- New rootless doos container runtime: sandbox, cgroup, network, images, hardening, davmount, CLI plus molo integration - 18 CVE audit reproductions with READMEs and Makefiles - Example DoosDemo routes, IndexCatalog, static assets, spec update - CLI serve on 0.0.0.0:8000, arg parser, dev server improvements - Runtime HTTP fixes, supervisor isolation backend - Tests for doos, example doos routes, CLI serve; suite count 261 to 265
audit
Two fixed, named regression sets, each check in its own directory with the public source (or in-house finding), why it matters, and a non-destructive check. This is not "every CVE" (that set is unbounded and mostly irrelevant); it is capped to the exposures that target code paths this tree actually has.
MOLO-*: in-house findings against the framework (HTTP parsing, CLI, WebDAV, tunnels, static files, websockets). Each drives the built artifacts (build/molo,build/example/living-server,build/bin/runtime_interop_server) or compiles a tiny harness fromsrc/.CVE-*: 18 known CVEs relevant to the mechanisms doos uses (user namespaces, overlayfs, tar extraction, abstract sockets, mount handling), each run againstbuild/doos/doosinside a scratchDOOS_HOME. Inherited from doos 1.6.0 (seesrc/doos/PROVENANCE.md); they answer one question: does this doos binary, today, reproduce the exposure the CVE describes.
Running it
make # build first (artifacts must exist)
make cve-audit # all checks, concurrent, via the root Makefile
make -C audit test # sequential, stops at the first FAIL
make -C audit -j8 test # concurrent, one job per check directory
make -C audit report # runs all, never stops, one line prefix per check
make -C audit list # names the check directories
Each check is independent, writes only under its own mktemp -d (under
$TMPDIR, defaulting to build/audit-tmp), and cleans up on exit. Checks
that need something the host does not have (network, python3, a specific
kernel feature, an unbuilt artifact) print SKIP with the reason and exit 0;
they never report PASS for a precondition they could not test. The CVE checks
additionally need user namespaces for the build/doos/doos path (see
src/doos/README.md troubleshooting).
Verdicts
| Verdict | Meaning |
|---|---|
PASS |
This binary does not reproduce the exposure, under the conditions this check creates. |
FAIL |
It does. Treat as a regression; the check prints what it observed. |
SKIP |
The check's precondition was not met on this host. Not a verdict on the code. |
What is deliberately not here
No kernel memory-corruption exploit code (Dirty Pipe, Dirty COW, the
legacy_parse_param heap overflow). Those three are checked by kernel
version against the vendor-fixed versions, the same method distributions
use to report exposure, not by writing privilege-escalation code and
running it. Everything else here drives the binaries through their real
interfaces on the machine running the check; nothing here targets any
other host, and nothing here is a weaponized exploit for an unrelated
target.
The CVE list
| CVE | Component the bug lives in | What doos has in common |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2019-5736 | runc (Go) /proc/self/exe handling |
overlayed host /usr must stay read-only from inside |
| CVE-2024-21626 | runc (Go) fchdir / fd close ordering |
no leaked host fd reachable from the exec'd process |
| CVE-2020-15257 | containerd-shim (Go) UID-only access check | --net host shares the host's abstract socket namespace by design |
| CVE-2022-0185 | Linux kernel fs/fs_context.c |
depends on unprivileged user namespaces; doos's seccomp denylist blocks the mount family |
| CVE-2022-0847 | Linux kernel pipe buffer handling | doos runs on the host kernel; a kernel bug is a doos-host bug |
| CVE-2016-5195 | Linux kernel mm/gup.c |
doos runs on the host kernel; a kernel bug is a doos-host bug |
| CVE-2026-17106 | moby/go-archive (Go), and tar extractors generally | doos image add extracts caller-supplied tarballs the same way |
| CVE-2021-30465 | runc (Go) mount target resolution | fsutil::mkdirs follows symlinks the same way create_directories does by default |
| CVE-2021-3493 | Linux kernel overlayfs (fs/overlayfs) |
doos mounts overlayfs inside an unprivileged user namespace on every attach |
| CVE-2023-2640 | Linux kernel overlayfs (Ubuntu patch set) | same mount doos issues on every attach |
| CVE-2023-32629 | Linux kernel overlayfs (Ubuntu patch set) | same mount doos issues on every attach |
| CVE-2015-1328 | Linux kernel overlayfs | same precondition doos depends on (overlayfs + unprivileged user namespace) |
| CVE-2022-0492 | Linux kernel kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c |
doos uses cgroup v2 only and mounts no /sys/cgroupfs into the container |
| CVE-2022-27650 | crun / Moby (Go/C) capability handling at container start | doos sets its own capability bounding set in Hardening::apply() |
| CVE-2019-16884 | runc (Go) mount-target validation | doos's own /proc must be a real proc mount, independent of any AppArmor profile |
| CVE-2023-28642 | runc (Go) /proc mount-target validation | doos's own /proc must be a real directory mount, not substitutable by an image |
| CVE-2018-12020 | GnuPG status-fd / verbose filename echoing | doos trusts gpg's verdict to decide whether to extract a downloaded image |
| CVE-2020-7039 | libslirp (C) packet parsing | slirp4netns, doos's default --net mode, links this library |