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# MOLO-CLI-001: shell command injection in `molo new <name>`
**Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md)
In-house finding (not a public CVE), CWE-78 ("Improper Neutralization of Special
Elements used in an OS Command").
## Where
`src/cli/cli/cli_app.cpp`, `cmd_new`:
```cpp
opts.name = args.positionals[0];
...
std::string dir = opts.name;
ScaffoldResult result = scaffolder.scaffold(dir, opts);
```
`src/cli/cli/scaffolder.cpp`, `Scaffolder::scaffold`:
```cpp
std::string cmd = "git -C \"" + dir + "\" init -q 2>/dev/null";
if (system(cmd.c_str()) != 0) { ... }
```
`dir` is the project name exactly as typed on the command line, checked only for
length (1-64 chars, `kMaxProjectName`). It is concatenated inside one pair of double
quotes and handed to `system()`, a real shell. A name containing a `"` ends that
quoted argument early; anything after it is ordinary shell syntax.
## Relevance
`molo new <name>` is the first command in the README's own quickstart. Project names
are often copied from elsewhere (a ticket title, a client's brand name, a CI
variable) rather than hand-typed, which is exactly the kind of untrusted-but-looks-
like-a-filename input this bug class targets.
## What the check does
Runs `molo new 'x"; touch <marker>; echo "' --force` in a scratch directory and checks
whether the injected `touch` created the marker file. PASS means it did not (the name
is now escaped or passed to `git` without a shell); FAIL means the command ran.
## Caveats
This proves injection with a benign `touch`, not a demonstration of what an attacker
could do with it; `system()` runs as the invoking user with that user's full
permissions, so the practical impact is whatever that user could already do by hand.
Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.