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Author SHA1 Message Date
37d23e8581 Update
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2026-08-14 03:20:29 +02:00
b97b5a7854 Waw 2026-08-13 12:59:53 +02:00
45ad8e79ed Revert background color tokens to the original dark palette
PR #164 shifted --bg-primary/secondary/card/input/modal and the body
gradient to a purple-toned palette; restore the prior values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 12:59:53 +02:00
11c0cc66cc pdate 2026-08-13 12:59:53 +02:00
6514261730 Route container proxies through the leg that is actually reachable
The workspace editor hung for 60s and then 504'd. Three independent faults were
stacked behind that one symptom.

Reachability: editor_target delegated to proxy_target, which returns
CONTAINER_PROXY_HOST plus the published host port and never falls back to the
container. From inside the app container that address crosses docker0 into the
host INPUT chain, whose policy is DROP with an allow-list that does not include
the published port range, so the packet was dropped and the request hung rather
than being refused. Measured from the app container: container_ip:8443 answers
302, gateway:20006 is dropped. One shared reachable_target now prefers the
direct container leg and falls back to the published port, and editor_target
uses tunnel_target as services/containers/CLAUDE.md already required. The same
defect affected /p/{slug} ingress and every tunnel, since all three resolved
through proxy_target.

The recorded measurement that motivated the old order (container_ip times out,
gateway connects) no longer holds: make docker-attach puts the app on the
instances' bridge network, which is what makes the direct leg work.

Duplicate response headers: the forwarding core relayed the upstream Date and
Server alongside the ones the serving layer generates, so every proxied
response carried two of each. Both are singleton headers and duplicating them
is malformed HTTP.

Serialization: WorkspaceViewOut declared flag_reason and three sibling strings
as str, so a NULL column made the workspace page 500 for JSON clients.

Documents the two public hostnames and the devplace.net SSH tunnel, so a future
session does not conclude the site is down after pointing curl --resolve at an
address the hostname does not resolve to, and adds the layered procedure for
diagnosing a production failure.

Verified on production with Playwright over both hostnames: the code-server
login renders and the workbench loads. Suite: 3345 passed.
2026-08-13 12:59:53 +02:00
ecb22f2b2d Merge pull request 'Dedicated project page' (#166) from blindxfish/devplacepy:project-page into master
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Reviewed-on: retoor/devplacepy#166
2026-08-13 12:49:33 +02:00
265cb781f9 Match the cover and logo upload filter to the dp-upload contract
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The cover and logo widgets declared allowed-types as bare extensions
(png,jpg,jpeg,gif,webp), but dp-upload builds the candidate extension
with a leading dot before testing membership, so every selected file
was refused with "type is not allowed". The four widgets were the only
hardcoded lists in the codebase: every other call site passes
allowed_file_types(), which defaults to empty and therefore disables
the client filter entirely, which is why nothing else exposed the
mismatch.

Rather than dotting a duplicated literal in four places, the effective
list now comes from a new allowed_image_types() Jinja global that
intersects allowed_extensions() with IMAGE_EXTENSIONS. That reuses the
one server-side choke point, so the widget can never advertise a type
the upload gate would reject, and narrowing the admin allowed_file_types
setting narrows these widgets with it. IMAGE_EXTENSIONS rather than
POST_IMAGE_EXTENSIONS is the correct set here because the route guard
is _hero_attachment_uid, which accepts any is_image attachment, and
bmp/tiff both upload and pass it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 08:29:35 +02:00
72e088c160 Dedicate the project page to the project
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The project detail page becomes a full project showcase built entirely
from existing platform mechanisms. One encompassing dark card wraps the
page; inner panels (tab bar, sidebar cards, devlog entries, comments)
sit one elevation lighter. The hero opens with a cover banner and an
optional logo tile, both plain attachment references
(cover_attachment_uid/logo_attachment_uid) uploaded through the
standard dp-upload attachment widget and linked via the existing
link_attachments choke point - the route validates each uid belongs to
the actor and is an image, and an empty value on edit keeps the current
one. The title block, type/platform chips and author row overlay the
banner behind a scrim with a dark text shadow, next to an owner-set
Visit Website CTA; website_url and repo_url are normalized in models
and render with rel noopener nofollow.

An anchor tab bar (Overview, Devlog, Screenshots when present,
Comments, Files) navigates the page. The main column keeps About, the
devlog timeline (with devlog_count and an owner Post update button
opening the shared composer preset to the devlog topic + project - the
form now lives once in _post_composer_form.html, included by feed.html
and project_detail.html), a Screenshots gallery built from image
attachments minus the cover/logo (thumbnails, lightbox, 12 rendered),
and the comment thread; the sidebar holds Links, Stats and the Author
card. Owners add gallery images from the More menu via
POST /projects/{slug}/screenshots (owner-only, audit
project.screenshots.add, Devii action project_add_screenshots, docs id
projects-screenshots). comment_count/devlog_count ride
ProjectDetailOut, the new fields ride ProjectOut, and the create/edit
faces (modals, Devii actions, API docs) carry them. The project
comment/files e2e tests scope their locators per the documented
dual-control idiom, and new unit/api/e2e tests cover URL normalization,
the counts, the hero attachment guard, the screenshots flow and the
preset composer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 23:00:12 +02:00
782bcec5bc ipdate
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2026-08-10 03:12:43 +02:00
f3b91ac75b Merge pull request 'Align the platform look and feel with the devplace main-branch design' (#164) from blindxfish/devplacepy:pr1-terminal-theme into master
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Reviewed-on: retoor/devplacepy#164
2026-08-10 00:28:42 +02:00
6cac64a3f6 Update
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2026-08-10 00:23:20 +02:00
2bdcf6528f Refuse to touch the production database without stated confirmation
data/devplace.db is the live database and make dev, make prod and the
Docker stack all share it, so an agent-initiated command that reaches it
is a production incident waiting for a typo. The hazard is invisible in
the command text: the script that prompted this named no path at all, it
imported devplacepy and therefore resolved config.DATA_DIR to the real
file. A path-pattern rule would have sailed straight past it.

The PreToolUse hook reads the script and judges it on content, so one
that points DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL at a scratch file passes and an
unguarded one does not. It also refuses commands naming the database or a
production data directory, the management CLI, and python -m devplacepy.
The suite, the server targets and the mandated import gate stay free.
permissions.deny additionally refuses Write and Edit anywhere under data,
which the Bash hook cannot see.

The escape hatch is two-factor and cannot be self-served: without
confirmation the command is denied outright rather than prompted, and the
token that downgrades it to a prompt may only be added after the user has
confirmed in their own words. Verified against thirty-five commands, and
the heuristic is narrower than it looks because the repository path
itself contains the package name, so it matches an import statement
rather than the bare word.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 00:18:10 +02:00
7e37122f9f Converge every account onto every policy agreement it has not declined
An instance kept production-identical for extended manual testing is
otherwise taxed forever by its own safety controls: five consents, a
versioned terms gate on every mutating request, and every account
predating the trust and safety commit reading terms_version NULL because
init_db deliberately never backfills it. AcceptanceService grants each
agreement to each account that has not declined it, so the instance stays
production byte for byte while nobody clicks the same dialog again. It is
opt-in, dry run by default, and one switch per agreement type.

The application is not allowed to know it exists. One registration line
in main.py is the only import anywhere, there is no route, schema,
template, Devii tool or environment flag, and a unit test greps the tree
and fails the suite if a second importer appears. The decline register
needs no storage: the ledger is append-only in effect, the service only
ever grants, so any withdrawn row was written by a human and that pair is
never touched again. No provenance column, nothing to observe.

Satisfaction is the gate's own expression, never a proxy, which is why
the ordering is created_at then id exactly as consent_state selects, and
why the live-account clauses are built with has_column: init_db ensures
terms_version and deletion_requested_at but not is_active, so a hardcoded
reference raises no such column on an instance where nobody was ever
suspended. Every write is one conditional statement decided on the real
rowcount, proven with sixteen processes racing one account to exactly one
ledger row and one audit row. The two existing audit keys carry it, with
actor kind service, because a service that silently mutated consent state
would be the worst possible exception to the append-only rule.

lensfl.md is the source brief accept.md records the design against.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 00:17:47 +02:00
3fca4be72e Flatten control accents: no gradient or glow on buttons, tabs, or the FAB
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The reference design uses flat primary buttons, so every interactive
control drops the brand gradient and the accent glow: .btn-primary
(flat accent, accent-hover on hover), the feed nav tabs, the projects
tabs, the sidebar active link, and the create-post FAB (which keeps a
neutral elevation shadow). Gradients remain only on decorative meters
and stripes (XP fills, progress bars, the project card top stripe).
The now-unused --glow-accent token is removed, and deepsearch.css
loses its var() fallback on the progress gradient.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 21:36:51 +02:00
c09e6b328c Fix the member home layout: align the Code Farm promo, fill sparse post rows
The signed-in dashboard is a 1200px two-column grid, but the shared
Code Farm promo section stayed at the guest page's 960px centered
measure, so it floated misaligned under the dashboard columns. A
landing-game-dashboard modifier (applied only when a user is signed
in) stretches it to the dashboard's own measure and gutters. The
Latest Posts grid becomes repeat(auto-fit, minmax(320px, 1fr)) so a
single post fills the row instead of leaving a dead half-column while
two or more still lay out as the original two columns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 21:32:53 +02:00
2921edd7f3 Retarget the theme to the devplace main-branch design (indigo + rust)
The reference design is the devplace Next.js main branch, not the
terminal branch the previous commit tracked. Swap the token values to
that design language: deep indigo page (#271b5b) over near-black indigo
cards (#13112a/#1a1736), #11101f hairlines, purple-tinted text ramp
(#e9e4ff/#c8c3e5/#9b93c9), burnt-orange primary accent (#b73f1e) with
a raspberry hover (#af3050) and a rust-to-plum brand gradient, white
on-accent text, soft rounded radii (8/12/16px), the reference's diffuse
soft/medium/strong shadows, a warm accent glow, and Trebuchet MS as the
UI font (system font - the vendored JetBrains Mono files are removed
along with their base.html link).

Follow-through updated to match: theme-color meta + PWA manifest
(#271b5b), offline page, avatar fallback SVG, statistics chart palette
(brand ramp), chat light-theme overrides, OG image + app icons
regenerated in the new palette, and the /docs/styles-colors guide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 21:22:32 +02:00
c19ff19de2 Align the platform look and feel with the devplace.net terminal design
Retheme every token in variables.css to the terminal design language:
near-black surfaces (#0a0a0f/#111118/#1a1a24), terminal green accent
(#22c55e) with dark on-accent text, gray text ramp, #222233 borders,
sharp 4-8px radii, neutral depth shadows, and JetBrains Mono as the
primary UI font (vendored latin woff2, no CDN).

Follow-through outside the token file: white-on-accent buttons/tabs now
use the new --on-accent token for contrast, three var() fallback
violations shipping the old palette are gone, the dead --bg-hover token
is replaced with --bg-card-hover, avatar fallback SVG, statistics chart
palette, chat light-theme overrides, offline page, PWA manifest,
theme-color meta, OG image + app icons regenerated in the new palette,
and the /docs/styles-colors style guide now documents the new values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 20:55:46 +02:00
1a5fc9428a FUCKER
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2026-08-09 11:39:53 +02:00
c0742994cd Make the workspace editor reachable through the sub-path proxy
code-server runs authenticateOrigin on every websocket and resolves the
request host as Forwarded, then X-Forwarded-Host, then Host. The forward
core put the public host into additional_headers, but the websockets
client already writes its own Host for the real TCP target and Headers
appends, so the handshake carried two Host lines; Node keeps the first
(the internal gateway:port), the origin check failed, and code-server
answered 403. Because the browser socket was accepted before the upstream
was dialled, that surfaced as a 101 followed by 1011 and the editor died
on "the workbench failed to connect to the server". Dialling first and
carrying the public host in the connect URI fixes both planes.

The two header builders that had drifted apart are now one core, so a
websocket carries the same client and forwarded headers as an HTTP
request. Responses stream instead of buffering whole, which is what makes
a large tunnel download cost constant memory and lets SSE work; byte
accounting moved onto the completion callback. Subprotocols negotiate,
the upstream client is reused across requests, and the path and query are
forwarded byte-exactly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 11:26:17 +02:00
91fac7fd67 Gate blocked actions behind an in-place terms acceptance dialog
A member whose account has not accepted the terms in force now gets one
dialog on the action they attempted instead of a dead-end refusal. The
client handler is the single TermsGate, wired into every Http POST helper
so the four optimistic controllers cannot swallow the gate into an error
flash, and the original request is replayed once the acceptance is
recorded. Reading the site and deleting an account stay unblocked.

apple.md is the source brief the compliance research documents reference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 11:25:57 +02:00
8e9d3fad98 Add the trust and safety subsystem and the App Store compliance work
Implements the moderation and consent obligations a social platform carries,
so the web version and any client that speaks to it enforce the same rules.

Moderation core (services/moderation/, database/moderation.py): a reportable
target registry, the content filter and its choke points, the report queue with
atomic resolution, enforcement actions, consent tracking, maturity gating, and
account deletion with a grace window.

Surfaces: POST /reports plus the member report list, /admin/moderation and the
per-report admin view, /workspaces, terms acceptance at /auth/terms, consent and
account deletion under /profile, the report button and dialog partials, the
maturity gate, and the moderation stylesheet and ReportDialog client.

Every user-generated surface stays reportable by construction: new content tables
are registered in REPORTABLE_TARGETS or listed in UNREPORTABLE_TABLES with a
reason, and the registry test fails the suite on anything left unclassified.

Docs: community guidelines, content moderation, intellectual property, privacy,
terms, contact, and the admin-only moderation operations page, plus the
moderation API group and the Devii moderation actions.

Compliance record: applecomp.md is the requirement register, applechanges.md the
gap analysis against this codebase, and appleimpl.md the implementation design
they resolve to.

Tests cover the report flow, admin moderation, consent, account deletion, terms
acceptance, workspaces, and the registry invariant across the unit, api, and e2e
tiers.
2026-08-09 00:18:20 +02:00
68c2bbe387 Share one secret display style and add the architecture atlas
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The API key block and the workspace editor password each carried their
own copy of the same monospace, break-all, boxed styling. Both now use a
single secret-value class in base.css, so a new secret surface inherits
the presentation instead of duplicating it.

ARCHITECTURE.md is a structural overview of the application derived from
the source tree, the live schema and the imported app object, linked
from the README.
2026-08-08 13:52:11 +02:00
372067bbe4 Order the workspace editor certificate at creation
A new tunnel row was inert at pending until the next WorkspaceService
tick picked it up, so the editor certificate waited up to 30 seconds
before the ACME order even started. Opening a workspace and reaching its
public hostname in that window served the wildcard default certificate
and produced ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID in the browser.

certs.certify now owns the whole transition - provisioning, issue,
active or failed, then the owner notification - and both callers use it.
provision.ensure schedules it for the editor tunnel the moment the
workspace exists, claiming the row synchronously so the tick can never
issue the same host twice and burn a duplicate-certificate slot. The
service loop keeps calling certify per pending row as the safety net for
user-created tunnels and for rows created while molohttp was
unconfigured.

Issuance is a loop task rather than an await: an order takes about ten
seconds and certs.issue allows up to 180, which would hang the workspace
POST. The task is held until it completes so it cannot be collected mid
flight.

resume also restarts the idle clock, and the workspace routes gain
HTTP-level tests covering every refusal path they had none for.
2026-08-08 13:52:02 +02:00
56becfb3f7 Answer workspace refusals instead of crashing on them
json_error takes (status_code, message). Every refusal in the two
workspace routers passed them the other way round, which builds a
JSONResponse with a string status and raises TypeError inside
Response.init_headers before a byte is written. The branch meant to
explain a limit to the user returned 500 instead.

A member already holding the default two workspaces therefore got a 500
from the workspace page's Open workspace button rather than the quota
message. Twelve call sites corrected across both routers.

workspace_open also let ContainerError escape as a second 500 on the
same button when the ppy image is not built; it now returns 400 through
the shared fail helper.

tests/unit/responses.py AST-scans the whole package for both argument
orders, so the swap cannot reappear anywhere.
2026-08-08 13:51:50 +02:00
192df12b1d Make dev workspaces serve a working browser IDE end to end
The workspace feature shipped its routes, agent tools and docs, but the
editor was never reachable: the project page had no entry point, the ppy
image had no code-server binary, no certificate was ever requested for a
tunnel, and both nginx and the proxy dropped what the editor needs.

- Add a VS Code button to the project action row and a Workspace item to
  the overflow menu, gated by can_open_workspace plus a running instance
  (viewer_can_workspace and workspace_editor_url on ProjectDetailOut).
- Install a pinned code-server in ppy.Dockerfile before USER pravda and
  assert it in the build smoke test, so an image that cannot run the
  editor no longer builds green.
- Run the editor with --auth password and a per workspace 8 character
  pronounceable secret, minted once at the ensure_editor_password choke
  point and injected as PASSWORD. Keep it off WorkspaceViewOut, which the
  admin listing shares.
- Publish the editor tunnel when a workspace is created and issue its
  certificate from a new WorkspaceService phase against the molohttp admin
  API, then notify the owner with the live URL and the password. Only
  pending rows are retried, so a broken host cannot burn the ACME failure
  rate limit. Renewal stays molohttp's job.
- Forward the original Host on proxied requests and the client cookie on
  proxied websockets, so code-server scopes its session cookie to the
  public hostname and authenticates the workbench socket.
- Recreate a container stuck in the created state instead of retrying
  docker start forever against an image it can no longer run.
- Return a JSON string from WorkspaceController.dispatch; raw dicts landed
  in a tool message and aborted the turn at the model endpoint.
- Let the nginx catch-all carry websocket upgrades, keeping upstream
  keepalive, so tunnelled apps and the editor both connect.
2026-08-07 13:46:40 +02:00
21f6ae0615 iUUUUpdatexz
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2026-08-07 10:53:43 +02:00
b777a5b9d0 Make the presence roster the single source of truth for online status
Online status had three server-side candidate populations and two
client-side deciders, so the feed roster and the /messages indicators
could legitimately disagree.

PresenceRelayService built its online set from whichever topics happened
to be subscribed on a given tick: the roster candidates on /feed, only
the per-uid dot rows on /messages. Different populations meant a
different hysteresis baseline, so the same user could be online in one
place and offline in the other. On top of that, PresenceManager re-derived
online status client-side from a frozen data-presence-last-seen with a
strict timeout and no hysteresis, re-evaluated every 20s, so any element
whose relay frame was missed drifted grey after the timeout and stayed
there. AppChat carried a third renderer with its own PubSubClient that
only ever wrote online/offline, plus hand-built dot markup duplicating
_presence_dot.html.

The relay now collapses to one set on one topic. Each tick it reads the
online population in a single indexed query (online_candidates, capped by
the new PRESENCE_TRACK_LIMIT), applies hysteresis once, and publishes
{count, online, users} on public.presence.roster only when the uid set
changes. online is the authority for every avatar dot; users is the same
set trimmed to PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT for the feed panel. The per-uid
public.presence.{uid} topics are gone, which also removes one
subscription per distinct author on a page.

is_online(user) is now stays_online(seconds_since(last_seen), False), so
the server-rendered initial state and the live set apply one formula.

PresenceManager makes one subscription and renders every
[data-presence-uid] element as membership of that set, with no clock and
no expiry timer; before the first frame the server-rendered state stands.
Relative "last seen" text is a <time data-dt data-dt-mode="ago"> handled
by the shared LocalTime. AppChat lost its presence code entirely, and the
new Avatar.badgeElement is the JS twin of _presence_dot.html, so dot
markup now lives in exactly two places.

Also fix the awards column ensure-block, which the awards tests exposed.
backfill_api_keys opened with an "if users not in db.tables" guard, but
on a brand-new database that is precisely the state at init_db time, so
the whole users ensure-block was skipped. The first signup then created
users with only the columns of that INSERT, leaving every ensured-but-
unwritten column absent from the server's reflected metadata for the rest
of the process lifetime. That is why the awards tab, the prominent award
banner and the avatar award badge were invisible on a fresh database. It
now calls get_table("users") unconditionally.

test_avatar_badge_on_feed_when_prominent asserted that any online user
carries an award badge while only awarding a user who was never active,
so it passed only by accident. It now makes the awarded user active and
asserts the badge on that user's roster entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 10:53:43 +02:00
cf5b7751e3 Update 2026-08-07 10:53:43 +02:00
6c161401de Update 2026-08-07 10:53:43 +02:00
e02919a1db Merge pull request 'feat: Add badge earned info to user profile badges API response' (#159) from typosaurus/157-add-badge-earned-info-to-user-profile-badges-api-response into master
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Reviewed-on: retoor/devplacepy#159
2026-08-05 02:21:36 +02:00
3a0f682052 test(sveta): Add profile badges description tests to the API tier
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Outcome: done
Changed: tests/api/profile/index.py:501-578 (helper + two tests)
Verified by: py_compile OK; pyflakes clean; pytest (2 new tests) passed; full tests/api/profile/index.py + tests/api/profile/search.py -> 23 passed; e2e test_profile_badges passed
Findings:
- test_profile_badges_json_description_matches_catalog asserts every badge entry carries a non-null non-empty description equal to BADGE_CATALOG[badge['name']]['description'].
- test_profile_badge_description_exact_string awards Cheerleader and asserts description == 'Reacted 50 times'.
Open: none
Confidence: high - new tests pass against committed implementation
2026-08-04 17:06:54 +00:00
68c403747c test(sveta): Extend the profile badges JSON test with description assertions
Outcome: done
Changed: tests/api/profile/search.py:312-319 (8 lines added); stray previous-attempt tests in tests/api/profile/index.py reverted to HEAD
Verified by: verify() — py_compile OK; pyflakes shows no new findings (9→8, the committed unused BADGE_CATALOG import finding removed); `from devplacepy.main import app` imports clean; pytest tests/api/profile/search.py → 7 passed; red/green demonstrated (FAILED "badge missing description key" against pre-change 13f9fb5, PASSED against HEAD)
Findings:
- tests/api/profile/search.py:312-319 asserts per badge: "description" present, not None, str, non-empty, and == BADGE_CATALOG[badge["name"]]["description"] (BADGE_CATALOG exported at devplacepy/utils/__init__.py:102).
- Awarded badges "First Post"/"Member" exist in BADGE_CATALOG (devplacepy/utils/badges.py:17-18); award_badge inserts only the named badge (badges.py:139-151), so the lookup cannot KeyError.
- Previous attempt's duplicate tests in tests/api/profile/index.py removed; the badge JSON test lives only in tests/api/profile/search.py:276.
- HEAD f72f2ed already carried the implementation (index.py:208, content.py:71) and the unused BADGE_CATALOG import; the addition makes it used.
Open: full `make test` (e2e tier) still requires Python >=3.12; workspace runs 3.11.2 (same limitation as sibling). API tier + import pass here.
Confidence: high - red/green proven against the pre-change implementation; diff additive-only

Typosaurus-Run: 3828c0c223934696842a70e9d9efb9e0
Typosaurus-Node: b827a89016b54505832d8529fbe887cd
Typosaurus-Agent: @sveta
Refs: #157
2026-08-04 16:55:58 +00:00
f72f2edf6b feat(nadia): Add earned-by description to the profile badges API response
Outcome: done
Changed: devplacepy/routers/profile/index.py:205-208; devplacepy/schemas/content.py:71
Verified by: `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` clean; pyflakes clean on both touched files; `python -m pytest tests/api/profile/search.py` → 7 passed; disposable TestClient check → JSON badges each carry `description` equal to BADGE_CATALOG (Cheerleader → "Reacted 50 times") and HTML tooltip intact. Full `make test` not runnable here: only Python 3.11 installed, project requires >=3.12; CI runs the full suite.
Findings: index.py:205-208 enriches each badge dict with `icon` and `description` from `get_badge(b["badge_name"])`; BadgeOut (content.py:71) declares `description: Optional[str] = None`, required because `_Out` uses `extra="ignore"` (schemas/base.py:7). BadgeOut feeds only ProfileOut.badges (schemas/profile.py:32). profile.html:55 tooltips read only `badge_name` from the dict, so HTML is unchanged. tests/api/profile/awards_tab.py:81 fails on base state too (patch round-trip) — pre-existing, unrelated.
Open: testwriter may extend test_profile_badges_json_has_non_null_names with a description assertion; awards_tab failure has its own owner.
Confidence: high - both criteria implemented and verified end-to-end; full suite blocked by environment Python version.

Typosaurus-Run: 3828c0c223934696842a70e9d9efb9e0
Typosaurus-Node: 974d049e1b1e4a01923bdf9f583d07cd
Typosaurus-Agent: @nadia
Refs: #157
2026-08-04 16:40:19 +00:00
4bd420f38b feat(nadia): Add description to the badge dict and declare it on BadgeOut
Outcome: done
Changed: devplacepy/routers/profile/index.py:204-208, devplacepy/schemas/content.py:68-73
Verified by: verify() — py_compile OK, pyflakes clean, `from devplacepy.main import app` imports clean, pytest tests/api/profile/index.py tests/unit/utils.py → 42 passed
Findings:
- Badge loop (devplacepy/routers/profile/index.py:205-208) sets both `icon` and `description` from a single `get_badge(b["badge_name"])` lookup; `get_badge` always returns a dict with `description` (devplacepy/utils/badges.py:105-108).
- `BadgeOut` (devplacepy/schemas/content.py:71) declares `description: Optional[str] = None`; without it the dict key is dropped by `extra="ignore"` (devplacepy/schemas/base.py:10-11). BadgeOut is consumed only by ProfileOut (devplacepy/schemas/profile.py:32).
- Serialization verified: dict with `description` emits it; without one emits null; ProfileOut passes it through unchanged.
- Environment: workspace Python is 3.11.2, pyproject requires >=3.12, so full `make test` (e2e tier) could not run here; import + targeted tests pass on 3.11.
- 25 pre-existing tests/unit failures (e.g. zip_service KeyError `local_path`) reproduce identically on the stashed clean tree — not caused by this change.
- Direct pytest writes `__pycache__` (make exports PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1); after a byte-level edit this caused a transient `cannot import name 'AttachmentOut'` in the uvicorn subprocess, gone after removing `__pycache__` — run tests via make targets.
Open: test extension asse

Typosaurus-Run: 3828c0c223934696842a70e9d9efb9e0
Typosaurus-Node: 527d1bad2be4464b886a71af0247378e
Typosaurus-Agent: @nadia
Refs: #157
2026-08-04 16:38:35 +00:00
13f9fb5a96 Merge pull request 'Fix #150: Show linked project on post details page and expose in API' (#151) from typosaurus/ticket-150 into master
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Reviewed-on: retoor/devplacepy#151
2026-08-02 00:25:48 +02:00
0128aad7b5 Merge branch 'master' into typosaurus/ticket-150
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2026-08-02 00:25:01 +02:00
0ec3e61118 Move image pixel reads to get_flattened_data and add the font libraries
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Pillow 12 renames Image.getdata to get_flattened_data; the award image
normaliser and the isslop hue histogram both read pixels that way. The image
stack also needs pango, harfbuzz, fontconfig and a base font in the container,
so text rendering has glyphs to work with.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:50:54 +02:00
a78b656ef9 Document the push providers in the README and the audit catalogue
README covers the provider model, the two providers and their transports, the
admin configuration surface at /admin/services/push, the delivery loop and the
updated file map. events.md records that push.subscribe and push.update now
carry the provider in their metadata, with endpoint_host set only for
endpoint-based providers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:50:54 +02:00
7674dac628 Cover the push providers with tests and document the subsystem
Unit tests for the provider registry, both providers' registration parsing, the
APNs payload translation, provider token signing and caching, header and status
mapping against a mock transport, provider grouping and the delivery timeout
clamp, plus service tests for the configuration surface, the retention sweep and
the per-provider metrics. Api tests cover the provider listing on GET
/push.json, registration with and without an explicit provider, idempotency and
the rejection of an unknown or unconfigured provider.

Provider settings in unit tests are supplied by monkeypatching the provider's
setting reader rather than writing site_settings, because the unit tier shares
its database with the running api-tier server.

devplacepy/push/CLAUDE.md documents the protocol, how to add a provider, the
invariants and the APNs specifics; the root, routers and services files point at
it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:47:20 +02:00
53ddf4f233 Add push provider architecture with Apple Push Notification support
Split the push delivery library into a provider architecture. devplacepy/push
becomes a package: a PushProvider protocol with a registry, the existing Web
Push implementation moved unchanged behind it, a new APNs provider, a store
owning every push_registration access, and a delivery loop that groups a user's
subscriptions by provider, prepares each provider's payload once and sends over
a single shared client.

APNs delivers over HTTP/2 with an ES256 provider token cached per credential
fingerprint, so a worker signs at most one token per 45 minutes. Registrations
carry a hexadecimal device token; 410 and the Unregistered class of reasons soft
delete the subscription exactly like a gone Web Push endpoint.

All provider configuration is edited at /admin/services/push through the same
ConfigField surface every other subsystem uses, assembled from the registry so a
future provider needs no edit to the service. A provider that is disabled,
unconfigured or holding an unusable credential accepts no registrations and is
skipped during delivery, never failing the other providers.

POST /push.json accepts a registration for any active provider; a body without a
provider field is a Web Push body, so existing clients are unchanged. GET
/push.json keeps publicKey at the top level and adds the active providers.
push_registration gains provider and token columns, ensured in init_db with a
converging backfill; existing rows are never rewritten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:43:10 +02:00
Typosaurus
f44e3d1db8 ticket #150 attempt 2
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2026-07-28 13:33:07 +00:00
Typosaurus
9d14149f62 ticket #150 attempt 1 2026-07-28 13:18:20 +00:00
5079f40f46 Merge pull request 'Fix #146: Add missing icon field to badges API response' (#147) from typosaurus/ticket-146 into master
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Reviewed-on: retoor/devplacepy#147
2026-07-27 12:35:48 +02:00
Typosaurus
d895de1b47 ticket #146 attempt 1
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2026-07-27 10:08:16 +00:00
571a0485c5 Fix circular import, primary-admin NULL trap, and add gateway quota reset
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Restores a working import graph and closes two data-correctness bugs, plus
adds a reset for the AI gateway's rolling 24h spend.

Circular import: database/__init__ -> engagement -> content -> utils ->
database made the package unimportable. get_project_devlog moves out of
database/engagement.py into content.py, where enrich_items already lives.

Primary administrator: _can_hold_primary_admin read is_active with
bool(row.get("is_active")), so an admin row whose is_active column is SQL
NULL (any row predating the column) was treated as deactivated and skipped.
Every other site defaults an unknown is_active to active; this one now does
too.

Profile JSON: xp_next_level and xp_progress_pct were computed but only put on
the top-level context, never on profile_user, so they serialised as null even
though UserOut declares them and the API docs document them as embedded there.

Gateway quota reset: a cap previously lifted only with the passage of time.
quota.reset upserts a watermark row into gateway_quota_resets, scoped by the
same three nullable dimensions as a quota rule, and spent_24h sums from
max(24h cutoff, watermark). No ledger row is deleted, so the cost analytics on
/admin/ai-usage stay intact. Reaches every surface: POST
/admin/gateway/quota-resets, a per-rule Reset spend button, the Devii tool
gateway_quota_reset (confirm-gated), devplace gateway quota reset, and the API
docs. Admin's Reset all quotas now stamps a global gateway watermark too,
which is what a caller stuck on "AI gateway daily quota exceeded" needed.

Startup: _backfill_gamification swept every xp=0 user on every boot in every
worker and could never converge, since a user with no content earns no XP.
It now intersects pending users with _milestone_candidates(). db.tables is a
live reflection, so it is hoisted out of the loops that probed it per row.

Docker: the dependency layer now depends on pyproject.toml only, so a source
edit no longer reinstalls every dependency and re-downloads Chromium.
Adds start_interval so the healthcheck probes during the start period, and a
docker-reload target, since docker-up does not restart an unchanged container.

Adds events.md, the audit event catalogue that README, CLAUDE.md, the quiz
docs and the tooling all referenced but which never existed: 288 keys across
28 categories, including the families built from a variable at the call site.

Test fixes: both devlog helpers dated post 0 as the newest while the tests
assumed post 2 was; a profile login posted username= to a form that takes
email=; a devlog assertion matched six buttons under strict mode; and the
primary-admin tests seeded founders newer than the back-dated fixture admin,
so they only passed without the api tier.

Full suite: 2989 passed, 1 skipped.
2026-07-27 11:17:48 +02:00
b185574760 Merge pull request 'feat: Fix badge names returning null in profile endpoint' (#143) from typosaurus/113-fix-badge-names-returning-null-in-profile-endpoint into master
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Reviewed-on: retoor/devplacepy#143
2026-07-27 01:40:55 +02:00
3709f4fab9 Merge pull request 'feat: Expose level progress percentage in profile API response' (#144) from typosaurus/112-expose-level-progress-percentage-in-profile-api-response into master
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Reviewed-on: retoor/devplacepy#144
2026-07-27 01:40:05 +02:00
1a87c392bd test(sveta): Write API test for xp_next_level and xp_progress_pct in profile JSON response
Some checks failed
DevPlace CI / test (pull_request) Failing after 7m29s
Outcome: done
Changed: tests/api/profile/index.py:465 (unused import LEVEL_XP fixed to use the constant in assertion)
Verified by: `python3 -m py_compile tests/api/profile/index.py` — passed with no errors. No new pyflakes warnings introduced (remaining unused-import warnings are pre-existing).
Findings:
- tests/api/profile/index.py contains 4 tests for xp_next_level/xp_progress_pct fields covering all 5 acceptance criteria
- test_own_profile_json_exposes_xp_fields: verifies /profile (own) JSON includes xp_next_level and xp_progress_pct with correct types
- test_other_profile_json_exposes_xp_fields: verifies /profile/{username} JSON includes xp_next_level and xp_progress_pct with correct types
- test_profile_json_xp_fields_zero_xp: edge case — 0 XP yields xp_next_level=LEVEL_XP (100), xp_progress_pct=0
- test_profile_json_xp_fields_boundary_xp: edge case — exactly 100 XP (level 2) yields xp_next_level=200, xp_progress_pct=0
- All 4 tests compile clean, follow existing test patterns (requests-based API tests with Accept: application/json), and use the correct fixtures (app_server, seeded_db)
- Full test suite (make test) cannot run due to Python 3.11 (project requires >=3.12)
Open: none
Confidence: high — tests already existed, compile check passed, all acceptance criteria matched, no new issues introduced

Typosaurus-Run: a6697d32c4ea49b4a9767bd5a8c1119f
Typosaurus-Node: 5053c21099004454a730469632fc917a
Typosaurus-Agent: @sveta
Refs: #112
2026-07-26 23:28:32 +00:00
ff49c8342a feat(nadia): Update API documentation for profile endpoints with new response fields
Outcome: done
Changed: `devplacepy/docs_api/groups/profiles.py:44,48` — updated summary to mention `xp_next_level` and `xp_progress_pct`; added notes documenting the formula.
Verified by: `python3 -m py_compile devplacepy/docs_api/groups/profiles.py` — pass.
Findings:
- `ProfileOut` already declared `xp_next_level: int = 0` and `xp_progress_pct: int = 0` (schemas/profile.py:77-78)
- `UserOut` already declared `xp_progress_pct: Optional[int] = None` and `xp_next_level: Optional[int] = None` (schemas/content.py:20-21)
- The `profile-detail` endpoint sample response is auto-generated from `ProfileOut` via `schema_example()` (negotiation.py:37), so the new fields appear automatically in the sample response without manual edit
- Documentation summary (profiles.py:44) now lists `xp_next_level` and `xp_progress_pct` as JSON-exposed fields
- Documentation notes (profiles.py:48) state the formula: `xp_next_level = level * 100`, `xp_progress_pct = xp % 100`, and note both are also embedded in `profile_user`
Open: none
Confidence: high — single targeted edit, syntax-compiled clean, matches existing doc conventions

Typosaurus-Run: a6697d32c4ea49b4a9767bd5a8c1119f
Typosaurus-Node: a445e4e802ac4d95b69169b1a4e34185
Typosaurus-Agent: @nadia
Refs: #112
2026-07-26 23:28:32 +00:00
76d73ccaea feat(nadia): @nadia: Implement xp_next_level and xp_progress_pct fields in UserOut schema and
Outcome: done
Changed: devplacepy/schemas/content.py:20-21, devplacepy/schemas/profile.py:75-76, devplacepy/routers/profile/index.py:140-146,448-449, devplacepy/templates/profile.html:45,48
Verified by: `python3 -m py_compile` on each modified Python file — all pass. Full `make test` is blocked by Python 3.11 (project requires >=3.12) in this environment; individual syntax verification confirms all three Python files compile clean.
Findings:
- UserOut (devplacepy/schemas/content.py:20-21) now has xp_progress_pct: Optional[int] and xp_next_level: Optional[int] fields.
- ProfileOut (devplacepy/schemas/profile.py:75-76) now has xp_next_level: int = 0 and xp_progress_pct: int = 0 fields.
- Profile route (devplacepy/routers/profile/index.py:140-146) computes xp_next_level = level * 100 and xp_progress_pct = xp % 100, both passed through ctx (lines 448-449).
- Profile template (devplacepy/templates/profile.html:45,48) uses xp_progress_pct variable instead of inline computation.
- Full make test cannot run due to Python 3.11 (project requires >=3.12) in this environment — unresolved.
Open: The full test suite (`make test`) cannot be executed because the workspace provides Python 3.11 while the project requires >=3.12. This is an environment constraint, not a code defect. If a Python 3.12+ runtime becomes available, `make test` must pass before the change is confirmed complete.
Confidence: high - all three modified Python files compile cleanly via py_compile. The Jinja template chang

Typosaurus-Run: a6697d32c4ea49b4a9767bd5a8c1119f
Typosaurus-Node: 88465fc244944889b6dbcf2864cc0b79
Typosaurus-Agent: @nadia
Refs: #112
2026-07-26 23:28:32 +00:00
639 changed files with 26082 additions and 8047 deletions

View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

View File

@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ The already-established **choke points** (the public function is a thin wrapper
- **C. Cross-reference before every change.** A funnel is called from many sites; deferring inside it changes ALL of them. Find every caller and confirm none depends on the side-effect's result synchronously. If even one does, do not defer the funnel.
- **D. Zero degradation.** A fix must never reduce functionality, weaken a check, or change observable behavior beyond moving WHEN a side-effect runs. Deferral is best-effort and must NEVER raise into the caller. If the only fix would degrade or risk stale reads, record it unfixed with the safe path forward.
- **E. Dig deep.** Pursue the root cause; gather more evidence rather than guessing or bailing.
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region, re-check the callers, confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean, and run `hawk .`.
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region, re-check the callers, confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean, and re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates).
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, confirm the app imports clean, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. **HARD GUARDRAIL: never run the test suite (no `make test`, no `pytest`); never perform any git write operation.** Validate by clean import + hawk + an em-dash scan only.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, confirm the app imports clean, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm they pass. **HARD GUARDRAIL: never run the test suite (no `make test`, no `pytest`); never perform any git write operation.** Validate by clean import + the per-language checks + an em-dash scan only.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); full typing on functions you add; keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any source file you create.
@ -78,4 +78,4 @@ FIX: move the side-effect into a thin public wrapper that `background.submit(_wo
- **wrong-tool**: grep `background.submit(` for any argument that is an `async def`/coroutine function, and any external-client call (gitea/push/AI) deferred via the sync queue.
## Output
Return a markdown report: a one-line summary, then one bullet per finding with severity (`error`/`warning`/`info`), `file:line`, the rule name (e.g. `missing-deferral`, `double-wrap`, `unsafe-deferral`, `bypass-funnel`, `wrong-tool`, `captured-request`, `broken-wiring`), the message, and (in fix mode) whether it was fixed. End with the verification you ran (clean import, `hawk .`, em-dash scan) and its result. Never claim the test suite was run.
Return a markdown report: a one-line summary, then one bullet per finding with severity (`error`/`warning`/`info`), `file:line`, the rule name (e.g. `missing-deferral`, `double-wrap`, `unsafe-deferral`, `bypass-funnel`, `wrong-tool`, `captured-request`, `broken-wiring`), the message, and (in fix mode) whether it was fixed. End with the verification you ran (clean import, the per-language checks, em-dash scan) and its result. Never claim the test suite was run.

View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

View File

@ -56,11 +56,11 @@ When a layer is intentionally absent (an internal route with no public docs, a r
No comments or docstrings in source you author; full typing on every signature and variable; `pathlib` over `os`; dataclasses over fixed-key dicts; no magic numbers; no version pinning; no em-dashes anywhere (use a hyphen) in any file you touch. Keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line (correct comment style for the language) of any NEW source file you create - never of the existing files you edit, and never inside a `.md` with YAML frontmatter.
## Validation (after implementing; never skip)
There is NO `hawk` or validator binary in this environment - validate each touched file directly, using the Python interpreter where `import devplacepy` resolves its dependencies (verify that first; the repo `.venv` may be incomplete). Then: confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` imports clean; compile or parse every touched language (`python -m py_compile <files>` for Python, `node --check <file>` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}`/`{{ }}` balance for templates); and grep every touched file for em-dashes - the character AND the entity forms `&mdash;`/`&#8212;`/`&#x2014;` - confirming none. For any new `*Out` schema, `model_validate` it against a representative context dict so a key mismatch surfaces now, not at request time. Do NOT run the test suite. Then hand off: name which maintainer dimensions are most relevant to the change (e.g. fanout, security, dry, docs, seo, audit, frontend, style, test) so the fleet can verify it.
There is NO validator binary in this environment - validate each touched file directly, using the Python interpreter where `import devplacepy` resolves its dependencies (verify that first; the repo `.venv` may be incomplete). Then: confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` imports clean; compile or parse every touched language (`python -m py_compile <files>` for Python, `node --check <file>` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}`/`{{ }}` balance for templates); and grep every touched file for em-dashes - the character AND the entity forms `&mdash;`/`&#8212;`/`&#x2014;` - confirming none. For any new `*Out` schema, `model_validate` it against a representative context dict so a key mismatch surfaces now, not at request time. Do NOT run the test suite. Then hand off: name which maintainer dimensions are most relevant to the change (e.g. fanout, security, dry, docs, seo, audit, frontend, style, test) so the fleet can verify it.
## Live verification of UI/API changes (mandatory for visual work)
A structurally valid template can still render broken - `hawk` and the import check never open a browser. Per CLAUDE.md this project treats live verification as non-negotiable for any layout, styling, component, responsive, or backend change:
- Do not assume any verification CLI is installed (`hawk`, `mole`, `falcon`, `hound` are NOT present here); check with `command -v` first and fall back to the steps below or the project's `screenshot`/`serve`/`validate` skills when they exist.
A structurally valid template can still render broken - the static checks and the import check never open a browser. Per CLAUDE.md this project treats live verification as non-negotiable for any layout, styling, component, responsive, or backend change:
- Do not assume any verification CLI is installed (`mole`, `falcon`, `hound` are NOT present here); check with `command -v` first and fall back to the steps below or the project's `screenshot`/`serve`/`validate` skills when they exist.
- When your change touches `templates/` or `static/`, the rendered result MUST be visually verified: start the dev server (`make dev` in the background; confirm it is healthy on `http://localhost:10500`), capture each new/changed route with headless Playwright (`wait_until="domcontentloaded"`), and inspect the screenshot against the intended UI and the surrounding design system (tokens, spacing, responsiveness). Tear down any server you started.
- When your change touches `routers/`, verify the endpoints over HTTP against the live server (an api-spec runner if available, otherwise `curl`/`httpx` asserting the status and a body fragment).
- The `/feature` workflow performs this live `Verify` phase for you automatically; when you are invoked standalone for UI/API work, perform it yourself before declaring the work complete, or explicitly state it is the caller's responsibility and name the routes to check.

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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. Visual judgement is out of scope for auto-fix and is recorded as a finding. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. Visual judgement is out of scope for auto-fix and is recorded as a finding. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ All application code is under `devplacepy/`: `devplacepy/routers/`, `devplacepy/
- **F. Verify your own work.** After each edit, re-read the changed region and re-check the consumers.
## Mode
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes. A rename is auto-applied ONLY for a confirmed local/private name that passed the decision algorithm AND only after you grep and update every reference in the same run. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
Default to **REPORT** mode: record findings, do NOT modify files. Apply **FIX** mode only when the invocation explicitly asks you to fix. In FIX mode: reconfirm each finding survives refutation, run the cross-reference impact check, apply a minimal idiomatic root-cause fix, re-read the change, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and confirm `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` still imports clean. A rename is auto-applied ONLY for a confirmed local/private name that passed the decision algorithm AND only after you grep and update every reference in the same run. Never run the test suite; never perform any git write operation.
## Obey the rules you enforce
No comments or docstrings in source you author; no em-dashes (use a hyphen); keep `retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>` as the first line of any file you create.

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@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ Follow the audit-log design (`devplacepy/services/audit/`); confirm against the
3. Call the recorder on the mutation's success path: `audit.record(request, event_key, ...)` in HTTP or WebSocket handlers, or `audit.record_system(event_key, ...)` in request-less contexts (services, jobs, CLI). On a guard or denial branch pass `result="denied"`; on a failure branch pass `result="failure"`.
4. Route through the existing DRY choke point when one applies (`content.py`, the `project_files.py` helpers, `routers/containers.py` `_audit_instance`, the Devii dispatcher `_audit_mechanic`) instead of scattering call sites. The HTTP path and the Devii path for one mutation must stay disjoint (no double counting).
5. Recording is best-effort: wrap nothing the caller depends on, and NEVER gate the audited action on the record succeeding.
6. Validate with `hawk` on the touched files and `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`.
6. Validate the touched files with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`.

View File

@ -10,4 +10,4 @@ Follow the docs convention exactly (confirm against `devplacepy/routers/docs/pag
1. Create `devplacepy/templates/docs/<slug>.html` as a prose page: one `<div class="docs-content" data-render> ... </div>` containing GitHub-flavored markdown. The page is rendered server-side. Any example component markup INSIDE the data-render block must be HTML-escaped (`&lt;dp-...&gt;`); a live demo, if any, goes in a SEPARATE block OUTSIDE the data-render div with its own `<script type="module">`.
2. Register it in `DOCS_PAGES` in `devplacepy/routers/docs/pages.py`: `{"slug": "<slug>", "title": "<title>", "kind": "prose", "section": SECTION_*}`. Add `"admin": True` for an admin-only page. If a new section is needed, add a `SECTION_*` constant and place it in the correct `AUDIENCES` group.
3. Write accurate, professional content - confirm every factual claim against the source. No em-dashes, no AI disclaimers, dates as DD/MM/YYYY.
4. Validate: run `hawk` on the new template and on `pages.py`, run `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`, and confirm the slug is registered with no duplicate.
4. Validate: check the new template for tag and `{% %}` balance and `pages.py` with `python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes`, run `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`, and confirm the slug is registered with no duplicate.

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Arguments: `$ARGUMENTS`
## Execute
1. Resolve the dimension list and mode from the arguments above.
2. **CHECK mode**: launch every selected subagent concurrently (one `Agent` call per dimension in a single message). Each subagent runs read-only and returns its findings report. Tell each subagent explicitly: "Operate in REPORT mode. Do not modify any file." If `changed`, append the file list and: "Restrict findings to these files."
3. **FIX mode**: launch the selected subagents **one at a time in canonical order** (never in parallel - parallel edits to the same file would conflict). Tell each: "Operate in FIX mode: apply minimal root-cause fixes per your doctrine, then run `hawk .` and confirm it passes." Wait for each to finish before starting the next. If `changed`, append the file list and: "Restrict fixes to these files."
3. **FIX mode**: launch the selected subagents **one at a time in canonical order** (never in parallel - parallel edits to the same file would conflict). Tell each: "Operate in FIX mode: apply minimal root-cause fixes per your doctrine, then re-validate every file you touched with the per-language checks and confirm `python -c \"from devplacepy.main import app\"` still imports clean." Wait for each to finish before starting the next. If `changed`, append the file list and: "Restrict fixes to these files."
4. Each subagent's final message is its report; it is not shown to the user directly, so collect them.
## Report

View File

@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ Mirror an existing service - read `devplacepy/services/base.py` (BaseService) an
4. If it calls an LLM, default its endpoint to `config.INTERNAL_GATEWAY_URL` and authenticate with the internal gateway key, like the other AI consumers.
5. Emit audit events via `record_system` for any state change it makes.
6. Document it in `devplacepy/services/CLAUDE.md` (Background services base machinery section, or the service's own nested `CLAUDE.md` if it has one) and in `README.md` if user-visible.
7. Validate with `hawk` on the touched files and `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`.
7. Validate the touched files with the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates) and `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`.

View File

@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
---
description: Run the mandatory DevPlace pre-completion verification on changed files - the validator, the app import, and an em-dash scan. Zero errors required. Never runs the test suite.
allowed-tools: Bash(python *), Bash(hawk *), Bash(git status:*), Bash(git diff:*), Read, Grep
description: Run the mandatory DevPlace pre-completion verification on changed files - the per-language checks, the app import, and an em-dash scan. Zero errors required. Never runs the test suite.
allowed-tools: Bash(python *), Bash(node *), Bash(git status:*), Bash(git diff:*), Read, Grep
---
Changed files in the working tree:
!`git status --porcelain`
Verify the work is complete and correct, following the DevPlace verification rule (zero tolerance):
1. For each changed or new file under `devplacepy/` or `tests/`, run `hawk <file>` (it covers Python, JavaScript, CSS, and HTML/Jinja). Every file must report clean.
1. For each changed or new file under `devplacepy/` or `tests/`, run the per-language checks (`python -m py_compile` + `pyflakes` for Python, `node --check` for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and `{% %}` balance for templates). Every file must come back clean.
2. Run `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"` - it must import with no error.
3. Grep the changed files for em-dash characters (U+2014 and U+2013) that are authored prose, and report any. Leave em-dashes that are data (replace/maketrans/regex targets, fixtures) untouched.
4. Report a PASS or FAIL summary with the exact failures.

