44 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
44 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# CVE-2024-21626: runc WORKDIR leaks a privileged host file descriptor into the container
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**Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [COMPARISON](../../COMPARISON.md) · [docs/RESEARCH](../../docs/RESEARCH.md)
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CVSS 8.6 ("Leaky Vessels"). Affects runc <= 1.1.11.
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## Source
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- [WithSecure writeup](https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/runc-working-directory-breakout--cve-2024-21626)
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- [Red Hat RHSB-2024-001](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerability/RHSB-2024-001)
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## Relevance to doos
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runc changed the process's working directory with `fchdir` before closing a privileged
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host directory file descriptor it had open during setup. A `WORKDIR /proc/self/fd/N`
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pointed at that still-open, still-privileged descriptor, giving the containerized
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process host filesystem access through a leaked fd rather than through an escape of
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the mount namespace itself.
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The general risk, "does any host-privileged file descriptor survive, open and
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reachable, into the process doos finally execs inside the container", applies to any
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namespace-building tool, doos included, independent of whether its own setup code has
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this exact bug.
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## What the check does
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Attaches a container and lists every fd under `/proc/self/fd` from inside it, resolving
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each symlink target. Any target that is an absolute path reaching outside the
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container's own root (identified by its distinctive marker file, planted by doos's
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normal container setup) is a leak. FAIL on any such fd; PASS if every fd resolves
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inside the container or to a pipe/socket/anon_inode with no path component.
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## Caveats
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Checks the symptom (a leaked host-reachable fd inside the exec'd process), not runc's
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specific `fchdir`-before-close code path, since doos does not share that code. A PASS
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here is a statement about the one command doos happened to run for the check, not a
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proof that no fd can ever leak under any flag combination.
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Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.
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