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moloapp/audit/README.md
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retoor 0595284fe3 feat(doos): add container runtime, audit cases, example demo and tests
- New rootless doos container runtime: sandbox, cgroup, network, images, hardening, davmount, CLI plus molo integration
- 18 CVE audit reproductions with READMEs and Makefiles
- Example DoosDemo routes, IndexCatalog, static assets, spec update
- CLI serve on 0.0.0.0:8000, arg parser, dev server improvements
- Runtime HTTP fixes, supervisor isolation backend
- Tests for doos, example doos routes, CLI serve; suite count 261 to 265
2026-11-06 04:36:00 +01:00

5.5 KiB

audit

Scope: README ยท AGENTS

Two fixed, named regression sets, each check in its own directory with the public source (or in-house finding), why it matters, and a non-destructive check. This is not "every CVE" (that set is unbounded and mostly irrelevant); it is capped to the exposures that target code paths this tree actually has.

  • MOLO-*: in-house findings against the framework (HTTP parsing, CLI, WebDAV, tunnels, static files, websockets). Each drives the built artifacts (build/molo, build/example/living-server, build/bin/runtime_interop_server) or compiles a tiny harness from src/.
  • CVE-*: 18 known CVEs relevant to the mechanisms doos uses (user namespaces, overlayfs, tar extraction, abstract sockets, mount handling), each run against build/doos/doos inside a scratch DOOS_HOME. Inherited from doos 1.6.0 (see src/doos/PROVENANCE.md); they answer one question: does this doos binary, today, reproduce the exposure the CVE describes.

Running it

make                                # build first (artifacts must exist)
make cve-audit                      # all checks, concurrent, via the root Makefile
make -C audit test                  # sequential, stops at the first FAIL
make -C audit -j8 test              # concurrent, one job per check directory
make -C audit report                # runs all, never stops, one line prefix per check
make -C audit list                  # names the check directories

Each check is independent, writes only under its own mktemp -d (under $TMPDIR, defaulting to build/audit-tmp), and cleans up on exit. Checks that need something the host does not have (network, python3, a specific kernel feature, an unbuilt artifact) print SKIP with the reason and exit 0; they never report PASS for a precondition they could not test. The CVE checks additionally need user namespaces for the build/doos/doos path (see src/doos/README.md troubleshooting).

Verdicts

Verdict Meaning
PASS This binary does not reproduce the exposure, under the conditions this check creates.
FAIL It does. Treat as a regression; the check prints what it observed.
SKIP The check's precondition was not met on this host. Not a verdict on the code.

What is deliberately not here

No kernel memory-corruption exploit code (Dirty Pipe, Dirty COW, the legacy_parse_param heap overflow). Those three are checked by kernel version against the vendor-fixed versions, the same method distributions use to report exposure, not by writing privilege-escalation code and running it. Everything else here drives the binaries through their real interfaces on the machine running the check; nothing here targets any other host, and nothing here is a weaponized exploit for an unrelated target.

The CVE list

CVE Component the bug lives in What doos has in common
CVE-2019-5736 runc (Go) /proc/self/exe handling overlayed host /usr must stay read-only from inside
CVE-2024-21626 runc (Go) fchdir / fd close ordering no leaked host fd reachable from the exec'd process
CVE-2020-15257 containerd-shim (Go) UID-only access check --net host shares the host's abstract socket namespace by design
CVE-2022-0185 Linux kernel fs/fs_context.c depends on unprivileged user namespaces; doos's seccomp denylist blocks the mount family
CVE-2022-0847 Linux kernel pipe buffer handling doos runs on the host kernel; a kernel bug is a doos-host bug
CVE-2016-5195 Linux kernel mm/gup.c doos runs on the host kernel; a kernel bug is a doos-host bug
CVE-2026-17106 moby/go-archive (Go), and tar extractors generally doos image add extracts caller-supplied tarballs the same way
CVE-2021-30465 runc (Go) mount target resolution fsutil::mkdirs follows symlinks the same way create_directories does by default
CVE-2021-3493 Linux kernel overlayfs (fs/overlayfs) doos mounts overlayfs inside an unprivileged user namespace on every attach
CVE-2023-2640 Linux kernel overlayfs (Ubuntu patch set) same mount doos issues on every attach
CVE-2023-32629 Linux kernel overlayfs (Ubuntu patch set) same mount doos issues on every attach
CVE-2015-1328 Linux kernel overlayfs same precondition doos depends on (overlayfs + unprivileged user namespace)
CVE-2022-0492 Linux kernel kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c doos uses cgroup v2 only and mounts no /sys/cgroupfs into the container
CVE-2022-27650 crun / Moby (Go/C) capability handling at container start doos sets its own capability bounding set in Hardening::apply()
CVE-2019-16884 runc (Go) mount-target validation doos's own /proc must be a real proc mount, independent of any AppArmor profile
CVE-2023-28642 runc (Go) /proc mount-target validation doos's own /proc must be a real directory mount, not substitutable by an image
CVE-2018-12020 GnuPG status-fd / verbose filename echoing doos trusts gpg's verdict to decide whether to extract a downloaded image
CVE-2020-7039 libslirp (C) packet parsing slirp4netns, doos's default --net mode, links this library

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