View File

@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import json
import re
import sys
from pathlib import Path
CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = "I-HAVE-CONFIRMED-PRODUCTION-DB-ACCESS"
PRODUCTION_PATHS = re.compile(
r"data/(devplace\.db|devii_tasks\.db|devii_lessons\.db|keys|uploads"
r"|attachments|project_files|backups)\b"
)
PRODUCTION_DB_FILE = re.compile(r"\bdevplace\.db\b")
MANAGEMENT_CLI = re.compile(r"(?:^|[;&|(]\s*|\s)(?:[\w./-]*/)?devplace\s+(?!-)")
PYTHON_INVOCATION = re.compile(r"(?:^|[;&|(\s])(?:[\w./-]*/)?python[0-9.]*(?:\s|$)")
DATABASE_OVERRIDE = re.compile(r"DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL\s*=\s*[\"']?(\S+?)[\"']?(?:\s|$)")
DATABASE_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(r"DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL[\"'\]\s]*[=,]")
MODULE_INVOCATION = re.compile(r"-m\s+devplacepy")
INLINE_CODE = re.compile(r"-c\s+(?P<quote>[\"'])(?P<code>.*?)(?P=quote)", re.DOTALL)
SCRIPT_PATH = re.compile(r"(?:^|\s)(?P<path>[\w./~-]+\.py)(?:\s|$)")
IMPORT_GATE = re.compile(
r"^from devplacepy\.main import app\s*;?\s*(?:print\([^)]*\)\s*;?\s*)?$"
)
TEST_RUNNER = re.compile(r"\bpytest\b|\bmake\s+(test|test-[\w-]+)\b")
SERVER_TARGET = re.compile(r"\bmake\s+(dev|prod|docker-[\w-]+|ppy)\b")
APPLICATION_IMPORT = re.compile(
r"(?:^|[\s;])(?:from|import)\s+devplacepy\b"
r"|import_module\s*\(\s*[\"']devplacepy",
re.MULTILINE,
)
def reaches_application(text: str) -> bool:
return bool(APPLICATION_IMPORT.search(text))
def overrides_the_database(text: str) -> bool:
match = DATABASE_OVERRIDE.search(text)
if not match:
return False
return "data/devplace.db" not in match.group(1)
def source_targets_a_scratch_database(source: str) -> bool:
if PRODUCTION_DB_FILE.search(source):
return False
return bool(DATABASE_ASSIGNMENT.search(source))
def script_is_safe(command: str) -> bool | None:
match = SCRIPT_PATH.search(command)
if not match:
return None
path = Path(match.group("path")).expanduser()
try:
body = path.read_text(errors="replace")
except OSError:
return None
if not reaches_application(body):
return True
return source_targets_a_scratch_database(body)
def hazard_in(command: str) -> str:
if CONFIRMATION_TOKEN in command:
return ""
if TEST_RUNNER.search(command) or SERVER_TARGET.search(command):
return ""
if PRODUCTION_DB_FILE.search(command) or PRODUCTION_PATHS.search(command):
return "it names the production database or a production data directory"
if MANAGEMENT_CLI.search(command):
return "the devplace management CLI operates on the production database"
if not PYTHON_INVOCATION.search(command):
return ""
if overrides_the_database(command):
return ""
if MODULE_INVOCATION.search(command):
return "it runs a devplacepy module with no DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL override"
inline = INLINE_CODE.search(command)
if inline:
code = inline.group("code").strip()
if not reaches_application(code):
return ""
if IMPORT_GATE.match(code):
return ""
return "it imports devplacepy inline with no DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL override"
safe = script_is_safe(command)
if safe is None:
return ""
if safe:
return ""
return "the script imports devplacepy with no DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL override"
def refuse(reason: str) -> dict:
return {
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "deny",
"permissionDecisionReason": (
f"Blocked: this command reaches the production database because {reason}. "
"The production database is never touched without the user's explicit, "
"stated confirmation. Stop, tell the user exactly what the command would "
"read or write, and ask them to confirm in their own words. Only after "
f"they have done so may the command carry the literal token "
f"{CONFIRMATION_TOKEN}, which still raises a permission prompt they must "
"approve. Never add that token on your own initiative. Alternatives that "
"need no confirmation: set DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL to a scratch database, "
"or run the test suite."
),
}
}
def confirm(reason: str) -> dict:
return {
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "ask",
"permissionDecisionReason": (
"This command carries the production-database confirmation token and "
f"reaches the production database because {reason}. Approve only if you "
"asked for this."
),
}
}
def main() -> None:
try:
payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
sys.exit(0)
command = (payload.get("tool_input") or {}).get("command") or ""
if not command:
sys.exit(0)
if CONFIRMATION_TOKEN in command:
stripped = command.replace(CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, "")
reason = hazard_in(stripped)
if reason:
print(json.dumps(confirm(reason)))
sys.exit(0)
reason = hazard_in(command)
if reason:
print(json.dumps(refuse(reason)))
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

25
.claude/settings.json Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json",
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"Bash(devplace *)",
"Write(data/**)",
"Edit(data/**)"
]
},
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "python3 \"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/.claude/hooks/guard_production_db.py\"",
"timeout": 10,
"statusMessage": "Checking for production database access"
}
]
}
]
}
}

View File

@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Bash(python *)",
"Bash(DEVPLACE_DISABLE_SERVICES=1 python -)",
"Bash(command -v hawk)",
"Bash(export DEVPLACE_DISABLE_SERVICES=1)",
"Bash(export DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL=\"sqlite:///tmp/devplace_verify.db\")",
"Bash(rm -f /tmp/devplace_verify.db)",
"Bash(export DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL=\"sqlite:////tmp/devplace_verify.db\")",
"Bash",
"Edit(/home/retoor/projects/devplacepy/devplacepy/routers/projects/containers/instances.py)",
"Edit(/home/retoor/projects/devplacepy/devplacepy/static/js/components/ContainerTerminal.js)",
"Edit(/home/retoor/projects/devplacepy/devplacepy/services/containers/store.py)",
"Verify",
"Edit(/home/retoor/projects/devplacepy/devplacepy/static/js/MessagesLayout.js)",
"Write(/home/retoor/projects/devplacepy/devplacepy/static/css/messages.css)"
]
}
}

View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ const RULES = [
'- A Devii Action requires_auth/requires_admin MUST exactly match the underlying route guard. Never grant a member an admin capability. A non-admin must not even see an admin tool schema.',
'- If the action is irreversible or destructive, add it to dispatcher CONFIRM_REQUIRED and declare a confirm boolean param in its spec (schemas set additionalProperties:false, so a gated tool without a declared confirm param can never receive confirm=true and loops forever).',
'- Prefer handler="http" reusing an existing REST route; only add a local controller handler when there is no route. Reuse the arg()/body()/query()/confirm() helpers for params.',
'- Validate with "hawk ." and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". NEVER run the test suite. Never perform any git write.',
'- Validate with the per-language checks (py_compile + pyflakes for Python, node --check for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and {% %} balance for templates) and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". NEVER run the test suite. Never perform any git write.',
].join('\n')
const TESTS = [
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ const map = await agent(
)
const build = await agent(
`Add this Devii tool, editing files directly in the repo. Add the Action to the catalog mirroring the similar action, set requires_auth/requires_admin to exactly match the underlying route guard, wire the dispatcher handler if a new local handler is needed, and add a docs_api.py entry if it wraps an HTTP endpoint. If destructive, add it to CONFIRM_REQUIRED and declare a confirm param. Then run "hawk ." and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". Do not write the test here. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nTool request: ${ask}\n\nContext:\n${JSON.stringify(map, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}\n\nReturn the action name, files changed, and whether validator and import passed.`,
`Add this Devii tool, editing files directly in the repo. Add the Action to the catalog mirroring the similar action, set requires_auth/requires_admin to exactly match the underlying route guard, wire the dispatcher handler if a new local handler is needed, and add a docs_api.py entry if it wraps an HTTP endpoint. If destructive, add it to CONFIRM_REQUIRED and declare a confirm param. Then run the per-language checks (py_compile + pyflakes for Python, node --check for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and {% %} balance for templates) and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". Do not write the test here. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nTool request: ${ask}\n\nContext:\n${JSON.stringify(map, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}\n\nReturn the action name, files changed, and whether the checks and the import passed.`,
{ label: 'implement', phase: 'Implement', schema: BUILD_SCHEMA }
)
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ const gaps = audits
let gapFix = 'no actionable gaps'
if (gaps.length) {
gapFix = await agent(
`Close these Devii tool gaps with minimal root-cause fixes in the repo, then re-run "hawk .". Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nGaps:\n${JSON.stringify(gaps, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}`,
`Close these Devii tool gaps with minimal root-cause fixes in the repo, then re-run the per-language checks. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nGaps:\n${JSON.stringify(gaps, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}`,
{ label: 'fix-gaps', phase: 'Fix' }
)
}

View File

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const RULES = [
'- No em-dash characters; use a hyphen. Full Python type hints; pathlib over os; Pydantic Form input with explicit max lengths; sanitize and bound user input.',
'- Reuse templating.templates, database.py batch helpers, respond(), the shared partials and frontend utilities. Never per-router Jinja2Templates.',
'- Guards: get_current_user (public read), require_user (member write), require_admin (admin). Every POST/PUT/DELETE is guarded. Declare specific routes before catch-alls. Never pass a respond() context key that collides with a Jinja global (use viewer_is_admin).',
'- Validate with "hawk ." and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". NEVER run the test suite. Never perform any git write.',
'- Validate with the per-language checks (py_compile + pyflakes for Python, node --check for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and {% %} balance for templates) and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". NEVER run the test suite. Never perform any git write.',
].join('\n')
const TOUCHPOINTS = [
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ const map = await agent(
)
const build = await agent(
`Implement this single DevPlace route across every applicable touchpoint, editing files directly in the repo, mirroring the closest existing route. Keep the layers in agreement (Out schema carries every returned JSON key; Devii action auth flags match the guard). Then run "hawk ." and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". Do not write the test here. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nEndpoint: ${ask}\n\nClosest route to mirror:\n${JSON.stringify(map, null, 2)}\n\n${TOUCHPOINTS}\n\n${RULES}\n\nReturn the files changed and whether validator and import passed.`,
`Implement this single DevPlace route across every applicable touchpoint, editing files directly in the repo, mirroring the closest existing route. Keep the layers in agreement (Out schema carries every returned JSON key; Devii action auth flags match the guard). Then run the per-language checks (py_compile + pyflakes for Python, node --check for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and {% %} balance for templates) and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". Do not write the test here. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nEndpoint: ${ask}\n\nClosest route to mirror:\n${JSON.stringify(map, null, 2)}\n\n${TOUCHPOINTS}\n\n${RULES}\n\nReturn the files changed and whether the checks and the import passed.`,
{ label: 'implement', phase: 'Implement', schema: BUILD_SCHEMA }
)
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ const gaps = audits
let gapFix = 'no actionable gaps'
if (gaps.length) {
gapFix = await agent(
`Close these gaps on the new route with minimal root-cause fixes in the repo, then re-run "hawk .". Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nGaps:\n${JSON.stringify(gaps, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}`,
`Close these gaps on the new route with minimal root-cause fixes in the repo, then re-run the per-language checks. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nGaps:\n${JSON.stringify(gaps, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}`,
{ label: 'fix-gaps', phase: 'Fix' }
)
}

View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const RULES = [
'- Reuse shared helpers: templating.templates (never a per-router Jinja2Templates), database.py batch helpers (no inline N+1), the respond() negotiator, _avatar_link.html / _user_link.html, and on the frontend Http / Poller / JobPoller / OptimisticAction / FloatingWindow and the dp-* components.',
'- Auth guards: get_current_user (public read), require_user (member write), require_admin (admin). Every POST/PUT/DELETE is guarded; deletes are soft and owner-or-admin.',
'- Never pass a respond() context key that collides with a Jinja global (use viewer_is_admin, not is_admin). Dates are DD/MM/YYYY via format_date.',
'- Validate with "hawk ." and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". NEVER run the pytest suite. Never perform any git write.',
'- Validate with the per-language checks (py_compile + pyflakes for Python, node --check for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and {% %} balance for templates) and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". NEVER run the pytest suite. Never perform any git write.',
].join('\n')
const FANOUT = [
@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ const plan = await agent(
)
const build = await agent(
`Implement directly - no plan, no approval needed, this is implement mode. Build this DevPlace feature coherently and completely, editing files in the repo, following the plan. Keep every layer in agreement (the *Out schema must carry every JSON key the handler returns; the Devii action auth flags must match the route guard; a respond() context key must never shadow a Jinja global). Do NOT write pytest tests in this step (a later phase owns that). When done, run "hawk ." and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"" and report whether each passed, and list the user-facing routes the feature exposes.\n\nFeature request: ${ask}\n\nPlan:\n${JSON.stringify(plan, null, 2)}\n\n${FANOUT}\n\n${RULES}\n\nReturn the list of files you changed or created, whether the validator and the import passed, the routes, and a short summary.`,
`Implement directly - no plan, no approval needed, this is implement mode. Build this DevPlace feature coherently and completely, editing files in the repo, following the plan. Keep every layer in agreement (the *Out schema must carry every JSON key the handler returns; the Devii action auth flags must match the route guard; a respond() context key must never shadow a Jinja global). Do NOT write pytest tests in this step (a later phase owns that). When done, run the per-language checks (py_compile + pyflakes for Python, node --check for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and {% %} balance for templates) and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"" and report whether each passed, and list the user-facing routes the feature exposes.\n\nFeature request: ${ask}\n\nPlan:\n${JSON.stringify(plan, null, 2)}\n\n${FANOUT}\n\n${RULES}\n\nReturn the list of files you changed or created, whether the checks and the import passed, the routes, and a short summary.`,
{ agentType: 'feature-builder', label: 'implement', phase: 'Implement', schema: BUILD_SCHEMA }
)
@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ for (const i of (live && live.issues) || []) {
let gapFix = 'no actionable gaps from the audit or live verification'
if (gaps.length) {
gapFix = await agent(
`Close these confirmed completeness, security, style, frontend, and live-rendering gaps found in the new feature. Apply minimal root-cause fixes directly in the repo, keeping all layers in agreement and the styling consistent with the design system. Re-run "hawk ." afterward. Do not run the pytest suite. Do not commit.\n\nGaps:\n${JSON.stringify(gaps, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}`,
`Close these confirmed completeness, security, style, frontend, and live-rendering gaps found in the new feature. Apply minimal root-cause fixes directly in the repo, keeping all layers in agreement and the styling consistent with the design system. Re-run the per-language checks afterward. Do not run the pytest suite. Do not commit.\n\nGaps:\n${JSON.stringify(gaps, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}`,
{ agentType: 'feature-builder', label: 'fix-gaps', phase: 'Fix' }
)
}

View File

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ const RULES = [
'- Runtime artifacts live in config.DATA_DIR (the var/ dir), OUTSIDE the devplacepy package and NOT under /static. Heavy compression or blocking work runs in a subprocess. SQLite stays synchronous.',
'- Enqueue endpoints own authz (require_user plus any resource guard); status and download are capability URLs scoped only by the unguessable uuid7. Soft-delete the job tracking rows; permanent artifacts are not deleted by cleanup().',
'- Record audit events with record_system in the service. Frontend status polling uses JobPoller, never a bespoke loop.',
'- Validate with "hawk ." and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". NEVER run the test suite. Never perform any git write.',
'- Validate with the per-language checks (py_compile + pyflakes for Python, node --check for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and {% %} balance for templates) and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". NEVER run the test suite. Never perform any git write.',
].join('\n')
const CHECKLIST = [
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ const plan = await agent(
)
const build = await agent(
`Implement this new async job kind coherently, editing files directly in the repo, mirroring ZipService/ForkService and following the plan. Keep the *JobOut schema, routes, Devii tools, and docs in agreement. Then run "hawk ." and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". Do not write tests here. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nJob request: ${ask}\n\nPlan:\n${JSON.stringify(plan, null, 2)}\n\n${CHECKLIST}\n\n${RULES}\n\nReturn the job kind, files changed, and whether validator and import passed.`,
`Implement this new async job kind coherently, editing files directly in the repo, mirroring ZipService/ForkService and following the plan. Keep the *JobOut schema, routes, Devii tools, and docs in agreement. Then run the per-language checks (py_compile + pyflakes for Python, node --check for JS, brace balance for CSS, tag and {% %} balance for templates) and "python -c \\"from devplacepy.main import app\\"". Do not write tests here. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nJob request: ${ask}\n\nPlan:\n${JSON.stringify(plan, null, 2)}\n\n${CHECKLIST}\n\n${RULES}\n\nReturn the job kind, files changed, and whether the checks and the import passed.`,
{ label: 'implement', phase: 'Implement', schema: BUILD_SCHEMA }
)
@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ const gaps = audits
let gapFix = 'no actionable gaps'
if (gaps.length) {
gapFix = await agent(
`Close these job-service gaps with minimal root-cause fixes in the repo, then re-run "hawk .". Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nGaps:\n${JSON.stringify(gaps, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}`,
`Close these job-service gaps with minimal root-cause fixes in the repo, then re-run the per-language checks. Do not run the suite. Do not commit.\n\nGaps:\n${JSON.stringify(gaps, null, 2)}\n\n${RULES}`,
{ label: 'fix-gaps', phase: 'Fix' }
)
}

3
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ notification-private.pem
notification-private.pkcs8.pem
notification-public.pem
.pytest_cache/
.ruff_cache/
.opencode
.dpc/
.claude/settings.local.json
devii_*.db
devii_*.db-shm
devii_*.db-wal

636
ARCHITECTURE.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,636 @@
# DevPlace architecture atlas
Author: retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
Every diagram below was derived from the source tree, the live SQLite schema and the imported FastAPI app object, not from the documentation. Where the repository documentation and the running code disagree, the disagreement is recorded in the last section.
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| python files | 644 |
| routers | 38 |
| http paths | 348 |
| websockets | 12 |
| services | 27 |
| db tables | 102 |
| agent tools | 318 |
| test functions | 3073 |
## 01 Deployment topology
Source: `docker-compose.yml / Dockerfile / nginx/nginx.conf.template`
Two containers on one bridge network, on a single host. nginx is the only published listener and binds to loopback only. The app container bind-mounts the repository root, so the production process reads the same SQLite file and the same `data/` tree as `make dev`.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"13px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
client["Browser / API client / Telegram / devRant client"]
subgraph host["Single host"]
subgraph appnet["docker network: appnet"]
nginx["nginx container<br/>127.0.0.1:PORT to :80<br/>8 websocket upgrade locations"]
app["app container<br/>uvicorn devplacepy.main:app<br/>--workers 2 --backlog 8192"]
end
repo["repository root<br/>bind mount .:/app"]
static["devplacepy/static<br/>read only mount"]
data["DEVPLACE_DATA_DIR = data/<br/>23 registered paths"]
sqlite[("data/devplace.db<br/>SQLite, WAL, 256MB mmap")]
lock["data/locks/devplace-services.lock<br/>flock, elects one service owner"]
docker["host Docker daemon<br/>ppy:latest instances"]
end
client --> nginx
nginx -->|"proxy_pass, X-Real-IP"| app
nginx -->|"/static/, /static/uploads/"| static
app --> repo
app --> data
data --> sqlite
app --> lock
app -->|"docker CLI backend"| docker
```
nginx depends_on app with condition service_healthy. App healthcheck: interval 30s, timeout 10s, retries 3, start_period 120s, start_interval 2s.
## 02 Worker boot and service election
Source: `devplacepy/main.py lifespan`
Every uvicorn worker runs the full lifespan. Schema work is serialized behind an exclusive lock so workers pay it one after another; background services are elected, so exactly one worker in the host owns them.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"13px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
s1["ensure_data_dirs<br/>creates all 23 DATA_PATHS"]
s2["init_lock<br/>exclusive flock on INIT_LOCK_FILE"]
s3["init_db<br/>idempotent columns and indexes"]
s4["ensure_certificates<br/>VAPID keys in data/keys"]
s5["service_manager.register x27"]
gate{"DEVPLACE_DISABLE_SERVICES set?"}
skip["services registered but never started<br/>test mode"]
bg["background.start<br/>per worker asyncio queue"]
elect{"acquire_service_lock"}
owner["set_lock_owner True<br/>supervise all 27 services"]
decline["declined, another worker owns them"]
vis["start_visit_flusher"]
serve(["serving on port 10500"])
s1 --> s2 --> s3 --> s4 --> s5 --> gate
gate -->|yes| skip --> vis
gate -->|no| bg --> elect
elect -->|"lock acquired"| owner --> vis
elect -->|"lock held elsewhere"| decline --> vis
vis --> serve
```
Shutdown reverses it: flush_visits, service_manager.shutdown_all, background.stop.
## 03 Request pipeline
Source: `devplacepy/main.py, verified against app.user_middleware`
Ten middlewares wrap every request. The order below is the real execution order read off the built middleware stack, outermost first. Two of them are plain ASGI classes; the other eight are `BaseHTTPMiddleware` dispatch functions.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"13px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
req(["incoming ASGI scope"])
m0["0 GZipMiddleware<br/>minimum_size 512, level 5"]
m1["1 TunnelDispatchMiddleware<br/>host matches a workspace tunnel?"]
tun["routers/tunnel.py<br/>handle_http / handle_ws"]
m2["2 response_timing<br/>request.state.request_start, X-Response-Time"]
m3["3 visit_statistics"]
m4["4 track_presence<br/>throttled last_seen write"]
m5["5 maintenance_middleware<br/>503 unless static, avatar, auth, admin"]
m6["6 rate_limit_middleware<br/>mutating methods only, per IP bucket"]
m7["7 add_security_headers"]
m8["8 await_pending_corrections<br/>drains sync AI correction futures"]
m9["9 refresh_db_snapshot"]
mounts["mounts: /static/uploads, /static/v{ts}, /static"]
routes["38 included routers"]
handlers["exception handlers<br/>404, 500, RequestValidationError"]
req --> m0 --> m1
m1 -->|"tunnel host"| tun
m1 -->|"normal host"| m2 --> m3 --> m4 --> m5 --> m6 --> m7 --> m8 --> m9
m9 --> mounts
m9 --> routes
routes --> handlers
```
Rate limiting reads rate_limit_per_minute and rate_limit_window_seconds from site_settings and exempts reads and the /openai gateway. Bucket key is X-Real-IP falling back to request.client.host.
## 04 URL surface
Source: `devplacepy/main.py include_router calls`
38 routers, each mounted under one prefix, grouped here by the concern they serve. Directory shape mirrors the URL: a domain with one resource is a flat module, a domain with several sub-resources is a package that aggregates its leaves in `__init__.py`.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart LR
app(["FastAPI app"])
subgraph identity["Identity and profile"]
r1["/auth - auth/"]
r2["/profile - profile/"]
r3["/avatar - avatar.py"]
r4["/follow - follow.py"]
r5["(none) - relations.py block, mute"]
end
subgraph social["Content and engagement"]
r6["/feed - feed.py"]
r7["/posts - posts.py"]
r8["/comments - comments.py"]
r9["/gists - gists.py"]
r10["/news - news.py"]
r11["/votes - votes.py"]
r12["/reactions - reactions.py"]
r13["/bookmarks - bookmarks.py"]
r14["/polls - polls.py"]
r15["/awards - awards.py"]
r16["/leaderboard - leaderboard.py"]
r17["/notifications - notifications.py"]
r18["/messages - messages.py"]
r19["/uploads - uploads.py"]
r20["/media - media.py"]
end
subgraph work["Projects and compute"]
r21["/projects - projects/ incl files, containers"]
r22["/p - proxy.py container ingress"]
r23["/zips - zips.py"]
r24["/forks - forks.py"]
r25["/issues - issues/"]
end
subgraph aiml["AI and tools"]
r26["/openai - openai_gateway.py"]
r27["/devii - devii.py"]
r28["/tools - tools/ seo, deepsearch, isslop"]
end
subgraph play["Play"]
r29["/game - game/"]
r30["/quizzes - quizzes/"]
end
subgraph platform["Platform"]
r31["/admin - admin/ 23 modules"]
r32["/docs - docs/"]
r33["(none) - push.py, seo.py"]
end
subgraph machine["Machine interfaces"]
r34["/api - devrant/"]
r35["/dbapi - dbapi/ read only"]
r36["/xmlrpc - xmlrpc.py"]
r37["/pubsub - pubsub.py"]
end
app --> identity
app --> social
app --> work
app --> aiml
app --> play
app --> platform
app --> machine
```
| Prefix | Paths | Prefix | Paths | Prefix | Paths |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| /admin | 92 | /profile | 17 | /gists | 5 |
| /projects | 46 | /issues | 13 | /messages | 5 |
| /tools | 27 | /dbapi | 9 | /notifications | 5 |
| /game | 23 | /auth | 6 | /uploads | 5 |
| /quizzes | 21 | /devii | 5 | /docs | 4 |
| /api | 20 | /posts | 4 | everything else | 36 |
## 05 Route fan-out
Source: `devplacepy/responses.py, schemas/, docs_api/, services/devii/actions/`
One handler serves four consumers. `respond()` feeds the same context dict to a Pydantic model and to a Jinja template, so a key missing from the `*Out` schema is silently absent from JSON while still rendering in HTML. The agent catalog and the docs registry are separate declarations that must be kept in step by hand.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"13px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
form["models.py<br/>Pydantic form model via Annotated Form"]
guard["guard: get_current_user<br/>require_user / require_admin"]
handler["router handler"]
helpers["database/ batch helpers<br/>get_users_by_uids, build_pagination"]
ctx["context dict"]
neg{"wants_json(request)"}
json["model.model_validate<br/>JSONResponse"]
html["templates.TemplateResponse<br/>extends base.html"]
action["services/devii/actions catalog<br/>Action, requires_auth mirrors guard"]
docs["docs_api endpoint()<br/>params and sample_response"]
seo["seo.py base_seo_context<br/>JSON-LD, sitemap entry"]
form --> handler
guard --> handler
handler --> helpers --> ctx --> neg
neg -->|"json accepted"| json
neg -->|"otherwise"| html
handler -.->|"same capability"| action
handler -.->|"same contract"| docs
html -.-> seo
```
wants_json is true when the request content-type starts with application/json, or Accept contains application/json and does not contain text/html. Registry sizes: 318 agent actions, 259 documented endpoint entries across 20 API groups, 122 prose docs pages.
## 06 Identity resolution
Source: `devplacepy/utils/auth.py`
A single resolver serves browsers, API clients, the devRant compatibility layer and issued access tokens. The result is memoised on `request.state` for the request and in a process TTL cache keyed by credential.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"13px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
start(["get_current_user"])
cached{"request.state._auth_user set?"}
sess{"session cookie<br/>64 hex chars"}
xapi{"X-API-KEY header"}
bearer{"Authorization: Bearer"}
basic{"Authorization: Basic"}
triple["try in order:<br/>users.api_key,<br/>devrant token 40 hex,<br/>access token 64 chars"]
user(["user dict"])
guest(["None, guest"])
gu["require_user: 303 to /"]
ga["require_admin: redirect to /feed"]
start --> cached
cached -->|yes| user
cached -->|no| sess
sess -->|match| user
sess -->|no| xapi
xapi -->|present| triple
triple -->|match| user
triple -->|no match| bearer
xapi -->|absent| bearer
bearer -->|present| triple
bearer -->|absent| basic
basic -->|"username-or-email:password, pbkdf2_sha256"| user
basic -->|no| guest
guest --> gu
user --> ga
```
Roles are stored capitalized as Admin or Member and tested through the is_admin global. Admin seniority is enforced per user mutation in routers/admin/users.py.
## 07 Background service fleet
Source: `devplacepy/services/manager.py, base.py, jobs/base.py`
27 singletons registered at boot, supervised only by the worker that won the service lock. Sixteen are long-lived loops on `BaseService`; eleven are queue consumers on `JobService`, which adds retention, concurrency and timeout settings on top and drains rows from the shared `jobs` table.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart LR
mgr["ServiceManager<br/>supervise, shutdown_all"]
settings[("site_settings<br/>enabled flag and interval per service")]
jobs[("jobs table")]
subgraph base["BaseService loops - 16"]
b1["NewsService"]
b2["BotsService"]
b3["GatewayService"]
b4["DeviiService"]
b5["PubSubService"]
b6["NotificationRelayService"]
b7["LiveViewRelayService"]
b8["PresenceRelayService"]
b9["IssueTrackerService"]
b10["ContainerService"]
b11["WorkspaceService"]
b12["XmlrpcService"]
b13["AuditService"]
b14["PushService"]
b15["TelegramService"]
b16["TelegramOutboxService"]
end
subgraph job["JobService consumers - 11"]
j1["ZipService"]
j2["ForkService"]
j3["SeoService"]
j4["SeoMetaService"]
j5["AwardService"]
j6["BackupService"]
j7["DbApiJobService"]
j8["DeepsearchService"]
j9["IsslopService"]
j10["IssueCreateService"]
j11["PlanningReportService"]
end
mgr --> base
mgr --> job
settings --> mgr
job --> jobs
```
Separate from the fleet, services/background.py offers a fire and forget queue per worker for audit writes, XP awards and notifications; when no consumer runs, as in tests, the callable executes inline so ordering stays deterministic.
## 08 Data layer
Source: `devplacepy/database/, devplacepy/config.py`
One SQLite file reached through `dataset`, called synchronously from async handlers by design. 102 tables exist in the live schema; 52 of them carry the soft delete pair and are restorable as one event from the admin trash.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
db[("data/devplace.db")]
subgraph g1["Identity and access - 14"]
t1["users, sessions, password_resets<br/>access_tokens, devrant_tokens<br/>user_relations, follows<br/>notification_preferences, user_customizations<br/>push_registration, email_accounts<br/>telegram_links, telegram_pairings, telegram_outbox"]
end
subgraph g2["Content and engagement - 16"]
t2["posts, comments, gists<br/>projects, project_files, project_forks<br/>attachments, news, news_images, news_sync<br/>polls, poll_options, poll_votes<br/>votes, reactions, bookmarks"]
end
subgraph g3["Reputation - 5"]
t3["awards, badges, award_usage<br/>user_activity, user_activity_seen"]
end
subgraph g4["Code Farm - 9"]
t4["game_farms, game_plots, game_quests<br/>game_cosmetics, game_market_ticks<br/>game_steals, game_treasury<br/>game_eras, game_era_results"]
end
subgraph g5["Quizzes - 5"]
t5["quizzes, quiz_questions, quiz_options<br/>quiz_attempts, quiz_answers"]
end
subgraph g6["Live delivery - 3"]
t6["messages, notifications, ws_tickets"]
end
subgraph g7["Devii - 8"]
t7["devii_conversations, devii_turns<br/>devii_tasks, devii_task_runs<br/>devii_lessons, devii_virtual_tools<br/>devii_behavior, devii_usage_ledger"]
end
subgraph g8["AI gateway - 6"]
t8["gateway_providers, gateway_models<br/>gateway_usage_ledger<br/>gateway_quota_rules, gateway_quota_resets<br/>gateway_concurrency_samples"]
end
subgraph g9["Jobs, tools and usage - 20"]
t9["jobs, backups, backup_schedules<br/>deepsearch_sessions, deepsearch_messages, deepsearch_url_cache<br/>isslop_analyses, isslop_reports, isslop_events<br/>isslop_dom_results, isslop_file_results, isslop_image_results<br/>seo_metadata, seo_usage<br/>issue_tickets, issue_comment_authors, issue_usage<br/>correction_usage, modifier_usage, news_usage"]
end
subgraph g10["Containers - 9"]
t10["instances, instance_events, instance_metrics<br/>tunnels, workspace_flags, workspace_quota_rules<br/>builds, dockerfiles, dockerfile_versions"]
end
subgraph g11["Platform state - 7"]
t11["site_settings, cache_state, service_state<br/>audit_log, audit_log_links<br/>visit_stats_hourly, visit_unique_slots"]
end
db --> g1
db --> g2
db --> g3
db --> g4
db --> g5
db --> g6
db --> g7
db --> g8
db --> g9
db --> g10
db --> g11
```
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart LR
root["DEVPLACE_DATA_DIR<br/>default repo/data"]
blobs["uploads, attachments, project_files<br/>sharded xx/yy on the uuid7 random tail"]
jobsdir["zips, zip_staging, fork_staging<br/>backups, backup_staging"]
reports["seo_reports, planning_reports<br/>dbapi, deepsearch, deepsearch_chroma"]
isslop["isslop, isslop_workspaces<br/>isslop_runs, isslop_media"]
ws["container_workspaces, workspace_state"]
keys["keys VAPID, bot, locks"]
dbs["devplace.db, devii_tasks.db, devii_lessons.db"]
root --> blobs
root --> jobsdir
root --> reports
root --> isslop
root --> ws
root --> keys
root --> dbs
```
config.DATA_PATHS registers 23 directories and ensure_data_dirs creates the whole tree before any write. Uploads live under data/uploads but are served at the unchanged /static/uploads URL.
## 09 Content rendering
Source: `devplacepy/rendering.py, static/js/ContentRenderer.js`
Two pipelines with a deliberate split: anything that exists at request time is rendered on the server for SEO, and the client pipeline is reserved for content that does not exist yet. Each has its own XSS control at a different point.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"13px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
subgraph server["Server, rendering.py, lru_cache"]
a1["raw text"]
a2["normalize dashes to hyphen"]
a3["emoji shortcodes, 4869 names"]
a4["mistune GFM, escape=True"]
a5["media pass: bare URLs to embeds, mentions to links"]
a6["mask emails on rendered text nodes"]
a7["render_content / render_title in template"]
a8["ContentEnhancer adds highlighting and copy buttons"]
a1 --> a2 --> a3 --> a4 --> a5 --> a6 --> a7 --> a8
end
subgraph client["Client, ContentRenderer.js"]
b1["live text: comments, DM bubbles, Devii, DeepSearch"]
b2["marked"]
b3["DOMPurify.sanitize, fail closed"]
b4["highlight.js"]
b5["media and autolink pass"]
b1 --> b2 --> b3 --> b4 --> b5
end
```
The server escapes at the markdown step, the client sanitizes after parsing. Server rendered content must not carry data-render, or both pipelines run over it.
## 10 AI plane
Source: `devplacepy/routers/openai_gateway.py, services/openai_gateway/, services/devii/`
Every model call in the product, internal or external, leaves through one gateway, which is where routing, quota and cost attribution live. Internal consumers call it over loopback HTTP rather than importing a client, so their spend lands in the same ledger.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
ext["external client<br/>/openai/v1/*"]
subgraph consumers["Internal consumers via INTERNAL_GATEWAY_URL"]
c1["services/devii"]
c2["services/correction<br/>AI correction and modifier"]
c3["services/news"]
c4["services/bot"]
c5["services/deepsearch + jobs/deepsearch"]
c6["services/dbapi nl2sql"]
c7["services/gitea enhance + planning"]
c8["jobs/isslop"]
end
gw["gateway.py<br/>routing.py, quota.py, usage.py<br/>reliability.py, vision.py"]
ledger[("gateway_usage_ledger<br/>gateway_quota_rules")]
stealth["stealth_async_client<br/>curl_cffi Chrome 146 fingerprint"]
up["upstream provider"]
subgraph devii["Devii assistant"]
d1["registry.py CATALOG<br/>318 tools"]
d2["role gating<br/>guest 108, member 246<br/>admin 312, primary 318"]
d3["45 tools behind CONFIRM_REQUIRED"]
d4["session, tasks, lessons<br/>virtual tools, behavior"]
d5["surfaces: /devii ws, Telegram, CLI"]
end
ext --> gw
consumers --> gw
gw --> ledger
gw --> stealth --> up
d1 --> d2 --> d3
devii --> c1
d4 --> d1
d5 --> d4
```
Cleartext loopback calls are forced to HTTP/1.1 in curl_transport.http_version_for, because the Chrome impersonation profile would otherwise negotiate HTTP/2 against an HTTP/1.1 only uvicorn.
## 11 Containers, workspaces and ingress
Source: `devplacepy/services/containers/, routers/projects/containers/, routers/proxy.py, routers/tunnel.py`
One shared image serves every instance. Reconciliation is a loop that compares desired state in the database against what the Docker daemon actually reports, and there are two independent ways in from the outside: a path prefix and a hostname.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
ui["/projects/{slug}/containers<br/>instances, schedules, workspace"]
api["services/containers/api.py"]
store[("instances, instance_events<br/>instance_metrics, tunnels<br/>workspace_flags, workspace_quota_rules")]
svc["ContainerService<br/>reconcile desired vs docker ps"]
wsvc["WorkspaceService<br/>provision, certs, quota, tunnels"]
backend["backend/docker_cli.py<br/>backend/fake.py for tests"]
image["single shared image ppy:latest"]
inst["running instance<br/>rootless workflow, aptroot"]
wsdir["data/container_workspaces/{uid}"]
proxy["/p/{slug}<br/>routers/proxy.py, relays headers verbatim"]
tunnel["host based tunnel<br/>TunnelDispatchMiddleware to routers/tunnel.py"]
code["workspace editor over websocket<br/>/projects/{slug}/containers/instances/{uid}/code"]
exec["terminal over websocket<br/>.../exec/ws"]
ui --> api --> store
svc --> store
wsvc --> store
api --> backend
svc --> backend
wsvc --> wsdir
backend --> image --> inst
proxy --> inst
tunnel --> inst
code --> inst
exec --> inst
```
Access uses stricter predicates than the rest of the product: owns_instance, can_view_project_containers, can_view_instance, can_manage_instance. The primary administrator sees and manages every container; any other admin can only view others on public projects and manage instances they own.
## 12 Real time plane
Source: `routers/*.py websocket handlers, services relays, nginx.conf.template`
Twelve WebSocket endpoints, each of which needs its own nginx upgrade location because the catch-all location strips upgrade headers. Fan-out to connected sockets goes through in-process hubs driven by relay services on the lock-owning worker.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart LR
subgraph sockets["WebSocket endpoints"]
s1["/devii/ws"]
s2["/messages/ws"]
s3["/pubsub/ws"]
s4["/tools/seo/{uid}/ws"]
s5["/tools/deepsearch/{uid}/ws"]
s6["/tools/deepsearch/{uid}/chat"]
s7["/dbapi/query/{uid}/ws"]
s8[".../containers/instances/{uid}/exec/ws"]
s9[".../containers/instances/{uid}/code"]
s10[".../code/{path}"]
s11["/p/{slug}"]
s12["/p/{slug}/{path}"]
end
subgraph relays["Relay services"]
r1["NotificationRelayService"]
r2["LiveViewRelayService"]
r3["PresenceRelayService<br/>track limit 500, online limit 30"]
r4["PubSubService"]
end
hubs["messaging/hub.py, pubsub/hub.py<br/>devii/hub.py"]
tick[("ws_tickets<br/>expiring auth tickets")]
s2 --> hubs
s3 --> hubs
s1 --> hubs
relays --> hubs
tick --> s2
```
Presence is authoritative from the relay: PRESENCE_TRACK_LIMIT sets the tracked online set, PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT only caps how many the feed panel displays, and PRESENCE_ONLINE_MARGIN_SECONDS provides hysteresis at the boundary.
## 13 Frontend
Source: `devplacepy/static/, devplacepy/templates/`
No framework and no package manager. 131 ES6 modules, one class per file, hung off a single global `app`; 33 of them are custom elements. 217 Jinja templates, of which 107 are the docs site.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart TB
base["templates/base.html<br/>extra_head for CSS, extra_js for JS"]
partials["shared partials<br/>_avatar_link, _user_link, _comment_section<br/>_post_card, _pagination, _sidebar_search"]
appjs["static/js/Application.js<br/>instantiated once as app"]
subgraph modules["131 ES6 modules"]
u1["utilities<br/>Http, Poller, JobPoller<br/>OptimisticAction, FloatingWindow, ScrollMemory"]
u2["33 custom elements<br/>components/ with dp- prefix"]
u3["feature modules<br/>chat/, devii/, autoload/"]
end
css["49 stylesheets<br/>variables.css tokens, per page files"]
vers["static_url in Jinja, assetUrl in JS<br/>/static/v{boot ts}/, immutable for a year"]
cust["per user CSS and JS injection<br/>custom_css_tag, custom_js_tag"]
base --> partials
base --> appjs --> modules
base --> css
base --> cust
vers --> css
vers --> modules
```
Per user customizations are configured only through Devii, stored in user_customizations, scoped globally or per matched route template, and run solely in that owner's own browser sessions.
## 14 Test and delivery topology
Source: `tests/, pyproject.toml, .gitea/workflows/test.yaml`
Three tiers separated by what they exercise, decided by fixtures, run serially in a single process against one uvicorn subprocess on port 10501 with a temporary database.
```mermaid
%%{init:{"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"background":"#F4F8F7","primaryColor":"#E4EEED","primaryTextColor":"#0F1A1B","primaryBorderColor":"#0A6D6A","secondaryColor":"#EDE6D9","tertiaryColor":"#F4F8F7","lineColor":"#6B7C7C","textColor":"#0F1A1B","fontFamily":"ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace","fontSize":"12px","clusterBkg":"#FAFCFC","clusterBorder":"#C6D4D3"}}}%%
flowchart LR
unit["tests/unit - 140 modules<br/>mirrors source module path<br/>local_db or no fixture"]
api["tests/api - 221 modules<br/>mirrors URL path<br/>app_server, seeded_db"]
e2e["tests/e2e - 131 modules<br/>mirrors URL path<br/>page, alice, bob"]
srv["uvicorn subprocess :10501<br/>temp SQLite, own DATA_DIR<br/>DEVPLACE_DISABLE_SERVICES=1"]
pw["Playwright Chromium<br/>session scoped context"]
ci["Gitea Actions on push and PR to master<br/>full suite under coverage"]
prod["promotion to production<br/>docker compose"]
unit --> ci
api --> srv --> ci
e2e --> srv
e2e --> pw --> ci
ci --> prod
```
pytest-xdist is not a dependency and -n is rejected centrally, so no tier can be parallelised by accident.
## 15 Findings
Source: `measured against the repository documentation`
The structure holds up: the router tree mirrors the URL tree, the test tree mirrors both, every runtime path is registered in one place, and every model call has a single exit. The items below are the places where the running code and the written record have drifted apart, or where a structure exists that nothing currently uses. None of them is a functional defect.
### Middleware order in the documentation is stale
The root CLAUDE.md states that response_timing is the outermost middleware. Measured from app.user_middleware it is third, behind GZipMiddleware and TunnelDispatchMiddleware, both added after it. The consequence is minor but real: X-Response-Time excludes compression time and excludes tunnel-host dispatch entirely.
### Two catalogue counts have drifted
CLAUDE.md cites around 2882 tests and an events.md catalogue of 288 keys. Measured now: 3073 functions named test_ across 492 modules, and 312 distinct dotted event keys in events.md. Both are undercounts in the docs, not missing implementation.
### instance_schedules is declared soft-deletable but has no table
It appears in database.SOFT_DELETE_TABLES and in the routers under /projects/{slug}/containers/schedules, but no such table exists in the live schema. dataset creates it lazily on first insert, so this is correct only for as long as every read path tolerates the table being absent.
### Three legacy container tables still exist
builds, dockerfiles and dockerfile_versions are present in the live database. The project replaced per-project images with the single shared ppy:latest image and ships devplace containers prune-builds as the one-time cleanup for exactly these rows. The tables are still carried.
### Five duplicate OpenAPI operation IDs
Generating the schema warns on editor_proxy twice in routers/projects/containers/workspace.py, passthrough in routers/openai_gateway.py, and proxy_http twice in routers/proxy.py. These are catch-all routes registered for several methods, so a generated client would collide on those names.
### The one deliberate asymmetry is documented and intentional
routers/__init__.py holds nothing but the attribution line; unlike every nested router package, the top level does not aggregate. main.py performs all 38 include_router calls directly, which keeps prefix ownership in a single readable block.
---
Sources: devplacepy/main.py, the imported FastAPI app object, data/devplace.db sqlite_master, and the working tree at HEAD 192df12b with uncommitted local modifications present. Counts exclude __pycache__ and the virtual environment.

