60 lines
2.4 KiB
C++
60 lines
2.4 KiB
C++
// MOLO-EXPOSE-001: UpstreamHostAllowed's private/local allow-list is a
|
|
// bare string-prefix test, so a public hostname that merely starts with a
|
|
// private-looking label (e.g. "10.evil.com") is misclassified as private
|
|
// and let through when it should be rejected. See README.md.
|
|
//
|
|
// UpstreamHostAllowed is a pure function (no I/O, no server needed): the
|
|
// real policy check reverse.md documents and src/realtime/expose/tunnel.cpp
|
|
// calls before registering an upstream.
|
|
#include <cstdio>
|
|
|
|
#include "realtime/expose/upstream.h"
|
|
|
|
using molo::realtime::expose::UpstreamHostAllowed;
|
|
|
|
struct Case {
|
|
const char* host;
|
|
bool should_be_private; // the correct verdict: is this really loopback/RFC1918/link-local?
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int main() {
|
|
// These are real public DNS names (any attacker can register one) that
|
|
// share a prefix with a private-range literal. The correct verdict for
|
|
// all of them is "not private".
|
|
static const Case kCases[] = {
|
|
{"10.evil.com", false},
|
|
{"127.evil.com", false},
|
|
{"192.168.attacker.net", false},
|
|
{"169.254.attacker.net", false},
|
|
{"172.99.evil.com", false},
|
|
// Sanity controls: a real private literal must still pass.
|
|
{"10.0.0.5", true},
|
|
{"192.168.1.1", true},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int failures = 0;
|
|
for (const auto& c : kCases) {
|
|
bool allowed = UpstreamHostAllowed(c.host, /*allow_public=*/false);
|
|
bool wrong = allowed != c.should_be_private;
|
|
std::printf("%-28s allowed=%-5s want_private=%-5s %s\n", c.host,
|
|
allowed ? "true" : "false", c.should_be_private ? "true" : "false",
|
|
wrong ? "MISMATCH" : "ok");
|
|
if (wrong) failures++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (failures > 0) {
|
|
std::printf(
|
|
"FAIL: %d/%zu cases misclassified; UpstreamHostAllowed (src/realtime/expose/"
|
|
"upstream.cpp) uses host.rfind(\"10.\",0)==0 style bare prefix tests, so a "
|
|
"public hostname that starts with a private-looking label is accepted as "
|
|
"private even though DNS will resolve it to an arbitrary public (or "
|
|
"attacker-controlled) address: an allow-list bypass in the policy reverse.md "
|
|
"documents as \"upstream host must be loopback / RFC1918 / link-local unless "
|
|
"allow_public is set\" (CWE-184, incomplete allow-list)\n",
|
|
failures, sizeof(kCases) / sizeof(kCases[0]));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
std::printf("PASS: all %zu cases classified correctly\n", sizeof(kCases) / sizeof(kCases[0]));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|