54 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# MOLO-EXPOSE-001: expose upstream allow-list bypass via hostname prefix
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**Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md)
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In-house finding (not a public CVE). CWE-184 ("Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs"),
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the same bug shape behind many documented SSRF / allow-list-bypass CVEs that trust a
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string-prefix or substring test to stand in for a real IP-range check.
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## Where
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`src/realtime/expose/upstream.cpp`, `UpstreamHostAllowed`:
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```cpp
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if(h.rfind("10.",0)==0)return true;
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if(h.rfind("192.168.",0)==0)return true;
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...
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if(h.rfind("169.254.",0)==0||h.rfind("fe80",0)==0||h.rfind("FE80",0)==0)return true;
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```
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`reverse.md` documents the policy as "upstream host must be loopback / RFC1918 /
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link-local unless `allow_public` is set" (section 7), i.e. this function is meant to
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be a strict allow-list that keeps `molo expose` upstreams pointed at the local
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machine or its private network. `rfind(prefix, 0) == 0` only checks that `host`
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*starts with* the literal text `"10."`, `"192.168."` etc; it is not an IP-address
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parse. A DNS name like `10.evil.com` or `127.evil.com` starts with that text too, and
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resolves to whatever public IP its owner points it at.
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## Relevance
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This is the one guard standing between "an exposer may only tunnel to something on
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its own machine or LAN" and "an exposer can tunnel to any host on the internet it can
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name," for any deployment that has not explicitly opted into `allow_public`. A caller
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that relies on this function to keep `molo expose` from being turned into an open
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proxy gets a false sense of enforcement.
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## What the check does
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Compiles a tiny harness directly against the real `upstream.cpp` (a pure function,
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no I/O, no server needed) and calls `UpstreamHostAllowed` with five public hostnames
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chosen to share a prefix with a private-range literal, plus two real private
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literals as sanity controls. PASS requires every public hostname to be rejected and
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every private literal to be accepted; FAIL means at least one public hostname was
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misclassified as private.
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## Caveats
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This checks the string-matching logic in isolation; it does not drive a live
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`molo expose` registration end to end, because doing so would require resolving a
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real external DNS name to prove the end effect, which this audit's own ground rules
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avoid making the check depend on (network access). The misclassification itself is
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provable with no network.
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Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.
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