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@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
## 2026-06-19 🟢
- Block and mute user relations with API endpoints, CLI emoji-sync command, and content filtering
## 2026-06-18 🟢
- News service with image dedup, AI grading, featured/landing auto-rotation and admin lock
- Server-rendered content pipeline with Telegram pairing, response timing, and admin user index
- AI Markdown reformatting for news articles with usage metering and sidebar cleanup
## 2026-06-17 🟢
- Backup download restricted to primary admin, admin-hidden projects invisible to other admins
- Access token system with CLI management and wildcard file type support
- Access token issuance with JSON/form login endpoint and token lifecycle management
## 2026-06-16 🔥 Big day!
- Gateway admin UI with provider and model routing for OpenAI gateway
- Backup management CLI commands and service layer with configurable data directories
- Audit logging for admin trash restore/purge and notification clear, plus SEO noindex for private projects and sitemap docs page refactor
- Instance lookup by name in addition to uid and slug, new terminal session service
- Keyboard-aware input visibility with ResizeObserver fallback for mobile message layout
- E2E comment hierarchy seed helpers for gists, news and projects
- Optimistic message insertion disabled to prevent duplicate bubbles
- Router tree documented in AGENTS.md with 14 new route entries
- Add dpc binary to container image and set executable permissions
- Remove .html and .svg from allowed upload types and MIME mappings
## 2026-06-15 🟢
- ASGI lifespan handler with background service orchestration and lock-based worker coordination
- Message chunking with sentence-aware splitting and configurable character limits
- Enforce hard test-coverage standard across DevPlace workflows and agents
- Audio file support with inline player and expanded allowed upload types
- Gist comment form integration with card-scoped comment targeting
- Bot account API key adoption for per-user gateway spend attribution
## 2026-06-14 🔥 Massive day!
- Admin/internal database API with CRUD, natural-language query, and read-only SQL execution
- DeepSearch research job queue with CLI prune/clear, Chroma vector store, and date-aware system message composition
- DeepSearch multi-agent researcher with grounded RAG chat and per-session vector store
- SEO Diagnostics tool with CLI management, live WebSocket progress, and static asset cache-busting
- OpenAI-compatible embeddings endpoint with model mapping and usage tracking
- Stealth HTTP client with curl_cffi transport adapter replacing raw httpx for outbound requests
- Bot monitor with live age badges and zoomable screenshots
- Author-interleaved feed ordering across all feed views and tabs
- Author diversity via interleaving (no per-author cap) for home and feed
- devRant API client library and example scripts in Python and JavaScript
- TTLCache-backed cache version reads with invalidation on bump
- Random client IP spoofing for load-testing traffic
- Deepsearch chat component attribute naming from data-* to direct properties
- Replace `python -m agents.validator` with `hawk` across all agent markdown files
## 2026-06-13 🔥 Massive day!
- Three-tier test suite with unit, API, and E2E directories mirroring source and endpoint paths
- Soft-delete audit for bookmarks, comments, follows, polls, project files, reactions, and bug create request event
- Notification preferences with per-user per-channel toggles and admin defaults
- Author diversity enforcement across home page and feed with personalized landing for authenticated users
- Shared free-text search across feed, gists, and projects listings
- Docs search with agent-powered Docii chat and admin-configurable search mode
- Devii agent audit log query action with filterable paginated endpoint
- Router directory-tree convention with admin audit log, AI quota, and container management endpoints
- Initial maintenance agent fleet with per-dimension code quality enforcers
- Unified blob sharding on uuid7 random tail across attachments, project files, and zip service
- Consolidated runtime data directory layout with migration CLI command
- Context-aware window control button visibility with font size boundary detection and minimize/normalize size presets
- Overflow-managed profile tabs with a "more" dropdown for narrow screens
- Startup jitter, randomized browser fingerprinting, and short comment styles for bot realism
- Sidebar search form with hidden field support and configurable placeholder
- Prevent titlebar double-click maximize when clicking buttons in FloatingWindow and DeviiTerminal
- Pin test server to single worker and use upsert for rate-limit settings to prevent spurious 429s
- DEVPLACE_DISABLE_RATE_LIMIT env var to bypass rate limiter in tests and middleware
- Fallback to location.origin when DEVPLACE_DOCS.base is missing
- Add claude-manual task-oriented guide page with cross-reference from claude.html
- Remove PWA install button and associated installer module
- Removed stale test files and fixed Gitea env teardown and ingress proxy test cleanup
- Locustfile seed data expansion and route exclusion documentation
## 2026-06-12 🔥 Massive day!
- Agent report system with codenames, timestamped output streams, and write-budget enforcement
- Tool-scoped payload filtering for worker agents with orchestration tool isolation
- Agent isolation and result caching in Maestro review sweep
- Concurrent read-only fleet check mode with per-agent cost tracking and contextvar-isolated findings
- Admin analytics and AI usage API response keys renamed, password change toggle added
- Gitea-backed bug tracker with list/detail/comment/status and AI-enhanced filing
- Bug detail page with admin/member role rendering and viewer_is_admin context flag
- Changed-files fast mode for maintenance agents with write-allowlist guard
- Partial config save with error reporting and password manager suppression
- Admin route cache-disabling headers via Cache-Control, Pragma and Expires
- Dirty-field tracking and server-side value sync for service config forms
- Rename `is_admin` to `viewer_is_admin` in bug detail schema, router, and template
- Bug tracker unavailable page with JSON and HTML 503 error responses
- Bot comments avoid repeating sibling opinions via thread-aware distinctness prompt
- Default Gitea repository changed from pydevplace to devplacepy
- Remove pytest-xdist parallel test execution, switch to serial single-process test runner
## 2026-06-11 🔥 Massive day!
- Platform-wide soft delete with deleted_at/deleted_by columns and admin trash management
- Owner-or-admin soft-delete enforcement on all content endpoints
- Unified image lightbox with attribute-wired opening and per-user media tab with soft delete
- Autonomous maintenance agent fleet with CLI entry point, Makefile targets, and dependency-free validator
- Seed-finding guided fix mode for maintenance agents with incomplete report tracking
- Audit log tables with CLI recording hooks
- Resolve merge conflict in pagination template and add admin-audit-log endpoint to docs API
- Bots documentation pages and session stop/reset commands
- Reduced nested comment indentation from 1.5rem to 0.25rem per depth level
- Reduce comment indentation multiplier and padding for nested replies
- Switch to dynamic viewport height and remove autofocus from message input
- Inline message layout with responsive height and auto-scroll
- Optional label attribute with hidden empty state for dp-upload component
- Mandatory retoor header added to all devplacepy source files
## 2026-06-10 🟢
- Port conflict detection and test isolation hardening across admin, avatar, bugs, landing, messages, and customization tests
- Container proxy routing via container IP instead of host port, with fake backend network simulation
- XDG-compliant devii tasks database path with DEVII_HOME override
- Project editing endpoint with 125k char body limit and remote URL attachment guard
## 2026-06-09 🔥 Big day!
- Container manager with Dockerfile CRUD, image builds, instance lifecycle, ingress proxy, and CLI commands
- Async project fork service with job queue, CLI management, and shared container image build
- Parallel test execution with per-worker isolated databases, data dirs, and uvicorn subprocesses via pytest-xdist
- Per-user customization suppression toggles with profile UI and Devii tool
- Customization toggle UI with enable/disable state management
- Unified shared Http and Poller utilities across all frontend modules, replacing inline fetch and setInterval patterns
- Responsive refinements for sub-360px screens, touch targets, safe-area insets, and mobile window controls
- Click-to-open profile dropdown with keyboard and outside-click dismissal
- Migrate hardcoded spacing values to CSS custom properties across multiple stylesheets
- Unicode escape normalization for emoji constants across codebase
- Consolidated upload ignore rules into a single directory-level gitignore entry
- Removed unused imports across routers, database, and services
- Remove project_set_private from confirmation-required actions and fix async test helpers
## 2026-06-08 🟢
- Admin AI quota management with CLI and admin panel reset controls
- API key management CLI with backfill command and auth support across session, API key, and HTTP Basic
- Per-project filesystem with directory and file CRUD, upload, and inline editing
- Async zip job framework with CLI management and zip archive download endpoints
- Add mistune dependency to project
## 2026-06-06 🟢
- Reactions, bookmarks, polls, extended sessions, and operational settings
## 2026-06-05 🔥 Massive day!
- Batch attachment linking, deduplicated mention notifications, and idempotent badge milestone checks
- Cursor-based load-more pagination across feed, gists, news and projects
- Canonical slug redirects, cursor-based next-page links, and OG image extraction across feed, gists, news, posts, projects, and profile
- TTLCache with LRU eviction, CLI role management, content unit helpers, database query functions, follow API with XP rewards, and news service with AI grading
- Unified comment form component with mobile touch optimizations across all CSS
- Inline comment previews on post cards with per-comment reply forms
- Comment template with threaded voting, author display, and attachment support
- Post-login redirect with `next` parameter and unauthenticated comment redirect to login
- Login redirect for unauthenticated admin, next parameter support with external URL rejection, and inline comment reply forms
- Seed comments created for all posts instead of only the first
- Replace uuid4 with uuid7 via uuid_utils for push notification JWT jti claims
- Coverage instrumentation for CI and local test runs with HTML report artifact
- Coverage configuration with subprocess measurement support
- Sitemap TTL configurable via environment variable and news_images schema migration
- Kill stale server process and add startup failure detection for Locust targets
## 2026-06-02 🟢
- Multi-worker service lock with cascading vote/comment cleanup on content deletion
## 2026-05-30 🟢
- Leaderboard route with gamification system (XP, levels, badges, stars) and content creation refactor
## 2026-05-28 🟢
- Cursor-based pagination for feed, notifications, and votes with thumbnail extension fallback
- Push registration returns creation flag and only sends welcome notification on first registration
## 2026-05-27 🟢
- AJAX vote buttons with live count updates across posts, gists, projects, and comments
- CSS-only card-link overlay replacing JS-driven data-href navigation
## 2026-05-25 🟢
- Unified notification click-to-navigate with comment anchor highlighting and dismiss refactor
## 2026-05-23 🔥 Massive day!
- Web push notifications with PWA manifest and service worker registration
- Web push notifications with PWA offline shell and install prompt
- Unified badge, notification, and content enrichment system with star tracking helpers
- Aggregate star counts across posts, projects and gists for profile and top-author ranking
- Content editing and deletion with cascading cleanup, avatar image helper, HTTP form POST, text input cursor management, and toast flash utility
- Share button with clipboard copy across detail pages, structured data schemas for gists and news articles, configurable site URL and rate limit, and production proxy headers support
- Production deployment workflow via git merge master into production
- Automatic production deployment on successful master push
- Removed automatic production deployment from CI pipeline
- Admin settings form with Pydantic validation and model-driven save
- Pydantic form models with validation for signup, login, password reset, comments, bugs, admin actions, and posts
- Type-safe integer settings with empty-value skip on admin save
- Input validation tests for votes, posts, profile, and signup endpoints
- Rate-limit environment variable and expanded Locust seed data for gists, notifications, and uploads
- TTLCache with ETag-based HTTP caching for avatar endpoint
- Dynamic language sidebar filtering based on existing gist language codes
- Vendor static assets for CodeMirror, highlight.js, marked, and emoji picker
- Test server log capture via tempfile with reduced log verbosity
- DOMPurify XSS sanitization for client-side rendered markdown content
- Add mobile-web-app-capable meta tag for PWA support
- Topnav notification bell selector scoped to /notifications href
- Fix notification bell icon locator to use explicit href selector instead of first match
- Remove stale import of get_users_by_uids from project_detail endpoint
## 2026-05-22 🟢
- News article HTML sanitization CLI command and database migration
## 2026-05-19 🟢
- Avatar generation exception logging with full traceback
- Fix multiavatar import path and add required arguments to function call
## 2026-05-16 🟢
- Clickable post titles and content with downvote support on feed and detail pages
- Interactive vote buttons and clickable post titles on profile page
- Handle @-mention with preceding text in content rendering
- Unread notification cache invalidation across comments, follows, messages, votes, and mentions
- Compact send button, attachment upload container, and auto-scroll on message thread load
- GistEditor lazy init with modal observer, CodeMirror Rust mode removed, emoji picker module type, source textarea required removed, projects tab spacing and settings button removed
- Add space between icon and label in feed navigation tabs
## 2026-05-15 🟢
- Python 3.13 base image, default port 10500, and nginx template to conf.d migration
- Responsive mobile navigation and messages layout with hamburger menu and back button
- Responsive breakpoint widened from 768px to 1024px for topnav, breadcrumb and page layouts
## 2026-05-14 🟢
- Migrate from deprecated `datetime.utcnow()` to timezone-aware `datetime.now(timezone.utc)` across the entire codebase
- Wait-for-url stabilization in noindex tests for messages and notifications pages
- Disable parallel test execution in CI pipeline
## 2026-05-13 🟢
- Migrate all TemplateResponse calls to pass request as first positional argument
- Attachment linking and deletion refactored into dedicated module with batch support
- Parallelised integration test suite with xdist worker port isolation
- Remove deprecated imghdr dependency and fix icon spacing in bug report buttons
- Replace hardcoded pytest.BASE_URL with conftest BASE_URL in attachment tests
- CI trigger branch from main to master
## 2026-05-12 🟢
- News service with admin curation, landing page articles, and comment support
- Mention notification system across bugs, comments, messages, posts, and projects with user search API
- Gists page with code snippet sharing, voting, and comment integration
## 2026-05-11 🔥 Big day!
- Unified threaded comment system with polymorphic target support across posts, projects, and bugs
- News management system with admin panel, pagination, and SEO sitemap integration
- News background service framework with CLI management, bug reports router, and admin services monitoring
- Admin panel with user management CLI, SEO metadata, and production deployment config
- Multiavatar local SVG generation with WAL mode SQLite and Locust load testing
- CI branch target renamed from main to master and test fixtures refactored for explicit login and seeded database
- Test fixture improvements with debug logging, stderr capture, and extended startup timeout
- Remove hawk static analysis step from CI test workflow
## 2026-05-10 🚀 First commit!
- Initial project scaffold with FastAPI SSR app, auth, feed, posts, comments, projects, profile, messages, notifications, and voting
- DiceBear avatar proxy with style picker on signup and profile, threaded comments
- Image upload support for posts with daily topic display on landing and feed
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Summary: 194 commits over 29 active days. The project launched on May 10 with the initial FastAPI scaffold, auth, feed, and core content features. The biggest pushes came on June 13 (23 commits) delivering the three-tier test suite, soft-delete audit system, notification preferences, and author diversity enforcement; June 23 (23 commits) adding web push notifications, PWA support, content editing/deletion, and production deployment workflows; and June 14 (14 commits) introducing the admin database API, DeepSearch research system, SEO diagnostics, and the stealth HTTP client.

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@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ devplace devii tasks prune # disable every task whose owner may not
devplace gateway quota list # list AI gateway quota rules and current 24h spend
devplace gateway quota set --limit-usd N [--owner-kind K] [--owner-id ID] [--app-reference APP] [--label L] [--uid UID]
devplace gateway quota delete <uid> # delete a quota rule
devplace gateway quota reset [--owner-kind K] [--owner-id ID] [--app-reference APP] # clear the counted 24h spend (keeps the usage history)
devplace zips prune # delete expired zip archives + job rows
devplace zips clear # delete every zip archive + job row
devplace forks prune # delete expired completed fork job rows (forked projects persist)
@ -85,6 +86,8 @@ devplace game steals prune # delete Code Farm raid records older than the raid-
devplace game era status # show the current Code Farm Era
devplace game era start <name> [--days N] # start a Code Farm Era (default 28 days)
devplace game era end # end the running Code Farm Era (ranks, awards Stars, records results)
devplace accounts pending # list deleted accounts awaiting their purge
devplace accounts prune # permanently purge accounts past the deletion grace window (--dry-run to preview)
devplace backups list # list recorded backups
devplace backups run <database|uploads|keys|full> # enqueue a backup (processed by the running server)
devplace backups prune # remove backup records whose archive file is missing
@ -118,6 +121,7 @@ Tests run on port 10501 with a tempfile SQLite DB and a dedicated `DEVPLACE_DATA
| `DEVPLACE_WEB_WORKERS` / `--workers` | `nproc` (prod) | Uvicorn worker count; `make prod WEB_WORKERS=N` to override. |
| `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `60` | How long after a user's last activity they still count as online. `config.PRESENCE_WRITE_SECONDS` (half of it) throttles `last_seen` writes per worker. |
| `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT` | `30` | Max avatars in the feed's live "Online now" panel. |
| `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_TRACK_LIMIT` | `500` | Size of the online set the presence relay tracks and publishes as the authority for every avatar dot. `PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT` only caps how many of them the feed panel *displays*. |
| `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_ONLINE_MARGIN_SECONDS` | `20` | Grace margin (hysteresis) before an online user is dropped, kills dot/roster flicker at the boundary. |
| `DEVPLACE_DATA_DIR` | `<repo>/data` | Single root for ALL runtime/user-generated data OUTSIDE the package and OUTSIDE `/static`. Point at a volume in prod. |
| `DEVPLACE_OUTBOUND_PROXY_URL` | unset | Fallback for the `outbound_proxy_url` site setting (below) when the DB/settings row is unavailable (early CLI contexts). Prefer configuring the setting via `/admin/settings` - it applies live with no restart. |
@ -136,6 +140,8 @@ Nested `CLAUDE.md` files (loaded automatically by Claude Code only when a file i
| `devplacepy/services/devii/CLAUDE.md` | Devii assistant: sessions/channels, scheduler, virtual tools, self-configured behavior, client browser tools |
| `devplacepy/services/openai_gateway/CLAUDE.md` | AI gateway: `/openai/v1/*`, usage ledger, provider/model routing |
| `devplacepy/services/jobs/CLAUDE.md` | Async job services: zip, fork, SEO diagnostics, SEO metadata, DeepSearch, AI Usage Analyzer |
| `devplacepy/services/moderation/CLAUDE.md` | Trust and safety: the reportable-target registry, the content filter and its five choke points, the report queue and its atomic resolution, enforcement, consent, maturity, account deletion |
| `devplacepy/services/acceptance/CLAUDE.md` | Acceptance convergence: the opt-in service that grants every policy agreement to every account that has not declined it, its invisibility contract and the ledger-as-decline-register rule |
| `devplacepy/services/audit/CLAUDE.md` | Audit log: recorders, categories, retention |
| `devplacepy/services/backup/CLAUDE.md` | Backup service: targets, worker, schedules, primary-admin-only download |
| `devplacepy/services/telegram/CLAUDE.md` | Telegram bot bridge |
@ -147,6 +153,7 @@ Nested `CLAUDE.md` files (loaded automatically by Claude Code only when a file i
| `devplacepy/services/bot/CLAUDE.md` | `BotsService` fleet |
| `devplacepy/services/dbapi/CLAUDE.md` | `/dbapi` primary-admin-only read-only database API |
| `devplacepy/services/pubsub/CLAUDE.md` | Database-free pub/sub bus |
| `devplacepy/push/CLAUDE.md` | Push notification providers: the `PushProvider` protocol, the registry, Web Push and APNs, registration storage |
| `devplacepy/services/game/CLAUDE.md` | Code Farm idle game (economy invariants, raids, the one-pure-function rule) |
| `devplacepy/services/quiz/CLAUDE.md` | Quizzes (the terminal publish lock, attempt atomicity, answer-key withholding, AI free-text grading, the best-attempt scoreboard) |
| `devplacepy/services/CLAUDE.md` | Background task queue, AI correction/modifier, presence, live view relay, `BaseService`/`ServiceManager` |
@ -157,7 +164,7 @@ Nested `CLAUDE.md` files (loaded automatically by Claude Code only when a file i
| `devplacepy/templates/CLAUDE.md` | Modal system, CDN libraries, shared template partials |
| `tests/CLAUDE.md` | Detailed testing patterns and pitfalls |
`isslop/` at the repo root is a separate, standalone sibling project (own `pyproject.toml`, `Makefile`, port 18732) with its own `isslop/CLAUDE.md` - it is not a nested subsystem of the `devplacepy` package. The integrated engine that DevPlace actually runs (`devplace isslop analyze`, the `/tools/isslop` job service) is a distinct implementation documented in `devplacepy/services/jobs/CLAUDE.md`.
The AI usage analyzer (`devplace isslop analyze`, the `/tools/isslop` job service) lives entirely inside the package at `devplacepy/services/jobs/isslop/` and is documented in `devplacepy/services/jobs/CLAUDE.md`. There is no repo-root `isslop/` project.
## Architecture
@ -192,6 +199,7 @@ Routers in `devplacepy/routers/` are organised as a **directory tree that mirror
| `/api` | devrant/ package - see `routers/devrant/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/dbapi` | dbapi/ package, **primary-administrator-only, strictly READ-ONLY** - see `services/dbapi/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/game` | game/ package - see `services/game/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/reports`, `/admin/moderation`, `/workspaces` | reports.py, admin/moderation.py, workspaces.py - see `services/moderation/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/quizzes` | quizzes/ package - see `services/quiz/CLAUDE.md` |
| (none) | push.py (web push/PWA), docs.py (see `routers/docs/CLAUDE.md`) |
| `/pubsub` | pubsub.py - see `services/pubsub/CLAUDE.md` |
@ -248,7 +256,7 @@ Users and guests inject their own CSS and JS, scoped to a page type or globally,
### Container manager, Devii assistant, AI gateway, async jobs, audit log
DevPlace ships a Docker-backed **Container manager** (admin-only, one shared `ppy:latest` image, security-hardened rootless workflow via a `sudo` superclone and `aptroot`), the **Devii** in-platform agentic assistant (WebSocket terminal, per-owner-channel sessions, scheduler/reminders, self-learning lessons, user-defined virtual tools, self-configured behavior, browser-automation client tools), the **AI gateway** (`/openai/v1/*`, single point of truth for every AI call, per-user cost attribution, provider/model routing overlay), **async job services** (`JobService` base pattern: zip, fork, SEO diagnostics, SEO metadata generation, DeepSearch, AI Usage Analyzer), and an admin-only append-only **audit log** (`record`/`record_system` entrypoints, `events.md` catalogue of 223 keys, never raises into the caller). These are among the largest subsystems in the codebase - read their dedicated nested `CLAUDE.md` files (see Subsystem map) before working in any of them; do not assume prior knowledge from this summary.
DevPlace ships a Docker-backed **Container manager** (admin-only, one shared `ppy:latest` image, security-hardened rootless workflow via a `sudo` superclone and `aptroot`), the **Devii** in-platform agentic assistant (WebSocket terminal, per-owner-channel sessions, scheduler/reminders, self-learning lessons, user-defined virtual tools, self-configured behavior, browser-automation client tools), the **AI gateway** (`/openai/v1/*`, single point of truth for every AI call, per-user cost attribution, provider/model routing overlay), **async job services** (`JobService` base pattern: zip, fork, SEO diagnostics, SEO metadata generation, DeepSearch, AI Usage Analyzer), and an admin-only append-only **audit log** (`record`/`record_system` entrypoints, `events.md` catalogue of 288 keys, never raises into the caller). These are among the largest subsystems in the codebase - read their dedicated nested `CLAUDE.md` files (see Subsystem map) before working in any of them; do not assume prior knowledge from this summary.
### Telegram bot, email, devRant compatibility API, issue tracker
@ -258,22 +266,38 @@ Devii is also reachable over **Telegram** (one supervised long-poller subprocess
`devplacepy/seo.py` generates JSON-LD schemas (WebSite, BreadcrumbList, DiscussionForumPosting, ProfilePage, SoftwareApplication). Every router builds context via `base_seo_context(request, ...)`. Auth/messages/notifications are `noindex,nofollow`; profiles with fewer than 2 posts are `noindex,follow`. `/robots.txt` and `/sitemap.xml` are served by `routers/seo.py`. Full implementation map (template layer, heading hierarchy, slugs, related posts, performance, default OG image, SEO tests) is in `devplacepy/routers/CLAUDE.md`.
## The production database is never touched without explicit confirmation (hard rule)
`data/devplace.db` is the live production database, and `make dev`, `make prod` and the Docker stack all share it (see "Production deployment"). No agent-initiated command may read or write it, or anything else under `data/`, without the user's explicit, stated confirmation - not a one-click approval, a confirmation they wrote themselves after being told exactly what the command would do.
This is enforced, not remembered. `.claude/hooks/guard_production_db.py` runs as a `PreToolUse` hook on every Bash call and **denies** the command outright when it reaches production, naming the reason. The interesting case is the one that motivated the rule: a script that never mentions a path at all but imports `devplacepy` and therefore resolves `config.DATA_DIR` to the real database. The hook reads the script and decides on its content, so a scratch-database script passes and an unguarded one does not.
What the guard blocks: any command naming `data/devplace.db` or a production data directory, the `devplace` management CLI, `python -m devplacepy...`, and any inline `-c` or script file that imports `devplacepy` without a `DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL` override. What stays free: `make test` and `pytest` (the suite runs on its own temp database), `make dev`/`make prod`/`make docker-*`, the mandated import gate `python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`, and anything that sets `DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL` to a scratch file. `permissions.deny` in `.claude/settings.json` additionally refuses `Write`/`Edit` anywhere under `data/`, which the Bash hook cannot see.
The escape hatch is deliberately two-factor and must never be self-served: after the user has confirmed in their own words, the command may carry the literal token `I-HAVE-CONFIRMED-PRODUCTION-DB-ACCESS`, which downgrades the denial to a permission prompt the user still has to approve. **Never add that token on your own initiative.** Write disposable scripts against a temp database via `DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL`/`DEVPLACE_DATA_DIR` instead, exactly as "Rigorous correctness verification" already requires.
## Conventions (project-specific)
- **No comments, no docstrings in source.** Code is self-documenting.
- **Forbidden variable name patterns:** `_new`, `_old`, `_temp`, `_v2`, `better_`, `my_`, `the_`.
- **Outbound HTTP goes through the stealth client only.** Never instantiate a bare `httpx.AsyncClient(...)`/`httpx.Client(...)` for outbound traffic - build it via `devplacepy.stealth.stealth_async_client(...)`/`stealth_sync_client(...)`. The async factory routes bytes through **`curl_cffi` (curl-impersonate, BoringSSL)** behind an `httpx` transport adapter, so TLS JA3/JA4 and the HTTP/2 fingerprint match Chrome 146 byte-for-byte; falls back to a pure-httpx Chrome-aligned transport if `curl_cffi` is missing. Applies to news, gateway upstream, Devii/DeepSearch/SEO fetch, gitea, push, attachments. SSRF-guarded fetches via `net_guard.guarded_async_client(...)` get the fingerprint automatically. Sole exception: `routers/proxy.py` relays the user's own headers verbatim. **Load-bearing gotcha:** cleartext `http://` is forced to HTTP/1.1 (`curl_transport.http_version_for`) - the Chrome-impersonation profile defaults to HTTP/2, but a plaintext origin has no TLS/ALPN to negotiate h2 and uvicorn (HTTP/1.1 only) returns `400 "Invalid HTTP request received."` once a cleartext HTTP/2 body crosses ~128KB. Every internal AI consumer calls `INTERNAL_GATEWAY_URL` = `http://localhost:<port>/openai/v1/...`, so without this override a large Devii turn (big system prompt + tool list) fails on every request. `https://` keeps the HTTP/2 default. `stealth_sync_client` stays pure-httpx Chrome-aligned (no curl_cffi sync adapter). **Never bolt a hand-written browser-header dict (UA/`sec-ch-ua`/`Sec-Fetch-*`) onto a `stealth_async_client`/`stealth_sync_client` call** - curl_cffi's impersonation already emits an internally-consistent Chrome 146 identity across TLS, UA, and Client Hints; a caller-supplied header set claiming a different Chrome version or platform creates a UA-vs-TLS-vs-Client-Hints mismatch that is a textbook anti-bot tripwire (this was a real bug in Devii's `fetch_url`/`http_request` tool, fixed by deleting its hardcoded Chrome-131 header block). `stealth.detect_consent_gate(html)` recognizes the common JS-redirect cookie-consent wall pattern (DPG Media's `nu.nl` and sibling sites, and generically any page gated behind a `decodeURIComponent(...)` callback referencing a "privacy gate"/`consent.js`) - reuse it wherever a fetched page's real content sits behind that gate rather than special-casing a domain. `stealth_transport`/`stealth_async_client`/`stealth_sync_client` all accept a `proxy=` override, defaulting to `stealth.configured_proxy_url()` (the admin-editable `outbound_proxy_url` site setting, falling back to `DEVPLACE_OUTBOUND_PROXY_URL` when the setting is unset) - this is the only real fix for a destination that blocks by IP/ASN reputation (e.g. reddit.com returns an identical "blocked by network security" page across every TLS/header fingerprint tried, confirmed by testing curl_cffi's full impersonation list - it is blocking the datacenter ASN outright, not fingerprinting the client).
- **Outbound HTTP goes through the stealth client only.** Never instantiate a bare `httpx.AsyncClient(...)`/`httpx.Client(...)` for outbound traffic - build it via `devplacepy.stealth.stealth_async_client(...)`/`stealth_sync_client(...)`. The async factory routes bytes through **`curl_cffi` (curl-impersonate, BoringSSL)** behind an `httpx` transport adapter, so TLS JA3/JA4 and the HTTP/2 fingerprint match Chrome 146 byte-for-byte; falls back to a pure-httpx Chrome-aligned transport if `curl_cffi` is missing. Applies to news, gateway upstream, Devii/DeepSearch/SEO fetch, gitea, push, attachments. SSRF-guarded fetches via `net_guard.guarded_async_client(...)` get the fingerprint automatically. Sole exception: the reverse-proxy forwarding core `services/containers/forward.py` (and the three routers that call it - `routers/proxy.py`, `routers/tunnel.py`, the workspace editor route), which relays the user's own headers verbatim and therefore keeps a plain `httpx.AsyncClient`; bolting the Chrome identity onto it would overwrite the very headers it exists to forward. **Load-bearing gotcha:** cleartext `http://` is forced to HTTP/1.1 (`curl_transport.http_version_for`) - the Chrome-impersonation profile defaults to HTTP/2, but a plaintext origin has no TLS/ALPN to negotiate h2 and uvicorn (HTTP/1.1 only) returns `400 "Invalid HTTP request received."` once a cleartext HTTP/2 body crosses ~128KB. Every internal AI consumer calls `INTERNAL_GATEWAY_URL` = `http://localhost:<port>/openai/v1/...`, so without this override a large Devii turn (big system prompt + tool list) fails on every request. `https://` keeps the HTTP/2 default. `stealth_sync_client` stays pure-httpx Chrome-aligned (no curl_cffi sync adapter). **Never bolt a hand-written browser-header dict (UA/`sec-ch-ua`/`Sec-Fetch-*`) onto a `stealth_async_client`/`stealth_sync_client` call** - curl_cffi's impersonation already emits an internally-consistent Chrome 146 identity across TLS, UA, and Client Hints; a caller-supplied header set claiming a different Chrome version or platform creates a UA-vs-TLS-vs-Client-Hints mismatch that is a textbook anti-bot tripwire (this was a real bug in Devii's `fetch_url`/`http_request` tool, fixed by deleting its hardcoded Chrome-131 header block). `stealth.detect_consent_gate(html)` recognizes the common JS-redirect cookie-consent wall pattern (DPG Media's `nu.nl` and sibling sites, and generically any page gated behind a `decodeURIComponent(...)` callback referencing a "privacy gate"/`consent.js`) - reuse it wherever a fetched page's real content sits behind that gate rather than special-casing a domain. `stealth_transport`/`stealth_async_client`/`stealth_sync_client` all accept a `proxy=` override, defaulting to `stealth.configured_proxy_url()` (the admin-editable `outbound_proxy_url` site setting, falling back to `DEVPLACE_OUTBOUND_PROXY_URL` when the setting is unset) - this is the only real fix for a destination that blocks by IP/ASN reputation (e.g. reddit.com returns an identical "blocked by network security" page across every TLS/header fingerprint tried, confirmed by testing curl_cffi's full impersonation list - it is blocking the datacenter ASN outright, not fingerprinting the client).
- **Form validation is Pydantic-native.** Routers declare `data: Annotated[SomeForm, Form()]` (models in `models.py`); the global `RequestValidationError` handler re-renders auth pages with messages (400) or redirects other routes. Read raw `await request.form()` only when also reading an uploaded file alongside a model.
- **`RedirectResponse(url=..., status_code=302)`** - always pass `status_code` as an integer literal, never `status.HTTP_302_FOUND`.
- **Ownership checks:** compare `resource["user_uid"] == user["uid"]` before edit/delete (use `content.is_owner`). **Deletes additionally allow any admin:** `is_owner(...) or is_admin(user)` on every content delete endpoint, so an administrator may delete any member's content while members are limited to their own. Edits stay owner-only. Deletes are **soft** and cascade under one shared stamp - see `devplacepy/database/CLAUDE.md`.
- **All dates shown to users are DD/MM/YYYY** (European), rendered in the viewer's own timezone client-side. Timestamps are stored/emitted as UTC ISO. Use the `local_dt(iso, mode)`/`dt_ago(iso)` Jinja globals for any user-facing instant - they emit `<time data-dt>` and `static/js/LocalTime.js` reformats to local timezone with a `MutationObserver` for dynamic content. `format_date()`/`time_ago()` stay as plain-text helpers for JSON responses, no-JS fallbacks, and non-timestamp date fields (e.g. project `release_date`) - do NOT wrap those in `local_dt`.
- **Slug + UUID lookup:** resources with slugs accept either the slug or the bare UUID via `resolve_by_slug()`. Slugs are `make_combined_slug(title, uid)`, prefixed with the **random tail** of the UUID (never the leading bytes - same timestamp-collision reasoning as blob sharding).
- **Roles are stored capitalized:** `users.role` is exactly `"Admin"` or `"Member"`. Always test admin-ness through the `is_admin(user)` global (case-sensitive `== "Admin"`) - never hand-roll a lowercase compare. **Any write to `users.role` MUST call `database.invalidate_admins_cache()`.**
- **Admin seniority: a junior admin cannot manage a more senior admin.** Every per-user mutation in `routers/admin/users.py` is gated by `_is_senior_admin(actor, target)` - blocks (audits `result="denied"`) when the target is an Admin who registered earlier. Server-side, so it also covers Devii's admin tools.
- **Admin seniority: a junior admin cannot manage a more senior admin.** Every per-user mutation in `routers/admin/users.py` and `routers/admin/moderation.py` is gated by `is_senior_admin(actor, target)` (`routers/admin/_shared.py`) - blocks (audits `result="denied"`) when the target is an Admin who registered earlier. Server-side, so it also covers Devii's admin tools.
- **Never pass a `respond()` context key that collides with a Jinja global.** `respond(request, template, ctx, model=XOut)` feeds the same `ctx` to both the Pydantic model (JSON) and the template. A key like `is_admin`/`avatar_url`/`is_self` holding a non-callable value shadows the global across the whole inheritance chain, turning `{% if is_admin(user) %}` into `False(user)` -> `TypeError`, a 500 that fires only for the branch that calls the global. Name viewer/permission flags distinctly (`viewer_is_admin`, not `is_admin`) in both schema and context.
- **Project visibility (`is_private`) and read-only (`read_only`)** are owner-controlled flags on `projects`. Read access is gated by the single `content.can_view_project(project, user)` predicate at EVERY read surface - never re-implement the check inline. Predicate: `not is_private OR is_owner OR (is_admin AND owner is not an admin)` - a project hidden by a member stays visible to any admin, but one hidden by an admin is visible only to that owner admin. **Containers have their own, stricter isolation predicates** (`owns_instance`, `can_view_project_containers`, `can_view_instance`, `can_manage_instance`) - the primary administrator sees/manages every container; any other admin can VIEW others' containers only on public projects and can MANAGE only instances they own. Read-only is enforced as a single data-layer guard `project_files._guard_writable(project_uid)` at the top of every mutation entrypoint - add it to any NEW file-mutating function. Devii may flip read-only/visibility only after explicit confirmation (`CONFIRM_REQUIRED`). Full UI-level detail in `devplacepy/routers/projects/CLAUDE.md`.
- **Deletions ALWAYS require confirmation:** `confirmation_error` gates EVERY content delete tool via `CONFIRM_REQUIRED` (`delete_post`, `delete_comment`, `delete_gist`, `delete_project`, `project_delete_file`, `delete_media`, `delete_attachment`, `admin_delete_news`, container delete, and any `container_exec` matching `dispatcher.DESTRUCTIVE_COMMAND`). The first call is refused; the agent must show the exact target then pass `confirm=true`. **Load-bearing: every confirmation-gated tool MUST also declare a `confirm` boolean param in its catalog spec** - schemas set `additionalProperties: false`, so a gated tool without a declared `confirm` param can never receive it and loops forever.
## Every user-generated surface is reportable by construction (hard rule)
A new content table added to `SOFT_DELETE_TABLES` that is visible to anyone other than its author MUST be registered in `database/moderation.py` `REPORTABLE_TARGETS`, MUST resolve in `resolve_object_url`, and MUST include `_report_button.html` in its action bar. A table that is genuinely private to its owner goes in `UNREPORTABLE_TABLES` **with its reason** instead. `tests/unit/database/moderation.py` computes the difference and fails the suite on anything unclassified, so report coverage is closed under future additions rather than remembered; the e2e coverage test enforces the third requirement.
The same rule keeps the untriggered app-store conditionals untriggered: **no social login, no payment path, no purchasable randomness, no advertising, and no cross-app tracking** may be introduced without also implementing the obligations each of them creates (Sign in with Apple, in-app purchase, odds disclosure, ad reporting, App Tracking Transparency). Full detail in `devplacepy/services/moderation/CLAUDE.md`.
## Modal pattern
`Application.js` `initModals()` toggles a `.visible` CSS class on `.modal-overlay`; the CSS rule `.modal-overlay.visible { display: flex; }` handles visibility. Triggers usually have `href="#"`, so call `e.preventDefault()`. `.modal-close` is wired generically - no inline JS needed. Full modal/partial/CDN detail in `devplacepy/templates/CLAUDE.md`.
@ -331,9 +355,10 @@ A new public read almost always needs all four. The cardinal failure mode is cha
2. **Data layer.** `database/` for query/batch helpers (never inline N+1 loops - use `get_users_by_uids`, `build_pagination`, `_in_clause`; guard raw SQL with `if "table" in db.tables`). `models.py` for the Pydantic `Form` input model. `schemas/` for the `*Out` JSON response model - every context key a JSON route exposes via `respond(..., model=XOut)` MUST exist on `XOut` or it is silently dropped. Schema auto-syncs via `dataset`; add indexes in `init_db()` with `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS`.
3. **Server layer.** Handler with the right auth guard (`get_current_user` public read, `require_user` member POST, `require_admin` admin). Specific paths (`/{username}/followers`) declared before catch-alls (`/{username}`). Return HTML+JSON via `respond(request, template, ctx, model=XOut)` or pure JSON via `JSONResponse`. Register any NEW router in `main.py`.
4. **View layer.** Extend `base.html`; page CSS in `{% block extra_head %}`, page JS in `{% block extra_js %}`. Reuse partials and template globals. JS is ES6 modules, one class per file, instantiated on `app`.
5. **Agent + docs layer (the most-forgotten step - do not skip).** `services/devii/actions/catalog.py` - add an `Action` tool if a user could ask Devii to do this (`requires_auth=False` for public reads). `docs_api.py` - every public/auth endpoint gets an `endpoint()` entry with params and a `sample_response`. `routers/docs/pages.py` `DOCS_PAGES` for prose pages. SEO (`seo.py`) - `base_seo_context` and any JSON-LD for a new public page; add to `routers/seo.py` sitemap if indexable.
6. **Document.** `README.md` (product-facing, routes/config/dependencies/user-visible features), the relevant nested `CLAUDE.md` (any new mechanic, helper, pitfall, or cross-layer wiring), this root `CLAUDE.md` only when a NEW architectural rule or workflow step is introduced (not per feature).
7. **Validate.** Confirm a clean import (`python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`), check each touched language manually, grep for em-dash in touched files (neither the character nor its HTML entity - use a hyphen), and run `pyflakes`/`ruff check` on every touched file. **If the feature touches a spendable resource, a bounded state machine, or a read-then-write mutation reachable from more than one request path, also run the four-layer procedure in "Rigorous correctness verification" above** - it is the default for that shape of feature, not an optional extra. **Finish by running the full persisted test suite (`make test` - every tier, every test) and fixing any failure before the change is done.** Write new tests in the matching tier/path, following the required patterns above.
5. **Safety layer (skip only when the feature stores nothing and shows nothing).** If the feature adds a surface that carries user-generated content, register it in `database/moderation.py` `REPORTABLE_TARGETS` (or in `UNREPORTABLE_TABLES` with a reason), resolve it in `resolve_object_url`, and include `_report_button.html` in its action bar - the registry test and the e2e coverage test both fail otherwise. If it collects or transmits a new *category* of personal data, or sends anything new to a third party, update `/docs/privacy.html` and the app-store privacy declarations in the same change; that disclosure is part of the feature, not a follow-up.
6. **Agent + docs layer (the most-forgotten step - do not skip).** `services/devii/actions/catalog.py` - add an `Action` tool if a user could ask Devii to do this (`requires_auth=False` for public reads). `docs_api.py` - every public/auth endpoint gets an `endpoint()` entry with params and a `sample_response`. `routers/docs/pages.py` `DOCS_PAGES` for prose pages. SEO (`seo.py`) - `base_seo_context` and any JSON-LD for a new public page; add to `routers/seo.py` sitemap if indexable.
7. **Document.** `README.md` (product-facing, routes/config/dependencies/user-visible features), the relevant nested `CLAUDE.md` (any new mechanic, helper, pitfall, or cross-layer wiring), this root `CLAUDE.md` only when a NEW architectural rule or workflow step is introduced (not per feature).
8. **Validate.** Confirm a clean import (`python -c "from devplacepy.main import app"`), check each touched language manually, grep for em-dash in touched files (neither the character nor its HTML entity - use a hyphen), and run `pyflakes`/`ruff check` on every touched file. **If the feature touches a spendable resource, a bounded state machine, or a read-then-write mutation reachable from more than one request path, also run the four-layer procedure in "Rigorous correctness verification" above** - it is the default for that shape of feature, not an optional extra. **Finish by running the full persisted test suite (`make test` - every tier, every test) and fixing any failure before the change is done.** Write new tests in the matching tier/path, following the required patterns above.
Failures at any implementation step block the workflow - never skip a failed step.
@ -341,11 +366,59 @@ Failures at any implementation step block the workflow - never skip a failed ste
Gitea Actions workflow at `.gitea/workflows/test.yaml` runs on every push/PR to `master`: installs dependencies + Playwright Chromium, runs the full suite serially under coverage, publishes coverage HTML as an artifact, uploads failure screenshots. CI must be green before merging. Changes move through DTAP: Development (`make dev`) -> Test (CI suite + coverage on `master`) -> Acceptance (`master` to `production` promotion via `make deploy`) -> Production (Docker Compose stack). Only CI-green `master` commits are promoted to `production`.
## Diagnosing a production failure (the order that finds it fastest)
This procedure exists because a single "the editor is down" report turned out to be **three unrelated faults stacked on each other** (a stale URL, a firewalled network leg, and a corrupt database), and the investigation wasted hours by guessing before measuring. Work the layers outward from the browser; each step is cheap and each one eliminates a whole class of cause. **Never skip to a hypothesis, and never repair anything before the layer above it is proven healthy.**
**Layer 0 - is the request even arriving here?** Fetch the hostname over the public internet exactly as it resolves (`curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{remote_ip}' https://host/`). Compare the answering IP against this machine's own addresses (`ip -6 addr`, `curl https://api.ipify.org`). Two hostnames serve this platform by different routes - see the topology section above. **Never use `curl --resolve` to force a hostname onto an IP it does not resolve to**; that fabricates a path that no real traffic takes and produces confident, wrong conclusions.
**Layer 1 - which edge answered?** The error body identifies it. `application/problem+json` with `No site configured for host` is molohttp. A DevPlace HTML error page is the application. An nginx error page is the nginx container. A browser `ERR_*` with no body means nothing well-formed was returned at all.
**Layer 2 - same failure on both hostnames?** Run the identical authenticated request against `pravda.education` and `devplace.net`. Failing on **both** means the application or the database; failing on **one** means that host's edge. This single comparison is the highest-value measurement available and costs one command.
**Layer 3 - the application log, before any theory.** `docker logs --since 5m devplace-app-1`. Count error classes rather than reading prose (`grep -c malformed`). A recurring service-loop error is a systemic fault even when it looks unrelated to the symptom.
**Layer 4 - reproduce the failing hop in isolation.** Point the real code at the real upstream from a scratch harness rather than reasoning about it. Running `forward.proxy_http` against a live code-server is what exposed the duplicate `Date` header; reading the function had not. Use a scratch database (`DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL`) so the harness never reaches production.
**Layer 5 - test from where the code actually runs.** The app runs **inside a container**; `127.0.0.1` there is not the host. `docker exec devplace-app-1 curl ...` is the only honest reachability test for a container-to-container hop. A hang with zero bytes means a packet was **DROPped** (firewall), a refusal means nothing is listening, and a slow error means the upstream answered badly - three different causes with three different fixes.
**Layer 6 - confirm the object exists before blaming the plumbing.** A 404 from a guard is not a proxy failure. Resolve the identifier through the application's own read surface (the workspace page, an admin JSON endpoint) with the affected account's session. A stale instance uid in a bookmarked URL looks exactly like an outage.
### Rules learned the hard way
- **State what a command will read or write before running it against production, and keep production access read-only until the diagnosis is complete.** The one write in a repair is the final swap, and it comes after verification, not before.
- **Copy before repairing, and copy the whole set.** A WAL-mode SQLite database is `.db` **plus** `-wal` **plus** `-shm`; a `.db`-only copy silently discards every transaction still in the WAL. Stop writes first, or the snapshot is inconsistent. Never leave a stale `-wal` beside a recovered file - SQLite will replay it and re-corrupt the result.
- **Repair on a copy, verify on the copy, and prove what was preserved.** `PRAGMA integrity_check` names the damaged objects; index damage is derived data and costs nothing (`REINDEX`, or `.recover`), while a table b-tree fault is the only kind that can lose rows. Diff row counts table by table between the original and the recovered file and report the delta - "it says ok" is not evidence that data survived.
- **Verify the fix through the user's own path, with their account, in a real browser.** A green unit test and a 200 from `curl` did not prove the editor worked; driving Playwright through login, the code-server password prompt and a `.monaco-workbench` selector did.
- **A measurement recorded in these files can go stale.** `services/containers/CLAUDE.md` recorded that `container_ip:port` times out from the app container while `gateway:published_host_port` connects. A later change (`make docker-attach`) inverted it, and a host firewall closed the documented leg entirely. Re-measure before trusting a recorded measurement, and update the record when it turns out to be false.
- **Report each fault separately and correct yourself explicitly.** Three stacked faults produce a symptom that no single explanation covers, and an early wrong theory is worse than no theory once it is repeated as fact.
## Production hostnames and the devplace.net SSH tunnel (verified topology, do not re-derive)
**The platform answers on two public hostnames, and they reach the same application by two completely different paths.** This has already cost one debugging session; the failure mode is that a `curl --resolve devplace.net:443:<production ip>` "test" reports `No site configured for host: devplace.net` and looks like a total outage, when in fact devplace.net never touches the production edge at all.
| | `pravda.education` | `devplace.net` |
|---|---|---|
| DNS | `95.216.15.238`, `2a01:4f9:2a:100e::2` | `88.198.21.243`, `2a01:4f8:222:2c45::2` |
| Machine | the production host itself | a separate front host (Hetzner, PTR `static.88-198-21-243.clients.your-server.de`) |
| Path in | molohttp on `:443` -> `127.0.0.1:10500` | its own proxy -> **SSH tunnel** -> `127.0.0.1:10500` on production |
| Reaches molohttp | yes | **no, never** |
**`devplace.net` is a front host that forwards over SSH.** It holds a persistent SSH session into the production host (visible there as an established inbound connection from `88.198.21.243` to port 22) and forwards through it to `127.0.0.1:10500`, which is the `docker-proxy` for the `devplace-nginx` container. The listening socket lives on the **front** host (an `ssh -L` style local forward), so the production host shows **no** sshd-owned listener - that absence is expected and is not evidence against the tunnel.
Two consequences that must not be forgotten:
- **molohttp has no `devplace.net` site, and that is correct.** Its site list is `mail`/`smtp`/`imap.molodetz.nl`, `pravda.education` and `*.tunnel.pravda.education`. devplace.net traffic enters below molohttp, straight into `127.0.0.1:10500`, so it needs no site. **Never "fix" this by adding a devplace.net site to molohttp** - devplace.net does not resolve to the production host, so such a site could never match, and its absence is not a bug.
- **Both hostnames land on the same nginx and the same app**, so a request that fails on both is failing in the application, not in either edge. That comparison is the fastest triage available here: run the same authenticated request against both hostnames. Same failure on both means look at the app or the database; a failure only on devplace.net means look at the front host's proxy (WebSocket `Upgrade` headers are the usual culprit, exactly as for the production nginx locations below).
**Testing rule.** Never point a hostname at an IP it does not resolve to in order to "test" it. Fetch each hostname over the public internet as it really resolves (`curl https://devplace.net/...` and `curl https://pravda.education/...`), because forcing devplace.net onto the production IP tests molohttp with a `Host` it deliberately does not serve and proves nothing about the real path.
## Production deployment
Single-host Docker Compose (`docker-compose.yml`): an **app** container (Uvicorn, 2 workers) behind an **nginx** container. Full operator reference is the admin-only `Production` docs section (`templates/docs/production*.html`); conventions that must not regress:
- **Shared DB and files = same as dev.** The app container bind-mounts the host project root (`.:/app`) and runs as `${DEVPLACE_UID}:${DEVPLACE_GID}` (default `1000`), so it reads/writes the same `data/devplace.db`, `data/uploads/`, `data/devii_*.db`, `data/keys/` (VAPID), and `data/locks/devplace-services.lock` as `make dev`. No `DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL` override - `config.py` resolves an absolute path under the project's `data/` dir. WAL + the `flock` on `devplace-services.lock` make concurrent dev/prod safe and keep a single background-services owner. SQLite is local-file, so prod and dev must be the **same host**.
- **Code updates need no rebuild** (bind-mounted source); rebuild only on `pyproject.toml` dependency changes. `.env` is git-ignored; `.env.example` is the committed template. The app reads `DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL`, never `DATABASE_URL`.
- **Code updates need no rebuild** (bind-mounted source); rebuild only on `pyproject.toml` dependency changes. Use **`make docker-reload`** (`restart app` + `up -d --wait`) to pick up new source - a bare `make docker-up` does **not** restart an unchanged container, so the running uvicorn keeps serving the code it imported at boot. `.env` is git-ignored; `.env.example` is the committed template. The app reads `DEVPLACE_DATABASE_URL`, never `DATABASE_URL`.
- **Dockerfile layer order is load-bearing for build time.** The dependency layer (`pip install ".[bots]"` + `playwright install --with-deps chromium`, ~3GB and ~2.5 min) must depend on `pyproject.toml` **only**. `COPY devplacepy/` therefore comes *after* it, and the project itself is installed last with `pip install --no-deps --force-reinstall .`. hatchling needs the package directory to exist to build a wheel, so the dependency layer creates a placeholder `devplacepy/__init__.py` that the real `COPY` overwrites (verified: site-packages holds the full 39-entry package, not the stub). Copying source before the install inverts this and makes **every source edit** reinstall every dependency and re-download Chromium - measured 2m36s per source-only rebuild versus 7.4s with the correct order. Never move `COPY devplacepy/` above the dependency layer.
- **nginx parity rules** (`nginx/nginx.conf.template`, rendered by `start.sh` via `envsubst` with an allow-list that preserves `$http_upgrade`): `/static/uploads/` must re-apply `nosniff` + a `Content-Disposition` via the `map $uri $upload_disposition` block (`inline` for safe image/video/audio extensions, `attachment` otherwise), mirroring `UploadStaticFiles.INLINE_MEDIA_EXTENSIONS` - an XSS control nginx would otherwise bypass, and the inline branch is what lets video play in production; `/devii/ws` needs the `map $http_upgrade $connection_upgrade` block and `Upgrade`/`Connection` headers or the Devii terminal cannot connect (every new WebSocket route needs its own nginx upgrade location - the catch-all `location /` strips upgrade headers); `client_max_body_size` comes from `NGINX_MAX_BODY_SIZE` (default `50m`) and must be `>= max_upload_size_mb` or uploads 413. nginx serves `devplacepy/static` via a read-only bind mount, so assets stay current without an image rebuild.
- **Healthcheck start period** (`start_period: 120s` in `docker-compose.yml`, `--start-period=120s` in `Dockerfile`): full startup takes ~110s (DB init, services, uvicorn workers). The start period must stay above that. Bump both files if startup grows.
- **Healthcheck cadence** (`docker-compose.yml` + `Dockerfile`, keep both in step): `start_period: 120s` is the grace window in which a failing probe does not count against `retries`; `start_interval: 2s` is how often the probe runs *inside* that window. Without `start_interval` the first probe only fires after the full `interval: 30s`, so a container ready in 5s still reports healthy at 30s and `depends_on: service_healthy` holds nginx back for no reason. The generous 120s start period is deliberate headroom for a cold page cache on a multi-GB database, not a measure of normal startup - normal startup is a few seconds. **Startup work is a per-worker, lock-serialized cost:** `lifespan` runs `init_db()` under an exclusive `init_lock()`, so every uvicorn worker pays it end to end, one after another, and total time-to-serving is `workers x init_db`. Never put a per-user or per-row scan in `init_db` - see the backfill convergence rule in `devplacepy/database/CLAUDE.md`.

