HandshakeValidator::validate never read the Origin header, so any
cross-site page could open a WebSocket to the app and ride a victim's
cookies (CWE-1385, the CVE-2024-23898 class). Add HandshakeConfig's
allowed_origins exact-match list and reject the handshake when an
Origin header is present but not allow-listed. Empty/unset
allowed_origins is closed by default (any Origin present is
rejected), matching CorsPolicy's closed-by-default convention.
Requests with no Origin header (non-browser clients) are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Collector: timestamped ring (deque, 60s prune under lock); RateIn/Out KB/s
- Query text/JSON gain kb_s_in/kb_s_out columns
- test: assert rates non-zero after traffic, disabled fast-path takes no lock
- full realtime suite green (13 binaries, 0 fail)
Ten sequential spec files plus index covering runtime,
observability, security, data, routing, realtime, supervisor,
clients, CLI ops, and workflow, each with best practices,
structure, rules, guidelines, specs, and cross-references.
Scope covers HTTP/1.1+HTTP/2, WebSockets, Socket.IO, ORM with
prod self-healing, realtime clients, observability, supervisor,
AI harness CLI, and living example project.