023
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multi-vendor HTTP/2 incident across nginx, Envoy, Go net/http2 and others.
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`src/runtime/http/v2/connection.cpp` enforces `kH2MaxConcurrentStreamsDefault` (100,
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`src/runtime/caps.h`) by counting open streams, and `OnRst` (around line 535) erases
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the stream entry the moment an RST_STREAM arrives. There is no counter for how many
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streams a connection has opened-then-reset, and no backoff or GOAWAY triggered by a
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high reset rate, so the one cap this framework relies on for HTTP/2 concurrency never
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engages against this pattern.
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## What the check does
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Starts `build/bin/runtime_interop_server`, opens one real h2c prior-knowledge
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connection, and sends 4000 HEADERS(END_HEADERS|END_STREAM)+RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) pairs
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for distinct odd stream IDs in one connection. PASS requires the server to push back
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(GOAWAY, or refuse to echo an RST_STREAM for all of them) while staying up; FAIL means
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every pair was accepted with no backpressure signal.
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## Caveats
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This check measures whether a *rate-limiting signal* exists, not whether the process
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survives a sustained attack at scale; it stops at 4000 pairs (the harness's own
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`flood()` cap), far below what a real attacker would send, specifically so the check
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itself never becomes a denial-of-service tool.
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Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.
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