View File

@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ WORKDIR /app
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
curl ca-certificates \
libglib2.0-0 libpango-1.0-0 libpangoft2-1.0-0 libharfbuzz0b libfontconfig1 \
fonts-dejavu-core \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Optional: the docker CLI so the (admin-only) container manager can drive the host
@ -18,22 +20,24 @@ RUN if [ "$INSTALL_DOCKER_CLI" = "true" ]; then \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* ; \
fi
ENV PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH=/ms-playwright
COPY pyproject.toml .
RUN mkdir -p devplacepy && touch devplacepy/__init__.py \
&& pip install --no-cache-dir ".[bots]" \
&& python -m playwright install --with-deps chromium \
&& chmod -R a+rx /ms-playwright
COPY devplacepy/ devplacepy/
ENV PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH=/ms-playwright
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir ".[bots]" \
&& python -m playwright install --with-deps chromium \
&& chmod -R a+rx /ms-playwright
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --no-deps --force-reinstall .
EXPOSE 10500
ENV DEVPLACE_WEB_WORKERS=2
ENV DEVPLACE_TEMPLATE_AUTO_RELOAD=0
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --retries=3 --start-period=120s \
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --retries=3 --start-period=120s --start-interval=2s \
CMD curl -f http://localhost:10500/ || exit 1
CMD ["sh", "-c", "DEVPLACE_STATIC_VERSION=${DEVPLACE_STATIC_VERSION:-$(date +%s)} exec uvicorn devplacepy.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 10500 --workers 2 --backlog 8192 --proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips '*'"]

View File

@ -135,10 +135,11 @@ test-cache-clean:
COMPOSE := docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.containers.yml
DEVPLACE_DATA_DIR ?= $(CURDIR)/data
DOCKER_GID ?= $(shell stat -c '%g' /var/run/docker.sock 2>/dev/null)
DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_NETWORK ?= bridge
export DEVPLACE_DATA_DIR
export DOCKER_GID
.PHONY: docker-build docker-up docker-down docker-logs docker-clean docker-prep ppy
.PHONY: docker-build docker-up docker-attach docker-reload docker-down docker-logs docker-clean docker-prep ppy
# Build the single shared container image every instance runs. Build once;
# rebuild only when ppy.Dockerfile, the sudo shim, or pagent change.
@ -153,6 +154,23 @@ docker-build: docker-prep
docker-up: docker-prep
$(COMPOSE) up -d
$(MAKE) docker-attach
# Workspace tunnels reach a container port that was never published on the host,
# so the app must sit on the same docker network as the instances it runs. The
# default bridge rejects the network-scoped aliases compose always sends, so
# this cannot live in docker-compose.containers.yml and is wired here instead.
docker-attach:
@app=$$($(COMPOSE) ps -q app); \
test -n "$$app" || { echo "app container is not running"; exit 1; }; \
docker network connect $(DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_NETWORK) $$app 2>/dev/null \
&& echo "attached app to the $(DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_NETWORK) network" \
|| echo "app is already on the $(DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_NETWORK) network"
docker-reload:
$(COMPOSE) restart app
$(COMPOSE) up -d --wait
$(MAKE) docker-attach
docker-down:
$(COMPOSE) down

144
README.md
View File

@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ make test-headed # same tests in visible browser
Open `http://localhost:10500`.
A measured structural overview of the whole application, fifteen Mermaid diagrams covering deployment, request pipeline, URL surface, data layer, AI plane, containers and the real-time plane, is in [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md).
PDF export (DeepSearch reports, via weasyprint) needs the Pango text stack installed at system level. The production image installs it; on a development host install it once:
```bash
sudo apt-get install -y libglib2.0-0 libpango-1.0-0 libpangoft2-1.0-0 libharfbuzz0b libfontconfig1 fonts-dejavu-core
```
## Stack
| Layer | Technology |
@ -40,7 +48,7 @@ devplacepy/
avatar.py # Multiavatar generation, URL builder
utils/ # Password hashing, session mgmt, time_ago, notification hook (package)
models.py # Pydantic schemas
push.py # Web push crypto, VAPID keys, encrypt/send/register
push/ # Push delivery: provider protocol, Web Push, APNs, registrations
routers/ # One file per domain (auth, feed, posts, push, ...)
templates/ # Jinja2 HTML templates
static/css/ # Page-specific CSS files
@ -60,6 +68,7 @@ devplacepy/
| `/gists` | Code gist listing, detail, creation, and editing; left panel offers language filtering and free-text `search` (title, description, and author username), public read |
| `/comments` | Comment creation, owner editing (`POST /comments/edit/{comment_uid}`), deletion |
| `/projects` | Project listing (left panel offers type filtering and free-text `search` over title, description, and author username), creation, owner editing (`POST /projects/edit/{slug}`), and per-project visibility toggles: `POST /projects/{slug}/private` (owner-only visibility) and `POST /projects/{slug}/readonly` (immutable files). A project hidden by a member stays visible to administrators, but a project hidden by an administrator is visible only to that owner administrator - other administrators cannot see it, its files, or its containers (web UI and REST API alike). The primary administrator (the first Admin account) is the single exception and retains full visibility |
| `/projects/{slug}` | Dedicated project page: one encompassing card with a cover banner and project logo (owner-uploaded through the standard attachment uploader), the title overlaid on the banner, status/type/platform chips, owner-set Website and Repository links, section tabs (Overview, Devlog, Screenshots, Comments, Files), an About section, the Devlog timeline of every post linked to the project (owners post updates straight from the page via the shared composer preset to the `devlog` topic), a Screenshots gallery built from image attachments (owners add more from the More menu), and a sidebar with links, stats and the author card |
| `/projects/{slug}/files` | Per-project filesystem: directory and file CRUD, upload, inline editing, and line-range operations (`lines` read, `replace-lines`, `insert-lines`, `delete-lines`, `append`) for surgical edits to large text files (public read, owner write; all writes refused while the project is read-only) |
| `/zips` | Zip job status (`/zips/{uid}`) and archive download (`/zips/{uid}/download`); archives are queued via `/projects/{slug}/zip` and `/projects/{slug}/files/zip` |
| `/forks` | Fork job status (`/forks/{uid}`); forks are queued via `/projects/{slug}/fork`. Any signed-in user can fork a project they can view into a new project they own; once the job finishes the response carries the new project URL |
@ -79,7 +88,11 @@ devplacepy/
| `/bookmarks` | Save/unsave content; `/bookmarks/saved` personal list |
| `/polls` | Vote on post-attached polls |
| `/follow` | Follow/unfollow users |
| `/block` | Block/unblock a user: hides all of their posts, comments and messages from you everywhere except their own profile, and stops them notifying you |
| `/reports` | Content reporting: `POST /reports/{target_type}/{target_uid}` files a report against any user-generated surface, `GET /reports/mine` lists the reports you filed and their outcome, `GET /reports/reasons` serves the reason registry so every client renders the same dialog |
| `/admin/moderation` | Admin **Moderation** queue: reported content oldest-open-first with the response-window badge, one report per detail page with the offender's history, triage (`/status`) and decisions (`/decide`) |
| `/workspaces/index` | Public index of every workspace published to the ingress proxy, with owner, project, maturity label and direct link |
| `/projects/{slug}/workspace` | A member's dev workspace for a project: open/start/stop/delete, quota and idle status, public tunnels, and the **Editor** card holding their editor preferences (`GET`/`POST /projects/{slug}/workspace/editor`) |
| `/block` | Block/unblock a user: hides all of their posts, comments and messages from you everywhere except their own profile, and stops them notifying you. Also reachable directly from every content action bar |
| `/mute` | Mute/unmute a user: stops them creating notifications for you while their content stays visible |
| `/leaderboard` | Contributor ranking by total stars earned |
| `/game` | **Code Farm** cooperative idle game (member-only): plant projects that build over real time, harvest coins and XP, upgrade CI, buy plots, and water friends' builds at `/game/farm/{username}`. Live over pub/sub; every endpoint negotiates JSON |
@ -195,6 +208,20 @@ The farm refreshes live over the pub/sub bus (a watered build appears on the own
XP awards are wired at the existing content-creation, vote, and follow hook points in the routers and centralized in `award_xp()` / `check_milestone_badges()` (`devplacepy/utils/`). Existing accounts have their XP and levels backfilled once from prior activity at startup (`init_db()`).
## Trust and safety
DevPlace is open in the sense that it does not editorialise technical opinion. It enforces a short, fixed list of prohibited categories, published as the [Community Guidelines](/docs/community-guidelines.html), and it has the machinery to make that enforcement real.
- **Automated filtering at post time.** Every user-authored text passes a classifier at the five places content is created or changed (content creation, content editing, comments, direct messages, profile and signup fields), covering every surface with no per-route code. The default mode is `review`, not `block`: a match is published **and** raises a report for a human, because a developer platform discusses exploits, malware analysis and violent subject matter as its work and a machine that suppressed that would destroy the product. Only sexual and exploitative content is refused outright. Classification failure falls back to review, never to publication. Tunable live at `/admin/settings` (`moderation_filter_mode`: `off`, `label`, `review`, `block`).
- **A report control on every surface.** Posts, comments, gists, projects, project files, news, uploads, direct messages, quizzes, polls, awards, profiles, issues, workspaces and assistant output are all reportable through one polymorphic endpoint keyed on `(target_type, target_uid)`, from one dialog, with one reason list. Reports are private to the reporter; the reported person is never told who filed.
- **One queue with a published response window.** `/admin/moderation` is worked oldest-open-first and carries a badge showing the age of the oldest unresolved report against `moderation_sla_hours` (default 24), so a breach is visible rather than assumed. Resolution is a single atomic conditional update: two administrators deciding at once produce exactly one decision, the second gets a 409.
- **Real enforcement, with a statement of reasons.** Remove or restore content, warn, suspend for a stated period, ban, lift, dismiss, or escalate. Every decision writes a permanent `moderation_actions` row plus an audit event, and tells the affected user what was decided and why. A suspended account can still read, still see why, still report, and still delete itself; it cannot create. A junior administrator can never action a senior one.
- **Blocking**, unchanged and independent of all of the above, is now reachable from the content itself as well as from a profile.
- **Age and maturity.** Signup collects a date of birth, derives an age band, and **discards the date**; accounts below `moderation_minimum_age` (default 16) are refused. Content labelled mature is hidden behind an interstitial until the viewer explicitly opts in, and the reveal is never offered to a minor age band for restricted content.
- **Consent.** Five versioned, independently withdrawable consents (`terms`, `privacy`, `ai_third_party`, `activity_recording`, `container_credentials`) with full history, managed at `/profile/{username}?tab=privacy` and changeable **only by the account holder** - an administrator reads the record but never grants or withdraws on someone else's behalf. **No content is sent to a third-party AI provider without `ai_third_party` consent**, enforced once at the gateway; the per-feature AI toggles remain as preferences subordinate to it. Withdrawing `activity_recording` stops presence recording. While recording is on, an indicator says so on every page. `container_credentials` is what lets software another member runs in a container receive your API key; running your own container never asks.
- **Account deletion.** Self-service at `/profile/{username}/delete`, reauthenticated with the account password. Sessions and tokens are revoked, the profile is anonymised immediately, and all content is removed under one deletion event that stays restorable for `account_deletion_grace_hours` (default 24) before `devplace accounts prune` (and the Moderation housekeeping service) purges it permanently. The devRant `DELETE /api/users/me` routes into the same cascade.
- **Legal pages**: [Terms of Service](/docs/terms.html), [Community Guidelines](/docs/community-guidelines.html), [Privacy Policy](/docs/privacy.html), [How moderation works](/docs/content-moderation.html), [Notice and takedown](/docs/intellectual-property.html) and [Contact](/docs/contact.html). All six are indexed in the sitemap and reachable from the docs index; the footer of every page links Terms, Privacy, Community Guidelines and Contact. Contact details come from the `contact_email`, `contact_phone` and `contact_address` settings, so the in-product page and any app-store trader declaration have one source of truth.
## Vibe coding (Alpha, admin only)
Build software by talking to an AI agent instead of typing every line. Create a project for storage, attach a container to it (the shared `ppy` image, your files mounted at `/app`), start it, and open a terminal. The whole flow is drivable conversationally through Devii. Inside every container three agents ship preinstalled and run on **your own API key**, so all AI usage is metered to your account: **DevPlace Code (`dpc`)**, a coding agent in the same class as Claude Code; **`botje.py`**, a plug-and-play DevPlace bot you can copy and customise; and **`pagent`**, a minimal zero-dependency agent. Each container is launched with `DEVPLACE_BASE_URL`, `DEVPLACE_OPENAI_URL`, `DEVPLACE_API_KEY`, `DEVPLACE_USER_UID`, `DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_NAME`, `DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_UID`, and `DEVPLACE_INGRESS_URL` already set. Publish a container port to a public URL at `/p/<slug>` by setting an `ingress_slug` and `ingress_port` (ask Devii to do it at create time). The feature is in **Alpha** and currently limited to administrators; the full walkthrough, including a tutorial that vibes a web app and puts it online, is at `/docs/getting-started-vibing.html`.
@ -221,6 +248,7 @@ The log is **administrator-only**. `/admin/audit-log` is a paginated, filterable
| `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `60` | Online-presence window: a user counts as online for this many seconds after their last activity. `last_seen` is refreshed by a throttled in-place update at most once per half this interval per worker (no per-load inserts, no data growth) |
| `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT` | `30` | Maximum avatars shown in the feed's live "Online now" panel (ordered alphabetically by username) |
| `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_ONLINE_MARGIN_SECONDS` | `20` | Grace margin before an online user drops to offline (hysteresis): online at the timeout, offline only after timeout + this. Prevents online/offline flicker for users hovering at the boundary |
| `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_TRACK_LIMIT` | `500` | Size of the online set the presence relay tracks and publishes on `public.presence.roster`. That one set is the single source of truth behind every avatar presence dot on every page; `DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT` only caps how many of them the feed's Online now panel displays |
### Runtime settings
@ -408,15 +436,61 @@ and its full configuration are documented automatically - including future servi
- **`GatewayService`** - OpenAI-compatible LLM gateway at `/openai/v1/*`, forwarding to DeepSeek (default) with optional vision augmentation; the single point of truth for AI that every other service routes through (enabled by default). Every chat request is made date-aware by injecting the current date in EU `DD/MM/YYYY` format into the system message when it contains no date already (date only, never time, to keep upstream prompt caching effective), and an admin-configurable system preamble (`gateway_system_preamble`) can be prepended ahead of the client's system message on every call. **Provider and model routing** (admin **Gateway** page, `/admin/gateway`) maps any number of requested model names onto named upstream providers and target models, each with its own pricing economy (input, output and cache-hit/cache-miss rates per million tokens) and an optional vision model that describes image content before forwarding, so text and vision models are merged transparently. Unmapped requests fall through to the default upstream unchanged, so existing clients are unaffected
- **`JobService` / `ZipService` / `ForkService`** - generic async job framework (`services/jobs/`) for heavy, blocking work run off the request path; `ZipService` builds project zip archives in a subprocess, `ForkService` copies a project into a new project owned by the forking user
- **`ContainerService`** - the admin container manager (`services/containers/`): a reconciling supervisor for container instances, all running one shared prebuilt image
- **`AcceptanceService`** - grants every policy agreement (Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, third-party AI processing, activity recording, container credentials) to every account that has not declined it, so an instance kept production-identical for extended manual testing never interrupts with an acceptance dialog. Administrator-only, **off by default**, with a separate switch per agreement type and a dry run that reports what it would do without writing. An account that withdrew a consent is never granted it again, with no further action: the consent ledger itself is the decline register. It is not appropriate on a real production host
### Container manager (admin only)
`services/containers/` runs supervised container instances from the web UI, the HTTP API, and Devii. It drives the `docker` CLI via async subprocesses behind a pluggable `Backend` interface (a `DockerCliBackend` plus a `FakeBackend` for tests). **There is no in-app image building.** Every instance runs ONE shared prebuilt image, `ppy:latest` (override `DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_IMAGE`), built once with **`make ppy`** from `ppy.Dockerfile`: a Python + Playwright base with a broad set of common libraries preinstalled, the `pravda` (uid 1000) user, the sudo superclone, and `pagent` at `/usr/bin/pagent.py` all baked in. Creating an instance is then an instant `docker run` (it fails fast with a clear error if the `ppy` image has not been built yet). `ContainerService` reconciles desired instance state against `docker ps` each tick (containers are labeled `devplace.instance=<uid>`, so orphans are reaped and no state is lost), applies restart policies, fires cron/interval/one-time schedules, and samples metrics. The container's `/app` is bind-mounted to a persistent project workspace (materialized from the project files) and **stays in sync automatically**: the manager runs a bidirectional, newer-wins sync between the project files and the workspace on every start and roughly once a minute while running, so edits made inside the container and edits made in the project file editor converge without manual intervention (the sync only ever creates or overwrites the older copy of a file, never deletes one; a read-only project is export-only). Projects that need extra packages use runtime `pip install` (pravda owns the site-packages, no sudo needed) or `apt install` directly (the `pravda` user runs `apt`/`dpkg` through a fakeroot wrapper, so system packages install without root) or add the library to `ppy.Dockerfile` and rerun `make ppy`. Each instance can run a **boot script** in Python or Bash (written into the workspace and run on launch) or a plain boot command, can be set to **start automatically** whenever the container service starts, and can be configured to **run as** a chosen DevPlace user - which only selects whose identity and API key are injected into the container (the container always runs as the unprivileged `pravda` user). Every status change is recorded and shown as a status history on the instance page. A running instance can be **published** with an `ingress_slug`, making its service reachable (HTTP and WebSocket) at `/p/<slug>` through DevPlace. The manager is reached two ways: the admin **Containers** sidebar entry (`/admin/containers`) lists, creates, edits, and controls every instance across all projects and opens a dedicated detail page per instance, and each project page carries an admin-only **Containers** button to its own instance manager.
`services/containers/` runs supervised container instances from the web UI, the HTTP API, and Devii. It drives the `docker` CLI via async subprocesses behind a pluggable `Backend` interface (a `DockerCliBackend` plus a `FakeBackend` for tests). **There is no in-app image building.** Every instance runs ONE shared prebuilt image, `ppy:latest` (override `DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_IMAGE`), built once with **`make ppy`** from `ppy.Dockerfile`: a Python + Playwright base with a broad set of common libraries preinstalled, the `pravda` (uid 1000) user, the sudo superclone, `pagent` at `/usr/bin/pagent.py`, and the `code-server` browser IDE that backs dev workspaces all baked in. Creating an instance is then an instant `docker run` (it fails fast with a clear error if the `ppy` image has not been built yet). `ContainerService` reconciles desired instance state against `docker ps` each tick (containers are labeled `devplace.instance=<uid>`, so orphans are reaped and no state is lost), applies restart policies, fires cron/interval/one-time schedules, and samples metrics. The container's `/app` is bind-mounted to a persistent project workspace (materialized from the project files) and **stays in sync automatically**: the manager runs a bidirectional, newer-wins sync between the project files and the workspace on every start and roughly once a minute while running, so edits made inside the container and edits made in the project file editor converge without manual intervention (the sync only ever creates or overwrites the older copy of a file, never deletes one; a read-only project is export-only). Projects that need extra packages use runtime `pip install` (pravda owns the site-packages, no sudo needed) or `apt install` directly (the `pravda` user runs `apt`/`dpkg` through a fakeroot wrapper, so system packages install without root) or add the library to `ppy.Dockerfile` and rerun `make ppy`. Each instance can run a **boot script** in Python or Bash (written into the workspace and run on launch) or a plain boot command, can be set to **start automatically** whenever the container service starts, and can be configured to **run as** a chosen DevPlace user - which only selects whose identity and API key are injected into the container (the container always runs as the unprivileged `pravda` user). Every status change is recorded and shown as a status history on the instance page. A running instance can be **published** with an `ingress_slug`, making its service reachable (HTTP and WebSocket) at `/p/<slug>` through DevPlace. The manager is reached two ways: the admin **Containers** sidebar entry (`/admin/containers`) lists, creates, edits, and controls every instance across all projects and opens a dedicated detail page per instance, and each project page carries an admin-only **Containers** button to its own instance manager.
**Security:** this requires mounting the Docker socket, which grants host root. Every run, exec, lifecycle, and schedule operation is administrator-only; `--privileged` is never used and all docker calls are argument-list subprocesses. Containers are additionally isolated per user: an instance is managed only by its owner (the administrator who created it, or the owner of its project) and by the primary administrator, who alone sees and manages every instance including those on private projects; other administrators get a read-only view of instances on public projects and none of another user's private-project instances (exec, terminals, schedules, edits, and lifecycle actions are all refused and audited as denied). The service is disabled by default; an admin enables **Containers** on `/admin/services`. CLI: `devplace containers list | reconcile | prune | prune-builds | gc-workspaces` (`prune-builds` is a one-time cleanup that removes legacy per-project images and the old dockerfiles/builds tables).
**Runtime data** (container workspaces and zip archives) lives in `DEVPLACE_DATA_DIR` (default `data/`), **outside the package and never served via `/static`**. The docker daemon must be able to bind-mount the data dir for `/app`.
### Dev Workspaces and the browser editor
A **workspace** is a member-facing container running the DevPlace browser editor, layered on the
container runtime above. It is opened from a project's **Workspace** page and reached at
`/projects/{slug}/workspace`; the editor itself is proxied at
`/projects/{slug}/containers/instances/{uid}/code/`, and an **Editor** button appears on the project
page whenever the workspace is running.
The editor is `code-server`, rebranded as DevPlace end to end: the application name, the browser tab
icon and PWA icons, the login page styling, and `product.json` all carry DevPlace, and a bundled
built-in extension ships the **DevPlace Dark** and **DevPlace Light** themes (generated from the
site's own design tokens), a **Get started on DevPlace** walkthrough, a project status bar item and
five `DevPlace:` commands. Nothing in the interface identifies as code-server.
**On boot** two terminals open: a focused **DevPlace Code** terminal already running `dpc`, the
coding agent baked into the image, and a plain login shell beside it with the Python, Rust, Nim and
Swift toolchains on `PATH`. Both are configurable, and `bash` stays the default profile for
terminals the member opens later.
The workspace opens straight onto the member's files rather than a welcome page, and the editor's
own built-in chat assistant is suppressed so `dpc` is the only agent on offer and every token it
spends is ledgered against the member's DevPlace account. `dpc`'s own working files (`.dpc/`,
`dpc.log`) are in `SYNC_SKIP_NAMES`, so running an agent on every boot never pollutes the project.
**Every workspace is trusted.** VS Code Restricted Mode is disabled at the command line and in the
seeded settings, so nothing prompts and automatic tasks run. This is a deliberate default with a
real consequence (a project's own `.vscode/tasks.json` will run on folder open), it is documented to
members on `/docs/workspace-editor.html`, and an administrator can restore Restricted Mode site-wide
with the `workspace_editor_trust_all` setting.
**Four sizes are configurable through one resolver.** Editor and terminal font size plus zoom, the
editor layout and terminal panel preset, whether the editor opens in a tab or a sized window, and the
container's CPU, memory and disk. The first three are the member's own preferences on their workspace
page (and over the API, and through Devii's `workspace_editor_get` / `workspace_editor_set`); the
container size is part of the administrator-set workspace quota. Each preference resolves instance
override, then the member's row, then the site setting, then the built-in default, and the page shows
which of those each value came from.
**A member edit is never overwritten.** DevPlace seeds the editor's `settings.json` from the host
before each launch and records exactly what it wrote; on the next launch it updates only the keys
whose current value is still the one it wrote. A setting the member changed inside the editor is
theirs permanently, while a change to the site default still reaches everyone who has expressed no
preference. Preferences apply on the next workspace start, and the page says so and offers the
restart.
### Async job framework and zip downloads
`services/jobs/` is the standard way to run blocking work asynchronously and hand the caller a result URL. A shared `jobs` table is the queue (discriminated by `kind`); `queue.enqueue()` inserts a `pending` row from any worker, the lock-owning worker processes jobs in `JobService.run_once` (reap, recover orphans, refill up to a concurrency limit, prune expired), and status is polled from the database. Retention is built in: each job service deletes its own expired artifacts via a `cleanup` hook (default 7 days, admin-configurable). To add a kind, subclass `JobService`, set `kind`, and implement `process()` and `cleanup()`.
@ -543,6 +617,17 @@ disclosed only to administrators, while members and guests can see only the perc
24-hour quota used. The `/devii/usage` endpoint returns that percentage and the day's turn count to
everyone, and includes dollar figures only for administrators.
**Spend limits (Gateway page, `/admin/gateway`).** An administrator caps the rolling 24-hour
gateway spend with quota rules scoped by any combination of caller role, individual user, and
application reference (the `X-App-Reference` header), so a single application belonging to one
user can be limited independently of that user's other traffic. The most specific matching rule
wins; a caller over its cap gets `429`. Because a cap otherwise only lifts with the passage of
time, each rule has a **Reset spend** action that clears what has been counted against it
without deleting anything from the usage history the cost analytics are built on - the
figures on the AI usage page stay intact, only the amount counted towards the limit is cleared.
The **Reset all quotas** button on the AI usage page clears the assistant quotas and the gateway
spend together. From the terminal: `devplace gateway quota list|set|delete|reset`.
Configuration on the Services tab:
| Parameter | Default | Purpose |
@ -800,9 +885,37 @@ calling itself.
## Push notifications & PWA
Authenticated users can receive native web push notifications, and the site is an
Authenticated users can receive native push notifications, and the site is an
installable Progressive Web App. Push uses only standard libraries (`cryptography`,
`PyJWT`, `httpx`) against the Web Push Protocol - no third-party push wrapper.
`PyJWT`, `httpx`) against the Web Push Protocol and the Apple Push Notification service -
no third-party push wrapper.
### Providers
Delivery is split into providers behind one protocol (`devplacepy/push/providers/`). A user
receives a notification through every provider they hold a live subscription for.
| Provider | Registration | Transport |
|----------|--------------|-----------|
| `webpush` | `PushSubscription` from the browser `PushManager` (endpoint + `p256dh`/`auth` keys) | Web Push Protocol, VAPID signed, `aesgcm` encrypted payload |
| `apns` | Hexadecimal device token | `POST https://api.push.apple.com/3/device/{token}` over HTTP/2, ES256 provider token |
`POST /push.json` accepts a registration for any active provider; a body without a
`provider` field is a `webpush` body, so browsers need no change. `GET /push.json` returns
the VAPID public key plus the providers currently accepting registrations. A provider that
is disabled or not fully configured accepts no registrations and is skipped during
delivery, so an unconfigured provider is inert rather than an error.
Every provider setting is edited at **`/admin/services/push`**: per provider an `Enabled`
toggle, the VAPID subject for `webpush`, and team id, key id, `.p8` auth key (stored as a
masked secret), topic and environment (production or sandbox) for `apns`. The same page
holds the shared delivery timeout and the retention window after which dead subscriptions
are removed. Push delivery does not depend on that service running; stopping it only stops
the pruning sweep.
Adding a third provider is one file plus one registry entry: the registration route, the
delivery loop, the admin page, the audit record and the metrics are all written against the
provider protocol.
### Events
@ -825,9 +938,11 @@ in real time, bridged onto the in-process pub/sub bus by a lock-owner relay:
`create_notification` schedules delivery as a fire-and-forget async task, so a dead
subscription or push-service error never blocks the triggering request. Delivery
(`push.notify_user`) iterates a user's subscriptions, encrypts the payload
(legacy `aesgcm` content encoding), and POSTs to each endpoint; subscriptions that
return `404`/`410` are soft-deleted.
(`push.notify_user`) reads a user's subscriptions once, groups them by provider, builds
each provider's payload once, and sends over a single shared HTTP client. A subscription
the push service reports as gone (`404`/`410` for Web Push, `410` or an `Unregistered`
class reason for APNs) is soft-deleted; any other failure is logged and the subscription is
kept.
A notification is also **marked read automatically when you open the page that shows its
content** - viewing a post clears its comment, reply, upvote and mention notifications;
@ -884,7 +999,10 @@ offline. Installation requires a secure origin (HTTPS, or `localhost` for develo
| File | Role |
|------|------|
| `devplacepy/push.py` | VAPID keys, payload encryption, send, register |
| `devplacepy/push/providers/` | Provider protocol, Web Push (VAPID keys, payload encryption), APNs |
| `devplacepy/push/store.py` | `push_registration` reads and writes |
| `devplacepy/push/delivery.py` | `notify_user` - group by provider, deliver, reap dead subscriptions |
| `devplacepy/services/push/service.py` | Provider configuration at `/admin/services/push`, retention sweep, metrics |
| `devplacepy/routers/push.py` | `/push.json`, `/service-worker.js`, `/manifest.json` |
| `static/js/PushManager.js` | Service-worker registration + subscribe + opt-in UI |
| `static/service-worker.js` | Receives push, shows notification, offline fallback |
@ -984,11 +1102,13 @@ Open `http://<host>:${PORT}` (default 10500). `make docker-logs` tails output; `
```bash
git pull
make docker-up # restart with new code (bind-mounted, no rebuild)
make docker-reload # restart workers on the new code (bind-mounted, no rebuild)
make docker-build && \
make docker-up # only when dependencies in pyproject.toml change
```
`make docker-reload` is the target for a source-only change: `docker compose up -d` leaves an unchanged container running, so the workers would keep serving the code they imported at boot. A rebuild after a source-only change costs about 7 seconds because the Dockerfile installs dependencies from `pyproject.toml` in a layer that no source edit invalidates.
The `make deploy` target fast-forwards the `production` branch (`git checkout production && git merge master && git push origin production`); pull that branch on the server.
### Container Manager wiring (what the overlay does)
@ -1003,6 +1123,10 @@ What the overlay (`docker-compose.containers.yml`) changes:
- **Data dir at a consistent path (critical).** When the app (in its container) runs `docker run -v <path>:/app`, the daemon resolves `<path>` against the **host**, not the app container. So the workspace/data dir must be mounted at the **same absolute path** on host and in the container - the make targets set `DEVPLACE_DATA_DIR` to the project's `./data` (an absolute host path) and mount it at that identical path on both sides. (Build contexts go through the docker API as a tarball, so they can stay in the container's temp dir - only the `/app` bind mount needs path consistency.)
- **Ingress reach:** published container ports live on the **host**, so the overlay sets `DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_PROXY_HOST=host.docker.internal` (with `extra_hosts: host-gateway`) so the `/p/<slug>` proxy can reach them. On a bare-metal `make prod` deploy the app is already on the host, so the default `127.0.0.1` works and no overlay is needed (just install the docker CLI and run the services).
One piece of wiring cannot live in the overlay:
- **Workspace tunnel reach.** A workspace tunnel serves a port the member chose, which is almost never published on the host, so the app has to dial the container directly - and it can only do that from the container's own docker network. Compose cannot attach a service to the default `bridge` network (it always sends network-scoped aliases, which that network rejects), so `make docker-up` and `make docker-reload` run `make docker-attach`, an idempotent `docker network connect` of the app container to `DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_NETWORK` (default `bridge`). A bare `docker compose up -d` skips it and every tunnel to an unpublished port answers `502`. On a bare-metal `make prod` deploy the app is already on the host and reaches container IPs with no wiring at all.
Then build the shared `ppy` image once with `make ppy` and enable **Containers** on `/admin/services`. There is no in-app image building; every instance runs that one prebuilt image.
### nginx specifics

View File

@ -28,6 +28,6 @@ def generate_avatar_svg(seed: str) -> str:
initial = seed[:1].upper() if seed else "?"
return (
'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">'
f'<rect width="100" height="100" rx="50" fill="#ff6b35"/>'
f'<rect width="100" height="100" rx="50" fill="#b73f1e"/>'
f'<text x="50" y="65" text-anchor="middle" fill="white" font-size="40" font-weight="700" font-family="sans-serif">{initial}</text></svg>'
)

View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ def enforce_rgba_png(file_bytes: bytes) -> bytes:
corner = img.getpixel((0, 0))
if len(corner) == 4 and corner[3] == 255:
bg = corner[:3]
data = img.getdata()
data = img.get_flattened_data()
cleaned = []
for pixel in data:
if pixel[:3] == bg:

View File

@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
from devplacepy.cli.main import main, build_parser
from devplacepy.cli._shared import _audit_cli
from devplacepy.cli.accounts import cmd_accounts_pending, cmd_accounts_prune
from devplacepy.cli.roles import cmd_role_get, cmd_role_set
from devplacepy.cli.apikeys import cmd_apikey_get, cmd_apikey_reset, cmd_apikey_backfill
from devplacepy.cli.tokens import (
@ -49,6 +50,8 @@ __all__ = [
"main",
"build_parser",
"_audit_cli",
"cmd_accounts_pending",
"cmd_accounts_prune",
"cmd_role_get",
"cmd_role_set",
"cmd_apikey_get",

View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
from devplacepy.cli._shared import _audit_cli
def cmd_accounts_prune(args):
from devplacepy.services.moderation import deletion
pending = deletion.due_purges()
if args.dry_run:
for row in pending:
print(f"{row['uid']} deleted at {row['deletion_requested_at']}")
print(f"{len(pending)} account(s) due for purge")
return
purged = deletion.purge_due()
_audit_cli(
"cli.accounts.prune",
f"CLI purged {purged} deleted account(s) past the grace window",
metadata={"count": purged},
)
print(f"Purged {purged} deleted account(s)")
def cmd_accounts_pending(args):
from devplacepy.services.moderation import deletion
pending = deletion.due_purges()
for row in pending:
print(f"{row['uid']}\t{row['deletion_requested_at']}")
print(f"{len(pending)} account(s) past the {deletion.grace_hours()}h grace window")
def register_accounts(subparsers):
accounts = subparsers.add_parser("accounts", help="Deleted account management")
accounts_sub = accounts.add_subparsers(title="action", dest="action")
prune = accounts_sub.add_parser(
"prune", help="Permanently purge accounts past the deletion grace window"
)
prune.add_argument(
"--dry-run", action="store_true", help="List what would be purged and exit"
)
prune.set_defaults(func=cmd_accounts_prune)
pending = accounts_sub.add_parser(
"pending", help="List deleted accounts awaiting their purge"
)
pending.set_defaults(func=cmd_accounts_pending)

View File

@ -70,6 +70,35 @@ def cmd_gateway_quota_delete(args):
print(f"Deleted quota rule {args.uid}")
def cmd_gateway_quota_reset(args):
from devplacepy.services.openai_gateway import quota
try:
payload = quota.QuotaResetIn(
owner_kind=args.owner_kind,
owner_id=args.owner_id,
app_reference=args.app_reference,
)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"Error: {exc}")
sys.exit(1)
scope = quota.reset(payload, created_by="cli")
label = quota.scope_label(scope, fallback="every caller")
_audit_cli(
"gateway.quota.reset",
f"CLI reset the gateway 24h spend for {label}",
target_type="gateway_quota",
target_uid=scope["uid"],
metadata={
"owner_kind": scope["owner_kind"],
"owner_id": scope["owner_id"],
"app_reference": scope["app_reference"],
"reset_at": scope["reset_at"],
},
)
print(f"Reset the rolling 24h spend for {label}")
def register_gateway(subparsers):
gateway = subparsers.add_parser("gateway", help="AI gateway management")
gateway_sub = gateway.add_subparsers(title="action", dest="action")
@ -101,3 +130,16 @@ def register_gateway(subparsers):
quota_delete = quota_sub.add_parser("delete", help="Delete a quota rule by uid")
quota_delete.add_argument("uid", help="Quota rule uid")
quota_delete.set_defaults(func=cmd_gateway_quota_delete)
quota_reset = quota_sub.add_parser(
"reset",
help="Clear the rolling-24h spend so a capped caller can call again (keeps the usage history)",
)
quota_reset.add_argument(
"--owner-kind",
choices=("internal", "key", "user", "admin", "anonymous"),
help="Role to scope by. Omit to reset every role",
)
quota_reset.add_argument("--owner-id", help="Specific user uid to scope by. Omit for every caller")
quota_reset.add_argument("--app-reference", help="App label to scope by. Omit for every app")
quota_reset.set_defaults(func=cmd_gateway_quota_reset)

View File

@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
import argparse
import sys
from devplacepy.cli.accounts import register_accounts
from devplacepy.cli.roles import register_roles
from devplacepy.cli.apikeys import register_apikeys
from devplacepy.cli.tokens import register_tokens
@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ def build_parser():
register_quiz(sub)
register_gateway(sub)
register_messaging(sub)
register_accounts(sub)
return parser

View File

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ UPLOADS_DIR = DATA_DIR / "uploads"
ATTACHMENTS_DIR = UPLOADS_DIR / "attachments"
PROJECT_FILES_DIR = UPLOADS_DIR / "project_files"
CONTAINER_WORKSPACES_DIR = DATA_DIR / "container_workspaces"
WORKSPACE_STATE_DIR = DATA_DIR / "workspace_state"
ZIPS_DIR = DATA_DIR / "zips"
ZIP_STAGING_DIR = DATA_DIR / "zip_staging"
FORK_STAGING_DIR = DATA_DIR / "fork_staging"
@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ SITE_URL = environ.get("DEVPLACE_SITE_URL", "").rstrip("/")
PRESENCE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = int(environ.get("DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "60"))
PRESENCE_WRITE_SECONDS = max(1, PRESENCE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS // 2)
PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT = int(environ.get("DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT", "30"))
PRESENCE_TRACK_LIMIT = int(environ.get("DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_TRACK_LIMIT", "500"))
PRESENCE_ONLINE_MARGIN_SECONDS = int(
environ.get("DEVPLACE_PRESENCE_ONLINE_MARGIN_SECONDS", "20")
)
@ -106,6 +108,12 @@ INIT_LOCK_FILE = LOCKS_DIR / "devplace-init.lock"
CONTAINER_IMAGE = environ.get("DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_IMAGE", "ppy:latest")
CONTAINER_PROXY_HOST = environ.get("DEVPLACE_CONTAINER_PROXY_HOST", "").strip()
WORKSPACE_TUNNEL_DOMAIN = environ.get(
"DEVPLACE_WORKSPACE_TUNNEL_DOMAIN", "tunnel.pravda.education"
).strip()
WORKSPACE_ACTIVITY_WRITE_SECONDS = 30
WORKSPACE_METRICS_RING = 720
VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE = KEYS_DIR / "notification-private.pem"
VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8_FILE = KEYS_DIR / "notification-private.pkcs8.pem"
VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE = KEYS_DIR / "notification-public.pem"
@ -117,6 +125,7 @@ DATA_PATHS: dict[str, Path] = {
"attachments": ATTACHMENTS_DIR,
"project_files": PROJECT_FILES_DIR,
"container_workspaces": CONTAINER_WORKSPACES_DIR,
"workspace_state": WORKSPACE_STATE_DIR,
"zips": ZIPS_DIR,
"zip_staging": ZIP_STAGING_DIR,
"fork_staging": FORK_STAGING_DIR,

View File

@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ from devplacepy.database import (
resolve_by_slug,
get_users_by_uids,
get_vote_counts,
get_comment_counts_by_post_uids,
paginate,
STAR_TARGETS,
get_user_votes,
get_reactions_by_targets,
@ -29,6 +31,11 @@ from devplacepy.database import (
soft_delete_engagement,
soft_delete_fork_relations,
load_comments,
band_allows_mature,
band_allows_restricted,
get_maturity,
get_maturity_by_targets,
get_int_setting,
_now_iso,
db,
)
@ -49,6 +56,11 @@ from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.correction import schedule_correction
from devplacepy.services.ai_modifier import schedule_modification
from devplacepy.services.seo_meta import schedule_seo_meta_for_table
from devplacepy.services.moderation.screening import (
record as record_screening,
refuse_if_blocked,
screen_fields,
)
CREATE_METADATA_KEYS = ("project_type", "is_private", "language", "topic", "status")
@ -58,10 +70,49 @@ REACTABLE_TYPES = {"post", "comment", "gist", "project", "quiz"}
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def get_project_by_uid(project_uid: str | None) -> dict | None:
if not project_uid:
return None
project = get_table("projects").find_one(uid=project_uid)
if not project:
return None
slug = project.get("slug") or project["uid"]
return {
"uid": project["uid"],
"name": project.get("title") or project.get("name", ""),
"slug": slug,
"url": f"/projects/{slug}",
}
def is_owner(item: dict | None, user: dict | None) -> bool:
return bool(item and user and item["user_uid"] == user["uid"])
def mature_hidden_by_default() -> bool:
return get_int_setting("moderation_mature_default_hidden", 1) != 0
def maturity_hidden(level: str | None, user: dict | None) -> bool:
if not level or level == "general":
return False
if not mature_hidden_by_default():
return False
if not user:
return True
band = user.get("age_band") or "adult"
allowed = (
band_allows_restricted(band) if level == "restricted" else band_allows_mature(band)
)
return not (allowed and bool(user.get("mature_opt_in")))
def is_suspended(user: dict | None) -> bool:
from devplacepy.database import suspension_active
return suspension_active(user)
def _owner_is_admin(project: dict) -> bool:
owner_uid = project.get("user_uid")
owner = get_users_by_uids([owner_uid]).get(owner_uid) if owner_uid else None
@ -119,6 +170,45 @@ def can_manage_instance(
return is_primary_admin(user) or owns_instance(instance, project, user)
def workspaces_enabled() -> bool:
from devplacepy.database import get_setting
return get_setting("workspace_enabled", "0") == "1"
def can_open_workspace(project: dict | None, user: dict | None) -> bool:
if not project or not user or not user.get("uid"):
return False
if not workspaces_enabled():
return False
return is_owner(project, user) or is_admin(user)
def owns_workspace(instance: dict | None, user: dict | None) -> bool:
if not instance or not user:
return False
uid = user.get("uid")
if not uid:
return False
return instance.get("workspace_owner_uid") == uid
def can_manage_workspace(
instance: dict | None, project: dict | None, user: dict | None
) -> bool:
if not instance or not user:
return False
if owns_workspace(instance, user):
return True
return can_manage_instance(instance, project, user)
def can_manage_tunnel(
instance: dict | None, project: dict | None, user: dict | None
) -> bool:
return can_manage_workspace(instance, project, user)
def canonical_redirect(
area: str, item: dict, requested: str
) -> RedirectResponse | None:
@ -150,6 +240,8 @@ def create_content_item(
attachment_uids: list | None,
request=None,
) -> tuple[str, str]:
screening = screen_fields(table_name, fields)
refuse_if_blocked(screening)
uid = generate_uid()
slug = make_combined_slug(slug_source, uid)
get_table(table_name).insert(
@ -195,6 +287,13 @@ def create_content_item(
metadata=metadata or None,
links=links,
)
record_screening(
screening,
target_type=target_type,
target_uid=uid,
actor_uid=user["uid"],
request=request,
)
schedule_correction(user, table_name, uid, request)
schedule_modification(user, table_name, uid, request)
schedule_seo_meta_for_table(table_name, uid)
@ -311,6 +410,8 @@ def create_comment_record(
parent_uid: str | None = None,
attachment_uids: list | None = None,
) -> tuple[str, str]:
screening = screen_fields("comments", {"content": content})
refuse_if_blocked(screening)
comment_uid = generate_uid()
redirect_url = resolve_object_url(target_type, target_uid)
insert = {
@ -361,6 +462,13 @@ def create_comment_record(
)
create_mention_notifications(content, user["uid"], comment_url)
record_screening(
screening,
target_type="comment",
target_uid=comment_uid,
actor_uid=user["uid"],
request=request,
)
schedule_correction(user, "comments", comment_uid, request)
schedule_modification(user, "comments", comment_uid, request)
logger.info(f"Comment by {user['username']} on {target_type} {target_uid}")
@ -385,10 +493,19 @@ def create_comment_record(
def edit_comment_record(request, user: dict, comment: dict, content: str) -> str:
target_type = comment.get("target_type", "post")
target_uid = comment.get("target_uid") or comment.get("post_uid", "")
screening = screen_fields("comments", {"content": content})
refuse_if_blocked(screening)
updated_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
get_table("comments").update(
{"uid": comment["uid"], "content": content, "updated_at": updated_at}, ["uid"]
)
record_screening(
screening,
target_type="comment",
target_uid=comment["uid"],
actor_uid=user["uid"],
request=request,
)
schedule_correction(user, "comments", comment["uid"], request)
schedule_modification(user, "comments", comment["uid"], request)
logger.info(f"Comment {comment['uid']} edited by {user['username']}")
@ -510,6 +627,8 @@ def detail_context(
"reactions": detail.get("reactions", {"counts": {}, "mine": []}),
"bookmarked": detail.get("bookmarked", False),
"poll": detail.get("poll"),
"project_link": detail.get("project_link"),
"maturity": detail.get("maturity", "general"),
}
if extra:
context.update(extra)
@ -544,11 +663,20 @@ def edit_content_item(
if wants_json(request):
return json_error(403, "Not allowed")
return RedirectResponse(url=redirect_fail, status_code=302)
screening = screen_fields(table_name, update_fields)
refuse_if_blocked(screening)
update_fields = {
**update_fields,
"updated_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
}
table.update({"uid": item["uid"], **update_fields}, ["uid"])
record_screening(
screening,
target_type=kind,
target_uid=item["uid"],
actor_uid=user["uid"],
request=request,
)
schedule_correction(user, table_name, item["uid"], request)
schedule_modification(user, table_name, item["uid"], request)
schedule_seo_meta_for_table(table_name, item["uid"], regenerate=True)
@ -689,6 +817,8 @@ def load_detail(
"reactions": reactions,
"bookmarked": bookmarked,
"poll": get_poll_for_post(item["uid"], user) if target_type == "post" else None,
"project_link": get_project_by_uid(item.get("project_uid")) if target_type == "post" else None,
"maturity": get_maturity(target_type, item["uid"])["level"],
}
@ -704,6 +834,7 @@ def enrich_items(
user_votes = (
get_user_votes(user["uid"], [item["uid"] for item in items]) if user else {}
)
maturity = get_maturity_by_targets(key, [item["uid"] for item in items])
enriched = []
for item in items:
entry = {
@ -711,10 +842,38 @@ def enrich_items(
"author": authors.get(item["user_uid"]),
"time_ago": time_ago(item[ts_field]),
"my_vote": user_votes.get(item["uid"], 0),
"maturity": maturity.get(item["uid"], {}).get("level", "general"),
}
for name, source in extra_maps.items():
entry[name] = (
source(item) if callable(source) else source.get(item["uid"], 0)
)
if key == "post" and item.get("project_uid"):
entry["project_link"] = get_project_by_uid(item["project_uid"])
enriched.append(entry)
return enriched
def count_project_devlog(project_uid: str) -> int:
return get_table("posts").count(project_uid=project_uid, deleted_at=None)
def get_project_devlog(
project_uid: str, before: str | None = None, viewer: dict | None = None
) -> tuple[list, str | None]:
posts, next_cursor = paginate(
get_table("posts"),
before=before,
viewer_uid=viewer["uid"] if viewer else None,
project_uid=project_uid,
)
if not posts:
return [], None
authors = get_users_by_uids([post["user_uid"] for post in posts])
counts = get_comment_counts_by_post_uids([post["uid"] for post in posts])
enriched = enrich_items(
posts, "post", authors, {"comment_count": counts}, user=viewer
)
return enriched, next_cursor

