55 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# MOLO-H1-001: chunked-body cap bypass via chunk-size addition overflow
|
|
|
|
**Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md)
|
|
|
|
In-house finding (not a public CVE), modeled on the same bug class as CVE-2022-29361-style
|
|
chunked-transfer-coding integer handling and the general HTTP request-smuggling /
|
|
resource-exhaustion family (CWE-190 integer overflow leading to CWE-400 uncontrolled
|
|
resource consumption).
|
|
|
|
## Where
|
|
|
|
`src/runtime/http/v1/parser.cpp`, `Parser::FeedChunkSize`:
|
|
|
|
```cpp
|
|
if (body_.size() + size > body_cap_) {
|
|
state_ = State::Failed;
|
|
return ParseResult::Error413;
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
`size` is attacker-controlled (parsed from the chunk-size line, up to 16 hex digits,
|
|
already overflow-checked against `SIZE_MAX` on its own). `body_.size() + size` is not
|
|
checked for overflow. A chunk declaring size `0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF` on top of a non-empty
|
|
`body_` wraps the sum to a small number, so the cap comparison passes when it should
|
|
fail with 413. `chunk_left_` is then set to the huge declared size, and every
|
|
subsequent byte the client sends is appended to `body_` in `FeedChunkData` with no
|
|
further cap check until that one chunk ends (which an attacker need never do).
|
|
|
|
## Relevance
|
|
|
|
`kBodyMaxDefault` (10 MiB, `src/runtime/caps.h`) is the framework's hard ceiling on
|
|
request body size, the exact kind of static ceiling `AGENTS.md`/the base rules require
|
|
("every knob has a hard static cap"). This bug makes that ceiling bypassable by anyone
|
|
who can open an HTTP/1.1 connection and send one request: memory grows without bound as
|
|
long as the client keeps writing, which is an unauthenticated remote DoS lever against
|
|
any MoloApp server (the living example, or any app built with `molo new`).
|
|
|
|
## What the check does
|
|
|
|
Starts `build/bin/runtime_interop_server` on a scratch port, opens a real TCP
|
|
connection, sends `POST /echo` with `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`, announces the
|
|
overflowing chunk size, then streams 14 MiB of chunk "data" past the 10 MiB cap and
|
|
confirms the server never responds 413 or closes the connection, i.e. the cap was
|
|
bypassed. PASS means a future fix (checking `size > body_cap_ - body_.size()`) made the
|
|
server reject before the cap, or the overflow attempt itself failed to run (SKIP covers
|
|
a missing build).
|
|
|
|
## Caveats
|
|
|
|
This is a size-cap bypass proven by pushing memory growth past the configured ceiling,
|
|
not a crash; it stops at the harness's own 64 MiB send cap (`molo_audit.MAX_SEND_BYTES`)
|
|
regardless of verdict, so the check itself never becomes the DoS it is checking for.
|
|
|
|
Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.
|