- New rootless doos container runtime: sandbox, cgroup, network, images, hardening, davmount, CLI plus molo integration - 18 CVE audit reproductions with READMEs and Makefiles - Example DoosDemo routes, IndexCatalog, static assets, spec update - CLI serve on 0.0.0.0:8000, arg parser, dev server improvements - Runtime HTTP fixes, supervisor isolation backend - Tests for doos, example doos routes, CLI serve; suite count 261 to 265
42 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
42 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# CVE-2018-12020: GnuPG "SigSpoof": signature/decryption status spoofed via unescaped filename on --status-fd 2
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**Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [COMPARISON](../../COMPARISON.md) · [docs/RESEARCH](../../docs/RESEARCH.md)
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Disclosed June 2018. Fixed in GnuPG 2.2.8 / 1.4.23.
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## Source
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- [Help Net Security writeup](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2018/06/15/cve-2018-12020-digital-signature-spoofing/)
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- [CERT-EU advisory](https://cert.europa.eu/publications/security-advisories/2018-016/markdown)
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## Relevance to doos
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Applications that ran GnuPG with `--status-fd 2` (merging machine-readable status lines
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into stderr) and GnuPG's verbose mode (which echoes the input file's embedded name to
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stderr without escaping newlines) could be fed a crafted message whose filename field
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injected fake status lines, spoofing a GOODSIG result for an unsigned or badly signed
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input. doos calls `gpg` to verify Alpine's and Ubuntu's release signatures
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(`verifySignature` in `src/doos/image.cpp`), so getting this invocation right is the one place
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a bug in this class would matter: a spoofed GOODSIG here would make doos trust and
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extract an unverified image.
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## What the check does
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Reads the exact `gpg` invocations in `src/doos/image.cpp` for the two properties that defeat
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this bug class: `--status-fd` must be a dedicated fd (not `2`, which would merge it with
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stderr), and `--verbose` must not be passed. Source inspection, not a dynamic exploit
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attempt: crafting a message that reproduces GnuPG's own newline-escaping bug would be
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testing GnuPG, not doos, and depends on an unpatched GnuPG the audit does not control.
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## Caveats
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A static check: it verifies the invocation in the source tree the check runs against,
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not the behavior of whatever `gpg` binary happens to be installed. It also does not
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prove there is no other way to smuggle data into the fd doos does read; it confirms the
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one specific, named defeat (`--status-fd 2` plus `--verbose`) is not present.
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Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.
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