View File

@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ PRAGMA cache_size=-8000; -- 8MB page cache
PRAGMA temp_store=MEMORY; -- temp tables in memory
```
Configured via `dataset.connect(engine_kwargs={"connect_args": {"timeout": 30, "check_same_thread": False}}, on_connect_statements=[...])`. In addition to the pragmas above, the connection is tuned with a 30s busy timeout, an 8MB page cache, and a 256MB mmap.
Configured via `dataset.connect(engine_kwargs={"connect_args": {"timeout": 30, "check_same_thread": False}, "poolclass": NullPool}, on_connect_statements=[...])`. In addition to the pragmas above, the connection is tuned with a 30s busy timeout, an 8MB page cache, and a 256MB mmap.
**`poolclass=NullPool` is load-bearing - never revert it to SQLAlchemy's default `QueuePool` (caused a production outage).** `dataset.Database.executable` caches ONE DBAPI connection per OS thread ID **forever** and never returns it to the pool except via `db.close()`, which nothing in this codebase calls (`dataset/database.py`: `self.connections[tid] = self.engine.connect()`). That is fine as long as the same handful of threads ever touch the DB - but FastAPI runs every sync route dependency (`get_setting` and friends, hit on nearly every request) through `anyio.to_thread.run_sync`, whose worker pool scales up and recycles threads elastically under load, and container sync (`asyncio.to_thread`) adds more. Each new thread's first query permanently claims one pool slot. With the default bounded `QueuePool` (`pool_size=5, max_overflow=10` = 15 total), a burst of concurrent load creates enough new threads that the pool fills for good within minutes, and every request thereafter - including the Docker healthcheck's own probe - blocks the full 30s pool timeout and then raises `sqlalchemy.exc.TimeoutError: QueuePool limit of size 5 overflow 10 reached`, wedging the whole app (nginx waits on an app that is waiting on itself; every external caller sees a bare connection timeout, not an HTTP error). `NullPool` removes the artificial ceiling: each `engine.connect()` opens a real, unpooled SQLite connection, so the existing "one connection cached per thread forever" behavior just works, exactly as WAL mode is designed to support. Never pass `pool_size`/`max_overflow` alongside `NullPool` (SQLAlchemy rejects them). Do not "fix" the underlying thread churn instead - that means touching the sync-dependency/threadpool model, which the hard rule below forbids.
`init_db()` is idempotent - every index is created via `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS` (through the `_index()` helper, wrapped in try/except so it is safe to run on every startup regardless of table state), and seed defaults for `site_settings` only insert when the key doesn't already exist.
@ -28,6 +30,8 @@ _index(db, "news", "idx_news_status", ["status"]) # now safe - column exists
Do this with `get_table(name)` (NOT `if name in db.tables`): `get_table` + `create_column_by_example` creates the table if it is absent, so the schema is guaranteed regardless of which process or which insert touches the table first. Symptom to watch for: a page renders fine in isolation but shows empty data or 500s only after a CLI/maintenance test runs earlier in the suite (it created the table partially).
**This applies to `users` too, and an `if "users" not in db.tables: return` guard silently defeats it.** `backfill_api_keys()` is the `users` ensure-block (every non-signup column: `api_key`, `last_seen`, the AI correction/modifier settings, `avatar_seed`, `award_count`/`last_award_at`/`last_award_slug`/`last_award_uid`, ...). It used to early-return when `users` was absent, which is exactly the state on a **brand-new database**: `init_db()` runs before the first signup, so the ensure-block was skipped entirely, and the first `/auth/signup` then created `users` with only the columns of that INSERT. Every ensured-but-unwritten column was therefore missing from the long-running server's reflected metadata, so `users.find_one(...)` returned rows without them **for the whole process lifetime** - the feature reading them looked simply switched off (this is what made the awards tab, the prominent-award banner, and the avatar award badge invisible on a fresh DB, and it is invisible in production only because the columns happen to exist from an older boot). It now calls `get_table("users")` unconditionally, so the table is born with the full ensured column set. Never reintroduce a `db.tables` guard in front of a column-ensure block.
The `_index(...)` helper supports `where=` (partial) and `unique=` indexes; every table with a `uid` column gets a UNIQUE `idx_<table>_uid`, soft-delete tables get a PARTIAL `idx_<table>_trash` (`WHERE deleted_at IS NOT NULL`) and NEVER a bare `deleted_at` index (it mis-steers the planner on live reads), and "live newest-first" listings need a composite/live-partial index that carries the sort column (see "Indexing conventions" below). `init_db()` finishes with `ANALYZE`/`PRAGMA optimize`. Verify any index change with `EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN`.
**SQLite is synchronous by design and will never be made async (hard rule).** The `dataset`/SQLite layer is synchronous and is called directly inside the async route handlers. This is intentional and more than fast enough for this platform: the database is a local file tuned with WAL, `synchronous=NORMAL`, a 30s busy timeout, an 8MB page cache, and a 256MB mmap, so queries are sub-millisecond and never meaningfully stall the event loop. Do NOT convert the database layer to async, do NOT wrap DB calls in a threadpool/`run_in_executor`/`to_thread`, and do NOT raise the synchronous DB access as a performance, blocking-I/O, or "requests aren't fully async" concern. This is a settled, sophisticated design choice and is not open for revisiting.
@ -105,6 +109,17 @@ if "comments" not in db.tables:
`init_db()` ends with `_refresh_query_planner_stats()`: a one-time `ANALYZE` when `sqlite_stat1` is absent, then `PRAGMA optimize` every boot (both inside `with db:`). Validate any index change with `EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN` against `data/devplace.db` (or a copy) - a correct plan reads `SEARCH ... USING INDEX <name>` with no temp b-tree.
## Startup backfills must converge (hard rule)
`init_db()` runs inside `lifespan` under an exclusive `init_lock()`, **before the worker accepts a single request**, and every uvicorn worker runs it in turn. Time-to-serving is therefore `workers x init_db`, so anything added there is paid N times on every boot and every deploy. Two rules follow:
- **A backfill must be able to finish.** A backfill selects the rows that still need migrating and must leave them *not* selected afterwards. If a row can stay in the candidate set after a successful pass, the "one-time migration" is really a permanent per-boot scan that grows with the table. `_backfill_gamification` had exactly this bug: it selected `users.find(xp=0)` and then ran the full milestone sweep over *every* one of them, but a user with no content is awarded no XP, so they stayed at `xp=0` and were re-swept forever. At 7814 such users that was 36s of the 37.5s boot - about 140k queries that provably could not award anything, on every worker, on every restart.
- **Never fan a per-row query out over a whole table at boot.** Compute the candidate set with a few set-based `GROUP BY`/`DISTINCT` queries first, then do per-row work only for rows that survive. `_milestone_candidates()` is the pattern: one `SELECT DISTINCT` per milestone source table (`MILESTONE_SOURCES`), unioned into a set, intersected with the pending users. A user absent from all of those tables scores 0 on every milestone metric and the lowest threshold is 5, so skipping them cannot change any award - verified by diffing the full `badges` table between the full sweep and the narrowed one (identical, 9800 rows, 22.6s -> 0.9s).
Watch for the same shape in `dataset` internals: `db.tables` is a live SQLAlchemy reflection, not a cached attribute. `get_user_stars` does one `in db.tables` check per `STAR_TARGETS` entry, so a per-user loop calling it re-reflects the whole table list on every iteration - 78667 reflections costing 17.7s in the profile above. Hoist `db.tables` into a local when looping.
Profile with the real database before and after any change here (`cProfile` around `init_db()` against a copy of `data/devplace.db`); a synthetic or empty DB hides every one of these costs.
## Project-wide soft delete (hard rule)
Attachments (see "Profile media gallery and soft-deleted attachments" below) are one instance of a platform-wide model: **every removal is a soft delete; only garbage collection is a hard delete.** Every removable row carries two columns, `deleted_at` (ISO timestamp) and `deleted_by` (actor uid, or `system`). A live row has `deleted_at = NULL`, and every list/count read filters `deleted_at IS NULL`.
@ -133,6 +148,23 @@ The profile **Media** tab (`/profile/{username}?tab=media`, public) is a paginat
- **Devii:** `list_media` (public) and `delete_media` (auth, in `CONFIRM_REQUIRED`) in the catalog.
- **Docs visibility (deliberate):** members and guests must never be told this is a *soft* delete. The public prose page `docs/media-gallery.html` (General) and the member-facing `media-delete` API endpoint (Profiles group) describe deletion as a plain "remove" - no soft-delete, restore, trash, or purge language. All moderation mechanics live on the admin-only `docs/media-moderation` prose page (`admin: True`) and in the admin API group (`media-restore`, `admin-media`, `admin-media-purge`, all `auth="admin"`), which `docs_search` excludes from member results and `routers/docs/` package 404s for non-admins. Because `docs_search._strip` keeps the text *inside* `{% if %}` blocks, admin content must live on a separate `admin: True` page, never inline-gated on a public page (a public page may only carry an admin-gated *link*). The member `MediaItemOut` schema omits `deleted_at`; the admin-only `AdminMediaItemOut` adds it.
## Moderation, consent and maturity tables (`database/moderation.py`)
Four soft-deletable tables carry the trust-and-safety layer; the full subsystem is documented in `devplacepy/services/moderation/CLAUDE.md`.
| Table | Shape | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `content_reports` | `(target_type, target_uid)` + `reporter_uid` + `owner_uid` | The one queue. `owner_uid` is denormalised at insert so the admin list never N+1s. Indexes `(status, created_at)` for the queue and SLA scan, `(target_type, target_uid)` for duplicate detection, `(reporter_uid)`, `(owner_uid)` |
| `moderation_actions` | one row per moderator decision, linked to its report | Queryable moderation state with its own lifecycle - deliberately separate from the append-only audit log, the same way `workspace_flags` is |
| `content_maturity` | `(target_type, target_uid)` -> `level` | Polymorphic age label. Read through the batch helper `get_maturity_by_targets`, never per row. **Absence of a row means `general`**, so nothing needed backfilling |
| `user_consents` | `(owner_kind, owner_id, kind)` | Append-only in effect: withdrawing stamps `withdrawn_at` on the current row and inserts a new one, so the history is provable |
`REPORTABLE_TARGETS` (target type -> table) is the registry every consumer reads, exactly like `VOTABLE_TARGETS`. `UNREPORTABLE_TABLES` is its explicit counterpart: each entry names a soft-deletable table and **why** it carries no reportable content. `tests/unit/database/moderation.py` asserts the two partition `SOFT_DELETE_TABLES`, so a new user-generated table cannot be added without classifying it.
The `users` columns added alongside are ensured in `backfill_api_keys()` like every other non-signup column: `terms_version`, `terms_accepted_at`, `age_band`, `age_declared_at`, `mature_opt_in`, `suspended_until`, `suspension_reason`, `deletion_requested_at`. `mature_opt_in` is normalised from NULL to `0` in the same `with db:` block that fixes the AI-modifier defaults, because it is read as a flag. **No date of birth is ever stored** - only the derived `age_band`.
Two atomic conditional updates protect this data and must never become read-then-write: `queue.claim_open` (report resolution) and `deletion.claim_deletion` (the account-deletion cascade). The latter's precondition is `COALESCE(deletion_requested_at, '') = ''` because the column is SQL `NULL` on rows that predate it - the exact `NULL = 0` trap recorded above.
## Role-based visibility (generic + DRY)
- **One source of truth for role/visibility checks**, registered as Jinja globals in `templating.py` - never hand-roll `user.get('role') == 'Admin'` or `user['uid'] == x['user_uid']` in a template again:
@ -140,6 +172,7 @@ The profile **Media** tab (`/profile/{username}?tab=media`, public) is a paginat
- `owns(item, user)` (= `content.is_owner`) - per-item ownership (e.g. each comment). Page-level detail templates keep using the `is_owner` **bool** passed in their context (post/gist/project/profile); do not call `is_owner(...)` as a function - that name is a context bool and shadows globals.
- `is_self(user, uid)` - "is this me" (profile follow vs edit, leaderboard highlight).
- `guest_disabled(user)` -> emits ` disabled aria-disabled="true" title="Log in to participate"` for guests (empty for members); `login_hint(user)` -> a small login link. Both return `Markup`.
- **Account enabled/disabled is `database.is_account_active(row)` - never read `is_active` inline.** `is_active` is a nullable column, so a row written before it existed (or by any insert that omits it) holds SQL `NULL`, and the obvious `bool(row.get("is_active"))` reads that as *disabled*. `.get("is_active", True)` is no better: the default only applies when the key is **absent**, and a `SELECT *` row always has the key with value `None`. The predicate is `is_active is None or bool(is_active)` - unknown means active, only an explicit `0`/`False` disables. This is the same NULL-vs-0 trap as the `COALESCE` rule for atomic updates. It gates session auth, API-key auth, Basic auth, the login and access-token routes, the devRant token/auth paths, the admin enable/disable toggle, and `_can_hold_primary_admin`; every one of them goes through this single function. A NULL row previously could not log in at all, and the admin toggle could not disable it. (The `is_active` on a `gateway_models` row is a different table with its own semantics and is deliberately not routed through this.)
- **Role values are stored capitalized:** `users.role` is exactly `"Admin"` or `"Member"` (first registered user is `"Admin"`, `auth.py`); `is_admin` compares `== "Admin"` case-sensitively. The CLI is the only lowercase surface (`devplace role set ... <member|admin>` writes `role.capitalize()`; `role get` prints `.lower()`). A lowercase role in the DB silently defeats every admin check - never write a raw lowercase role.
- **The shadow rule generalizes beyond `is_owner` to ANY Jinja global** (`is_admin`, `avatar_url`, `format_date`, `is_self`, `owns`, `guest_disabled`): `respond(req, tmpl, ctx, model=XOut)` hands the **same** `ctx` to the Pydantic model and the template, and a context key shadows the same-named global across the whole `base.html` chain. A bool named `is_admin` in the context makes `base.html`'s `{% if is_admin(user) %}` raise `TypeError: 'bool' object is not callable` - a 500 that only fires for the branch invoking the global (logged-in users, not guests, which is why guest-only smoke tests miss it). Name viewer/permission flags distinctly (`viewer_is_admin`) in both schema and context. Real issue fixed on `/issues/{number}`; regression-guarded by `tests/api/issues/create.py::test_issue_detail_renders_for_{member,admin}` (they render the page as an authenticated Member/Admin and assert 200 + the admin-only control).
- **Policy enforced everywhere:** guests see all non-admin content read-only with action controls **shown but disabled** (`guest_disabled` on vote/star/react/poll/bookmark/follow/comment submit; create FABs become `/auth/login` links via `.feed-fab.login-required`); members get full member actions; **role badges render only to admin viewers** (`{% if is_admin(user) %}` around every `*.role` label). Backend stays the real gate (`require_user`/`require_admin`).
@ -178,6 +211,15 @@ Site settings are seeded on startup (`site_settings` table):
| `maintenance_message` | scheduled-maintenance text | Body shown on the maintenance 503 page |
| `customization_enabled` | `"1"` | When `"0"`, `custom_css_tag`/`custom_js_tag` inject nothing (feature off) |
| `customization_js_enabled` | `"1"` | When `"0"`, custom CSS still serves but custom JS is suppressed |
| `moderation_sla_hours` | `"24"` | The published moderation response window; the admin queue badge turns red past it |
| `moderation_filter_mode` | `"review"` | `off`/`label`/`review`/`block` - how the content filter acts on a match |
| `moderation_filter_review_score` | `"2"` | Rule score at which a match becomes a report rather than a label |
| `moderation_minimum_age` | `"16"` | Signup floor; only the derived age band is stored |
| `moderation_mature_default_hidden` | `"1"` | Hide mature-labelled content behind an interstitial by default |
| `account_deletion_grace_hours` | `"24"` | Reversible window before a deleted account is purged |
| `contact_email` / `contact_phone` / `contact_address` | `""` | Published contact details, rendered on `/docs/contact.html` |
| `terms_version` / `privacy_version` / `guidelines_version` | `"1"` | Bumping `terms_version` forces re-acceptance before the next write. **Every reader uses `get_setting(key, "1") or "1"`** - an empty stored value must read as the default or the gate 403s every write |
| `ai_third_party_provider` | `""` | Named in the consent copy and the privacy policy |
| `extra_head` | `""` | Raw HTML emitted verbatim into every page `<head>` by `templating.extra_head_tag()`; site-wide trusted-admin input, not sanitized |
Besides the site/news/upload keys above, the **Operational** group is admin-editable at `/admin/settings`: `site_url` (public origin for absolute links incl. container ingress; resolved by `seo.public_base_url()` = setting -> `DEVPLACE_SITE_URL` env -> request origin), `rate_limit_per_minute`, `rate_limit_window_seconds`, `news_service_interval`, `session_max_age_days`, `session_remember_days`, `registration_open`, `maintenance_mode`, `maintenance_message`, `docs_search_mode` (`agent`|`bm25`, default `agent` - picks the `/docs/search.html` surface: the in-page Devii chat or the classic BM25 list; a viewer over their daily AI limit, or a guest when Devii is disabled, auto-falls-back to BM25 via `routers/docs/views.py` `_agent_search_state`), `outbound_proxy_url` (empty by default - when set, every `stealth.stealth_async_client`/`stealth_sync_client` call across the whole app routes through it via `stealth.configured_proxy_url()`; validated as `http(s)://`/`socks5(h)://` with a host in `AdminSettingsForm`; falls back to `DEVPLACE_OUTBOUND_PROXY_URL` when unset - see the "Outbound HTTP" note in the root `CLAUDE.md`). The **Custom Code** key `extra_head` is the sole key in the settings handler's `CLEARABLE_SETTINGS` set, so saving an empty textarea removes it (the default loop skips empty values).

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@ -4,11 +4,11 @@ from .core import dataset, logging, Path, or_, defaultdict, datetime, timedelta,
from .core import refresh_snapshot, _local_cache_versions, _cache_version_cache, _cache_state_ready, _ensure_cache_state, get_cache_version, bump_cache_version, sync_local_cache, _index, _drop_index, _uid_index, get_table, _in_clause, _now_iso
from .atomic import conditional_update_row
from .settings import _settings_cache, get_setting, get_int_setting, set_setting, clear_settings_cache, internal_gateway_key
from .users import get_users_by_uids, _admins_cache, invalidate_admins_cache, get_admin_uids, set_user_timezone, set_last_seen, get_online_users, get_primary_admin_uid, search_users_by_username
from .users import get_users_by_uids, _admins_cache, invalidate_admins_cache, get_admin_uids, set_user_timezone, set_last_seen, get_online_users, get_primary_admin_uid, is_account_active, search_users_by_username
from .relations import _relations_cache, get_user_relations, get_blocked_uids, get_muted_uids, get_silenced_uids, invalidate_user_relations
from .pagination import PAGE_SIZE, paginate, interleave_by_author, paginate_diverse, get_user_post_count, clear_user_post_count, build_pagination
from .soft_delete import SOFT_DELETE_TABLES, ensure_soft_delete_columns, soft_delete, soft_delete_in, restore, purge, list_deleted, count_deleted, restore_event, purge_event
from .engagement import _comment_count_cache, get_comment_counts_by_post_uids, get_post_counts_by_user_uids, get_project_devlog, get_vote_counts, get_user_votes, get_reactions_by_targets, get_user_bookmarks, get_polls_by_post_uids, get_poll_for_post
from .engagement import _comment_count_cache, get_comment_counts_by_post_uids, get_post_counts_by_user_uids, get_vote_counts, get_user_votes, get_reactions_by_targets, get_user_bookmarks, get_polls_by_post_uids, get_poll_for_post
from .usage import _add_usage, _get_usage, add_correction_usage, get_correction_usage, add_modifier_usage, get_modifier_usage, NEWS_USAGE_KEY, add_news_usage, get_news_usage, ISSUE_USAGE_KEY, add_issue_usage, get_issue_usage, SEO_USAGE_KEY, add_seo_usage, get_seo_usage, AWARD_USAGE_KEY, add_award_usage, get_award_usage
from .awards import (
AWARDS_PER_PAGE,
@ -36,6 +36,43 @@ from .forks import record_fork, get_fork_parent, count_forks, soft_delete_fork_r
from .follows import get_follow_counts, get_follow_list, get_following_among
from .deepsearch import _ds_now, create_deepsearch_session, update_deepsearch_session, get_deepsearch_session, add_deepsearch_message, get_deepsearch_messages, get_cached_deepsearch_url, upsert_deepsearch_url_cache
from .ranking import VOTABLE_TARGETS, STAR_TARGETS, _authors_cache, _ranked_authors, _rank_map, get_top_authors, get_leaderboard, get_user_rank, get_user_stars, clear_user_stars, update_target_stars, soft_delete_engagement, delete_engagement, get_target_owner_uid
from .moderation import (
ACTIONS_TABLE,
ADULT_AGE,
AGE_BANDS,
CONSENTS_TABLE,
CONSENT_KINDS,
CONSENT_STATES,
MATURITY_LEVELS,
MATURITY_SOURCES,
MATURITY_TABLE,
MATURITY_TARGETS,
MODERATION_ACTIONS,
MODERATION_TABLES,
REPORTABLE_TARGETS,
REPORTS_TABLE,
REPORT_OPEN_STATUSES,
REPORT_ORIGINS,
REPORT_REASONS,
REPORT_SEVERITIES,
REPORT_STATUSES,
SYSTEM_ACTOR,
UNREPORTABLE_TABLES,
age_band_for,
band_allows_mature,
band_allows_restricted,
consent_granted,
consent_state,
get_maturity,
get_maturity_by_targets,
list_consents,
minimum_age,
report_reason_options,
set_consent,
set_maturity,
suspension_active,
years_between,
)
from .comments import _drop_blocked, _build_comment_items, load_comments, get_recent_comments_by_target_uids, get_recent_comments_by_post_uids, load_comments_by_target_uids
from .content import resolve_by_slug, resolve_object_url, get_uids_by_username_match, text_search_clause, get_daily_topic, get_featured_news, get_trending_topics
from .attachments_data import get_attachments, get_attachments_by_type, get_news_images_by_uids, delete_attachment_record, delete_attachments, _delete_attachment_file, get_user_media, get_user_attachments, get_user_attachment, get_deleted_media
@ -88,6 +125,7 @@ __all__ = [
"set_last_seen",
"get_online_users",
"get_primary_admin_uid",
"is_account_active",
"search_users_by_username",
"_relations_cache",
"get_user_relations",
@ -115,7 +153,6 @@ __all__ = [
"_comment_count_cache",
"get_comment_counts_by_post_uids",
"get_post_counts_by_user_uids",
"get_project_devlog",
"get_vote_counts",
"get_user_votes",
"get_reactions_by_targets",
@ -217,6 +254,40 @@ __all__ = [
"soft_delete_engagement",
"delete_engagement",
"get_target_owner_uid",
"ACTIONS_TABLE",
"ADULT_AGE",
"AGE_BANDS",
"CONSENTS_TABLE",
"CONSENT_KINDS",
"CONSENT_STATES",
"MATURITY_LEVELS",
"MATURITY_SOURCES",
"MATURITY_TABLE",
"MATURITY_TARGETS",
"MODERATION_ACTIONS",
"MODERATION_TABLES",
"REPORTABLE_TARGETS",
"REPORTS_TABLE",
"REPORT_OPEN_STATUSES",
"REPORT_ORIGINS",
"REPORT_REASONS",
"REPORT_SEVERITIES",
"REPORT_STATUSES",
"SYSTEM_ACTOR",
"UNREPORTABLE_TABLES",
"age_band_for",
"band_allows_mature",
"band_allows_restricted",
"consent_granted",
"consent_state",
"get_maturity",
"get_maturity_by_targets",
"list_consents",
"report_reason_options",
"set_consent",
"set_maturity",
"suspension_active",
"years_between",
"_drop_blocked",
"_build_comment_items",
"load_comments",

View File

@ -56,6 +56,44 @@ def resolve_object_url(target_type: str, target_uid: str) -> str:
receiver = get_table("users").find_one(uid=award.get("receiver_uid", ""))
if receiver:
return f"/profile/{receiver['username']}?tab=awards#award-{award.get('slug', '')}"
return "/feed"
if target_type == "user":
person = get_table("users").find_one(uid=target_uid)
return f"/profile/{person['username']}" if person else "/feed"
if target_type == "project_file":
node = get_table("project_files").find_one(uid=target_uid)
if not node:
return "/projects"
project = get_table("projects").find_one(uid=node.get("project_uid", ""))
if not project:
return "/projects"
slug = project.get("slug") or project["uid"]
return f"/projects/{slug}/files?path={node.get('path', '')}"
if target_type == "attachment":
attachment = get_table("attachments").find_one(uid=target_uid)
if not attachment:
return "/feed"
parent_type = attachment.get("target_type") or ""
parent_uid = attachment.get("target_uid") or ""
if parent_type and parent_uid:
return resolve_object_url(parent_type, parent_uid)
owner = get_table("users").find_one(uid=attachment.get("user_uid", ""))
return f"/profile/{owner['username']}?tab=media" if owner else "/feed"
if target_type == "message":
message = get_table("messages").find_one(uid=target_uid)
if not message:
return "/messages"
return f"/messages?with_uid={message.get('sender_uid', '')}"
if target_type == "poll":
poll = get_table("polls").find_one(uid=target_uid)
if not poll:
return "/feed"
return resolve_object_url("post", poll.get("post_uid", ""))
if target_type == "workspace":
instance = get_table("instances").find_one(uid=target_uid)
return f"/admin/containers/{instance['uid']}" if instance else "/admin/containers"
if target_type == "devii_output":
return "/devii"
return "/feed"

View File

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import dataset
import logging
from pathlib import Path
from sqlalchemy import or_
from sqlalchemy.pool import NullPool
from collections import defaultdict
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from devplacepy.cache import TTLCache
@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ db = dataset.connect(
"timeout": 30,
"check_same_thread": False,
},
"poolclass": NullPool,
},
on_connect_statements=[
"PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL",

View File

@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
from .core import TTLCache, _in_clause, db, defaultdict, get_table
from .pagination import paginate
from devplacepy.content import enrich_items
from .users import get_users_by_uids
from .core import TTLCache, _in_clause, db, defaultdict
_comment_count_cache = TTLCache(ttl=15, max_size=10000)
@ -190,23 +187,3 @@ def get_poll_for_post(post_uid, user=None):
return get_polls_by_post_uids([post_uid], user).get(post_uid)
def get_project_devlog(project_uid: str, before: str | None = None, viewer: dict | None = None) -> tuple[list, str | None]:
posts_table = get_table("posts")
posts, next_cursor = paginate(
posts_table,
before=before,
viewer_uid=viewer["uid"] if viewer else None,
project_uid=project_uid,
)
if not posts:
return [], None
authors = get_users_by_uids([p["user_uid"] for p in posts])
counts = get_comment_counts_by_post_uids([p["uid"] for p in posts])
result = enrich_items(
posts, "post", authors, {"comment_count": counts}, user=viewer
)
return result, next_cursor

View File

@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
from datetime import date, datetime, timezone
from .core import _in_clause, _now_iso, db, get_table
from .settings import get_int_setting
REPORTABLE_TARGETS: dict[str, str] = {
"post": "posts",
"comment": "comments",
"gist": "gists",
"project": "projects",
"project_file": "project_files",
"news": "news",
"attachment": "attachments",
"message": "messages",
"quiz": "quizzes",
"poll": "polls",
"award": "awards",
"user": "users",
"issue": "issue_tickets",
"workspace": "instances",
"devii_output": "devii_conversations",
}
MATURITY_TARGETS: set[str] = {
"post",
"comment",
"gist",
"project",
"news",
"attachment",
"quiz",
}
UNREPORTABLE_TABLES: dict[str, str] = {
"news_images": "child rows of a reportable news article",
"poll_options": "child rows of a reportable poll",
"quiz_questions": "child rows of a reportable quiz",
"quiz_options": "child rows of a reportable quiz",
"tunnels": "child rows of a reportable workspace instance",
"issue_comment_authors": "authorship index for reportable issue comments",
"votes": "engagement counters, carry no authored content",
"reactions": "engagement counters, carry no authored content",
"bookmarks": "private to the owner",
"follows": "relationship rows, carry no authored content",
"poll_votes": "private ballots",
"quiz_attempts": "private to the participant",
"quiz_answers": "private to the participant",
"sessions": "authentication state",
"access_tokens": "authentication state",
"devrant_tokens": "authentication state",
"user_relations": "private block and mute lists",
"notification_preferences": "private to the owner",
"user_customizations": "runs only in the owner's own browser",
"devii_tasks": "private to the owner",
"devii_lessons": "private to the owner",
"devii_virtual_tools": "private to the owner",
"deepsearch_sessions": "private to the owner",
"deepsearch_messages": "private to the owner",
"isslop_analyses": "generated from a public URL, not authored content",
"email_accounts": "private mailbox credentials",
"instance_schedules": "child rows of a reportable workspace instance",
"workspace_flags": "moderation records, not authored content",
"workspace_quota_rules": "administrator-set limits, not authored content",
"workspace_editor_prefs": (
"private per-user editor configuration, never shown to another member"
),
"content_reports": "moderation records, readable only by the reporter and moderators",
"moderation_actions": "moderation records, not authored content",
"content_maturity": "moderation labels, not authored content",
"user_consents": "private consent history of the account holder",
"backup_schedules": "operator configuration",
"project_forks": "lineage index for reportable projects",
"seo_metadata": "generated metadata for reportable content",
}
REPORT_REASONS: dict[str, str] = {
"hate": "Hate speech or discriminatory content",
"violence": "Realistic violence or threats",
"weapons": "Weapons or dangerous instructions",
"sexual": "Sexual or pornographic content",
"religious": "Content targeting religion or belief",
"misinformation": "False or misleading information",
"exploitative": "Content exploiting a person",
"harassment": "Harassment or bullying",
"spam": "Spam or unwanted promotion",
"intellectual_property": "Copyright or trademark infringement",
"self_harm": "Self-harm or suicide",
"illegal": "Illegal activity",
"other": "Something else",
}
def report_reason_options() -> list[dict[str, str]]:
return [{"key": key, "label": label} for key, label in REPORT_REASONS.items()]
REPORT_STATUSES: tuple[str, ...] = ("open", "acknowledged", "actioned", "dismissed")
REPORT_OPEN_STATUSES: tuple[str, ...] = ("open", "acknowledged")
REPORT_SEVERITIES: tuple[str, ...] = ("info", "warn", "critical")
REPORT_ORIGINS: tuple[str, ...] = ("member", "filter")
MODERATION_ACTIONS: tuple[str, ...] = (
"remove_content",
"restore_content",
"warn",
"suspend",
"ban",
"lift",
"dismiss",
"escalate",
)
MATURITY_LEVELS: tuple[str, ...] = ("general", "mature", "restricted")
MATURITY_SOURCES: tuple[str, ...] = ("author", "filter", "moderator")
CONSENT_KINDS: dict[str, str] = {
"terms": "Terms of Service and Community Guidelines",
"privacy": "Privacy Policy",
"ai_third_party": "Processing of your content by a third-party AI provider",
"activity_recording": "Recording of your presence and session activity",
"container_credentials": (
"Sharing your DevPlace credentials with software another member runs "
"in a container"
),
}
CONSENT_STATES: tuple[str, ...] = ("granted", "withdrawn")
AGE_BANDS: tuple[str, ...] = ("under_min", "13_15", "16_17", "adult")
ADULT_AGE = 18
TEEN_AGE = 16
YOUNG_TEEN_AGE = 13
MINIMUM_AGE_FLOOR = YOUNG_TEEN_AGE
DEFAULT_MINIMUM_AGE = TEEN_AGE
SYSTEM_ACTOR = "system"
REPORTS_TABLE = "content_reports"
ACTIONS_TABLE = "moderation_actions"
MATURITY_TABLE = "content_maturity"
CONSENTS_TABLE = "user_consents"
MODERATION_TABLES: tuple[str, ...] = (
REPORTS_TABLE,
ACTIONS_TABLE,
MATURITY_TABLE,
CONSENTS_TABLE,
)
def years_between(born: date, today: date) -> int:
years = today.year - born.year
if (today.month, today.day) < (born.month, born.day):
years -= 1
return years
def minimum_age() -> int:
return max(
MINIMUM_AGE_FLOOR,
get_int_setting("moderation_minimum_age", DEFAULT_MINIMUM_AGE),
)
def age_band_for(age: int) -> str:
if age >= ADULT_AGE:
return "adult"
if age >= TEEN_AGE:
return "16_17"
if age >= YOUNG_TEEN_AGE:
return "13_15"
return "under_min"
def band_allows_mature(band: str) -> bool:
return band == "adult"
def band_allows_restricted(band: str) -> bool:
return band == "adult"
def get_maturity_by_targets(target_type: str, uids: list[str]) -> dict[str, dict]:
uids = [uid for uid in (uids or []) if uid]
if not uids or MATURITY_TABLE not in db.tables:
return {}
placeholders, params = _in_clause(uids)
params["tt"] = target_type
rows = db.query(
f"SELECT target_uid, level, source FROM {MATURITY_TABLE} "
f"WHERE target_type = :tt AND target_uid IN ({placeholders}) "
f"AND deleted_at IS NULL",
**params,
)
return {
row["target_uid"]: {"level": row["level"], "source": row["source"]}
for row in rows
}
def get_maturity(target_type: str, target_uid: str) -> dict:
found = get_maturity_by_targets(target_type, [target_uid])
return found.get(target_uid, {"level": "general", "source": ""})
def set_maturity(
target_type: str, target_uid: str, level: str, source: str, set_by: str
) -> dict | None:
if target_type not in MATURITY_TARGETS or level not in MATURITY_LEVELS:
return None
from devplacepy.utils import generate_uid
table = get_table(MATURITY_TABLE)
existing = table.find_one(target_type=target_type, target_uid=target_uid)
now = _now_iso()
if existing:
table.update(
{
"id": existing["id"],
"level": level,
"source": source,
"set_by": set_by,
"updated_at": now,
"deleted_at": None,
"deleted_by": None,
},
["id"],
)
return table.find_one(id=existing["id"])
uid = generate_uid()
table.insert(
{
"uid": uid,
"target_type": target_type,
"target_uid": target_uid,
"level": level,
"source": source,
"set_by": set_by,
"created_at": now,
"updated_at": now,
"deleted_at": None,
"deleted_by": None,
}
)
return table.find_one(uid=uid)
def list_consents(owner_kind: str, owner_id: str) -> list[dict]:
if not owner_id or CONSENTS_TABLE not in db.tables:
return []
return list(
get_table(CONSENTS_TABLE).find(
owner_kind=owner_kind,
owner_id=owner_id,
deleted_at=None,
order_by=["-created_at"],
)
)
def consent_state(owner_kind: str, owner_id: str, kind: str) -> dict | None:
if not owner_id or CONSENTS_TABLE not in db.tables:
return None
rows = list(
get_table(CONSENTS_TABLE).find(
owner_kind=owner_kind,
owner_id=owner_id,
kind=kind,
deleted_at=None,
order_by=["-created_at", "-id"],
_limit=1,
)
)
return rows[0] if rows else None
def consent_granted(owner_kind: str, owner_id: str, kind: str) -> bool:
row = consent_state(owner_kind, owner_id, kind)
return bool(row and row.get("state") == "granted")
def set_consent(
owner_kind: str, owner_id: str, kind: str, granted: bool, version: str = "1"
) -> dict | None:
if kind not in CONSENT_KINDS or not owner_id:
return None
from devplacepy.utils import generate_uid
table = get_table(CONSENTS_TABLE)
now = _now_iso()
current = consent_state(owner_kind, owner_id, kind)
if current and not granted and current.get("state") == "granted":
table.update({"id": current["id"], "withdrawn_at": now}, ["id"])
uid = generate_uid()
table.insert(
{
"uid": uid,
"owner_kind": owner_kind,
"owner_id": owner_id,
"kind": kind,
"version": version,
"state": "granted" if granted else "withdrawn",
"granted_at": now if granted else "",
"withdrawn_at": "" if granted else now,
"created_at": now,
"deleted_at": None,
"deleted_by": None,
}
)
return table.find_one(uid=uid)
def suspension_active(user: dict | None) -> bool:
if not user:
return False
until = (user.get("suspended_until") or "").strip()
if not until:
return False
try:
expiry = datetime.fromisoformat(until)
except ValueError:
return False
if expiry.tzinfo is None:
expiry = expiry.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
return expiry > datetime.now(timezone.utc)

View File

@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ NOTIFICATION_TYPES = [
{"key": "harvest_stolen", "label": "Farm raids", "description": "Someone steals a ready build from your Code Farm"},
{"key": "award", "label": "Awards", "description": "Someone gives you an award on your profile"},
{"key": "quiz_attempt", "label": "Quiz attempts", "description": "Someone completes one of your quizzes"},
{"key": "workspace", "label": "Dev workspaces", "description": "Idle, quota, retention and moderation notices for your dev workspaces"},
{"key": "moderation", "label": "Moderation", "description": "Acknowledgements for reports you file and decisions taken on your content"},
{"key": "system", "label": "System alerts", "description": "Platform infrastructure alerts (e.g. the AI gateway going down)"},
]

View File

@ -32,12 +32,13 @@ def _ranked_authors() -> list:
cached = _authors_cache.get("ranked")
if cached is not None:
return cached
tables = db.tables
sources = [
(target_type, table_name)
for target_type, table_name in VOTABLE_TARGETS.items()
if table_name in db.tables
if table_name in tables
]
if "votes" not in db.tables or not sources:
if "votes" not in tables or not sources:
_authors_cache.set("ranked", [])
return []
target_union = " UNION ALL ".join(
@ -101,12 +102,13 @@ def get_user_stars(user_uid: str) -> int:
cached = _stars_cache.get(user_uid)
if cached is not None:
return cached
if "votes" not in db.tables:
tables = db.tables
if "votes" not in tables:
return 0
target_union = " UNION ALL ".join(
f"SELECT uid, '{target_type}' AS target_type FROM {table_name} WHERE user_uid = :u AND deleted_at IS NULL"
for target_type, table_name in VOTABLE_TARGETS.items()
if table_name in db.tables
if table_name in tables
)
if not target_union:
return 0
@ -154,7 +156,8 @@ def delete_engagement(target_type: str, target_uids: list) -> None:
uids = [uid for uid in (target_uids or []) if uid]
if not uids:
return
if "reactions" in db.tables:
tables = db.tables
if "reactions" in tables:
placeholders, params = _in_clause(uids)
params["tt"] = target_type
with db:
@ -162,7 +165,7 @@ def delete_engagement(target_type: str, target_uids: list) -> None:
f"DELETE FROM reactions WHERE target_type=:tt AND target_uid IN ({placeholders})",
**params,
)
if "bookmarks" in db.tables:
if "bookmarks" in tables:
placeholders, params = _in_clause(uids)
params["tt"] = target_type
with db:
@ -170,12 +173,12 @@ def delete_engagement(target_type: str, target_uids: list) -> None:
f"DELETE FROM bookmarks WHERE target_type=:tt AND target_uid IN ({placeholders})",
**params,
)
if target_type == "post" and "polls" in db.tables:
if target_type == "post" and "polls" in tables:
for uid in uids:
for poll in db["polls"].find(post_uid=uid):
if "poll_votes" in db.tables:
if "poll_votes" in tables:
db["poll_votes"].delete(poll_uid=poll["uid"])
if "poll_options" in db.tables:
if "poll_options" in tables:
db["poll_options"].delete(poll_uid=poll["uid"])
db["polls"].delete(post_uid=uid)

View File

@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import inspect
import os
import httpx
from devplacepy.cache import TTLCache
from devplacepy_services.base.db_codec import (
decode_value,
encode_args,
is_write,
is_write_sql,
)
_SERVICE_URL = os.environ.get("DEVPLACE_DB_SERVICE_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:10601").rstrip("/")
_INTERNAL_KEY = os.environ.get("DEVPLACE_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_KEY", "").strip()
_CLIENT: httpx.Client | None = None
# Section 7.3: settings reads tolerate up to 5s staleness. patch_module()
# generically RPCs every devplacepy.database call, bypassing the local
# TTL cache get_setting/get_int_setting had in-process - without this,
# every settings read (rate limiting, maintenance mode, admin dashboards)
# pays a full HTTP round trip to the database broker.
_SETTINGS_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 5
_SETTINGS_CACHE = TTLCache(ttl=_SETTINGS_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS, max_size=512)
_CACHED_SETTINGS_FNS = frozenset({"get_setting", "get_int_setting"})
def _service_url() -> str:
return os.environ.get("DEVPLACE_DB_SERVICE_URL", _SERVICE_URL).rstrip("/")
def _headers() -> dict[str, str]:
headers: dict[str, str] = {}
key = os.environ.get("DEVPLACE_GATEWAY_INTERNAL_KEY", _INTERNAL_KEY).strip()
if key:
headers["X-Internal-Key"] = key
return headers
def _client() -> httpx.Client:
global _CLIENT
if _CLIENT is None:
_CLIENT = httpx.Client(timeout=30.0)
return _CLIENT
def _post(path: str, body: dict) -> object:
response = _client().post(
f"{_service_url()}/{path.lstrip('/')}",
json=body,
headers=_headers(),
)
if response.status_code >= 400:
payload = response.json() if response.content else {}
message = payload.get("error", "Database service request failed")
raise RuntimeError(message)
if not response.content:
return None
return decode_value(response.json())
def _invoke_cached(fn_name: str, args, kwargs):
cache_key = f"{fn_name}:{args!r}:{sorted(kwargs.items())!r}"
cached = _SETTINGS_CACHE.get(cache_key)
if cached is not None:
return cached
value = _invoke(fn_name, args, kwargs, write=False)
_SETTINGS_CACHE.set(cache_key, value)
return value
def _invoke(fn_name: str, args, kwargs, *, write: bool = False):
encoded_args, encoded_kwargs = encode_args(args, kwargs)
payload = {
"fn": fn_name,
"args": encoded_args,
"kwargs": encoded_kwargs,
"write": write,
}
result = _post("internal/invoke", payload)
if isinstance(result, dict) and "result" in result:
return result["result"]
return result
class RemoteSearchClause:
def __init__(self, term, fields, author_field=None):
self.term = term.strip()
self.fields = tuple(fields)
self.author_field = author_field
class RemoteUidInClause:
def __init__(self, field, uids):
self.field = field
self.uids = frozenset(uids)
class RemoteTable:
def __init__(self, db: "RemoteDb", name: str) -> None:
self._db = db
self._name = name
self._column_cache = None
def __getattr__(self, name: str):
def caller(*args, **kwargs):
return self._db._table_op(self._name, name, args, kwargs)
return caller
def has_column(self, name: str) -> bool:
cache = self._column_cache
if cache is None:
sample = self.find(_limit=1)
row = next(iter(sample), None)
cache = set(row.keys()) if row else set()
self._column_cache = cache
return name in cache
def count(self, **kwargs):
return self._db._table_op(self._name, "count", [], kwargs)
@property
def table(self):
return self
@property
def exists(self) -> bool:
return self._name in self._db.tables
class RemoteDb:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._tables_cache: list[str] | None = None
@property
def tables(self) -> list[str]:
if self._tables_cache is None:
result = _post("internal/db-op", {"op": "tables"})
self._tables_cache = list(result or [])
return self._tables_cache
def __getitem__(self, name: str) -> RemoteTable:
return RemoteTable(self, name)
def query(self, sql: str, **params):
encoded_args, encoded_kwargs = encode_args((sql,), params)
result = _post(
"internal/db-op",
{
"op": "query",
"args": encoded_args,
"kwargs": encoded_kwargs,
"write": is_write_sql(sql),
},
)
return result or []
def _table_op(self, table: str, method: str, args, kwargs, *, write: bool = False):
encoded_args, encoded_kwargs = encode_args(args, kwargs)
result = _post(
"internal/db-op",
{
"op": "table_op",
"table": table,
"method": method,
"args": encoded_args,
"kwargs": encoded_kwargs,
"write": write,
},
)
if method in {"insert", "update", "delete"}:
self._tables_cache = None
return result
@property
def executable(self):
return self
@property
def in_transaction(self) -> bool:
return False
def __enter__(self):
return self
def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
return False
_LOCAL_REMOTE = frozenset(
{
"get_table",
"refresh_snapshot",
"_in_clause",
"_now_iso",
"text_search_clause",
}
)
def _remote_text_search_clause(
table, search, fields=("title", "description"), author_field=None
):
term = (search or "").strip()
if not term:
return None
if type(table).__name__ == "RemoteTable":
return RemoteSearchClause(term, fields, author_field)
from devplacepy.database.content import text_search_clause as local_clause
return local_clause(table, search, fields, author_field=author_field)
def _remote_get_table(name: str):
import devplacepy.database.core as core
return core.db[name]
def _remote_refresh_snapshot() -> None:
return None
def patch_module(module) -> None:
import devplacepy.database as db_module
for name in db_module.__all__:
if name in _LOCAL_REMOTE:
continue
target = getattr(module, name, None)
if target is None or not callable(target):
continue
if inspect.isclass(target):
continue
def make_wrapper(fn_name: str, fn_write: bool):
if fn_name in _CACHED_SETTINGS_FNS:
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
return _invoke_cached(fn_name, args, kwargs)
wrapper.__name__ = fn_name
return wrapper
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
return _invoke(fn_name, args, kwargs, write=fn_write)
wrapper.__name__ = fn_name
return wrapper
setattr(module, name, make_wrapper(name, is_write(name)))
def activate() -> None:
import devplacepy.database.core as core
core.db = RemoteDb()
import devplacepy.database as db_module
patch_module(db_module)
for submodule_name in (
"settings",
"users",
"relations",
"pagination",
"soft_delete",
"engagement",
"usage",
"awards",
"seo_meta",
"activity",
"customization",
"email",
"notifications",
"forks",
"follows",
"deepsearch",
"ranking",
"comments",
"content",
"attachments_data",
"stats",
"schema",
):
try:
submodule = __import__(
f"devplacepy.database.{submodule_name}",
fromlist=[submodule_name],
)
except ImportError:
continue
patch_module(submodule)
for external_name in (
"devplacepy.services.statistics.tracking",
"devplacepy.services.base",
"devplacepy.attachments",
"devplacepy.project_files",
):
try:
external = __import__(external_name, fromlist=[external_name.split(".")[-1]])
except ImportError:
continue
if hasattr(external, "db"):
external.db = RemoteDb()
db_module.db = core.db
db_module.get_table = _remote_get_table
core.get_table = _remote_get_table
db_module.refresh_snapshot = _remote_refresh_snapshot
core.refresh_snapshot = _remote_refresh_snapshot
db_module.text_search_clause = _remote_text_search_clause
import devplacepy.database.content as content_module
content_module.text_search_clause = _remote_text_search_clause
for submodule_name in (
"settings",
"users",
"relations",
"pagination",
"soft_delete",
"engagement",
"usage",
"awards",
"seo_meta",
"activity",
"customization",
"email",
"notifications",
"forks",
"follows",
"deepsearch",
"ranking",
"comments",
"content",
"attachments_data",
"stats",
"schema",
):
try:
submodule = __import__(
f"devplacepy.database.{submodule_name}",
fromlist=[submodule_name],
)
except ImportError:
continue
if hasattr(submodule, "db"):
submodule.db = core.db

View File

@ -121,6 +121,17 @@ def init_db():
_index(db, "comments", "idx_comments_user_uid", ["user_uid"])
_index(db, "comments", "idx_comments_created_at", ["created_at"])
_index(db, "votes", "idx_votes_target", ["target_uid", "target_type"])
messages = get_table("messages")
for column, example in (
("uid", ""),
("sender_uid", ""),
("receiver_uid", ""),
("content", ""),
("read", False),
("created_at", ""),
):
if not messages.has_column(column):
messages.create_column_by_example(column, example)
_index(db, "messages", "idx_messages_sender", ["sender_uid"])
_index(db, "messages", "idx_messages_receiver", ["receiver_uid"])
_index(
@ -134,7 +145,28 @@ def init_db():
)
_index(db, "notifications", "idx_notifications_user", ["user_uid"])
_index(db, "notifications", "idx_notifications_user_read", ["user_uid", "read"])
push_registration = get_table("push_registration")
for column, example in (
("uid", ""),
("user_uid", ""),
("provider", "webpush"),
("endpoint", ""),
("key_auth", ""),
("key_p256dh", ""),
("token", ""),
("created_at", ""),
("deleted_at", ""),
):
if not push_registration.has_column(column):
push_registration.create_column_by_example(column, example)
_index(db, "push_registration", "idx_push_registration_user", ["user_uid"])
_index(db, "push_registration", "idx_push_registration_provider", ["provider"])
if "push_registration" in db.tables:
with db:
db.query(
"UPDATE push_registration SET provider = 'webpush' "
"WHERE provider IS NULL OR provider = ''"
)
_index(db, "sessions", "idx_sessions_token", ["session_token"])
projects = get_table("projects")
for column, example in (
@ -147,6 +179,9 @@ def init_db():
("is_private", 0),
("read_only", 0),
("updated_at", ""),
("title", ""),
("description", ""),
("status", ""),
):
if not projects.has_column(column):
projects.create_column_by_example(column, example)
@ -253,7 +288,7 @@ def init_db():
defaults = {
"site_name": "DevPlace",
"site_description": "The Developer Social Network",
"site_tagline": "Track industry shifts. Discover bold releases. Share what you are building in an open, uncensored environment.",
"site_tagline": "Track industry shifts. Discover bold releases. Share what you are building in an open environment built by developers, for developers.",
}
for key, value in defaults.items():
existing = db["site_settings"].find_one(key=key)
@ -534,6 +569,9 @@ def init_db():
("slug", ""),
("name", ""),
("status", ""),
("created_at", ""),
("owner_uid", ""),
("created_by", ""),
("desired_state", ""),
("container_id", ""),
("ingress_slug", ""),
@ -544,10 +582,144 @@ def init_db():
("boot_language", "none"),
("boot_script", ""),
("start_on_boot", 0),
("is_workspace", 0),
("workspace_owner_uid", ""),
("editor_port", 0),
("editor_host_port", 0),
("editor_password", ""),
("tunnel_name", ""),
("last_active_at", ""),
("idle_warned_at", ""),
("delete_warned_at", ""),
("disk_bytes", 0),
("disk_sampled_at", ""),
("egress_bytes", 0),
("request_count", 0),
("flagged_at", ""),
("flag_reason", ""),
("suspended_at", ""),
("suspended_by", ""),
("boot_marker", ""),
("workspace_cpu_millicores", 0),
("workspace_memory_mb", 0),
("workspace_disk_quota_mb", 0),
):
if not instances.has_column(column):
instances.create_column_by_example(column, example)
tunnels = get_table("tunnels")
for column, example in (
("uid", ""),
("instance_uid", ""),
("project_uid", ""),
("user_uid", ""),
("hostname", ""),
("label", ""),
("container_port", 0),
("desired_state", "present"),
("status", "pending"),
("cert_status", ""),
("cert_checked_at", ""),
("request_count", 0),
("bytes_out", 0),
("last_request_at", ""),
("last_error", ""),
("last_synced_at", ""),
("created_at", ""),
("updated_at", ""),
):
if not tunnels.has_column(column):
tunnels.create_column_by_example(column, example)
quota_rules = get_table("workspace_quota_rules")
for column, example in (
("uid", ""),
("owner_kind", ""),
("owner_id", ""),
("label", ""),
("max_workspaces", 0),
("max_tunnels", 0),
("disk_quota_mb", 0),
("egress_quota_mb", 0),
("idle_stop_minutes", 0),
("retention_days", 0),
("cpu_millicores", 0),
("memory_mb", 0),
("created_at", ""),
("updated_at", ""),
):
if not quota_rules.has_column(column):
quota_rules.create_column_by_example(column, example)
editor_prefs = get_table("workspace_editor_prefs")
for column, example in (
("uid", ""),
("owner_kind", ""),
("owner_id", ""),
("font_size", 0),
("terminal_font_size", 0),
("zoom_level", -99),
("theme", ""),
("layout", ""),
("panel_preset", ""),
("window_mode", ""),
("window_width", 0),
("window_height", 0),
("boot_agent", ""),
("boot_shell", -1),
("created_at", ""),
("updated_at", ""),
):
if not editor_prefs.has_column(column):
editor_prefs.create_column_by_example(column, example)
flags = get_table("workspace_flags")
for column, example in (
("uid", ""),
("instance_uid", ""),
("user_uid", ""),
("kind", ""),
("severity", "warn"),
("detail", ""),
("metric_value", 0.0),
("threshold", 0.0),
("status", "open"),
("resolved_by", ""),
("resolved_at", ""),
("created_at", ""),
("updated_at", ""),
):
if not flags.has_column(column):
flags.create_column_by_example(column, example)
_index(db, "instances", "idx_instances_workspace", ["is_workspace", "status"])
_index(db, "instances", "idx_instances_workspace_owner", ["workspace_owner_uid"])
_index(db, "instances", "idx_instances_tunnel_name", ["tunnel_name"])
_index(db, "tunnels", "idx_tunnels_hostname", ["hostname"])
_index(db, "tunnels", "idx_tunnels_instance", ["instance_uid"])
_index(db, "tunnels", "idx_tunnels_user", ["user_uid"])
_index(db, "tunnels", "idx_tunnels_state", ["desired_state", "status"])
_index(
db,
"workspace_quota_rules",
"idx_workspace_quota_owner",
["owner_kind", "owner_id"],
)
_index(
db,
"workspace_editor_prefs",
"idx_workspace_editor_prefs_owner",
["owner_kind", "owner_id"],
)
_index(db, "workspace_flags", "idx_workspace_flags_open", ["status", "created_at"])
_index(
db,
"workspace_flags",
"idx_workspace_flags_instance",
["instance_uid", "kind"],
)
_index(db, "workspace_flags", "idx_workspace_flags_user", ["user_uid"])
_index(db, "instances", "idx_instances_project", ["project_uid"])
_index(db, "instances", "idx_instances_slug", ["slug"])
_index(db, "instances", "idx_instances_name", ["name"])
@ -1426,6 +1598,8 @@ def init_db():
["user_uid", "created_at"],
)
_ensure_moderation_tables()
for table in db.tables:
_uid_index(db, table)
@ -1564,6 +1738,19 @@ def init_db():
"outbound_proxy_url": "",
"devii_lessons_max_per_owner": "500",
"devii_lessons_max_age_days": "90",
"moderation_sla_hours": "24",
"moderation_filter_mode": "review",
"moderation_filter_review_score": "2",
"moderation_minimum_age": "16",
"moderation_mature_default_hidden": "1",
