# CVE-2024-21626: runc WORKDIR leaks a privileged host file descriptor into the container **Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [COMPARISON](../../COMPARISON.md) · [docs/RESEARCH](../../docs/RESEARCH.md) CVSS 8.6 ("Leaky Vessels"). Affects runc <= 1.1.11. ## Source - [WithSecure writeup](https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/runc-working-directory-breakout--cve-2024-21626) - [Red Hat RHSB-2024-001](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerability/RHSB-2024-001) ## Relevance to doos runc changed the process's working directory with `fchdir` before closing a privileged host directory file descriptor it had open during setup. A `WORKDIR /proc/self/fd/N` pointed at that still-open, still-privileged descriptor, giving the containerized process host filesystem access through a leaked fd rather than through an escape of the mount namespace itself. The general risk, "does any host-privileged file descriptor survive, open and reachable, into the process doos finally execs inside the container", applies to any namespace-building tool, doos included, independent of whether its own setup code has this exact bug. ## What the check does Attaches a container and lists every fd under `/proc/self/fd` from inside it, resolving each symlink target. Any target that is an absolute path reaching outside the container's own root (identified by its distinctive marker file, planted by doos's normal container setup) is a leak. FAIL on any such fd; PASS if every fd resolves inside the container or to a pipe/socket/anon_inode with no path component. ## Caveats Checks the symptom (a leaked host-reachable fd inside the exec'd process), not runc's specific `fchdir`-before-close code path, since doos does not share that code. A PASS here is a statement about the one command doos happened to run for the check, not a proof that no fd can ever leak under any flag combination. Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.