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retoor 0595284fe3 feat(doos): add container runtime, audit cases, example demo and tests
- New rootless doos container runtime: sandbox, cgroup, network, images, hardening, davmount, CLI plus molo integration
- 18 CVE audit reproductions with READMEs and Makefiles
- Example DoosDemo routes, IndexCatalog, static assets, spec update
- CLI serve on 0.0.0.0:8000, arg parser, dev server improvements
- Runtime HTTP fixes, supervisor isolation backend
- Tests for doos, example doos routes, CLI serve; suite count 261 to 265
2026-11-06 04:36:00 +01:00

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# audit
**Scope:** [README](../README.md) ยท [AGENTS](../AGENTS.md)
Two fixed, named regression sets, each check in its own directory with the
public source (or in-house finding), why it matters, and a non-destructive
check. This is not "every CVE" (that set is unbounded and mostly
irrelevant); it is capped to the exposures that target code paths this tree
actually has.
- `MOLO-*`: in-house findings against the framework (HTTP parsing, CLI,
WebDAV, tunnels, static files, websockets). Each drives the built
artifacts (`build/molo`, `build/example/living-server`,
`build/bin/runtime_interop_server`) or compiles a tiny harness from `src/`.
- `CVE-*`: 18 known CVEs relevant to the mechanisms doos uses (user
namespaces, overlayfs, tar extraction, abstract sockets, mount handling),
each run against `build/doos/doos` inside a scratch `DOOS_HOME`.
Inherited from doos 1.6.0 (see `src/doos/PROVENANCE.md`); they answer one
question: does *this doos binary*, today, reproduce the exposure the CVE
describes.
## Running it
```
make # build first (artifacts must exist)
make cve-audit # all checks, concurrent, via the root Makefile
make -C audit test # sequential, stops at the first FAIL
make -C audit -j8 test # concurrent, one job per check directory
make -C audit report # runs all, never stops, one line prefix per check
make -C audit list # names the check directories
```
Each check is independent, writes only under its own `mktemp -d` (under
`$TMPDIR`, defaulting to `build/audit-tmp`), and cleans up on exit. Checks
that need something the host does not have (network, `python3`, a specific
kernel feature, an unbuilt artifact) print `SKIP` with the reason and exit 0;
they never report PASS for a precondition they could not test. The CVE checks
additionally need user namespaces for the `build/doos/doos` path (see
`src/doos/README.md` troubleshooting).
## Verdicts
| Verdict | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `PASS` | This binary does not reproduce the exposure, under the conditions this check creates. |
| `FAIL` | It does. Treat as a regression; the check prints what it observed. |
| `SKIP` | The check's precondition was not met on this host. Not a verdict on the code. |
## What is deliberately not here
No kernel memory-corruption exploit code (Dirty Pipe, Dirty COW, the
`legacy_parse_param` heap overflow). Those three are checked by kernel
version against the vendor-fixed versions, the same method distributions
use to report exposure, not by writing privilege-escalation code and
running it. Everything else here drives the binaries through their real
interfaces on the machine running the check; nothing here targets any
other host, and nothing here is a weaponized exploit for an unrelated
target.
## The CVE list
| CVE | Component the bug lives in | What doos has in common |
|---|---|---|
| [CVE-2019-5736](CVE-2019-5736/) | runc (Go) `/proc/self/exe` handling | overlayed host `/usr` must stay read-only from inside |
| [CVE-2024-21626](CVE-2024-21626/) | runc (Go) `fchdir` / fd close ordering | no leaked host fd reachable from the exec'd process |
| [CVE-2020-15257](CVE-2020-15257/) | containerd-shim (Go) UID-only access check | `--net host` shares the host's abstract socket namespace by design |
| [CVE-2022-0185](CVE-2022-0185/) | Linux kernel `fs/fs_context.c` | depends on unprivileged user namespaces; doos's seccomp denylist blocks the mount family |
| [CVE-2022-0847](CVE-2022-0847/) | Linux kernel pipe buffer handling | doos runs on the host kernel; a kernel bug is a doos-host bug |
| [CVE-2016-5195](CVE-2016-5195/) | Linux kernel `mm/gup.c` | doos runs on the host kernel; a kernel bug is a doos-host bug |
| [CVE-2026-17106](CVE-2026-17106/) | moby/go-archive (Go), and tar extractors generally | `doos image add` extracts caller-supplied tarballs the same way |
| [CVE-2021-30465](CVE-2021-30465/) | runc (Go) mount target resolution | `fsutil::mkdirs` follows symlinks the same way `create_directories` does by default |
| [CVE-2021-3493](CVE-2021-3493/) | Linux kernel overlayfs (`fs/overlayfs`) | doos mounts overlayfs inside an unprivileged user namespace on every attach |
| [CVE-2023-2640](CVE-2023-2640/) | Linux kernel overlayfs (Ubuntu patch set) | same mount doos issues on every attach |
| [CVE-2023-32629](CVE-2023-32629/) | Linux kernel overlayfs (Ubuntu patch set) | same mount doos issues on every attach |
| [CVE-2015-1328](CVE-2015-1328/) | Linux kernel overlayfs | same precondition doos depends on (overlayfs + unprivileged user namespace) |
| [CVE-2022-0492](CVE-2022-0492/) | Linux kernel `kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c` | doos uses cgroup v2 only and mounts no /sys/cgroupfs into the container |
| [CVE-2022-27650](CVE-2022-27650/) | crun / Moby (Go/C) capability handling at container start | doos sets its own capability bounding set in `Hardening::apply()` |
| [CVE-2019-16884](CVE-2019-16884/) | runc (Go) mount-target validation | doos's own `/proc` must be a real proc mount, independent of any AppArmor profile |
| [CVE-2023-28642](CVE-2023-28642/) | runc (Go) /proc mount-target validation | doos's own /proc must be a real directory mount, not substitutable by an image |
| [CVE-2018-12020](CVE-2018-12020/) | GnuPG status-fd / verbose filename echoing | doos trusts gpg's verdict to decide whether to extract a downloaded image |
| [CVE-2020-7039](CVE-2020-7039/) | libslirp (C) packet parsing | slirp4netns, doos's default --net mode, links this library |
Back to [README](../README.md), [SPEC](../src/doos/SPEC.md), [AGENTS](../AGENTS.md).