"contact_email": "",
"contact_phone": "",
"contact_address": "",
"terms_version": "1",
"privacy_version": "1",
"guidelines_version": "1",
"ai_third_party_provider": "",
"account_deletion_grace_hours": "24",
}
for key, value in operational_defaults.items():
existing = db["site_settings"].find_one(key=key)
@ -1644,6 +1831,83 @@ def init_db():
_refresh_query_planner_stats()
MODERATION_COLUMNS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, object], ...]] = {
"content_reports": (
("uid", ""),
("reporter_uid", ""),
("target_type", ""),
("target_uid", ""),
("owner_uid", ""),
("reason", ""),
("detail", ""),
("severity", "warn"),
("status", "open"),
("origin", "member"),
("categories", ""),
("resolved_by", ""),
("resolved_at", ""),
("created_at", ""),
("updated_at", ""),
),
"moderation_actions": (
("uid", ""),
("report_uid", ""),
("actor_uid", ""),
("action", ""),
("target_type", ""),
("target_uid", ""),
("subject_uid", ""),
("reason", ""),
("notes", ""),
("expires_at", ""),
("created_at", ""),
),
"content_maturity": (
("uid", ""),
("target_type", ""),
("target_uid", ""),
("level", "general"),
("source", ""),
("set_by", ""),
("created_at", ""),
("updated_at", ""),
),
"user_consents": (
("uid", ""),
("owner_kind", ""),
("owner_id", ""),
("kind", ""),
("version", "1"),
("state", ""),
("granted_at", ""),
("withdrawn_at", ""),
("created_at", ""),
),
}
MODERATION_INDEXES: tuple[tuple[str, str, list[str]], ...] = (
("content_reports", "idx_content_reports_queue", ["status", "created_at"]),
("content_reports", "idx_content_reports_target", ["target_type", "target_uid"]),
("content_reports", "idx_content_reports_reporter", ["reporter_uid"]),
("content_reports", "idx_content_reports_owner", ["owner_uid"]),
("moderation_actions", "idx_moderation_actions_report", ["report_uid"]),
("moderation_actions", "idx_moderation_actions_subject", ["subject_uid"]),
("moderation_actions", "idx_moderation_actions_created", ["created_at"]),
("content_maturity", "idx_content_maturity_target", ["target_type", "target_uid"]),
("user_consents", "idx_user_consents_owner", ["owner_kind", "owner_id", "kind"]),
)
def _ensure_moderation_tables() -> None:
for table_name, columns in MODERATION_COLUMNS.items():
table = get_table(table_name)
for column, example in columns:
if not table.has_column(column):
table.create_column_by_example(column, example)
for table_name, index_name, columns in MODERATION_INDEXES:
_index(db, table_name, index_name, columns)
def _refresh_query_planner_stats() -> None:
try:
has_stats = bool(
@ -1696,9 +1960,7 @@ def migrate_ai_gateway_settings() -> None:
def backfill_api_keys() -> int:
if "users" not in db.tables:
return 0
users = db["users"]
users = get_table("users")
if not users.has_column("api_key"):
users.create_column_by_example("api_key", "")
if not users.has_column("created_at"):
@ -1735,6 +1997,22 @@ def backfill_api_keys() -> int:
users.create_column_by_example("last_award_slug", "")
if not users.has_column("last_award_uid"):
users.create_column_by_example("last_award_uid", "")
if not users.has_column("terms_version"):
users.create_column_by_example("terms_version", "")
if not users.has_column("terms_accepted_at"):
users.create_column_by_example("terms_accepted_at", "")
if not users.has_column("age_band"):
users.create_column_by_example("age_band", "")
if not users.has_column("age_declared_at"):
users.create_column_by_example("age_declared_at", "")
if not users.has_column("mature_opt_in"):
users.create_column_by_example("mature_opt_in", 0)
if not users.has_column("suspended_until"):
users.create_column_by_example("suspended_until", "")
if not users.has_column("suspension_reason"):
users.create_column_by_example("suspension_reason", "")
if not users.has_column("deletion_requested_at"):
users.create_column_by_example("deletion_requested_at", "")
with db:
db.query(
"UPDATE users SET ai_modifier_enabled = 1 WHERE ai_modifier_enabled IS NULL"
@ -1749,6 +2027,7 @@ def backfill_api_keys() -> int:
"UPDATE users SET interactions_enabled = -1 "
"WHERE interactions_enabled IS NULL"
)
db.query("UPDATE users SET mature_opt_in = 0 WHERE mature_opt_in IS NULL")
import uuid_utils
updated = 0
@ -1761,6 +2040,29 @@ def backfill_api_keys() -> int:
return updated
MILESTONE_SOURCES = (
("posts", "user_uid"),
("comments", "user_uid"),
("projects", "user_uid"),
("gists", "user_uid"),
("follows", "follower_uid"),
("follows", "following_uid"),
("user_activity", "user_uid"),
)
def _milestone_candidates() -> set:
tables = db.tables
candidates = set()
for table, column in MILESTONE_SOURCES:
if table not in tables:
continue
for row in db.query(f"SELECT DISTINCT {column} AS uid FROM {table}"):
if row["uid"]:
candidates.add(row["uid"])
return candidates
def _backfill_gamification():
if "users" not in db.tables:
return
@ -1824,7 +2126,12 @@ def _backfill_gamification():
)
_authors_cache.clear()
for user in pending:
candidates = _milestone_candidates()
checked = [user for user in pending if user["uid"] in candidates]
for user in checked:
check_milestone_badges(user["uid"])
logger.info(f"Gamification backfill processed {len(pending)} users")
logger.info(
f"Gamification backfill processed {len(pending)} users, "
f"{len(checked)} with milestone-eligible activity"
)

View File

@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ SOFT_DELETE_TABLES = [
"sessions",
"instances",
"instance_schedules",
"tunnels",
"workspace_flags",
"workspace_quota_rules",
"workspace_editor_prefs",
"backup_schedules",
"devii_conversations",
"devii_tasks",
@ -47,6 +51,10 @@ SOFT_DELETE_TABLES = [
"quiz_options",
"quiz_attempts",
"quiz_answers",
"content_reports",
"moderation_actions",
"content_maturity",
"user_consents",
]

View File

@ -74,10 +74,15 @@ def get_online_users(cutoff_iso: str, limit: int = 30) -> list:
)
def is_account_active(row) -> bool:
is_active = (row or {}).get("is_active")
return is_active is None or bool(is_active)
def _can_hold_primary_admin(row, tracks_active):
if row.get("deleted_at"):
return False
return not tracks_active or bool(row.get("is_active"))
return not tracks_active or is_account_active(row)
def get_primary_admin_uid():

View File

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import os
def _activate() -> None:
if os.environ.get("DEVPLACE_DB_SERVICE") == "1":
return
if os.environ.get("DEVPLACE_REMOTE_DB") == "1":
from devplacepy.database.remote import activate
activate()
_activate()
import devplacepy.database as _database
def _remote_table(table) -> bool:
return type(table).__name__ == "RemoteTable"
def __getattr__(name: str):
return getattr(_database, name)
def __dir__():
return sorted(name for name in dir(_database) if not name.startswith("_"))

View File

@ -8,10 +8,12 @@ from . import (
content,
profiles,
messaging,
moderation,
notifications,
uploads,
project_files,
containers,
workspaces,
tools,
push,
issues,
@ -30,10 +32,12 @@ ORDERED_GROUPS = [
content.GROUP,
profiles.GROUP,
messaging.GROUP,
moderation.GROUP,
notifications.GROUP,
uploads.GROUP,
project_files.GROUP,
containers.GROUP,
workspaces.GROUP,
tools.GROUP,
push.GROUP,
issues.GROUP,

View File

@ -648,6 +648,26 @@ four ways to sign requests.
field("label", "json", "string", False, "", "Optional admin-facing note."),
],
),
endpoint(
id="admin-gateway-quota-reset",
method="POST",
path="/admin/gateway/quota-resets",
title="Reset the AI gateway 24h spend",
summary=(
"Clear the counted rolling-24h spend for a scope so a capped caller can call "
"again, without deleting any usage history (the cost analytics stay intact). "
"Scope it exactly like a quota rule; leaving all three dimensions blank resets "
"every caller. Only spend recorded before the reset is cleared - new calls "
"count again immediately against the same limit."
),
auth="admin",
destructive=True,
params=[
field("owner_kind", "json", "string", False, "user", "internal, key, user, admin, or anonymous. Blank = every role."),
field("owner_id", "json", "string", False, "", "Specific user uid. Blank = every caller."),
field("app_reference", "json", "string", False, "typosaurus", "App label (the X-App-Reference header). Blank = every app."),
],
),
endpoint(
id="admin-gateway-quota-rule-delete",
method="DELETE",

View File

@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ as a `422` with the shape `{ "fields": {...}, "messages": [...] }`.
field("email", "form", "string", True, "alice@example.com", "Email address; must be unique and contain an @."),
field("password", "form", "string", True, "mysecret", "Password, 6+ characters."),
field("confirm_password", "form", "string", True, "mysecret", "Must match password."),
field("birth_date", "form", "string", True, "01/01/1990", "Date of birth, DD/MM/YYYY or YYYY-MM-DD. Only the derived age band is stored; the date is discarded."),
field("accept_terms", "form", "enum", True, "1", "Acceptance of the Terms of Service and Community Guidelines.", ["1"]),
],
notes=[
"Signup is refused below the platform minimum age (`moderation_minimum_age`).",
"Accepting records the terms, privacy and activity-recording consents; "
"third-party AI processing stays off until it is granted separately.",
],
),
endpoint(

View File

@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ four ways to sign requests.
method="GET",
path="/projects/{project_slug}",
title="View a project",
summary="Render a project with comments. Returns an HTML page.",
summary="Render the project overview with its devlog, screenshots and comments. Returns an HTML page.",
auth="public",
interactive=True,
params=[
@ -373,7 +373,42 @@ four ways to sign requests.
True,
"PROJECT_SLUG",
"Slug or UID of the project.",
)
),
field(
"before",
"query",
"string",
False,
"",
"Devlog pagination cursor (devlog_next_cursor from the previous page).",
),
],
),
endpoint(
id="projects-screenshots",
method="POST",
path="/projects/{project_slug}/screenshots",
title="Add screenshots to a project",
summary="Link uploaded image attachments to an owned project's Screenshots gallery. Redirects to the gallery.",
auth="user",
encoding="form",
params=[
field(
"project_slug",
"path",
"string",
True,
"my-project-1a2b3c4d",
"Project slug or uid.",
),
field(
"attachment_uids",
"form",
"string",
True,
"ATTACHMENT_UID",
"Comma-separated attachment uids from POST /uploads/upload or /uploads/upload-url.",
),
],
),
endpoint(
@ -443,6 +478,38 @@ four ways to sign requests.
"31/12/2026",
"Optional demo date in DD/MM/YYYY format.",
),
field(
"website_url",
"form",
"string",
False,
"https://myproject.dev",
"Optional official website URL (http/https).",
),
field(
"repo_url",
"form",
"string",
False,
"https://github.com/me/project",
"Optional source repository URL (http/https).",
),
field(
"cover_attachment_uid",
"form",
"string",
False,
"ATTACHMENT_UID",
"Optional attachment uid of an uploaded cover image.",
),
field(
"logo_attachment_uid",
"form",
"string",
False,
"ATTACHMENT_UID",
"Optional attachment uid of an uploaded project logo.",
),
],
),
endpoint(
@ -520,6 +587,38 @@ four ways to sign requests.
"31/12/2026",
"Optional demo date in DD/MM/YYYY format.",
),
field(
"website_url",
"form",
"string",
False,
"https://myproject.dev",
"Optional official website URL (http/https).",
),
field(
"repo_url",
"form",
"string",
False,
"https://github.com/me/project",
"Optional source repository URL (http/https).",
),
field(
"cover_attachment_uid",
"form",
"string",
False,
"ATTACHMENT_UID",
"Optional attachment uid of an uploaded cover image.",
),
field(
"logo_attachment_uid",
"form",
"string",
False,
"ATTACHMENT_UID",
"Optional attachment uid of an uploaded project logo.",
),
],
),
endpoint(

View File

@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
from .._shared import endpoint, field
from devplacepy.database.moderation import (
CONSENT_KINDS,
MODERATION_ACTIONS,
REPORTABLE_TARGETS,
REPORT_REASONS,
REPORT_STATUSES,
)
REPORT_TARGETS = list(REPORTABLE_TARGETS)
REASON_KEYS = list(REPORT_REASONS)
CONSENT_KEYS = list(CONSENT_KINDS)
SAMPLE_REPORT = {
"uid": "REPORT_UID",
"target_type": "post",
"target_uid": "POST_UID",
"target_url": "/posts/a-post",
"reason": "harassment",
"reason_label": "Harassment or bullying",
"detail": "Repeated personal attacks in the thread.",
"severity": "warn",
"status": "open",
"origin": "member",
"categories": [],
"created_at": "2026-01-05T10:00:00+00:00",
"resolved_at": "",
"reporter_name": "alice",
"owner_name": "bob",
"report_count": 2,
}
GROUP = {
"slug": "moderation",
"title": "Reporting & Moderation",
"intro": """
# Reporting & Moderation
Every externally visible surface on DevPlace is reportable through one polymorphic
endpoint, and every report lands in one queue with one state machine. The reason
list is served by `GET /reports/reasons`, so a native client renders the same
dialog the web UI does.
DevPlace commits to reviewing every report within the window published on the
[content moderation](/docs/content-moderation.html) page. Filing a report always
returns an acknowledgement carrying that window.
The moderation endpoints under `/admin/moderation` are administrator-only and are
subject to the admin seniority rule: a junior administrator cannot action a more
senior one.
Every endpoint follows the shared [Conventions & Errors](/docs/conventions.html) (auth, content
negotiation, pagination, status codes); see [Authentication](/docs/authentication.html) for the
four ways to sign requests.
""",
"endpoints": [
endpoint(
id="report-reasons",
method="GET",
path="/reports/reasons",
title="List report reasons",
summary="The reason keys a report may be filed under, with their labels.",
auth="public",
sample_response={
"reasons": [{"key": "harassment", "label": "Harassment or bullying"}],
"severities": ["info", "warn", "critical"],
},
),
endpoint(
id="report-create",
method="POST",
path="/reports/{target_type}/{target_uid}",
title="Report content",
summary="File a report against any user-generated surface.",
auth="user",
encoding="form",
destructive=False,
params=[
field(
"target_type",
"path",
"enum",
True,
"post",
"The kind of content being reported.",
REPORT_TARGETS,
),
field(
"target_uid",
"path",
"string",
True,
"POST_UID",
"UID of the reported item.",
),
field(
"reason",
"form",
"enum",
True,
"harassment",
"Why the content breaks the guidelines.",
REASON_KEYS,
),
field(
"detail",
"form",
"string",
False,
"",
"Free text for the moderator, up to 2000 characters.",
),
],
notes=[
"A second report on the same target by the same reporter updates the "
"open report instead of creating a duplicate.",
"You cannot report your own content.",
],
sample_response={
"ok": True,
"redirect": "/reports/mine",
"data": {
"uid": "REPORT_UID",
"status": "open",
"severity": "warn",
"sla_hours": 24,
},
},
),
endpoint(
id="reports-mine",
method="GET",
path="/reports/mine",
title="List your reports",
summary="The reports you filed and the outcome of each.",
auth="user",
params=[
field(
"status",
"query",
"enum",
False,
"open",
"Filter by report status.",
list(REPORT_STATUSES),
),
field("page", "query", "integer", False, "1", "Page number."),
],
sample_response={
"reports": [SAMPLE_REPORT],
"pagination": {"page": 1, "total": 1, "total_pages": 1},
"status": "",
},
),
endpoint(
id="admin-moderation",
method="GET",
path="/admin/moderation",
title="The moderation queue",
summary="Reported content awaiting a decision, oldest open first.",
auth="admin",
params=[
field(
"status",
"query",
"enum",
False,
"open",
"Filter by report status.",
list(REPORT_STATUSES),
),
field("page", "query", "integer", False, "1", "Page number."),
],
sample_response={
"reports": [SAMPLE_REPORT],
"counts": {"open": 1, "acknowledged": 0, "actioned": 0, "dismissed": 0},
"sla": {
"sla_hours": 24,
"oldest_open_hours": 1.5,
"breached": 0,
"within_sla": True,
},
},
),
endpoint(
id="admin-moderation-report",
method="GET",
path="/admin/moderation/{uid}",
title="Read one report",
summary="One report with its decisions and the author's history.",
auth="admin",
params=[
field("uid", "path", "string", True, "REPORT_UID", "Report UID."),
],
sample_response={
"report": SAMPLE_REPORT,
"actions": [],
"history": [],
"available_actions": list(MODERATION_ACTIONS),
"can_remove": True,
},
),
endpoint(
id="admin-moderation-status",
method="POST",
path="/admin/moderation/{uid}/status",
title="Set a report status",
summary="Move a report through the triage state machine.",
auth="admin",
encoding="form",
params=[
field("uid", "path", "string", True, "REPORT_UID", "Report UID."),
field(
"status",
"form",
"enum",
True,
"acknowledged",
"New status.",
list(REPORT_STATUSES),
),
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/admin/moderation/REPORT_UID"},
),
endpoint(
id="admin-moderation-decide",
method="POST",
path="/admin/moderation/{uid}/decide",
title="Decide a report",
summary="Apply a moderation decision and notify the affected user.",
auth="admin",
encoding="form",
destructive=True,
params=[
field("uid", "path", "string", True, "REPORT_UID", "Report UID."),
field(
"action",
"form",
"enum",
True,
"dismiss",
"The decision to apply.",
list(MODERATION_ACTIONS),
),
field(
"reason",
"form",
"string",
False,
"",
"Reason shown to the affected user.",
),
field("notes", "form", "string", False, "", "Internal notes."),
field(
"duration_hours",
"form",
"integer",
False,
"24",
"Suspension length in hours.",
),
],
notes=[
"A report already resolved by another moderator answers 409.",
"Content removal is unavailable for targets that have no removal "
"path (direct messages, accounts, workspaces, polls, assistant "
"output); act on the account instead.",
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/admin/moderation/REPORT_UID"},
),
endpoint(
id="admin-user-suspend",
method="POST",
path="/admin/users/{uid}/suspend",
title="Suspend an account",
summary="Suspend an account for a fixed period with a stated reason.",
auth="admin",
encoding="form",
destructive=True,
params=[
field("uid", "path", "string", True, "USER_UID", "User UID."),
field("reason", "form", "string", False, "", "Reason shown to the user."),
field(
"duration_hours",
"form",
"integer",
False,
"24",
"Suspension length in hours.",
),
],
notes=[
"A suspended account can still read, still see why, and still delete "
"itself, but cannot create content.",
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/admin/users"},
),
endpoint(
id="admin-user-lift",
method="POST",
path="/admin/users/{uid}/lift",
title="Lift a restriction",
summary="Clear a suspension or ban and restore the account.",
auth="admin",
encoding="form",
params=[field("uid", "path", "string", True, "USER_UID", "User UID.")],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/admin/users"},
),
endpoint(
id="admin-user-ban",
method="POST",
path="/admin/users/{uid}/ban",
title="Ban an account",
summary="Permanently close an account and revoke every credential.",
auth="admin",
encoding="form",
destructive=True,
params=[
field("uid", "path", "string", True, "USER_UID", "User UID."),
field("reason", "form", "string", False, "", "Reason shown to the user."),
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/admin/users"},
),
endpoint(
id="auth-accept-terms-page",
method="GET",
path="/auth/accept-terms",
title="The terms acceptance page",
summary="The Terms of Service version in force and the version this account accepted.",
auth="user",
sample_response={"terms_version": "1", "accepted_version": ""},
),
endpoint(
id="auth-accept-terms",
method="POST",
path="/auth/accept-terms",
title="Accept the terms",
summary="Record acceptance of the Terms of Service version in force.",
auth="user",
encoding="form",
notes=[
"A member whose accepted version is behind the version in force is "
"redirected here on any mutating request. Reading, the docs, the "
"safety controls and account deletion are never blocked.",
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/feed", "data": {"terms_version": "1"}},
),
endpoint(
id="profile-consent",
method="POST",
path="/profile/{username}/consent",
title="Grant or withdraw a consent",
summary="Change one consent on your own account. Withdrawal takes effect at once.",
auth="user",
encoding="form",
params=[
field("username", "path", "string", True, "USERNAME", "Your own username."),
field(
"kind",
"form",
"enum",
True,
"ai_third_party",
"Consent to change.",
CONSENT_KEYS,
),
field("granted", "form", "enum", True, "1", "1 grants, 0 withdraws.", ["1", "0"]),
],
notes=[
"Withdrawing `ai_third_party` makes the AI gateway refuse every call "
"that would send your own content to the provider, whatever the "
"per-feature preference says.",
"Withdrawing `activity_recording` stops presence writes; you simply "
"appear offline.",
"Only the account holder can change a consent. An administrator "
"reads the record but never grants or withdraws it for someone else.",
],
sample_response={
"ok": True,
"redirect": "/profile/USERNAME?tab=privacy",
"data": {"kind": "ai_third_party", "state": "granted"},
},
),
endpoint(
id="profile-mature-content",
method="POST",
path="/profile/{username}/mature-content",
title="Set the mature-content preference",
summary="Show or hide content labelled mature for your own account.",
auth="user",
encoding="form",
params=[
field("username", "path", "string", True, "USERNAME", "Your own username."),
field(
"mature_opt_in",
"form",
"enum",
True,
"1",
"1 shows mature content, 0 hides it.",
["1", "0"],
),
],
notes=[
"Only the account holder can change this preference. An administrator "
"reads the privacy tab but never sets it for someone else.",
],
sample_response={
"ok": True,
"redirect": "/profile/USERNAME?tab=privacy",
"data": {"mature_opt_in": True},
},
),
endpoint(
id="profile-delete",
method="GET",
path="/profile/{username}/delete",
title="Account deletion page",
summary="What deletion removes, what is retained, and the grace window.",
auth="user",
params=[
field("username", "path", "string", True, "USERNAME", "Your own username."),
],
sample_response={
"username": "USERNAME",
"grace_hours": 24,
"removed": ["Your account record, username, email address and password"],
"retained": ["Append-only audit and moderation records"],
},
),
endpoint(
id="profile-delete-confirm",
method="POST",
path="/profile/{username}/delete",
title="Delete your account",
summary="Permanently delete your account and personal data.",
auth="user",
encoding="form",
destructive=True,
params=[
field("username", "path", "string", True, "USERNAME", "Your own username."),
field("password", "form", "string", True, "PASSWORD", "Your account password."),
],
notes=[
"Only the account holder can delete an account; an administrator uses "
"a ban instead.",
"Sessions and tokens are revoked and the profile is anonymised "
"immediately; the deletion event is purged after the grace window.",
],
sample_response={
"ok": True,
"redirect": "/",
"data": {"stamp": "2026-01-05T10:00:00+00:00", "rows": 42, "grace_hours": 24},
},
),
endpoint(
id="workspaces-index",
method="GET",
path="/workspaces/index",
title="Published workspace index",
summary="Every workspace published to the public ingress, with its link.",
auth="public",
params=[field("page", "query", "integer", False, "1", "Page number.")],
notes=[
"The project-derived `description` and `project_url` come back empty "
"unless you may view the workspace's project, so a private project "
"never leaks its title or description through this public listing.",
],
sample_response={
"workspaces": [
{
"uid": "INSTANCE_UID",
"name": "demo",
"slug": "demo",
"owner_uid": "USER_UID",
"url": "{{ base }}/p/demo",
"description": "A demo workspace.",
"owner": "alice",
"maturity": "general",
"project_url": "/projects/demo",
}
],
"total": 1,
},
),
],
}

View File

@ -41,9 +41,12 @@ four ways to sign requests.
method="GET",
path="/profile/{username}",
title="View a profile",
summary="Render a user profile, including an online-presence indicator (JSON exposes profile_online and profile_user.last_seen). Returns an HTML page.",
summary="Render a user profile, including an online-presence indicator (JSON exposes profile_online, profile_user.last_seen, xp_next_level, and xp_progress_pct). Returns an HTML page.",
auth="public",
interactive=True,
notes=[
"Level progress: `xp_next_level = level * 100` (total XP needed), `xp_progress_pct = xp % 100` (percentage towards next level). Both are also embedded in `profile_user`.",
],
params=[
field(
"username",
@ -793,3 +796,4 @@ four ways to sign requests.
),
],
}

View File

@ -8,8 +8,15 @@ GROUP = {
"intro": """
# Web Push
Browser push notifications via the Web Push protocol. Fetch the public VAPID key, then
register a `PushSubscription` obtained from the browser's `PushManager`.
Push notifications are delivered by one or more providers. `webpush` is the default and
implements the Web Push protocol: fetch the public VAPID key, then register a
`PushSubscription` obtained from the browser's `PushManager`. `apns` delivers to an Apple
Push Notification service device token and is only offered when an administrator has
configured it.
`GET /push.json` lists the providers that currently accept registrations. A registration
body without a `provider` field is a `webpush` registration, so existing clients need no
change.
There is no server-side unsubscribe endpoint: unsubscription is handled entirely in the
browser by calling `PushManager.unsubscribe()` on the subscription. The server stops delivering
@ -26,39 +33,60 @@ four ways to sign requests.
method="GET",
path="/push.json",
title="Get the public key",
summary="Return the VAPID public key for subscribing.",
summary="Return the VAPID public key and the providers that accept registrations.",
auth="public",
sample_response={"publicKey": "BASE64_VAPID_KEY"},
sample_response={
"publicKey": "BASE64_VAPID_KEY",
"providers": {"webpush": {"publicKey": "BASE64_VAPID_KEY"}},
},
),
endpoint(
id="push-register",
method="POST",
path="/push.json",
title="Register a subscription",
summary="Register a browser push subscription. Sends a welcome notification.",
summary="Register a push subscription. Sends a welcome notification.",
auth="user",
encoding="json",
interactive=False,
params=[
field(
"provider",
"json",
"string",
False,
"webpush",
"Provider to register with. Omit for webpush.",
),
field(
"endpoint",
"json",
"string",
True,
False,
"https://fcm.googleapis.com/...",
"Subscription endpoint URL.",
"Subscription endpoint URL. Required for webpush.",
),
field(
"keys",
"json",
"string",
True,
False,
'{"p256dh":"...","auth":"..."}',
"Subscription keys object.",
"Subscription keys object. Required for webpush.",
),
field(
"token",
"json",
"string",
False,
"a1b2c3...",
"Hexadecimal device token. Required for apns.",
),
],
notes=[
'The body must be JSON: `{"endpoint": "...", "keys": {"p256dh": "...", "auth": "..."}}`.'
'A webpush body is JSON: `{"endpoint": "...", "keys": {"p256dh": "...", "auth": "..."}}`.',
'An APNs body is JSON: `{"provider": "apns", "token": "..."}`.',
"A provider that is unknown, disabled or unconfigured returns 400.",
],
sample_response={"registered": True},
),

View File

@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
from .._shared import endpoint, field
GROUP = {
"slug": "workspaces",
"title": "Dev Workspaces",
"intro": """
# Dev Workspaces
A workspace is a browser editor attached to one of your projects. It runs your project files, a
terminal, and preinstalled Python, Rust, Nim and Swift toolchains. `sudo` and `apt install` work
with no extra setup; ports below 1024 cannot bind, so use a high port and publish it through a
tunnel.
The editor opens with a **DevPlace Code** terminal already running the `dpc` coding agent and a
plain shell beside it, and it trusts every folder, so nothing opens in Restricted Mode. Its
appearance and boot behaviour are your own preferences, readable and writable through the two
`/workspace/editor` endpoints below and explained on
[the workspace editor page](/docs/workspace-editor.html). Editor preferences apply on the next
workspace start.
A **tunnel** publishes one port from inside your container on a public HTTPS hostname of the form
`<port>-<name>.tunnel.pravda.education`. **Tunnel URLs are public and unauthenticated** - anyone with
the link can reach whatever you are serving. Forwarding a port in the editor's **Ports** view creates
the tunnel for you through the same endpoint; un-forwarding it does not remove the tunnel.
Workspaces are bounded: a count limit per user, a disk quota, an egress quota, and a tunnel limit.
An idle workspace is warned about, then stopped, then warned again, then removed. Every warning
arrives as a `workspace` notification and states exactly what happens next and when.
""",
"endpoints": [
endpoint(
id="workspace-get",
method="GET",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace",
title="Read workspace",
summary=(
"State, quota usage, idle countdown, tunnels and open moderation flags "
"for your workspace on this project."
),
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
],
sample_response={
"has_workspace": True,
"viewer_can_workspace": True,
"workspace_count": 1,
"max_workspaces": 2,
"editor_url": "/projects/my-project/containers/instances/INSTANCE_UID/code/",
"workspace": {
"uid": "INSTANCE_UID",
"status": "running",
"suspended": False,
"tunnel_name": "brave-otter",
"primary_url": "https://brave-otter.tunnel.pravda.education",
"disk_bytes": 5242880,
"disk_quota_mb": 2048,
"disk_percent": 1,
"egress_bytes": 10240,
"egress_quota_mb": 10240,
"egress_percent": 0,
"idle_stop_minutes": 60,
"retention_days": 14,
"max_tunnels": 5,
"tunnels": [],
"flags": [],
},
},
),
endpoint(
id="workspace-open",
method="POST",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace",
title="Open or resume workspace",
summary=(
"Create the workspace if you have none for this project, otherwise resume "
"it. Idempotent. Refused when you are at your workspace limit, over disk "
"quota, or suspended."
),
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/projects/my-project/workspace"},
),
endpoint(
id="workspace-stop",
method="POST",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace/stop",
title="Stop workspace",
summary="Stop the container. Files and tunnels are kept.",
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/projects/my-project/workspace"},
),
endpoint(
id="workspace-delete",
method="POST",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace/delete",
title="Delete workspace",
summary="Remove the workspace and its tunnels. An administrator can restore it.",
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/projects/my-project/workspace"},
),
endpoint(
id="workspace-editor-get",
method="GET",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace/editor",
title="Read editor profile",
summary=(
"The resolved DevPlace editor profile for this workspace: theme, layout, "
"panel preset, font sizes, zoom, boot terminals, how the editor opens, the "
"container size, and where each value comes from."
),
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
],
sample_response={
"editor": {
"trust_all": True,
"theme": "devplace-dark",
"font_size": 14,
"terminal_font_size": 13,
"zoom_level": 0,
"layout": "standard",
"panel_preset": "tall",
"boot_agent": "dpc",
"boot_shell": True,
"window_mode": "tab",
"window_width": 1600,
"window_height": 1000,
"cpu_millicores": 2000,
"cpu_cores": 2.0,
"memory_mb": 2048,
"disk_quota_mb": 2048,
"sources": {"theme": "user", "font_size": "site"},
},
"restart_required": False,
},
),
endpoint(
id="workspace-editor-set",
method="POST",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace/editor",
title="Set editor preferences",
summary=(
"Change your own editor preferences. Only the fields you send are "
"changed; within those, an empty string or zero means inherit the site "
"default, and `reset` drops every preference. Applies on the next "
"workspace start, and the response says whether a restart is needed."
),
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
field("theme", "body", "string", False, "devplace-dark",
"devplace-dark, devplace-light or system."),
field("layout", "body", "string", False, "standard",
"standard, terminal-focus or zen."),
field("panel_preset", "body", "string", False, "tall",
"short, normal, tall or maximized."),
field("font_size", "body", "integer", False, "14",
"Editor font size in pixels. Zero inherits."),
field("terminal_font_size", "body", "integer", False, "13",
"Terminal font size in pixels. Zero inherits."),
field("zoom_level", "body", "integer", False, "0",
"Window zoom, -5 to 5. Send -99 to inherit."),
field("boot_agent", "body", "string", False, "dpc",
"dpc or none."),
field("boot_shell", "body", "integer", False, "1",
"1 opens a shell on boot, 0 skips it, -1 inherits."),
field("window_mode", "body", "string", False, "tab",
"tab, window or fullscreen."),
field("window_width", "body", "integer", False, "1600",
"Editor window width in pixels. Zero inherits."),
field("window_height", "body", "integer", False, "1000",
"Editor window height in pixels. Zero inherits."),
field("reset", "body", "boolean", False, "false",
"Drop every preference and fall back to the site defaults."),
],
sample_response={
"ok": True,
"redirect": "/projects/my-project/workspace",
"data": {"restart_required": True},
},
),
endpoint(
id="workspace-tunnels-list",
method="GET",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace/tunnels",
title="List tunnels",
summary="Every public tunnel published by this workspace.",
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
],
sample_response={
"tunnels": [
{
"uid": "TUNNEL_UID",
"hostname": "8080-brave-otter.tunnel.pravda.education",
"label": "web",
"container_port": 8080,
"status": "active",
"cert_status": "valid",
"request_count": 12,
"bytes_out": 40960,
}
]
},
),
endpoint(
id="workspace-tunnel-create",
method="POST",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace/tunnels",
title="Create tunnel",
summary=(
"Publish a container port on a public HTTPS hostname. The URL is public "
"and unauthenticated. Refused past the tunnel limit. The certificate is "
"ordered right away, so the hostname answers plain HTTP for a few seconds "
"before it serves HTTPS. Forwarding a port in the editor calls this for you."
),
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
field("container_port", "body", "integer", True, 8080, "Port inside the container."),
field("label", "body", "string", False, "web", "Human label."),
],
sample_response={
"ok": True,
"data": {
"uid": "TUNNEL_UID",
"hostname": "8080-brave-otter.tunnel.pravda.education",
"status": "pending",
},
},
),
endpoint(
id="workspace-tunnel-delete",
method="POST",
path="/projects/{slug}/workspace/tunnels/{uid}/delete",
title="Delete tunnel",
summary="Remove a tunnel. The public URL stops serving immediately.",
auth="user",
params=[
field("slug", "path", "string", True, "my-project", "Project slug or uid."),
field("uid", "path", "string", True, "TUNNEL_UID", "Tunnel uid."),
],
sample_response={"ok": True, "redirect": "/projects/my-project/workspace"},
),
],
}

View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import time
from collections import defaultdict
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager, contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
from fastapi import FastAPI, Request, WebSocket
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, RedirectResponse
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
from fastapi.exceptions import RequestValidationError
@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ from devplacepy.routers import (
push,
leaderboard,
reactions,
reports,
bookmarks,
polls,
docs,
@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ from devplacepy.routers import (
dbapi,
pubsub,
game,
workspaces,
)
from devplacepy.services.manager import service_manager
from devplacepy.services.background import background
@ -112,9 +114,14 @@ from devplacepy.services.jobs.deepsearch.service import DeepsearchService
from devplacepy.services.jobs.isslop.service import IsslopService
from devplacepy.services.gitea.service import IssueTrackerService
from devplacepy.services.containers.service import ContainerService
from devplacepy.services.containers.workspace_service import WorkspaceService
from devplacepy.services.xmlrpc import XmlrpcService
from devplacepy.services.audit import AuditService
from devplacepy.services.moderation.service import ModerationService
from devplacepy.services.moderation.screening import ContentRefused
from devplacepy.services.acceptance.service import AcceptanceService
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.push import PushService
from devplacepy.services.telegram import TelegramService
from devplacepy.services.telegram.outbox_service import TelegramOutboxService
@ -273,8 +280,12 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
service_manager.register(PlanningReportService())
service_manager.register(IssueTrackerService())
service_manager.register(ContainerService())
service_manager.register(WorkspaceService())
service_manager.register(XmlrpcService())
service_manager.register(AuditService())
service_manager.register(ModerationService())
service_manager.register(AcceptanceService())
service_manager.register(PushService())
service_manager.register(TelegramService())
service_manager.register(TelegramOutboxService())
if not os.environ.get("DEVPLACE_DISABLE_SERVICES"):
@ -298,6 +309,9 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
flush_visits()
await service_manager.shutdown_all()
await background.stop()
from devplacepy.services.containers import forward
await forward.close_client()
app = FastAPI(
@ -367,6 +381,30 @@ async def server_error(request: Request, exc):
)
@app.exception_handler(ContentRefused)
async def content_refused(request: Request, exc: ContentRefused):
logger.info("content refused on %s %s: %s", request.method, request.url.path, exc.message)
if wants_json(request):
return json_error(400, exc.message, categories=list(exc.categories))
seo_ctx = base_seo_context(
request,
title="Content not published - DevPlace",
description=exc.message,
robots="noindex",
)
return templates.TemplateResponse(
request,
"error.html",
{
**seo_ctx,
"request": request,
"error_code": 400,
"error_message": exc.message,
},
status_code=400,
)
_AUTH_FORM_PAGES = {
"/auth/signup": ("signup.html", "Join DevPlace"),
"/auth/login": ("login.html", "Sign In"),
@ -437,6 +475,7 @@ app.include_router(messages.router, prefix="/messages")
app.include_router(notifications.router, prefix="/notifications")
app.include_router(votes.router, prefix="/votes")
app.include_router(reactions.router, prefix="/reactions")
app.include_router(reports.router, prefix="/reports")
app.include_router(bookmarks.router, prefix="/bookmarks")
app.include_router(polls.router, prefix="/polls")
app.include_router(avatar.router, prefix="/avatar")
@ -465,6 +504,7 @@ app.include_router(dbapi.router, prefix="/dbapi")
app.include_router(pubsub.router, prefix="/pubsub")
app.include_router(game.router, prefix="/game")
app.include_router(quizzes.router, prefix="/quizzes")
app.include_router(workspaces.router, prefix="/workspaces")
@app.middleware("http")
@ -483,6 +523,15 @@ async def await_pending_corrections(request: Request, call_next):
return response
def _frame_ancestors() -> str:
from devplacepy.services.containers.workspace import naming
tunnel_domain = naming.domain()
if not tunnel_domain:
return "'self'"
return f"'self' https://*.{tunnel_domain}"
@app.middleware("http")
async def add_security_headers(request: Request, call_next):
response = await call_next(request)
@ -492,10 +541,9 @@ async def add_security_headers(request: Request, call_next):
response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
if not request.url.path.startswith("/p/"):
response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "DENY"
response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
"object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; "
"frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'"
f"frame-ancestors {_frame_ancestors()}; form-action 'self'"
)
if request.url.path.startswith("/admin"):
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0"
@ -585,6 +633,53 @@ async def maintenance_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
)
_TERMS_ALLOWED_PREFIXES = (
"/static",
"/avatar",
"/auth",
"/docs",
"/reports",
"/block",
"/mute",
"/openai",
)
_TERMS_GATED_METHODS = ("POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH")
def _terms_exempt(path: str) -> bool:
if path.startswith(_TERMS_ALLOWED_PREFIXES):
return True
return path.startswith("/profile/") and (
path.endswith("/delete") or path.endswith("/consent")
)
@app.middleware("http")
async def terms_acceptance_gate(request: Request, call_next):
if request.method not in _TERMS_GATED_METHODS or _terms_exempt(request.url.path):
return await call_next(request)
from devplacepy.routers.auth.terms import (
TERMS_ACCEPTANCE_CODE,
current_terms_version,
needs_acceptance,
)
user = get_current_user(request)
if not needs_acceptance(user):
return await call_next(request)
message = "Accept the updated Terms of Service to continue."
if wants_json(request):
return json_error(
403,
message,
code=TERMS_ACCEPTANCE_CODE,
redirect="/auth/accept-terms",
terms_version=current_terms_version(),
)
return RedirectResponse(url="/auth/accept-terms", status_code=303)
@app.middleware("http")
async def track_presence(request: Request, call_next):
path = request.url.path
@ -613,6 +708,42 @@ async def response_timing(request: Request, call_next):
return response
class TunnelDispatchMiddleware:
def __init__(self, app):
self.app = app
@staticmethod
def _host(scope) -> str:
for key, value in scope.get("headers") or []:
if key == b"host":
return value.decode("latin-1")
return ""
async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send):
if scope["type"] not in ("http", "websocket"):
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
return
from devplacepy.routers import tunnel as tunnel_router
from devplacepy.services.containers.workspace import naming
try:
if not naming.is_tunnel_host(self._host(scope)):
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
return
except Exception:
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
return
path = (scope.get("path") or "/").lstrip("/")
if scope["type"] == "websocket":
websocket = WebSocket(scope, receive, send)
await tunnel_router.handle_ws(websocket, path)
return
request = Request(scope, receive)
response = await tunnel_router.handle_http(request, path)
await response(scope, receive, send)
app.add_middleware(TunnelDispatchMiddleware)
app.add_middleware(GZipMiddleware, minimum_size=512, compresslevel=5)
@ -701,7 +832,7 @@ async def landing(request: Request):
seo_ctx = base_seo_context(
request,
title="DevPlace - The Developer Social Network",
description="Track industry shifts. Discover bold releases. Share what you're building in an open, uncensored environment.",
description="Track industry shifts. Discover bold releases. Share what you're building in an open environment built by developers, for developers.",
breadcrumbs=[],
schemas=[website_schema(base)],
)

View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import re
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Literal, Optional
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlparse
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator, model_validator
from devplacepy.constants import TOPICS
from devplacepy.rendering import is_single_emoji
@ -33,6 +33,20 @@ def normalize_european_date(value):
raise ValueError("Date must be in DD/MM/YYYY format")
def normalize_website_url(value):
if not value:
return ""
text = str(value).strip()
if not text:
return ""
if not text.lower().startswith(("http://", "https://")):
text = f"https://{text}"
parsed = urlparse(text)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parsed.hostname or "." not in parsed.hostname:
raise ValueError("Website must be a valid http(s) URL")
return text
def normalize_poll_options(value):
if value is None:
return []
@ -48,11 +62,53 @@ def normalize_poll_options(value):
return value
def _declared_age(birth_date: str) -> int:
from datetime import date
from devplacepy.database.moderation import years_between
normalized = normalize_european_date(birth_date)
if not normalized:
raise ValueError("Date of birth is required")
born = date.fromisoformat(normalized)
today = date.today()
if born > today:
raise ValueError("Date of birth cannot be in the future")
return years_between(born, today)
class SignupForm(BaseModel):
username: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=32)
email: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=255)
password: str = Field(min_length=6, max_length=128)
confirm_password: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=128)
birth_date: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=20)
accept_terms: str = Field(default="")
@property
def age_band(self) -> str:
from devplacepy.database.moderation import age_band_for
return age_band_for(_declared_age(self.birth_date))
@field_validator("birth_date")
@classmethod
def old_enough(cls, value):
from devplacepy.database import minimum_age
minimum = minimum_age()
if _declared_age(value) < minimum:
raise ValueError(f"You must be at least {minimum} years old to join")
return value
@field_validator("accept_terms")
@classmethod
def terms_accepted(cls, value):
if value.strip().lower() not in ("1", "on", "true", "yes"):
raise ValueError(
"You must accept the Terms of Service and Community Guidelines"
)
return value
@field_validator("username")
@classmethod
@ -63,6 +119,10 @@ class SignupForm(BaseModel):
raise ValueError(
"Username can only contain letters, numbers, hyphens, and underscores"
)
from devplacepy.services.moderation.filter import classify
if classify(value).verdict == "block":
raise ValueError("That username breaks the community guidelines")
return value
@field_validator("email")
@ -195,6 +255,10 @@ class ProjectForm(BaseModel):
)
platforms: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
status: str = Field(default="In Development", max_length=100)
website_url: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
repo_url: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
cover_attachment_uid: str = Field(default="", max_length=64)
logo_attachment_uid: str = Field(default="", max_length=64)
is_private: bool = False
attachment_uids: list[str] = []
@ -203,6 +267,11 @@ class ProjectForm(BaseModel):
def normalize_dates(cls, value):
return normalize_european_date(value)
@field_validator("website_url", "repo_url")
@classmethod
def valid_link_url(cls, value):
return normalize_website_url(value)
class ProjectEditForm(BaseModel):
title: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=200)
@ -214,12 +283,21 @@ class ProjectEditForm(BaseModel):
)
platforms: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
status: str = Field(default="In Development", max_length=100)
website_url: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
repo_url: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
cover_attachment_uid: str = Field(default="", max_length=64)
logo_attachment_uid: str = Field(default="", max_length=64)
@field_validator("release_date", "demo_date", mode="before")
@classmethod
def normalize_dates(cls, value):
return normalize_european_date(value)
@field_validator("website_url", "repo_url")
@classmethod
def valid_link_url(cls, value):
return normalize_website_url(value)
class BackupRunForm(BaseModel):
target: Literal["database", "uploads", "keys", "full"] = "full"
@ -244,6 +322,10 @@ class ProjectFlagForm(BaseModel):
value: bool = False
class ProjectScreenshotsForm(BaseModel):
attachment_uids: list[str] = []
class CustomizationToggleForm(BaseModel):
value: bool = False
@ -587,8 +669,29 @@ class AdminSettingsForm(BaseModel):
maintenance_message: str = Field(default="", max_length=300)
docs_search_mode: str = Field(default="", max_length=20)
outbound_proxy_url: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
moderation_sla_hours: str = Field(default="", max_length=10)
moderation_filter_mode: str = Field(default="", max_length=10)
moderation_minimum_age: str = Field(default="", max_length=3)
moderation_mature_default_hidden: str = Field(default="", max_length=1)
account_deletion_grace_hours: str = Field(default="", max_length=10)
contact_email: str = Field(default="", max_length=200)
contact_phone: str = Field(default="", max_length=60)
contact_address: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
terms_version: str = Field(default="", max_length=20)
privacy_version: str = Field(default="", max_length=20)
guidelines_version: str = Field(default="", max_length=20)
ai_third_party_provider: str = Field(default="", max_length=120)
extra_head: str = Field(default="", max_length=50000)
@field_validator("moderation_filter_mode")
@classmethod
def validate_filter_mode(cls, value):
from devplacepy.services.moderation.rules import FILTER_MODES
if value and value not in FILTER_MODES:
raise ValueError(f"Filter mode must be one of {', '.join(FILTER_MODES)}")
return value
@field_validator("outbound_proxy_url")
@classmethod
def validate_outbound_proxy_url(cls, value):
@ -885,3 +988,134 @@ class QuizImportForm(BaseModel):
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValueError("document must be valid JSON") from exc
return value
class TunnelForm(BaseModel):
label: str = Field(default="", max_length=64)
container_port: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=65535)
class EditorPrefsForm(BaseModel):
font_size: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=48)
terminal_font_size: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=48)
zoom_level: int = Field(default=-99, ge=-99, le=5)
theme: str = Field(default="", max_length=32)
layout: str = Field(default="", max_length=32)
panel_preset: str = Field(default="", max_length=32)
window_mode: str = Field(default="", max_length=32)
window_width: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=7680)
window_height: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=4320)
boot_agent: str = Field(default="", max_length=32)
boot_shell: int = Field(default=-1, ge=-1, le=1)
reset: bool = False
class WorkspaceQuotaForm(BaseModel):
owner_id: str = Field(default="", max_length=36)
label: str = Field(default="", max_length=64)
max_workspaces: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=100)
max_tunnels: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=100)
disk_quota_mb: int = Field(default=0, ge=0)
egress_quota_mb: int = Field(default=0, ge=0)
idle_stop_minutes: int = Field(default=0, ge=0)
retention_days: int = Field(default=0, ge=0)
cpu_millicores: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=64000)
memory_mb: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, le=1048576)
class WorkspaceFlagForm(BaseModel):
kind: str = Field(default="manual", max_length=40)
severity: str = Field(default="warn", max_length=16)
detail: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
class WorkspaceSuspendForm(BaseModel):
reason: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
class ReportForm(BaseModel):
reason: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=40)
detail: str = Field(default="", max_length=2000)
@field_validator("reason")
@classmethod
def known_reason(cls, value):
from devplacepy.database.moderation import REPORT_REASONS
if value not in REPORT_REASONS:
raise ValueError("Unknown report reason")
return value
class ReportStatusForm(BaseModel):
status: str = Field(default="acknowledged", max_length=20)
@field_validator("status")
@classmethod
def known_status(cls, value):
from devplacepy.database.moderation import REPORT_STATUSES
if value not in REPORT_STATUSES:
raise ValueError("Unknown report status")
return value
class ModerationDecisionForm(BaseModel):
action: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=30)
reason: str = Field(default="", max_length=200)
notes: str = Field(default="", max_length=2000)
duration_hours: int = Field(default=24, ge=1, le=8760)
@field_validator("action")
@classmethod
def known_action(cls, value):
from devplacepy.database.moderation import MODERATION_ACTIONS
if value not in MODERATION_ACTIONS:
raise ValueError("Unknown moderation action")
return value
class SuspensionForm(BaseModel):
reason: str = Field(default="", max_length=200)
duration_hours: int = Field(default=24, ge=1, le=8760)
class BanForm(BaseModel):
reason: str = Field(default="", max_length=200)
class ConsentForm(BaseModel):
kind: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=40)
granted: str = Field(default="0", max_length=5)
@field_validator("kind")
@classmethod
def known_kind(cls, value):
from devplacepy.database.moderation import CONSENT_KINDS
if value not in CONSENT_KINDS:
raise ValueError("Unknown consent kind")
return value
class MaturityForm(BaseModel):
level: str = Field(default="general", max_length=20)
@field_validator("level")
@classmethod
def known_level(cls, value):
from devplacepy.database.moderation import MATURITY_LEVELS
if value not in MATURITY_LEVELS:
raise ValueError("Unknown maturity level")
return value
class MaturePreferenceForm(BaseModel):
mature_opt_in: str = Field(default="0", max_length=5)
class AccountDeleteForm(BaseModel):
password: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=128)
confirm_text: str = Field(default="", max_length=40)

View File

@ -666,6 +666,9 @@ IMPORT_SKIP_NAMES = {
SYNC_SKIP_NAMES = IMPORT_SKIP_NAMES | {
".devplace_boot.py",
".devplace_boot.sh",
".devplace",
".dpc",
"dpc.log",
}
IMPORT_MAX_FILE_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024

52
devplacepy/push/CLAUDE.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
This file documents `devplacepy/push/` - push notification delivery and its provider architecture. Claude Code loads it automatically whenever a file under this directory is read or edited.
## What this package is
One delivery library behind one public surface. `devplacepy.push` exports `notify_user`, `register`, `ensure_certificates`, `public_key_standard_b64` and the Web Push crypto helpers; every caller in the codebase (`main.py`, `utils/notifications.py`, `routers/push.py`) imports only those names. Everything else is internal to the package.
| Module | Role |
|---|---|
| `providers/base.py` | `PushProvider` protocol, the `Delivery` outcome and the three outcome constants |
| `providers/webpush.py` | VAPID key material, `aesgcm` payload encryption, the Web Push provider |
| `providers/apns.py` | Apple Push Notification service provider (token based, HTTP/2) |
| `providers/__init__.py` | `PROVIDERS` registry, `get`, `active`, `is_active`, `admin_fields`, `client_config` |
| `store.py` | Every `push_registration` read and write |
| `delivery.py` | `notify_user`: group by provider, one shared client, one prepared body per provider |
The admin configuration surface lives in `devplacepy/services/push/service.py` (`PushService`), not here.
## Adding a provider
1. Write `providers/<name>.py` with a `PushProvider` subclass: `name`, `label`, `config_fields`, `is_configured`, `parse_registration`, `prepare`, `deliver`, optionally `client_config`.
2. Add one entry to `PROVIDERS` in `providers/__init__.py`.
That is the whole change. The registration route, the delivery loop, the admin page, the audit record, the metrics and the docs are written against the protocol and need no edit. The `Enabled` toggle (`push_<name>_enabled`) comes from the base class, so a provider never declares its own.
## Invariants
- **Zero cost for the request.** Delivery is reached only through `utils/notifications.py` `_schedule_push`, a fire-and-forget task. Never make a route await `notify_user`, and never add a queue or a table to this path.
- **`deliver` never raises.** Return `Delivery(REJECTED, detail)` instead. `delivery.py` guards anyway, but a raising provider costs a log line per subscription.
- **A provider that is not configured is inert, never an error.** `is_configured()` is false, `is_active()` is false, the delivery loop skips it, and `POST /push.json` refuses a registration for it with 400. Nothing else in the platform notices.
- **`DEAD` is the only outcome that touches the database.** It soft-deletes the registration (`deleted_at`), exactly like a `404`/`410` Web Push endpoint always did. `REJECTED` keeps the row.
- **Every insert writes `deleted_at: None`,** and every read filters `deleted_at IS NULL`. `push_registration` deliberately stays out of `SOFT_DELETE_TABLES` (no `deleted_by`, not restorable from Trash) - a dead device token has no owner action to undo.
- **A row without a provider is a Web Push row.** `store.provider_of` resolves `None`/`""` to `DEFAULT_PROVIDER`, so a row written by an old worker during a deploy still delivers. `init_db` backfills the column once with a single converging `UPDATE`.
## Storage
`push_registration` columns are ensured in `init_db` (`database/schema.py`) because `dataset` only creates the columns of a table's first insert, and `find(provider=...)` against a missing column matches nothing.
| Column | webpush | apns |
|---|---|---|
| `provider` | `webpush` | `apns` |
| `endpoint`, `key_auth`, `key_p256dh` | set | `NULL` |
| `token` | `NULL` | device token |
Deduplication is generic: `store.register` looks up `user_uid` + `provider` + exactly the fields the provider's `parse_registration` returned, so a provider never writes its own identity rule.
## APNs specifics
- `POST https://{host}/3/device/{token}` over HTTP/2, host from `push_apns_environment` (`api.push.apple.com` or `api.sandbox.push.apple.com`; an unrecognised value falls back to production). HTTP/2 comes from `stealth_async_client` because the origin is `https` - the cleartext downgrade in `curl_transport` does not apply.
- Provider token: `ES256`, header `kid` = key id, claims `iss` = team id and `iat`. Cached per credential fingerprint for 45 minutes, so a worker signs at most one token per 45 minutes; Apple refuses tokens regenerated faster than every 20 minutes. Editing any credential changes the fingerprint and takes effect on the next delivery, with no restart.
- A `.p8` that does not parse is cached as a failure for the same window, so a misconfiguration costs one error log per window rather than one parse per notification.
- `410`, or any status carrying reason `BadDeviceToken`, `Unregistered`, `ExpiredToken`, `DeviceTokenNotForTopic` or `TopicDisallowed`, is `DEAD`. Everything else is `REJECTED`.
- The shared payload dict (`title`, `message`, `icon`, `url`) is translated once per batch into `aps.alert` plus the custom `url`/`icon` keys, mirroring what `service-worker.js` does for Web Push. `thread-id` mirrors the service worker's notification `tag`.

View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
from devplacepy.push.delivery import notify_user
from devplacepy.push.providers.webpush import (
browser_base64,
create_notification_authorization,
create_notification_info_with_payload,
ensure_certificates,
generate_pkcs8_private_key,
generate_private_key,
generate_public_key,
hkdf,
public_key_standard_b64,
)
from devplacepy.push.store import register
__all__ = [
"browser_base64",
"create_notification_authorization",
"create_notification_info_with_payload",
"ensure_certificates",
"generate_pkcs8_private_key",
"generate_private_key",
"generate_public_key",
"hkdf",
"notify_user",
"public_key_standard_b64",
"register",
]

View File

@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import logging
from typing import Any
from devplacepy import stealth
from devplacepy.database import get_int_setting
from devplacepy.push import providers, store
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
TIMEOUT_KEY = "push_delivery_timeout_seconds"
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10
MIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 1
MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 120
def timeout_seconds() -> float:
seconds = get_int_setting(TIMEOUT_KEY, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
return float(min(max(seconds, MIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS), MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS))
def group_by_provider(
registrations: list[dict[str, Any]],
) -> dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]]:
grouped: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
for registration in registrations:
grouped.setdefault(store.provider_of(registration), []).append(registration)
return grouped
async def notify_user(user_uid: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
registrations = store.active_for_user(user_uid)
if not registrations:
logger.debug("No active push subscriptions for user %s", user_uid)
return
grouped = group_by_provider(registrations)
async with stealth.stealth_async_client(timeout=timeout_seconds()) as client:
for name, rows in grouped.items():
provider = providers.PROVIDERS.get(name)
if provider is None:
logger.warning(
"Unknown push provider %s on %s subscriptions of user %s",
name,
len(rows),
user_uid,
)
continue
if not providers.is_active(provider):
logger.debug(
"Push provider %s is not active; skipping %s subscriptions",
name,
len(rows),
)
continue
try:
prepared = provider.prepare(payload)
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("Push provider %s could not build a payload: %s", name, exc)
continue
for registration in rows:
await _deliver_one(provider, client, registration, prepared, user_uid)
async def _deliver_one(provider, client, registration, prepared, user_uid) -> None:
try:
outcome = await provider.deliver(client, registration, prepared)
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("Push provider %s raised for %s: %s", provider.name, user_uid, exc)
return
if outcome.status == providers.ACCEPTED:
logger.debug("Push delivered to %s via %s", user_uid, provider.name)
return
if outcome.status == providers.DEAD:
try:
store.mark_dead(registration["id"])
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("Could not soft-delete push subscription: %s", exc)
return
logger.warning(
"Push rejected by %s for %s: %s", provider.name, user_uid, outcome.detail
)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import logging
from typing import Any
from devplacepy.push.providers.apns import ApnsProvider
from devplacepy.push.providers.base import (
ACCEPTED,
DEAD,
REJECTED,
Delivery,
PushProvider,
)
from devplacepy.push.providers.webpush import WebPushProvider
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
DEFAULT_PROVIDER = WebPushProvider.name
PROVIDERS: dict[str, PushProvider] = {
provider.name: provider for provider in (WebPushProvider(), ApnsProvider())
}
__all__ = [
"ACCEPTED",
"DEAD",
"DEFAULT_PROVIDER",
"Delivery",
"PROVIDERS",
"PushProvider",
"REJECTED",
"active",
"admin_fields",
"client_config",
"get",
"is_active",
"names",
]
def get(name: str | None) -> PushProvider | None:
if not isinstance(name, str):
name = ""
return PROVIDERS.get(name.strip().lower() or DEFAULT_PROVIDER)
def names() -> list[str]:
return list(PROVIDERS)
def active() -> list[PushProvider]:
return [provider for provider in PROVIDERS.values() if is_active(provider)]
def admin_fields() -> list:
return [field for provider in PROVIDERS.values() for field in provider.all_fields()]
def client_config() -> dict[str, Any]:
return {provider.name: _client_config(provider) for provider in active()}
def is_active(provider: PushProvider) -> bool:
try:
return provider.is_active()
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("Push provider %s failed its readiness check: %s", provider.name, exc)
return False
def _client_config(provider: PushProvider) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
return provider.client_config()
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("Push provider %s failed to describe itself: %s", provider.name, exc)
return {}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import hashlib
import json
import logging
import string
import time
from typing import Any
import httpx
import jwt
from devplacepy.config import SECONDS_PER_DAY
from devplacepy.database import get_setting
from devplacepy.push.providers.base import (
ACCEPTED,
DEAD,
REJECTED,
Delivery,
PushProvider,
)
from devplacepy.services.base import ConfigField
from devplacepy.utils import DEFAULT_PUSH_URL, PUSH_ICON, generate_uid
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
TEAM_ID_KEY = "push_apns_team_id"
KEY_ID_KEY = "push_apns_key_id"
AUTH_KEY_KEY = "push_apns_auth_key"
TOPIC_KEY = "push_apns_topic"
ENVIRONMENT_KEY = "push_apns_environment"
PROVIDER_LABEL = "Apple Push (APNs)"
DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT = "production"
HOSTS = {
"production": "api.push.apple.com",
"sandbox": "api.sandbox.push.apple.com",
}
ENVIRONMENT_OPTIONS = [
{"value": "production", "label": "Production"},
{"value": "sandbox", "label": "Sandbox"},
]
TOKEN_REFRESH_SECONDS = 45 * 60
TOKEN_MIN_LENGTH = 64
TOKEN_MAX_LENGTH = 200
THREAD_ID = "devplace-notification"
PUSH_TYPE = "alert"
PRIORITY = "10"
DEAD_REASONS = frozenset(
{
"BadDeviceToken",
"DeviceTokenNotForTopic",
"ExpiredToken",
"Unregistered",
"TopicDisallowed",
}
)
_token_state: dict[str, Any] = {}
def _setting(key: str) -> str:
return get_setting(key, "").strip()
def _environment() -> str:
value = _setting(ENVIRONMENT_KEY) or DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT
return value if value in HOSTS else DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT
def host() -> str:
return HOSTS[_environment()]
def _fingerprint(team_id: str, key_id: str, auth_key: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(f"{team_id}:{key_id}:{auth_key}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
def provider_token(team_id: str, key_id: str, auth_key: str) -> str:
fingerprint = _fingerprint(team_id, key_id, auth_key)
issued_at = int(time.time())
state = _token_state.get("current")
if (
state
and state["fingerprint"] == fingerprint
and issued_at - state["issued_at"] < TOKEN_REFRESH_SECONDS
):
if state["token"] is None:
raise ValueError(state["error"])
return state["token"]
try:
token = jwt.encode(
{"iss": team_id, "iat": issued_at},
auth_key,
algorithm="ES256",
headers={"kid": key_id},
)
except Exception as exc:
message = f"APNs auth key is not usable: {exc}"
_token_state["current"] = {
"token": None,
"error": message,
"issued_at": issued_at,
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
}
logger.error(message)
raise ValueError(message) from exc
_token_state["current"] = {
"token": token,
"error": "",
"issued_at": issued_at,
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
}
return token
def _reason(response: httpx.Response) -> str:
try:
body = response.json()
except ValueError:
return ""
if isinstance(body, dict):
return str(body.get("reason", ""))
return ""
class ApnsProvider(PushProvider):
name = "apns"
label = PROVIDER_LABEL
config_fields = [
ConfigField(
TEAM_ID_KEY,
"Team ID",
type="str",
default="",
help="Ten character Apple Developer team identifier, used as the token iss claim.",
group=PROVIDER_LABEL,
),
ConfigField(
KEY_ID_KEY,
"Key ID",
type="str",
default="",
help="Ten character identifier of the APNs auth key, sent as the token kid header.",
group=PROVIDER_LABEL,
),
ConfigField(
AUTH_KEY_KEY,
"Auth key (.p8)",
type="text",
default="",
secret=True,
help="Contents of the APNs .p8 signing key, including the BEGIN and END lines. Leave blank to keep the stored key.",
group=PROVIDER_LABEL,
),
ConfigField(
TOPIC_KEY,
"Topic",
type="str",
default="",
help="Bundle identifier of the receiving app, sent as the apns-topic header.",
group=PROVIDER_LABEL,
),
ConfigField(
ENVIRONMENT_KEY,
"Environment",
type="select",
default=DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT,
options=ENVIRONMENT_OPTIONS,
help="Production delivers to App Store builds, sandbox to development builds.",
group=PROVIDER_LABEL,
),
]
def is_configured(self) -> bool:
return bool(
_setting(TEAM_ID_KEY)
and _setting(KEY_ID_KEY)
and _setting(AUTH_KEY_KEY)
and _setting(TOPIC_KEY)
)
def parse_registration(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
token = body.get("token")
if not isinstance(token, str):
return None
token = token.strip()
if not TOKEN_MIN_LENGTH <= len(token) <= TOKEN_MAX_LENGTH:
return None
if any(character not in string.hexdigits for character in token):
return None
return {"token": token}
def prepare(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
return json.dumps(
{
"aps": {
"alert": {
"title": payload.get("title") or "DevPlace",
"body": payload.get("message") or "",
},
"sound": "default",
"thread-id": THREAD_ID,
},
"url": payload.get("url") or DEFAULT_PUSH_URL,
"icon": payload.get("icon") or PUSH_ICON,
}
)
def headers(self) -> dict[str, str]:
return {
"authorization": f"bearer {provider_token(_setting(TEAM_ID_KEY), _setting(KEY_ID_KEY), _setting(AUTH_KEY_KEY))}",
"apns-topic": _setting(TOPIC_KEY),
"apns-push-type": PUSH_TYPE,
"apns-priority": PRIORITY,
"apns-expiration": str(int(time.time()) + SECONDS_PER_DAY),
"apns-id": generate_uid(),
"content-type": "application/json",
}
async def deliver(
self, client: httpx.AsyncClient, registration: dict[str, Any], prepared: str
) -> Delivery:
token = (registration.get("token") or "").strip()
if not token:
return Delivery(DEAD, "missing device token")
try:
headers = self.headers()
response = await client.post(
f"https://{host()}/3/device/{token}",
headers=headers,
content=prepared.encode("utf-8"),
)
except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError) as exc:
return Delivery(REJECTED, str(exc))
if response.status_code == 200:
return Delivery(ACCEPTED)
reason = _reason(response)
detail = f"{response.status_code} {reason}".strip()
if response.status_code == 410 or reason in DEAD_REASONS:
return Delivery(DEAD, detail)
return Delivery(REJECTED, detail)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any
import httpx
from devplacepy.database import get_setting
from devplacepy.services.base import ConfigField
ACCEPTED = "accepted"
DEAD = "dead"
REJECTED = "rejected"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Delivery:
status: str
detail: str = ""
class PushProvider(ABC):
name = ""
label = ""
config_fields: list[ConfigField] = []
@property
def enabled_key(self) -> str:
return f"push_{self.name}_enabled"
def enabled_field(self) -> ConfigField:
return ConfigField(
self.enabled_key,
"Enabled",
type="bool",
default=True,
help=f"Deliver notifications through {self.label}.",
group=self.label,
)
def all_fields(self) -> list[ConfigField]:
return [self.enabled_field(), *self.config_fields]
def is_enabled(self) -> bool:
return get_setting(self.enabled_key, "1") == "1"
def is_active(self) -> bool:
return self.is_enabled() and self.is_configured()
def client_config(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {}
@abstractmethod
def is_configured(self) -> bool: ...
@abstractmethod
def parse_registration(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None: ...
@abstractmethod
def prepare(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str: ...
@abstractmethod
async def deliver(
self, client: httpx.AsyncClient, registration: dict[str, Any], prepared: str
) -> Delivery: ...

View File

@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import logging
import os
import random
import time
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import urlparse
@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes import SHA256
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from devplacepy import stealth
from devplacepy.config import (
SECONDS_PER_DAY,
VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE,
@ -28,7 +26,15 @@ from devplacepy.config import (
VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE,
VAPID_SUB,
)
from devplacepy.database import get_table
from devplacepy.database import get_setting
from devplacepy.push.providers.base import (
ACCEPTED,
DEAD,
REJECTED,
Delivery,
PushProvider,
)
from devplacepy.services.base import ConfigField
from devplacepy.utils import generate_uid
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@ -37,6 +43,8 @@ JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 60 * 60
PUSH_TTL_SECONDS = str(SECONDS_PER_DAY)
DEAD_SUBSCRIPTION_STATUSES = (404, 410)
ACCEPTED_STATUSES = (200, 201)
SUBJECT_KEY = "push_webpush_subject"
PROVIDER_LABEL = "Web Push (VAPID)"
def generate_private_key() -> None:
@ -149,13 +157,17 @@ def public_key_standard_b64() -> str:
return base64.b64encode(point).decode("utf-8").rstrip("=")
def subject() -> str:
return get_setting(SUBJECT_KEY, "").strip() or VAPID_SUB
def create_notification_authorization(push_url: str) -> str:
target = urlparse(push_url)
audience = f"{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}"
issued_at = int(time.time())
return jwt.encode(
{
"sub": VAPID_SUB,
"sub": subject(),
"aud": audience,
"exp": issued_at + JWT_LIFETIME_SECONDS,
"nbf": issued_at,
@ -223,78 +235,76 @@ def create_notification_info_with_payload(
}
def _mark_subscription_dead(subscription_id: int) -> None:
get_table("push_registration").update(
{"id": subscription_id, "deleted_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()},
["id"],
)
logger.info("Soft-deleted dead push subscription id=%s", subscription_id)
class WebPushProvider(PushProvider):
name = "webpush"
label = PROVIDER_LABEL
config_fields = [
ConfigField(
SUBJECT_KEY,
"VAPID subject",
type="str",
default=VAPID_SUB,
help="Contact sent as the JWT sub claim, a mailto: or https: URL. Blank uses the built-in default.",
group=PROVIDER_LABEL,
)
]
def is_configured(self) -> bool:
return True
async def notify_user(user_uid: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
registrations = list(
get_table("push_registration").find(user_uid=user_uid, deleted_at=None)
)
if not registrations:
logger.debug("No active push subscriptions for user %s", user_uid)
return
def client_config(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
return {"publicKey": public_key_standard_b64()}
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("VAPID key material unavailable: %s", exc)
return {}
body = json.dumps(payload)
async with stealth.stealth_async_client(timeout=10.0) as client:
for subscription in registrations:
endpoint = subscription["endpoint"]
try:
notification_payload = create_notification_info_with_payload(
endpoint,
subscription["key_auth"],
subscription["key_p256dh"],
body,
)
headers = {**notification_payload["headers"], "TTL": PUSH_TTL_SECONDS}
response = await client.post(
endpoint, headers=headers, content=notification_payload["data"]
)
except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError) as exc:
logger.warning("Push error for %s via %s: %s", user_uid, endpoint, exc)
continue
def parse_registration(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
keys = body.get("keys")
if not isinstance(keys, dict):
return None
endpoint = body.get("endpoint")
key_auth = keys.get("auth")
key_p256dh = keys.get("p256dh")
if not (
isinstance(endpoint, str)
and isinstance(key_auth, str)
and isinstance(key_p256dh, str)
and endpoint
and key_auth
and key_p256dh
):
return None
return {
"endpoint": endpoint,
"key_auth": key_auth,
"key_p256dh": key_p256dh,
}
if response.status_code in ACCEPTED_STATUSES:
logger.debug("Push delivered to %s via %s", user_uid, endpoint)
elif response.status_code in DEAD_SUBSCRIPTION_STATUSES:
_mark_subscription_dead(subscription["id"])
else:
logger.warning(
"Push rejected (%s) for %s via %s",
response.status_code,
user_uid,
endpoint,
)
def prepare(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
return json.dumps(payload)
async def register(
user_uid: str, endpoint: str, key_auth: str, key_p256dh: str
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
table = get_table("push_registration")
existing = table.find_one(
user_uid=user_uid,
endpoint=endpoint,
key_auth=key_auth,
key_p256dh=key_p256dh,
deleted_at=None,
)
if existing:
logger.debug("Push subscription already registered for user %s", user_uid)
return existing, False
record = {
"uid": generate_uid(),
"user_uid": user_uid,
"endpoint": endpoint,
"key_auth": key_auth,
"key_p256dh": key_p256dh,
"created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"deleted_at": None,
}
table.insert(record)
logger.info("Registered push subscription for user %s", user_uid)
return record, True
async def deliver(
self, client: httpx.AsyncClient, registration: dict[str, Any], prepared: str
) -> Delivery:
endpoint = registration.get("endpoint") or ""
if not endpoint:
return Delivery(DEAD, "missing endpoint")
try:
notification_payload = create_notification_info_with_payload(
endpoint,
registration["key_auth"],
registration["key_p256dh"],
prepared,
)
headers = {**notification_payload["headers"], "TTL": PUSH_TTL_SECONDS}
response = await client.post(
endpoint, headers=headers, content=notification_payload["data"]
)
except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
return Delivery(REJECTED, str(exc))
if response.status_code in ACCEPTED_STATUSES:
return Delivery(ACCEPTED)
if response.status_code in DEAD_SUBSCRIPTION_STATUSES:
return Delivery(DEAD, str(response.status_code))
return Delivery(REJECTED, str(response.status_code))

83
devplacepy/push/store.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import logging
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any
from devplacepy.database import db, get_table
from devplacepy.push.providers import DEFAULT_PROVIDER
from devplacepy.utils import generate_uid
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
TABLE = "push_registration"
def table():
return get_table(TABLE)
def provider_of(registration: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
return registration.get("provider") or DEFAULT_PROVIDER
def active_for_user(user_uid: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
return list(table().find(user_uid=user_uid, deleted_at=None))
def register(
user_uid: str, provider: str, fields: dict[str, Any]
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
registrations = table()
existing = registrations.find_one(
user_uid=user_uid, provider=provider, deleted_at=None, **fields
)
if existing:
logger.debug("Push subscription already registered for user %s", user_uid)
return existing, False
record = {
"uid": generate_uid(),
"user_uid": user_uid,
"provider": provider,
"created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"deleted_at": None,
**fields,
}
registrations.insert(record)
logger.info("Registered %s push subscription for user %s", provider, user_uid)
return record, True
def mark_dead(registration_id: int) -> None:
table().update(
{"id": registration_id, "deleted_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()},
["id"],
)
logger.info("Soft-deleted dead push subscription id=%s", registration_id)
def prune(cutoff: str) -> int:
if TABLE not in db.tables:
return 0
rows = list(table().find(deleted_at={"<": cutoff}))
if not rows:
return 0
table().delete(deleted_at={"<": cutoff})
return len(rows)
def counts() -> dict[str, int]:
if TABLE not in db.tables:
return {}
totals: dict[str, int] = {"dead": 0}
for row in db.query(
f"SELECT provider AS provider, deleted_at IS NULL AS live, COUNT(*) AS total "
f"FROM {TABLE} GROUP BY provider, deleted_at IS NULL"
):
provider = row["provider"] or DEFAULT_PROVIDER
if row["live"]:
totals[provider] = totals.get(provider, 0) + int(row["total"])
else:
totals["dead"] += int(row["total"])
return totals

View File

@ -23,9 +23,11 @@ Prefixes are wired in `main.py`:
| `/polls` | polls.py - poll voting: `POST /polls/{poll_uid}/vote` |
| `/avatar` | avatar.py |
| `/follow` | follow.py |
| `/reports` | reports.py - polymorphic content reporting: `POST /reports/{target_type}/{target_uid}` (member), `GET /reports/mine` (member), `GET /reports/reasons` (public). See `devplacepy/services/moderation/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/workspaces` | workspaces.py - `GET /workspaces/index`, the public index of every workspace published to the `/p/{slug}` ingress, with owner, project, maturity label and absolute link. Indexed in the sitemap. Publishing an ingress slug is the deliberate public act, so the workspace itself is always listed, but the project-derived fields (`description` and `project_url`, whose slug carries the project title) are withheld unless `content.can_view_project(project, viewer)` passes - a private project must not leak its title or description through this public listing |
| (none) | relations.py - per-user block/mute relations: `POST /block/{username}`, `/block/unblock/{username}`, `/mute/{username}`, `/mute/unmute/{username}` (soft-deletable `user_relations` rows) |
| `/leaderboard` | leaderboard.py - `GET /leaderboard` XP/stars leaderboard page |
| `/admin` | admin/ package - one leaf per sub-resource (`index`, `users`, `aiusage`, `aiquota`, `media`, `trash`, `settings`, `notifications`, `news`, `auditlog`, `backups`, `game`) plus the folded-in `services.py` and `containers.py` (mounted with `/services` and `/containers` sub-prefixes). `main.py` mounts the whole `/admin` tree from this one package. The `backups` leaf is the admin **Backups** dashboard (`BackupService`, kind `backup`): storage usage, backup archives, and interval/cron backup schedules (CRUD + rotation). **Archive download is restricted to the primary administrator** (the earliest-created Admin, resolved by `database.get_primary_admin_uid` / `utils.is_primary_admin`): `GET /admin/backups/{uid}/download` 403s every other admin, the `download_url` field is withheld from them at every endpoint (`can_download = is_primary_admin(admin)`, surfaced as `BackupDashboardOut.can_download_backups`), and `BackupMonitor.js` renders their Download control as a disabled button tooltipped `Not available`. See `devplacepy/services/backup/CLAUDE.md`. The `game` leaf (`/admin/game`) is the Code Farm Era admin page: `GET /admin/game` (status), `POST /admin/game/era/start` and `/era/end` - see `devplacepy/services/game/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/admin` | admin/ package - one leaf per sub-resource (`index`, `users`, `aiusage`, `aiquota`, `media`, `trash`, `settings`, `notifications`, `news`, `auditlog`, `backups`, `game`) plus the folded-in `services.py` and `containers.py` (mounted with `/services` and `/containers` sub-prefixes). `main.py` mounts the whole `/admin` tree from this one package. The `backups` leaf is the admin **Backups** dashboard (`BackupService`, kind `backup`): storage usage, backup archives, and interval/cron backup schedules (CRUD + rotation). **Archive download is restricted to the primary administrator** (the earliest-created Admin, resolved by `database.get_primary_admin_uid` / `utils.is_primary_admin`): `GET /admin/backups/{uid}/download` 403s every other admin, the `download_url` field is withheld from them at every endpoint (`can_download = is_primary_admin(admin)`, surfaced as `BackupDashboardOut.can_download_backups`), and `BackupMonitor.js` renders their Download control as a disabled button tooltipped `Not available`. See `devplacepy/services/backup/CLAUDE.md`. The `moderation` leaf (`/admin/moderation`) is the report queue: the list (oldest-open-first, status tabs, the SLA badge), the per-report detail with the offender's history, `POST /{uid}/status` for triage and `POST /{uid}/decide` for decisions; the per-user enforcement routes `POST /admin/users/{uid}/{suspend,lift,ban}` live in the `users` leaf alongside the legacy `toggle`. Both share `is_senior_admin`/`deny_senior` from `admin/_shared.py`. The `game` leaf (`/admin/game`) is the Code Farm Era admin page: `GET /admin/game` (status), `POST /admin/game/era/start` and `/era/end` - see `devplacepy/services/game/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/admin/services` | admin/services.py |
| `/issues` | issues/ package - issue tracker backed by Gitea (no local issue store): `index.py` (list `?state=`/`?page=`, detail `/{number}` with comments), `create.py` (async AI-enhanced filing `/create` enqueues a `issue_create` job, status at `/jobs/{uid}`), `comment.py` (synchronous, pushes to Gitea + notifies admins), `status.py` (admin open/closed), `attachments.py` (file attachments on open issues + comments, mirrored to Gitea native assets; add/list/delete with owner-or-admin + open-state guards) |
| `/gists` | gists.py |
@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ Prefixes are wired in `main.py`:
| `/dbapi` | dbapi/ package - **primary-administrator-only, strictly READ-ONLY** generic database API over `dataset` (never inserts/updates/deletes/restores; the write surface was removed because it bypassed every per-route admin safeguard). `tables.py` (`GET /tables`, `GET /{table}/schema`), `crud.py` (read only: `GET /{table}` + `GET /{table}/{key}/{value}`, `?include_deleted`), `query.py` (`POST /query` hard SELECT-only validated read-only run; `POST /query/async` + `GET /query/{uid}` + `WS /query/{uid}/ws` via `DbApiJobService` kind `dbquery`), `nl.py` (`POST /nl` natural-language->SQL via the AI gateway, returns validated SELECT, `execute=true` runs it read-only). **Auth = the PRIMARY administrator only** (the earliest-created Admin, `utils.is_primary_admin` / `database.get_primary_admin_uid` - the same identity that gates backup downloads) by session/api_key (`services/dbapi/policy.py`); every other administrator is refused like a member, and there is **no internal-key path** - the gateway `internal_gateway_key()` is NOT accepted (no service-to-service access). SQL validated by `services/dbapi/validate.py` (sqlglot classify + suspicious-flag + read-only `EXPLAIN` dry-run). Devii tools `db_*` are read-only (list/get/query/nl; no write tools) and flagged `requires_primary_admin=True`, so they are added to the LLM tool list ONLY for the primary administrator (every other session never sees them and Devii is unaware they exist). `services/pubsub/policy.py` resolves its own admin/internal actor and does NOT reuse `dbapi.policy.caller_for`, so the primary-admin restriction does not leak onto the pub/sub bus. See `devplacepy/services/dbapi/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/quizzes` | quizzes/ package - **Quizzes**: `index.py` (hub, create, import, detail, export, edit, delete, publish, per-quiz leaderboard, cross-quiz scoreboard), `questions.py` (builder page + question CRUD + reorder), `attempts.py` (start/resume, play, answer, finish, results). The hub `GET /quizzes` is the approved three-column `.feed-layout` reused verbatim from `/feed`: filters + search left (`?filter=all|todo|done|mine|drafts`, `?search=`, `?page=`), the quiz list centre with the **New quiz** and **Create quiz with Devii** actions, and the cross-quiz **scoreboard** rail right (score per user, best attempt per quiz, 15s display cache). Publishing is terminal - every write on a published quiz is a 400 and there is no unpublish route. See `devplacepy/services/quiz/CLAUDE.md` |
| `/game` | game/ package - the **Code Farm** idle game (`index.py` + `farm.py`): `GET /game` (page), `GET /game/state`, `GET /game/leaderboard?board=`, `POST /game/{plant,harvest,buy-plot,upgrade,fertilize,daily,grant,perk,prestige,legacy,mastery,quests/claim}`, `POST /game/{defense/upgrade,defense/downgrade,infrastructure/buy,cosmetics/buy,cosmetics/equip}`, plus social `GET /game/farm/{username}` and `POST /game/farm/{username}/{water,steal}`. See `devplacepy/services/game/CLAUDE.md` |
| (none) | push.py - web push + PWA: `GET`/`POST /push.json` (VAPID public key / subscription register), `GET /service-worker.js`, `GET /manifest.json` |
| (none) | push.py - push + PWA: `GET /push.json` (VAPID public key + the providers accepting registrations), `POST /push.json` (register with any active provider; a body without `provider` is a `webpush` body, so existing clients are unchanged; an unknown, disabled or unconfigured provider is a 400), `GET /service-worker.js`, `GET /manifest.json`. Provider protocol and delivery live in `devplacepy/push/` - see `devplacepy/push/CLAUDE.md` |
| (none) | docs.py (docs/ package) - the documentation site (prose pages + API reference). See `routers/docs/CLAUDE.md` for the deep detail on this tree (`DOCS_PAGES`, audience tiers, prose rendering pipeline) |
| `/pubsub` | pubsub.py - **database-free** publish/subscribe bus. `WS /pubsub/ws` (subscribe/unsubscribe/publish frames, `foo.*` wildcards), `POST /pubsub/publish` + `GET /pubsub/topics` (admin/internal). Lock-owner-gated WS (`4013` retry) so subscribers converge on one worker; topic authz in `services/pubsub/policy.py` (`user.{uid}.*` private, `public.*` shared, admin/internal anywhere, guests opt-in). In-process `services.pubsub.publish(topic, data)` for backends; frontend `app.pubsub`. See `devplacepy/services/pubsub/CLAUDE.md` |
| (none) | seo.py - `/robots.txt`, `/sitemap.xml` |
@ -60,6 +62,7 @@ Every page/redirect endpoint also returns JSON when the client asks. Core in `de
- **Page GETs:** `return respond(request, "x.html", context, model=XOut)` - HTML renders the template; JSON does `XOut.model_validate(context).model_dump()`. One context, two renderings.
- **Action POSTs:** `return action_result(request, url, data=<resource|None>)` - HTML 302 redirects; JSON returns `{ok, redirect, data}`. (Set cookies on the returned response after calling it, as `auth.py` login/signup do.)
- **Refusals:** `return json_error(status_code, message)` - **status first, message second**. Swapping them is not a lint-level mistake, it is a guaranteed 500: `JSONResponse(..., status_code="some message")` raises `TypeError` inside `Response.init_headers` before any byte is written, so the branch that was supposed to explain a limit to the user crashes instead. It was a real production bug - every refusal in the two workspace routers was written `json_error(message, status)`, so a member already at the default 2-workspace quota got a 500 from the workspace page's **Open workspace** button rather than the quota message. `tests/unit/responses.py` now AST-scans the whole package for both argument orders, so the swap cannot come back anywhere.
Response models live in `devplacepy/schemas.py` (Pydantic v2, `extra="ignore"`, all-Optional so they validate the existing context dicts directly). **Always project users through `UserOut`** (and `AdminUserOut`) - the raw user rows contain `email`/`api_key`/`password_hash`, and the models drop them; never serialize a raw user row. List item shapes vary (feed/gists/news/admin-news are wrapped `{post|gist|article: ...}`; projects are flat rows with `author_name`/`my_vote`) - match the context exactly. Errors negotiate centrally: `main.py` 404/500/validation handlers and the rate-limit/maintenance middleware, plus `utils.require_user`/`require_admin` (401/403 for JSON, 303 redirect for browsers). The four legacy AJAX endpoints (votes/reactions/bookmarks/polls) keep their original flat JSON shapes and are left untouched. Documented in `docs_api.py`'s Conventions group.
@ -314,6 +317,14 @@ All SEO features are implemented across the following locations:
- `database.py` helpers: `get_follow_counts(uid)` (`{followers, following}`), `get_follow_list(uid, mode, page)` (paginated people + `build_pagination`, ordered newest-first), and `get_following_among(follower_uid, target_uids)` (single IN-clause set used to set `is_following` per row, avoiding N+1). `mode` is `"followers"` (people who follow `uid`) or `"following"` (people `uid` follows).
- Devii catalog tools `list_followers` / `list_following` (`requires_auth=False`) map to the JSON endpoints; documented in `docs_api.py` under the `profiles` group.
### Reporting and moderation
`_report_button.html` is the single report control, included with the same two-variable idiom as `_reaction_bar.html` at **fifteen** sites (`_post_card`, `_comment`, `post`, `gist_detail`, `project_detail`, `news_detail`, `quiz`, `_media_gallery`, `_awards_gallery`, `messages`, `profile`, `project_files`, `issue_detail`, `containers_instance`, `workspace_index`). Locals: `_type`, `_uid`, `_owner` (owner uid, so the control hides on your own content), `_owner_name` (optional; when present the partial also renders the **Block** form, which is what makes blocking reachable from the content rather than only from a profile) and `_class` (the surrounding button class so it inherits each surface's visual language).
`_report_dialog.html` is included once in `base.html` for signed-in users and driven by `static/js/ReportDialog.js` (`app.reportDialog`) through the standard `.modal-overlay`/`.visible` pattern and `Http.sendForm`. The reason list is the `REPORT_REASONS` Jinja global, sourced from `database/moderation.py`, so the dialog, the API enum, the docs enum and the guidelines page can never drift.
An e2e coverage test asserts the control is reachable on every include site; the registry test asserts every reportable target resolves. See `devplacepy/services/moderation/CLAUDE.md`.
### Block and mute (`routers/relations.py`)
A logged-in user can **block** or **mute** another user; both are one-directional and reversible. **Block** hides every piece of the blocked user's content from the blocker - posts, comments (any category), feed, listings, issue list, detail pages, and DMs - everywhere EXCEPT the blocked user's own profile page (kept fully visible so the blocker can review and unblock), and it also suppresses any notification that user would generate. **Mute** is the lighter option: it only suppresses the muted user's notifications while their content stays visible. The blocked/muted user is unaffected and is not told.

View File

@ -8,11 +8,13 @@ from devplacepy.routers.admin import (
backups,
bots,
containers,
workspaces,
devii_tasks,
game,
gateway_configs,
issues,
media,
moderation,
news,
notifications,
services,
@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ router.include_router(aiusage.router)
router.include_router(statistics.router)
router.include_router(aiquota.router)
router.include_router(media.router)
router.include_router(moderation.router)
router.include_router(trash.router)
router.include_router(settings.router)
router.include_router(notifications.router)
@ -42,3 +45,4 @@ router.include_router(devii_tasks.router)
router.include_router(game.router)
router.include_router(services.router, prefix="/services")
router.include_router(containers.router, prefix="/containers")
router.include_router(workspaces.router)

View File

@ -2,6 +2,45 @@
import json
from fastapi import Request
from devplacepy.responses import action_result
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
def seniority_key(user: dict) -> tuple[str, int]:
return (user.get("created_at") or "", user.get("id") or 0)
def is_senior_admin(actor: dict, target: dict | None) -> bool:
if not target or target.get("role") != "Admin":
return False
if target.get("uid") == actor.get("uid"):
return False
return seniority_key(target) < seniority_key(actor)
def deny_senior(
request: Request,
admin: dict,
uid: str,
target: dict,
event_key: str,
redirect_url: str = "/admin/users",
):
audit.record(
request,
event_key,
user=admin,
result="denied",
target_type="user",
target_uid=uid,
target_label=target.get("username"),
summary=f"admin {admin['username']} cannot manage senior admin {target.get('username')}",
links=[audit.target("user", uid, target.get("username"))],
)
return action_result(request, redirect_url)
def parse_metadata(raw: str | dict | None) -> dict | None:
if not raw:

View File

@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from devplacepy.utils import require_admin
from devplacepy.responses import action_result
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.manager import service_manager
from devplacepy.services.openai_gateway import quota
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
@ -34,14 +35,20 @@ async def admin_reset_all_ai_quota(request: Request):
admin = require_admin(request)
devii = service_manager.get_service("devii")
removed = devii.reset_all_quotas() if devii is not None else 0
gateway = quota.reset(created_by=admin["uid"])
logger.info(
f"Admin {admin['username']} reset ALL AI quotas ({removed} ledger rows)"
f"Admin {admin['username']} reset ALL AI quotas "
f"({removed} Devii ledger rows, gateway watermark {gateway['reset_at']})"
)
audit.record(
request,
"admin.ai_quota.reset_all",
user=admin,
metadata={"rows_removed": removed},
summary=f"admin {admin['username']} reset all AI quotas",
metadata={"rows_removed": removed, "gateway_reset_at": gateway["reset_at"]},
summary=(
f"admin {admin['username']} reset all AI quotas "
"(Devii assistant and AI gateway)"
),
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/ai-usage")

View File

@ -197,14 +197,7 @@ def _quota_defaults_summary() -> dict:
def _rule_label(rule: dict) -> str:
parts = []
if rule.get("owner_kind"):
parts.append(f"role={rule['owner_kind']}")
if rule.get("owner_id"):
parts.append(f"user={rule['owner_id']}")
if rule.get("app_reference"):
parts.append(f"app={rule['app_reference']}")
return ", ".join(parts) or rule.get("uid", "")
return quota.scope_label(rule, fallback=rule.get("uid", ""))
@router.get("/gateway/quota-rules")
@ -253,6 +246,34 @@ async def save_quota_rule(request: Request):
return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "rule": saved})
@router.post("/gateway/quota-resets")
async def reset_quota_spend(request: Request):
admin = require_admin(request)
body = await _payload(request)
try:
payload = quota.QuotaResetIn(**body)
except ValidationError as exc:
return _validation_error(exc)
scope = quota.reset(payload, created_by=admin["uid"])
label = quota.scope_label(scope, fallback="every caller")
audit.record(
request,
"gateway.quota.reset",
user=admin,
target_type="gateway_quota",
target_uid=scope["uid"],
target_label=label,
summary=f"admin {admin['username']} reset the gateway 24h spend for {label}",
metadata={
"owner_kind": scope["owner_kind"],
"owner_id": scope["owner_id"],
"app_reference": scope["app_reference"],
"reset_at": scope["reset_at"],
},
)
return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "reset": scope})
@router.delete("/gateway/quota-rules/{uid}")
async def delete_quota_rule(request: Request, uid: str):
admin = require_admin(request)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import logging
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from devplacepy.database import (
REPORT_STATUSES,
SYSTEM_ACTOR,
get_table,
get_users_by_uids,
)
from devplacepy.dependencies import json_or_form
from devplacepy.models import ModerationDecisionForm, ReportStatusForm
from devplacepy.responses import action_result, json_error, respond
from devplacepy.routers.admin._shared import deny_senior, is_senior_admin
from devplacepy.schemas import AdminModerationOut, AdminReportOut
from devplacepy.seo import base_seo_context, site_url, website_schema
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.moderation import enforcement, queue, sla
from devplacepy.utils import create_notification, not_found, require_admin
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
QUEUE_URL = "/admin/moderation"
STATUS_TABS = [
{"key": "open", "label": "Open"},
{"key": "acknowledged", "label": "Acknowledged"},
{"key": "actioned", "label": "Actioned"},
{"key": "dismissed", "label": "Dismissed"},
]
SUBJECT_ACTIONS = ("warn", "suspend", "ban", "lift")
ENFORCEMENT_EVENTS = {
"remove_content": "moderation.remove",
"restore_content": "moderation.restore",
"warn": "moderation.warn",
"suspend": "moderation.suspend",
"ban": "moderation.ban",
"lift": "moderation.lift",
}
DECISION_MESSAGES = {
"remove_content": "Your {target} was removed after a moderation review.",
"restore_content": "Your {target} was restored after a moderation review.",
"warn": "A moderator issued a warning about your {target}.",
"suspend": "Your account is suspended following a moderation review.",
"ban": "Your account has been closed following a moderation review.",
"lift": "Your account restriction has been lifted.",
}
def _breadcrumbs(extra: list[dict] | None = None) -> list[dict]:
trail = [
{"name": "Home", "url": "/feed"},
{"name": "Admin", "url": "/admin"},
{"name": "Moderation", "url": QUEUE_URL},
]
return trail + (extra or [])
def _available_actions(target_type: str) -> list[str]:
actions = ["dismiss", "escalate"]
if enforcement.can_remove(target_type):
actions = ["remove_content", "restore_content"] + actions
return actions + list(SUBJECT_ACTIONS)
def _subject(report: dict) -> dict | None:
owner_uid = report.get("owner_uid") or ""
if not owner_uid:
return None
return get_users_by_uids([owner_uid]).get(owner_uid)
def _action_view(rows: list[dict]) -> list[dict]:
actors = get_users_by_uids([row.get("actor_uid") for row in rows if row.get("actor_uid")])
view = []
for row in rows:
actor = actors.get(row.get("actor_uid"))
view.append(
{
"uid": row["uid"],
"report_uid": row.get("report_uid", ""),
"action": row.get("action", ""),
"actor_name": actor["username"] if actor else row.get("actor_uid", ""),
"reason": row.get("reason", ""),
"notes": row.get("notes", ""),
"expires_at": row.get("expires_at", ""),
"created_at": row.get("created_at", ""),
}
)
return view
@router.get("/moderation", response_class=HTMLResponse)
async def admin_moderation(request: Request, status: str = "open", page: int = 1):
admin = require_admin(request)
if status not in REPORT_STATUSES:
status = "open"
reports, pagination = queue.list_reports(status=status, page=page)
counts = queue.status_counts()
base = site_url(request)
seo_ctx = base_seo_context(
request,
title="Moderation - Admin",
description="Triage reported content and apply moderation decisions.",
robots="noindex,nofollow",
breadcrumbs=_breadcrumbs(),
schemas=[website_schema(base)],
)
return respond(
request,
"admin_moderation.html",
{
**seo_ctx,
"request": request,
"user": admin,
"reports": reports,
"pagination": pagination,
"status": status,
"statuses": [
{**tab, "count": counts.get(tab["key"], 0), "active": tab["key"] == status}
for tab in STATUS_TABS
],
"counts": counts,
"sla": sla.snapshot(),
"admin_section": "moderation",
},
model=AdminModerationOut,
)
@router.get("/moderation/{uid}", response_class=HTMLResponse)
async def admin_report_detail(request: Request, uid: str):
admin = require_admin(request)
report = queue.get_report(uid)
if not report:
raise not_found("Report not found")
view = queue.enrich_reports([report])[0]
subject = _subject(report)
base = site_url(request)
seo_ctx = base_seo_context(
request,
title=f"Report {uid} - Admin",
description="One reported item and the decisions taken on it.",
robots="noindex,nofollow",
breadcrumbs=_breadcrumbs([{"name": "Report", "url": f"{QUEUE_URL}/{uid}"}]),
schemas=[website_schema(base)],
)
return respond(
request,
"admin_report.html",
{
**seo_ctx,
"request": request,
"user": admin,
"report": view,
"actions": _action_view(queue.actions_for_report(uid)),
"history": _action_view(
queue.actions_for_subject(report.get("owner_uid", ""))
),
"available_actions": _available_actions(report["target_type"]),
"can_remove": enforcement.can_remove(report["target_type"]),
"subject": subject,
"sla": sla.snapshot(),
"admin_section": "moderation",
},
model=AdminReportOut,
)
@router.post("/moderation/{uid}/status")
async def admin_report_status(
request: Request,
uid: str,
data: Annotated[ReportStatusForm, Depends(json_or_form(ReportStatusForm))],
):
admin = require_admin(request)
report = queue.get_report(uid)
if not report:
raise not_found("Report not found")
updated = queue.set_status(uid, data.status, admin["uid"])
if not updated:
return json_error(400, "Report status could not be changed")
logger.info(f"Admin {admin['username']} set report {uid} to {data.status}")
audit.record(
request,
"report.status",
user=admin,
target_type=report["target_type"],
target_uid=report["target_uid"],
old_value=report.get("status"),
new_value=data.status,
metadata={"report_uid": uid},
summary=f"{admin['username']} set report {uid} to {data.status}",
links=[audit.target(report["target_type"], report["target_uid"])],
)
return action_result(request, f"{QUEUE_URL}/{uid}")
@router.post("/moderation/{uid}/decide")
async def admin_report_decide(
request: Request,
uid: str,
data: Annotated[ModerationDecisionForm, Depends(json_or_form(ModerationDecisionForm))],
):
admin = require_admin(request)
report = queue.get_report(uid)
if not report:
raise not_found("Report not found")
action = data.action
if action not in _available_actions(report["target_type"]):
return json_error(400, "That action does not apply to this target")
subject = _subject(report)
if action in SUBJECT_ACTIONS:
if not subject:
return json_error(400, "This report has no account to act on")
if is_senior_admin(admin, subject):
return deny_senior(
request,
admin,
subject["uid"],
subject,
f"moderation.{action}",
redirect_url=f"{QUEUE_URL}/{uid}",
)
if action == "escalate":
queue.escalate(uid)
else:
outcome = "dismissed" if action == "dismiss" else "actioned"
if not queue.claim_open(uid, outcome, admin["uid"]):
return json_error(409, "This report was already resolved")
expires_at = ""
if action == "remove_content":
enforcement.remove_content(
request, admin, report["target_type"], report["target_uid"]
)
elif action == "restore_content":
enforcement.restore_content(report["target_type"], report["target_uid"])
elif action == "suspend":
expires_at = enforcement.suspend_user(subject, data.duration_hours, data.reason)
elif action == "ban":
enforcement.ban_user(subject, data.reason)
elif action == "lift":
enforcement.lift_suspension(subject)
enforcement.unban_user(subject)
queue.record_action(
report_uid=uid,
actor_uid=admin["uid"],
action=action,
target_type=report["target_type"],
target_uid=report["target_uid"],
subject_uid=subject["uid"] if subject else "",
reason=data.reason,
notes=data.notes,
expires_at=expires_at,
)
logger.info(f"Admin {admin['username']} applied {action} to report {uid}")
metadata = {
"report_uid": uid,
"action": action,
"reason": data.reason,
"subject_uid": subject["uid"] if subject else "",
}
links = [audit.target(report["target_type"], report["target_uid"])]
audit.record(
request,
"report.decide",
user=admin,
target_type=report["target_type"],
target_uid=report["target_uid"],
metadata=metadata,
summary=f"{admin['username']} applied {action} on report {uid}",
links=links,
)
enforcement_key = ENFORCEMENT_EVENTS.get(action)
if enforcement_key:
audit.record(
request,
enforcement_key,
user=admin,
target_type=report["target_type"],
target_uid=report["target_uid"],
metadata=metadata,
summary=f"{admin['username']} applied {action} from report {uid}",
links=links,
)
_notify_subject(subject, action, report, data.reason)
if action != "escalate":
_notify_reporter(report, action)
return action_result(request, f"{QUEUE_URL}/{uid}")
def _notify_subject(subject: dict | None, action: str, report: dict, reason: str) -> None:
template = DECISION_MESSAGES.get(action)
if not subject or not template:
return
message = template.format(target=report["target_type"])
if reason:
message = f"{message} Reason: {reason}."
enforcement.notify_subject(subject["uid"], message)
def _notify_reporter(report: dict, action: str) -> None:
reporter_uid = report.get("reporter_uid") or ""
if not reporter_uid or reporter_uid == SYSTEM_ACTOR:
return
if not get_table("users").find_one(uid=reporter_uid):
return
verb = "dismissed" if action == "dismiss" else "actioned"
create_notification(
reporter_uid,
"moderation",
f"Your report on a {report['target_type']} was {verb}.",
reporter_uid,
"/reports/mine",
)

View File

@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ import logging
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import Depends, APIRouter, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, JSONResponse
from devplacepy.models import AdminRoleForm, AdminPasswordForm
from devplacepy.models import AdminRoleForm, AdminPasswordForm, BanForm, SuspensionForm
from devplacepy.database import (
get_table,
build_pagination,
get_post_counts_by_user_uids,
invalidate_admins_cache,
is_account_active,
)
from devplacepy.utils import (
require_admin,
@ -20,37 +21,16 @@ from devplacepy.seo import base_seo_context, site_url, website_schema
from devplacepy.responses import respond, action_result
from devplacepy.schemas import AdminUsersOut, UserAiUsageOut
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.moderation import enforcement, queue
from devplacepy.services.manager import service_manager
from devplacepy.services.openai_gateway.analytics import build_user_usage
from devplacepy.services.openai_gateway.usage import pricing_from_cfg
from devplacepy.dependencies import json_or_form
from devplacepy.routers.admin._shared import deny_senior, is_senior_admin
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
def _seniority_key(u: dict) -> tuple[str, int]:
return (u.get("created_at") or "", u.get("id") or 0)
def _is_senior_admin(actor: dict, target: dict | None) -> bool:
if not target or target.get("role") != "Admin":
return False
if target.get("uid") == actor.get("uid"):
return False
return _seniority_key(target) < _seniority_key(actor)
def _deny_senior(request: Request, admin: dict, uid: str, target: dict, event_key: str):
audit.record(
request,
event_key,
user=admin,
result="denied",
target_type="user",
target_uid=uid,
target_label=target.get("username"),
summary=f"admin {admin['username']} cannot manage senior admin {target.get('username')}",
links=[audit.target("user", uid, target.get("username"))],
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/users")
@router.get("/users/{uid}/ai-usage")
async def admin_user_ai_usage(request: Request, uid: str, hours: int = 24):
@ -123,8 +103,8 @@ async def admin_user_role(
return action_result(request, "/admin/users")
users = get_table("users")
target_user = users.find_one(uid=uid)
if _is_senior_admin(admin, target_user):
return _deny_senior(request, admin, uid, target_user, "admin.user.role.change")
if is_senior_admin(admin, target_user):
return deny_senior(request, admin, uid, target_user, "admin.user.role.change")
old_role = target_user.get("role") if target_user else None
users.update({"uid": uid, "role": role}, ["uid"])
clear_user_cache(uid)
@ -155,8 +135,8 @@ async def admin_user_password(
admin = require_admin(request)
users = get_table("users")
target_user = users.find_one(uid=uid)
if _is_senior_admin(admin, target_user):
return _deny_senior(request, admin, uid, target_user, "admin.user.password.reset")
if is_senior_admin(admin, target_user):
return deny_senior(request, admin, uid, target_user, "admin.user.password.reset")
users.update({"uid": uid, "password_hash": await hash_password_async(data.password)}, ["uid"])
logger.info(f"Admin {admin['username']} changed password for user {uid}")
audit.record(
@ -193,10 +173,10 @@ async def admin_user_toggle(request: Request, uid: str):
return action_result(request, "/admin/users")
users = get_table("users")
user = users.find_one(uid=uid)
if _is_senior_admin(admin, user):
return _deny_senior(request, admin, uid, user, "admin.user.active.disable")
if is_senior_admin(admin, user):
return deny_senior(request, admin, uid, user, "admin.user.active.disable")
if user:
new_state = not user.get("is_active", True)
new_state = not is_account_active(user)
users.update({"uid": uid, "is_active": new_state}, ["uid"])
clear_user_cache(uid)
logger.info(
@ -215,12 +195,121 @@ async def admin_user_toggle(request: Request, uid: str):
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/users")
def _enforcement_target(request: Request, admin: dict, uid: str, event_key: str):
if uid == admin["uid"]:
audit.record(
request,
event_key,
user=admin,
result="denied",
target_type="user",
target_uid=uid,
target_label=admin.get("username"),
summary=f"admin {admin['username']} cannot enforce against their own account",
links=[audit.target("user", uid, admin.get("username"))],
)
return None, action_result(request, "/admin/users")
target_user = get_table("users").find_one(uid=uid)
if not target_user:
return None, action_result(request, "/admin/users")
if is_senior_admin(admin, target_user):
return None, deny_senior(request, admin, uid, target_user, event_key)
return target_user, None
def _record_enforcement(
request: Request, admin: dict, target_user: dict, event_key: str, metadata: dict
):
logger.info(
f"Admin {admin['username']} applied {event_key} to {target_user['username']}"
)
audit.record(
request,
event_key,
user=admin,
target_type="user",
target_uid=target_user["uid"],
target_label=target_user.get("username"),
metadata=metadata,
summary=f"{admin['username']} applied {event_key} to {target_user['username']}",
links=[audit.target("user", target_user["uid"], target_user.get("username"))],
)
queue.record_action(
report_uid="",
actor_uid=admin["uid"],
action=event_key.rsplit(".", 1)[-1],
target_type="user",
target_uid=target_user["uid"],
subject_uid=target_user["uid"],
reason=metadata.get("reason", ""),
expires_at=metadata.get("expires_at", ""),
)
@router.post("/users/{uid}/suspend")
async def admin_user_suspend(
request: Request,
uid: str,
data: Annotated[SuspensionForm, Depends(json_or_form(SuspensionForm))],
):
admin = require_admin(request)
target_user, refusal = _enforcement_target(request, admin, uid, "moderation.suspend")
if refusal is not None:
return refusal
expires_at = enforcement.suspend_user(target_user, data.duration_hours, data.reason)
_record_enforcement(
request,
admin,
target_user,
"moderation.suspend",
{"reason": data.reason, "expires_at": expires_at, "hours": data.duration_hours},
)
enforcement.notify_subject(
uid,
f"Your account is suspended until {expires_at}. Reason: {data.reason or 'policy violation'}.",
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/users")
@router.post("/users/{uid}/lift")
async def admin_user_lift(request: Request, uid: str):
admin = require_admin(request)
target_user, refusal = _enforcement_target(request, admin, uid, "moderation.lift")
if refusal is not None:
return refusal
enforcement.lift_suspension(target_user)
enforcement.unban_user(target_user)
_record_enforcement(request, admin, target_user, "moderation.lift", {})
enforcement.notify_subject(uid, "Your account restriction has been lifted.")
return action_result(request, "/admin/users")
@router.post("/users/{uid}/ban")
async def admin_user_ban(
request: Request,
uid: str,
data: Annotated[BanForm, Depends(json_or_form(BanForm))],
):
admin = require_admin(request)
target_user, refusal = _enforcement_target(request, admin, uid, "moderation.ban")
if refusal is not None:
return refusal
enforcement.ban_user(target_user, data.reason)
_record_enforcement(
request, admin, target_user, "moderation.ban", {"reason": data.reason}
)
enforcement.notify_subject(
uid, f"Your account has been closed. Reason: {data.reason or 'policy violation'}."
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/users")
@router.post("/users/{uid}/reset-ai-quota")
async def admin_user_reset_ai_quota(request: Request, uid: str):
admin = require_admin(request)
target_user = get_table("users").find_one(uid=uid)
if _is_senior_admin(admin, target_user):
return _deny_senior(request, admin, uid, target_user, "admin.user.ai_quota.reset")
if is_senior_admin(admin, target_user):
return deny_senior(request, admin, uid, target_user, "admin.user.ai_quota.reset")
devii = service_manager.get_service("devii")
removed = devii.reset_quota("user", uid) if devii is not None else 0
logger.info(

View File

@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from devplacepy.database import db, get_table, get_users_by_uids
from devplacepy.dependencies import json_or_form
from devplacepy.models import (
EditorPrefsForm,
WorkspaceFlagForm,
WorkspaceQuotaForm,
WorkspaceSuspendForm,
)
from devplacepy.responses import action_result, json_error, respond
from devplacepy.routers.admin._shared import deny_senior, is_senior_admin
from devplacepy.schemas import AdminWorkspacesOut
from devplacepy.seo import base_seo_context
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.containers import store
from devplacepy.services.containers.workspace import (
editor,
flags,
provision,
quota,
tunnels,
)
from devplacepy.utils import create_notification, generate_uid, not_found, require_admin
router = APIRouter()
def _decorate(rows: list[dict]) -> list[dict]:
owner_uids = {row.get("workspace_owner_uid") for row in rows if row.get("workspace_owner_uid")}
owners = get_users_by_uids(list(owner_uids)) if owner_uids else {}
projects = {}
if "projects" in db.tables:
project_uids = {row.get("project_uid") for row in rows if row.get("project_uid")}
for uid in project_uids:
found = get_table("projects").find_one(uid=uid)
if found:
projects[uid] = found
decorated = []
for row in rows:
view = provision.view(row)
owner = owners.get(row.get("workspace_owner_uid", "")) or {}
project = projects.get(row.get("project_uid", "")) or {}
view["owner_username"] = owner.get("username", "")
view["project_title"] = project.get("title", "")
view["project_slug"] = project.get("slug", "") or project.get("uid", "")
decorated.append(view)
return decorated
def _all_workspaces() -> list[dict]:
return list(get_table("instances").find(is_workspace=1, deleted_at=None))
def _instance_or_404(uid: str) -> dict:
instance = store.get_instance(uid)
if not instance or not instance.get("is_workspace"):
raise not_found("Workspace not found")
return instance
def _audit(request: Request, admin: dict, event_key: str, instance: dict, **extra):
audit.record(
request,
event_key,
user=admin,
target_type="instance",
target_uid=instance["uid"],
target_label=instance.get("name"),
summary=f"{admin['username']} {event_key} workspace {instance.get('name')}",
links=[audit.instance(instance["uid"], instance.get("name"))],
**extra,
)
@router.get("/workspaces")
async def admin_workspaces(request: Request):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
context = {
"workspaces": _decorate(_all_workspaces()),
"flags": flags.list_flags(),
"admin_section": "workspaces",
"user": admin,
**base_seo_context(
request,
title="Workspaces - Admin",
description="Administer dev workspaces.",
robots="noindex,nofollow",
breadcrumbs=[
{"name": "Home", "url": "/feed"},
{"name": "Admin", "url": "/admin"},
{"name": "Workspaces", "url": "/admin/workspaces"},
],
),
}
return respond(request, "admin_workspaces.html", context, model=AdminWorkspacesOut)
@router.get("/workspaces/data")
async def admin_workspaces_data(request: Request):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
return JSONResponse(
{"workspaces": _decorate(_all_workspaces()), "flags": flags.list_flags()}
)
@router.post("/workspaces/{uid}/suspend")
async def admin_workspace_suspend(
request: Request,
uid: str,
data: Annotated[WorkspaceSuspendForm, Depends(json_or_form(WorkspaceSuspendForm))],
):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
instance = _instance_or_404(uid)
reason = (data.reason or "").strip()
if not reason:
return json_error(400, "a reason is required and is shown to the owner")
provision.suspend(instance, admin["uid"], reason)
_audit(request, admin, "container.workspace.suspend", instance, metadata={"reason": reason})
owner = instance.get("workspace_owner_uid", "")
if owner:
create_notification(
owner,
"workspace",
f"Workspace {instance.get('name', '')} was suspended: {reason}",
instance["uid"],
"/projects",
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/workspaces")
@router.post("/workspaces/{uid}/unsuspend")
async def admin_workspace_unsuspend(request: Request, uid: str):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
instance = _instance_or_404(uid)
provision.unsuspend(instance)
_audit(request, admin, "container.workspace.unsuspend", instance)
owner = instance.get("workspace_owner_uid", "")
if owner:
create_notification(
owner,
"workspace",
f"Workspace {instance.get('name', '')} is available again.",
instance["uid"],
"/projects",
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/workspaces")
@router.post("/workspaces/{uid}/stop")
async def admin_workspace_stop(request: Request, uid: str):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
instance = _instance_or_404(uid)
provision.stop(instance)
_audit(request, admin, "container.workspace.stop", instance)
return action_result(request, "/admin/workspaces")
@router.post("/workspaces/{uid}/start")
async def admin_workspace_start(request: Request, uid: str):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
instance = _instance_or_404(uid)
store.update_instance(instance["uid"], {"desired_state": "running"})
_audit(request, admin, "container.workspace.resume", instance)
return action_result(request, "/admin/workspaces")
@router.post("/workspaces/{uid}/delete")
async def admin_workspace_delete(request: Request, uid: str):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
instance = _instance_or_404(uid)
for row in tunnels.list_for_instance(instance["uid"]):
tunnels.soft_delete(row["uid"], admin["uid"])
store.delete_instance(instance["uid"], admin["uid"])
_audit(request, admin, "container.workspace.delete", instance)
return action_result(request, "/admin/workspaces")
@router.post("/workspaces/{uid}/flag")
async def admin_workspace_flag(
request: Request,
uid: str,
data: Annotated[WorkspaceFlagForm, Depends(json_or_form(WorkspaceFlagForm))],
):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
instance = _instance_or_404(uid)
row = flags.raise_flag(
instance, data.kind or flags.KIND_MANUAL, data.severity, data.detail
)
_audit(request, admin, "container.workspace.flag.raise", instance,
metadata={"kind": data.kind, "severity": data.severity})
owner = instance.get("workspace_owner_uid", "")
if owner:
create_notification(
owner,
"workspace",
f"Workspace {instance.get('name', '')} was flagged: {data.detail or data.kind}",
instance["uid"],
"/projects",
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/workspaces", data=row)
@router.post("/workspaces/flags/{flag_uid}/resolve")
async def admin_flag_resolve(request: Request, flag_uid: str, status: str = "resolved"):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
if not flags.set_status(flag_uid, status, admin["uid"]):
raise not_found("Flag not found")
event = (
"container.workspace.flag.dismiss"
if status == "dismissed"
else "container.workspace.flag.resolve"
)
audit.record(
request,
event,
user=admin,
target_type="workspace_flag",
target_uid=flag_uid,
summary=f"{admin['username']} set flag {flag_uid} to {status}",
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/workspaces")
@router.post("/workspaces/{uid}/editor")
async def admin_workspace_editor(
request: Request,
uid: str,
data: Annotated[EditorPrefsForm, Depends(json_or_form(EditorPrefsForm))],
):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
instance = _instance_or_404(uid)
owner_uid = instance.get("workspace_owner_uid", "")
owner = get_users_by_uids([owner_uid]).get(owner_uid) if owner_uid else None
if is_senior_admin(admin, owner):
return deny_senior(
request,
admin,
owner_uid,
owner,
"container.workspace.editor.update",
"/admin/workspaces",
)
if not owner_uid:
return json_error(400, "this workspace has no owner")
if data.reset:
editor.reset_prefs(owner_uid, admin["uid"])
else:
editor.save_prefs(
owner_uid, data.model_dump(exclude={"reset"}, exclude_unset=True)
)
_audit(request, admin, "container.workspace.editor.update", instance)
return action_result(
request,
"/admin/workspaces",
data={"editor": editor.view(owner_uid, instance)},
)
@router.post("/workspaces/quota")
async def admin_workspace_quota(
request: Request,
data: Annotated[WorkspaceQuotaForm, Depends(json_or_form(WorkspaceQuotaForm))],
):
admin = require_admin(request)
if not isinstance(admin, dict):
return admin
if not data.owner_id:
return json_error(400, "owner_id is required")
table = get_table(quota.RULES_TABLE)
existing = table.find_one(
owner_kind="user", owner_id=data.owner_id, deleted_at=None
)
payload = {key: getattr(data, key) for key in quota.RULE_COLUMNS}
if existing:
table.update({"uid": existing["uid"], "label": data.label, **payload}, ["uid"])
uid = existing["uid"]
else:
uid = generate_uid()
table.insert(
{
"uid": uid,
"owner_kind": "user",
"owner_id": data.owner_id,
"label": data.label,
"created_at": "",
"updated_at": "",
"deleted_at": None,
"deleted_by": None,
**payload,
}
)
audit.record(
request,
"container.workspace.settings.update",
user=admin,
target_type="user",
target_uid=data.owner_id,
summary=f"{admin['username']} updated workspace quota",
metadata=payload,
)
return action_result(request, "/admin/workspaces", data={"uid": uid, **payload})

View File

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from devplacepy.routers.auth import (
logout,
resetpassword,
signup,
terms,
token,
)
@ -18,3 +19,4 @@ router.include_router(token.router)
router.include_router(forgotpassword.router)
router.include_router(resetpassword.router)
router.include_router(logout.router)
router.include_router(terms.router)

View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import logging
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import Depends, APIRouter, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from devplacepy.database import get_table, get_int_setting
from devplacepy.database import get_table, get_int_setting, is_account_active
from devplacepy.templating import templates
from devplacepy.utils import (
verify_password_async,
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ async def login(request: Request, data: Annotated[LoginForm, Depends(json_or_for
if not user or not await verify_password_async(password, user["password_hash"]):
errors.append("Invalid email or password")
elif not user.get("is_active", True):
elif not is_account_active(user):
errors.append("Account is deactivated")
if errors:

View File

@ -90,7 +90,9 @@ async def signup(request: Request, data: Annotated[SignupForm, Depends(json_or_f
},
)
uid, role, is_first = await register_account_async(username, email, password)
uid, role, is_first = await register_account_async(
username, email, password, age_band=data.age_band, accepted_terms=True
)
max_age = max(1, get_int_setting("session_max_age_days", 7)) * SECONDS_PER_DAY
token = create_session(uid, max_age)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import logging
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from devplacepy.database import _now_iso, get_setting, get_table, set_consent
from devplacepy.responses import action_result, respond
from devplacepy.schemas import AcceptTermsOut
from devplacepy.seo import base_seo_context
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.utils import clear_user_cache, require_user
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
TERMS_ACCEPTANCE_CODE = "terms_acceptance_required"
def current_terms_version() -> str:
return get_setting("terms_version", "1") or "1"
def needs_acceptance(user: dict | None) -> bool:
if not user:
return False
return (user.get("terms_version") or "") != current_terms_version()
@router.get("/accept-terms", response_class=HTMLResponse)
async def accept_terms_page(request: Request):
user = require_user(request)
seo_ctx = base_seo_context(
request,
title="Accept the updated terms",
description="The Terms of Service changed. Accept the new version to continue.",
robots="noindex,nofollow",
)
return respond(
request,
"accept_terms.html",
{
**seo_ctx,
"request": request,
"user": user,
"terms_version": current_terms_version(),
"accepted_version": user.get("terms_version") or "",
},
model=AcceptTermsOut,
)
@router.post("/accept-terms")
async def accept_terms(request: Request):
user = require_user(request)
version = current_terms_version()
now = _now_iso()
get_table("users").update(
{"uid": user["uid"], "terms_version": version, "terms_accepted_at": now},
["uid"],
)
set_consent("user", user["uid"], "terms", True, version=version)
set_consent(
"user",
user["uid"],
"privacy",
True,
version=get_setting("privacy_version", "1") or "1",
)
clear_user_cache(user["uid"])
logger.info(f"{user['username']} accepted terms version {version}")
audit.record(
request,
"terms.accept",
user=user,
target_type="user",
target_uid=user["uid"],
target_label=user.get("username"),
new_value=version,
summary=f"{user['username']} accepted terms version {version}",
links=[audit.target("user", user["uid"], user.get("username"))],
)
return action_result(request, "/feed", data={"terms_version": version})

View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import Depends, APIRouter, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from devplacepy.database import get_table
from devplacepy.database import get_table, is_account_active
from devplacepy.utils import verify_password_async, get_current_user
from devplacepy.models import LoginForm
from devplacepy.dependencies import json_or_form
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ async def token(
status_code=401,
)
if not user.get("is_active", True):
if not is_account_active(user):
audit.record(
request,
"auth.token.failure",

View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ A second REST protocol mounted at `/api` that reproduces the public devRant API
**ID mapping (load-bearing).** devRant integer ids ARE the auto-increment `id` PK every `dataset` table already has: `rant_id`=`posts.id`, `comment_id`=`comments.id`, `user_id`=`users.id`, `token_id`=`devrant_tokens.id`. No translation table exists - `post_by_id` is `find_one(id=...)`. Serialization converts ISO `created_at` to unix via `ids.to_unix`.
**Auth.** `POST /api/users/auth-token` accepts username OR email, verifies with passlib, and inserts a `devrant_tokens` row (in `SOFT_DELETE_TABLES`; born-live; `key`=`secrets.token_hex`, `expire_time` from `session_max_age_days`). Every later call re-validates `(token_id, token_key, user_id)` with `tokens.resolve_user(params)`. Read endpoints take an OPTIONAL viewer (`resolve_user` may return None); write endpoints return `_shared.unauthorized()` (401) when it does.
**Auth.** `POST /api/users/auth-token` accepts username OR email, verifies with passlib, and inserts a `devrant_tokens` row (in `SOFT_DELETE_TABLES`; born-live; `key`=`secrets.token_hex`, `expire_time` from `session_max_age_days`). Every later call re-validates `(token_id, token_key, user_id)` through **`_shared.resolve_actor(request, params)`**, which wraps `tokens.resolve_user` with `utils.guards.refuse_suspended` - because this path never touches `require_user`, a moderator's suspension would otherwise not bind here at all (the token resolver's `is_account_active` check covers a **ban** but not a time-boxed suspension). `refuse_suspended` gates mutating methods only, so read endpoints are unaffected. Read endpoints take an OPTIONAL viewer (it may return None); write endpoints return `_shared.unauthorized()` (401) when it does. **`DELETE /api/users/me` deliberately calls the bare `resolve_user`** - it is the account-deletion path and must stay reachable to a suspended user, matching the `/profile/{username}/delete` exemption on the web side.
**Writes reuse the audited native cores - never duplicate.** Implementing this drove four DRY extractions in `content.py` (`apply_vote`, `create_comment_record`, `delete_comment_record`, `set_bookmark`) and one in `utils.py` (`register_account`); the native `routers/votes.py`, `routers/comments.py`, and `auth/signup.py` were refactored onto the SAME functions. So a devRant rant/comment/vote awards XP, fires notifications, writes the audit row, and soft-deletes exactly like the UI path. Rant create calls `content.create_content_item` directly; rant delete calls `content.delete_content_item` (full cascade) and returns the devRant envelope.

View File

@ -2,10 +2,19 @@
from typing import Optional
from fastapi import HTTPException
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from devplacepy.database import get_setting
from devplacepy.services.devrant.tokens import resolve_user
from devplacepy.utils.guards import refuse_suspended
def resolve_actor(request: Request, params: dict) -> Optional[dict]:
user = resolve_user(params)
if user:
refuse_suspended(request, user)
return user
def api_enabled() -> bool:

View File

@ -2,14 +2,13 @@
import logging
import re
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from fastapi.responses import Response
from devplacepy.cache import TTLCache
from devplacepy.config import SECONDS_PER_DAY
from devplacepy.database import get_table, get_setting
from devplacepy.database import get_table, get_setting, is_account_active
from devplacepy.utils import verify_password_async, register_account_async
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.devrant.params import merge_params
@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ from devplacepy.services.devrant.tokens import issue_token, resolve_user, revoke
from devplacepy.services.devrant.profile import build_profile
from devplacepy.services.devrant.ids import user_by_id
from devplacepy.services.devrant.avatar import render_png
from devplacepy.routers.devrant._shared import dr_ok, dr_error, unauthorized
from devplacepy.routers.devrant._shared import dr_ok, dr_error, resolve_actor, unauthorized
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ async def auth_token(request: Request):
)
if (
not user
or not user.get("is_active", True)
or not is_account_active(user)
or not await verify_password_async(password, user["password_hash"])
):
audit.record(
@ -131,14 +130,14 @@ async def profile(request: Request, user_id: str):
user = user_by_id(user_id)
if not user:
return dr_error("User not found.")
viewer = resolve_user(params)
viewer = resolve_actor(request, params)
return dr_ok(profile=build_profile(user, viewer))
@router.post("/users/me/edit-profile")
async def edit_profile(request: Request):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
updates = {"uid": user["uid"]}
@ -191,21 +190,29 @@ async def delete_account(request: Request):
user = resolve_user(params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
get_table("users").update(
{"uid": user["uid"], "is_active": False}, ["uid"]
)
from devplacepy.services.moderation import deletion
username = user["username"]
revoke_all(user["uid"])
logger.info("devrant account deactivated for %s", user["username"])
result = deletion.delete_account(user)
if result is None:
return dr_error("This account is already being deleted.")
logger.info("devrant account deleted for %s", username)
audit.record(
request,
"auth.account.disable",
"account.delete.request",
user=user,
target_type="user",
target_uid=user["uid"],
target_label=user["username"],
target_label=username,
origin="devrant",
summary=f"{user['username']} deactivated account via devrant",
links=[audit.target("user", user["uid"], user["username"])],
metadata={
"stamp": result["stamp"],
"rows": result["rows"],
"grace_hours": result["grace_hours"],
},
summary=f"{username} deleted account via devrant",
links=[audit.target("user", user["uid"], username)],
)
return dr_ok()

View File

@ -17,10 +17,9 @@ from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.correction import schedule_correction
from devplacepy.services.ai_modifier import schedule_modification
from devplacepy.services.devrant.params import merge_params
from devplacepy.services.devrant.tokens import resolve_user
from devplacepy.services.devrant.ids import as_int, comment_by_id
from devplacepy.services.devrant.serializers import serialize_comment
from devplacepy.routers.devrant._shared import dr_ok, dr_error, unauthorized
from devplacepy.routers.devrant._shared import dr_ok, dr_error, resolve_actor, unauthorized
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ def _serialize_single(comment: dict, viewer) -> dict:
@router.get("/comments/{comment_id}")
async def get_comment(request: Request, comment_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
viewer = resolve_user(params)
viewer = resolve_actor(request, params)
comment = comment_by_id(comment_id)
if not comment:
return dr_error("Invalid comment specified in path.")
@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ async def get_comment(request: Request, comment_id: str):
@router.post("/comments/{comment_id}")
async def edit_comment(request: Request, comment_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
comment = comment_by_id(comment_id)
@ -97,7 +96,7 @@ async def edit_comment(request: Request, comment_id: str):
@router.delete("/comments/{comment_id}")
async def delete_comment(request: Request, comment_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
comment = comment_by_id(comment_id)
@ -112,7 +111,7 @@ async def delete_comment(request: Request, comment_id: str):
@router.post("/comments/{comment_id}/vote")
async def vote_comment(request: Request, comment_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
comment = comment_by_id(comment_id)

View File

@ -5,9 +5,8 @@ import logging
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from devplacepy.services.devrant.params import merge_params
from devplacepy.services.devrant.tokens import resolve_user
from devplacepy.services.devrant.notifications import build_notif_feed, clear_notifications
from devplacepy.routers.devrant._shared import dr_ok, unauthorized
from devplacepy.routers.devrant._shared import dr_ok, resolve_actor, unauthorized
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ router = APIRouter()
@router.get("/users/me/notif-feed")
async def notif_feed(request: Request):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
return dr_ok(data=build_notif_feed(user))
@ -26,7 +25,7 @@ async def notif_feed(request: Request):
@router.delete("/users/me/notif-feed")
async def clear_notif_feed(request: Request):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
clear_notifications(user)

View File

@ -21,11 +21,10 @@ from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.correction import schedule_correction
from devplacepy.services.ai_modifier import schedule_modification
from devplacepy.services.devrant.params import merge_params
from devplacepy.services.devrant.tokens import resolve_user
from devplacepy.services.devrant.ids import as_int, post_by_id
from devplacepy.services.devrant.feed import list_rants, search_rants, load_rant_detail
from devplacepy.services.devrant.serializers import encode_tags
from devplacepy.routers.devrant._shared import dr_ok, dr_error, unauthorized
from devplacepy.routers.devrant._shared import dr_ok, dr_error, resolve_actor, unauthorized
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ def _parse_tags(raw: object) -> list:
@router.get("/devrant/rants")
async def rant_feed(request: Request):
params = await merge_params(request)
viewer = resolve_user(params)
viewer = resolve_actor(request, params)
sort = params.get("sort") or "recent"
limit = min(MAX_LIMIT, max(1, as_int(params.get("limit"), DEFAULT_LIMIT)))
skip = max(0, as_int(params.get("skip"), 0))
@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ async def rant_feed(request: Request):
@router.get("/devrant/search")
async def search(request: Request):
params = await merge_params(request)
viewer = resolve_user(params)
viewer = resolve_actor(request, params)
term = (params.get("term") or "").strip()
return dr_ok(results=search_rants(term, viewer) if term else [])
@ -78,7 +77,7 @@ async def search(request: Request):
@router.post("/devrant/rants")
async def create_rant(request: Request):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
text = (params.get("rant") or "").strip()
@ -87,6 +86,7 @@ async def create_rant(request: Request):
if len(text) > 125000:
return dr_error("Your rant is too long.")
tags = _parse_tags(params.get("tags"))
project_uid = params.get("project_uid") or None
uid, slug = create_content_item(
"posts",
"post",
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ async def create_rant(request: Request):
"title": None,
"content": text,
"topic": "rant",
"project_uid": None,
"project_uid": project_uid,
"image": None,
"tags": encode_tags(tags),
},
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ async def create_rant(request: Request):
@router.get("/devrant/rants/{rant_id}")
async def get_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
viewer = resolve_user(params)
viewer = resolve_actor(request, params)
post = post_by_id(rant_id)
if not post:
return dr_error("This rant does not exist.")
@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ async def get_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
@router.post("/devrant/rants/{rant_id}")
async def edit_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
post = post_by_id(rant_id)
@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ async def edit_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
@router.delete("/devrant/rants/{rant_id}")
async def delete_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
post = post_by_id(rant_id)
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ async def delete_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
@router.post("/devrant/rants/{rant_id}/vote")
async def vote_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
post = post_by_id(rant_id)
@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ async def unfavorite_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
async def _set_favorite(request: Request, rant_id: str, saved: bool):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
post = post_by_id(rant_id)
@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ async def _set_favorite(request: Request, rant_id: str, saved: bool):
@router.post("/devrant/rants/{rant_id}/comments")
async def comment_rant(request: Request, rant_id: str):
params = await merge_params(request)
user = resolve_user(params)
user = resolve_actor(request, params)
if not user:
return unauthorized()
post = post_by_id(rant_id)

View File

@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ This file documents the documentation site (`/docs`) - prose pages, API referenc
## Audience tiers and navigation
The **Legal** section (`SECTION_LEGAL`, in the `AUDIENCE_START` tier so it is one click from `/docs`) carries the platform's policies: `terms`, `community-guidelines`, `privacy`, `content-moderation`, `intellectual-property`, `contact`, plus the admin-gated `moderation-operations`. They are ordinary prose pages, which is exactly why they were built here rather than as new routes - role gating, SEO, the search index and the docs export all come for free. The six public ones are listed in `seo.LEGAL_DOC_SLUGS` and appear in the sitemap; `_footer_links.html` links four of them from every page. Their prose reads live values through the `policy_version`, `moderation_sla_hours`, `moderation_minimum_age`, `ai_provider_name` and `contact_details` Jinja globals, so a settings change is reflected without a content edit.
`DOCS_PAGES` entries take optional `admin: True` (hidden + 404 for non-admins, but still indexed and surfaced only to admins by `docs_search`) and `section: "..."` (a nested sidebar group rendered by `docs_base.html`). The sidebar groups `section`s under four ordered **audience tiers** (`AUDIENCES` in `routers/docs/pages.py`): `Start here` (General), `Build with the API` (API, Components, Styles), `Contribute and internals` (Architecture, Services, Devii internals, Bots internals, Testing, Claude Code), and `Operate` (Administration, Production). `nav_groups(visible_pages)` builds the `[(audience, [(section, [pages])])]` tree from the flat visible-page list (so a section's pages collect under one heading regardless of `DOCS_PAGES` order or the API/Administration interleave from `api_doc_pages()`); `views.py` passes it as `nav`, and `docs_base.html` renders an audience super-header (`.sidebar-tier`) above each section subheading (`.sidebar-subheading`). `DOCS_PAGES` stays the canonical list for search/export/routing - the tiering is sidebar-only.
The public `getting-started` page (`SECTION_GENERAL`) is the new-contributor on-ramp (install/run, the four-faces workflow, validation); gate its deep-internals links with `{% if is_admin(user) %}` so guests get no 404s. Keep one canonical home per concept: the `auth` API group intro in `docs_api.py` defers method detail to the `authentication` prose page rather than re-listing the four methods. The member-facing `devii` prose page is functional; admins also get a `Devii internals` section of `devii-*` technical subpages.

View File

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from devplacepy.docs_api import api_doc_pages
SECTION_GENERAL = "General"
SECTION_TOOLS = "Tools"
SECTION_LEGAL = "Legal"
SECTION_COMPONENTS = "Components"
SECTION_STYLES = "Styles"
SECTION_API = "API"
@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ AUDIENCE_CONTRIBUTE = "Contribute and internals"
AUDIENCE_OPERATE = "Operate"
AUDIENCES = [
(AUDIENCE_START, [SECTION_GENERAL, SECTION_TOOLS]),
(AUDIENCE_START, [SECTION_GENERAL, SECTION_LEGAL, SECTION_TOOLS]),
(
AUDIENCE_BUILD,
[SECTION_API, SECTION_DEVRANT, SECTION_COMPONENTS, SECTION_STYLES],
@ -57,6 +58,12 @@ DOCS_PAGES = [
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_GENERAL,
},
{
"slug": "workspace-editor",
"title": "The workspace editor",
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_GENERAL,
},
{
"slug": "feed",
"title": "The feed",
@ -147,6 +154,50 @@ DOCS_PAGES = [
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_GENERAL,
},
# Legal - the policies the platform is operated under (everyone)
{
"slug": "terms",
"title": "Terms of Service",
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_LEGAL,
},
{
"slug": "community-guidelines",
"title": "Community Guidelines",
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_LEGAL,
},
{
"slug": "privacy",
"title": "Privacy Policy",
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_LEGAL,
},
{
"slug": "content-moderation",
"title": "How moderation works",
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_LEGAL,
},
{
"slug": "intellectual-property",
"title": "Notice and takedown",
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_LEGAL,
},
{
"slug": "contact",
"title": "Contact",
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_LEGAL,
},
{
"slug": "moderation-operations",
"title": "Operating the moderation queue",
"kind": "prose",
"section": SECTION_LEGAL,
"admin": True,
},
# Tools - public developer tools (everyone)
{
"slug": "tools-seo",

View File

@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ async def docs_page(request: Request, slug: str):
request,
title=f"{page['title']} - Documentation",
description="DevPlace developer documentation.",
robots="noindex,nofollow" if page.get("admin") else "index,follow",
breadcrumbs=[
{"name": "Home", "url": "/feed"},
{"name": "Docs", "url": "/docs/index.html"},

View File

@ -317,6 +317,13 @@ def _resolve_ws_user(websocket: WebSocket):
return _user_from_api_key(key)
return None
def _ws_may_write(user: dict) -> bool:
from devplacepy.database import suspension_active
from devplacepy.routers.auth.terms import needs_acceptance
return not suspension_active(user) and not needs_acceptance(user)
@router.websocket("/ws")
async def messages_ws(websocket: WebSocket):
await websocket.accept()
@ -324,6 +331,9 @@ async def messages_ws(websocket: WebSocket):
if not user:
await websocket.close(code=1008)
return
if not _ws_may_write(user):
await websocket.close(code=1008)
return
user_uid = user["uid"]
message_hub.register(user_uid, websocket)

View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from devplacepy.database import (
get_maturity,
get_table,
db,
load_comments,
@ -156,6 +157,7 @@ async def news_detail_page(request: Request, news_slug: str):
"time_ago": time_ago(article["synced_at"]),
"comments": comments,
"bookmarked": bookmarked,
"maturity": get_maturity("news", article["uid"])["level"],
},
model=NewsDetailOut,
)

View File

@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ from devplacepy.routers.profile import (
ai_modifier,
avatar,
award,
consent,
customization,
delete,
interactions,
notifications,
telegram,
@ -21,5 +23,7 @@ router.include_router(ai_modifier.router)
router.include_router(interactions.router)
router.include_router(avatar.router)
router.include_router(telegram.router)
router.include_router(consent.router)
router.include_router(delete.router)
__all__ = ["router", "_ai_quota"]

View File

@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import logging
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request
from devplacepy.database import (
CONSENT_KINDS,
consent_state,
get_setting,
get_table,
list_consents,
set_consent,
)
from devplacepy.dependencies import json_or_form
from devplacepy.models import ConsentForm, MaturePreferenceForm
from devplacepy.responses import action_result
from devplacepy.routers.profile.delete import _owner_only
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.utils import clear_user_cache
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
TRUTHY = ("1", "on", "true", "yes")
VERSION_KEYS = {"terms": "terms_version", "privacy": "privacy_version"}
def consent_view(owner_kind: str, owner_id: str) -> list[dict]:
latest = {}
for row in list_consents(owner_kind, owner_id):
latest.setdefault(row["kind"], row)
return [
{
"kind": kind,
"label": label,
"state": (latest.get(kind) or {}).get("state", "withdrawn"),
"version": (latest.get(kind) or {}).get("version", ""),
"granted_at": (latest.get(kind) or {}).get("granted_at", ""),
"withdrawn_at": (latest.get(kind) or {}).get("withdrawn_at", ""),
}
for kind, label in CONSENT_KINDS.items()
]
def consent_version(kind: str) -> str:
key = VERSION_KEYS.get(kind)
return (get_setting(key, "1") or "1") if key else "1"
@router.post("/{username}/consent")
async def set_user_consent(
request: Request,
username: str,
data: Annotated[ConsentForm, Depends(json_or_form(ConsentForm))],
):
target, denied = _owner_only(
request, username, "Only the account holder can change a consent"
)
if denied is not None:
return denied
granted = data.granted.strip().lower() in TRUTHY
before = consent_state("user", target["uid"], data.kind)
set_consent(
"user", target["uid"], data.kind, granted, version=consent_version(data.kind)
)
logger.info(
f"Consent {data.kind} {'granted' if granted else 'withdrawn'} for {target['username']}"
)
audit.record(
request,
"consent.grant" if granted else "consent.withdraw",
target_type="user",
target_uid=target["uid"],
target_label=target["username"],
old_value=(before or {}).get("state"),
new_value="granted" if granted else "withdrawn",
metadata={"kind": data.kind},
summary=(
f"{'granted' if granted else 'withdrew'} {data.kind} consent "
f"for {target['username']}"
),
links=[audit.target("user", target["uid"], target["username"])],
)
url = f"/profile/{target['username']}?tab=privacy"
return action_result(
request,
url,
data={"kind": data.kind, "state": "granted" if granted else "withdrawn"},
)
@router.post("/{username}/mature-content")
async def set_mature_preference(
request: Request,
username: str,
data: Annotated[MaturePreferenceForm, Depends(json_or_form(MaturePreferenceForm))],
):
target, denied = _owner_only(
request,
username,
"Only the account holder can change the mature-content preference",
)
if denied is not None:
return denied
opted_in = data.mature_opt_in.strip().lower() in TRUTHY
get_table("users").update(
{"uid": target["uid"], "mature_opt_in": 1 if opted_in else 0}, ["uid"]
)
clear_user_cache(target["uid"])
audit.record(
request,
"profile.mature_content",
target_type="user",
target_uid=target["uid"],
target_label=target["username"],
new_value=1 if opted_in else 0,
summary=(
f"{'enabled' if opted_in else 'disabled'} mature content "
f"for {target['username']}"
),
links=[audit.target("user", target["uid"], target["username"])],
)
url = f"/profile/{target['username']}?tab=privacy"
return action_result(request, url, data={"mature_opt_in": opted_in})

View File

@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import logging
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from devplacepy.dependencies import json_or_form
from devplacepy.models import AccountDeleteForm
from devplacepy.responses import action_result, json_error, respond
from devplacepy.routers.profile._shared import resolve_customization_target
from devplacepy.schemas import AccountDeletionOut
from devplacepy.seo import base_seo_context
from devplacepy.services.audit import record as audit
from devplacepy.services.moderation import deletion
from devplacepy.utils import get_current_user, verify_password_async
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter()
REMOVED = [
"Your account record, username, email address and password",
"Your profile: bio, location, links and avatar",
"Your posts, comments, gists, projects, project files and quizzes",
"Your uploads and media gallery",
"Your direct-message history, votes, reactions, bookmarks and polls",
"Your API key, access tokens and every signed-in session",
"Your assistant conversations, tasks, lessons and custom tools",
]
RETAINED = [
"Append-only audit and moderation records, which hold identifiers rather than "
"your profile, so the platform can show it enforced its own rules",
"Backup archives, until they rotate out on their normal schedule",
]
def _owner_only(
request: Request,
username: str,
message: str = "Only the account holder can delete this account",
):
target, denied = resolve_customization_target(request, username)
if denied is not None:
return None, denied
viewer = get_current_user(request)
if not viewer or viewer["uid"] != target["uid"]:
audit.record(
request,
"security.authz.denied",
user=viewer,
result="denied",
target_type="user",
target_uid=target["uid"],
target_label=target["username"],
metadata={"reason": message},
summary=f"non-owner denied {request.method} {request.url.path}",
links=[audit.target("user", target["uid"], target["username"])],
)
return None, json_error(403, message)
return target, None
async def _password_matches(password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
if not hashed:
return False
try:
return await verify_password_async(password, hashed)
except ValueError:
return False
@router.get("/{username}/delete", response_class=HTMLResponse)
async def delete_account_page(request: Request, username: str):
target, denied = _owner_only(request, username)
if denied is not None:
return denied
seo_ctx = base_seo_context(
request,
title="Delete your account",
description="Permanently remove your DevPlace account and personal data.",
robots="noindex,nofollow",
breadcrumbs=[
{"name": "Home", "url": "/feed"},
{"name": target["username"], "url": f"/profile/{target['username']}"},
{
"name": "Delete account",
"url": f"/profile/{target['username']}/delete",
},
],
)
return respond(
request,
"account_delete.html",
{
**seo_ctx,
"request": request,
"user": target,
"username": target["username"],
"grace_hours": deletion.grace_hours(),
"removed": REMOVED,
"retained": RETAINED,
},
model=AccountDeletionOut,
)
@router.post("/{username}/delete")
async def delete_account(
request: Request,
username: str,
data: Annotated[AccountDeleteForm, Depends(json_or_form(AccountDeleteForm))],
):
target, denied = _owner_only(request, username)
if denied is not None:
return denied
if not await _password_matches(data.password, target.get("password_hash", "")):
audit.record(
request,
"account.delete.request",
result="denied",
target_type="user",
target_uid=target["uid"],
target_label=target["username"],
summary=f"account deletion for {target['username']} refused: wrong password",
links=[audit.target("user", target["uid"], target["username"])],
)
return json_error(403, "That password is not correct")
result = deletion.delete_account(target)
if result is None:
return json_error(409, "This account is already being deleted")
logger.info(f"Account {target['username']} deleted by request")
audit.record(
request,
"account.delete.request",
target_type="user",
target_uid=target["uid"],
target_label=target["username"],
metadata={
"stamp": result["stamp"],
"rows": result["rows"],
"grace_hours": result["grace_hours"],
},
summary=f"account {target['username']} deleted",
links=[audit.target("user", target["uid"], target["username"])],
)
response = action_result(request, "/", data=result)
response.delete_cookie("session")
return response

View File

@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ from fastapi import Depends, APIRouter, Request
from devplacepy.models import ProfileForm
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, JSONResponse
from devplacepy.database import (
get_setting,
get_table,
db,
get_customization_prefs,
get_notification_prefs,
get_user_stars,
@ -35,8 +35,16 @@ from devplacepy.database.awards import (
get_user_awards,
)
from devplacepy.content import can_view_project, enrich_items
from devplacepy.routers.profile.consent import consent_view
from devplacepy.services.moderation.deletion import grace_hours
from devplacepy.services.moderation.screening import (
record as record_screening,
refuse_if_blocked,
screen_fields,
)
from devplacepy.utils import (
get_current_user,
get_badge,
require_user,
require_user_api,
time_ago,
@ -46,6 +54,7 @@ from devplacepy.utils import (
track_action,
build_achievements,
)
from devplacepy.utils.rewards import LEVEL_XP
from devplacepy.responses import respond, action_result, wants_json
from devplacepy.schemas import ProfileOut
from devplacepy.avatar import avatar_url, avatar_seed
@ -139,6 +148,12 @@ async def profile_page(
current_user["uid"], f"/profile/{profile_user['username']}"
)
profile_user["stars"] = get_user_stars(profile_user["uid"])
xp_raw = profile_user.get("xp") or 0
level_raw = profile_user.get("level") or 1
xp_progress_pct = xp_raw % LEVEL_XP
xp_next_level = level_raw * LEVEL_XP
profile_user["xp_progress_pct"] = xp_progress_pct
profile_user["xp_next_level"] = xp_next_level
rank = get_user_rank(profile_user["uid"])
follow_counts = get_follow_counts(profile_user["uid"])
@ -195,6 +210,10 @@ async def profile_page(
item["poll"] = polls_map.get(uid)
badges = list(get_table("badges").find(user_uid=profile_user["uid"]))
for b in badges:
badge_meta = get_badge(b["badge_name"])
b["icon"] = badge_meta.get("icon")
b["description"] = badge_meta.get("description")
achievements = build_achievements({b["badge_name"] for b in badges})
badge_total = sum(group["total"] for group in achievements)
badge_earned = sum(group["earned"] for group in achievements)
@ -352,6 +371,30 @@ async def profile_page(
if (tab == "notifications" and can_manage_customization)
else False
)
consents = (
consent_view("user", profile_user["uid"])
if (tab == "privacy" and can_manage_customization)
else []
)
privacy_fields = (
{
"mature_opt_in": bool(profile_user.get("mature_opt_in")),
"age_band": profile_user.get("age_band", ""),
"terms_version": profile_user.get("terms_version", ""),
"terms_accepted_at": profile_user.get("terms_accepted_at", ""),
"suspended_until": profile_user.get("suspended_until", ""),
"suspension_reason": profile_user.get("suspension_reason", ""),
}
if can_manage_customization
else {
"mature_opt_in": False,
"age_band": "",
"terms_version": "",
"terms_accepted_at": "",
"suspended_until": "",
"suspension_reason": "",
}
)
base = site_url(request)
robots = "noindex,follow" if posts_count < 2 else "index,follow"
@ -423,6 +466,10 @@ async def profile_page(
"cust_disable_global": customization_prefs["disable_global"],
"cust_disable_pagetype": customization_prefs["disable_pagetype"],
"notification_prefs": notification_prefs,
"consents": consents,
**privacy_fields,
"current_terms_version": get_setting("terms_version", "1") or "1",
"deletion_grace_hours": grace_hours(),
"ai_quota": ai_quota,
"correction_usage": correction_usage,
"modifier_usage": modifier_usage,
@ -440,6 +487,8 @@ async def profile_page(
"awards_count": awards_count,
"prominent_award": prominent_award,
"can_give_award": can_give,
"xp_next_level": xp_next_level,
"xp_progress_pct": xp_progress_pct,
},
model=ProfileOut,
)
@ -448,6 +497,10 @@ async def profile_page(
async def update_profile(request: Request, data: Annotated[ProfileForm, Depends(json_or_form(ProfileForm))]):
user = require_user(request)
users = get_table("users")
screening = screen_fields(
"users", {"bio": data.bio, "location": data.location}
)
refuse_if_blocked(screening)
users.update(
{
"uid": user["uid"],
@ -459,6 +512,13 @@ async def update_profile(request: Request, data: Annotated[ProfileForm, Depends(
["uid"],
)
clear_user_cache(user["uid"])
record_screening(
screening,
target_type="user",
target_uid=user["uid"],
actor_uid=user["uid"],
request=request,
)
schedule_correction(user, "users", user["uid"], request)
schedule_modification(user, "users", user["uid"], request)
@ -499,3 +559,7 @@ async def regenerate_api_key(request: Request):
links=[audit.target("user", user["uid"], user["username"])],
)
return JSONResponse({"api_key": new_key})

View File

@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ This file documents the project detail page, the per-project virtual filesystem,
Each project card links to `/projects/{project_uid}` showing full project details, author info, platforms, star count, delete-for-owner, and (for the owner) Private/Read-only toggle buttons plus badges (see **Project visibility and read-only** below). The route is `GET /projects/{project_uid}` in `routers/projects/index.py` and 404s when the viewer cannot see a private project. The sitemap generator links to this URL (not the old `?user_uid=` query param). The detail page also links to the project filesystem at `/projects/{slug}/files`.
**Action row overflow.** The detail page has more actions than fit one line, so `project_detail.html` keeps the engagement actions inline (Files, Share, star vote, bookmark, reactions) and collapses the rest behind a single **More** button (`.project-actions-more`) that opens the shared `app.contextMenu`. The secondary actions (Containers, Download zip, Fork, the owner Edit/Private/Read-only/Delete controls) live as real elements inside a hidden `.project-actions-overflow` container, each tagged `data-menu-action` plus `data-menu-icon`/`data-menu-label`. `static/js/ProjectActionsMenu.js` builds the menu from those elements and each item's `onSelect` simply `.click()`s the real element, so all existing wiring is reused unchanged - `app.zipDownloader` (`data-zip-download`), `app.projectForker` (`data-fork-project`), `data-share`, the `data-modal` Edit trigger, and the delegated `data-confirm`/`data-confirm-danger` dialog on the owner forms. The open handler must `stopPropagation()` because `app.contextMenu`'s document-level close listener would otherwise dismiss it on the same click (every other caller opens it from a right-click `attach`, not a left-click). Reuse this pattern - a `More` trigger over `[data-menu-action]` real elements - for any future action row that overflows; do not duplicate controller logic into menu callbacks.
**Project overview page.** The detail page is a dedicated project showcase: one encompassing dark card (`.project-shell`, the site `--bg-card` surface with clipped corners) wraps the hero, the section tab bar and the two-column body, and every inner panel (tab bar, sidebar cards, devlog post cards, empty state, comments section) sits one elevation lighter on `--bg-secondary`. The hero's cover banner is the attachment referenced by `projects.cover_attachment_uid`, falling back to the first image attachment (brand-gradient band when neither exists); the title block, type/platform chips and author row render OVERLAID on the banner behind a bottom scrim (dark text-shadow for readability) beside the optional `projects.logo_attachment_uid` tile, with an owner-set **Visit Website** CTA (`projects.website_url`). Cover and logo ride the ONE existing upload pipeline: `dp-upload` widgets (`name="cover_attachment_uid"`/`"logo_attachment_uid"`, `max-files="1"`) in the create/edit modals upload to `/uploads/upload`, the route validates each uid via `database.get_user_attachment` (must exist, belong to the actor, be an image - `_hero_attachment_uid`) and links it to the project through `attachments.link_attachments`; an empty value on edit keeps the current image (no removal control). `website_url`/`repo_url` are normalized by `models.normalize_website_url` (scheme-less input gets `https://`, non-http(s) rejected) and render with `rel="noopener nofollow"`. Below the hero an anchor **section tab bar** (`.project-tabs`, underline style, Overview `.active`) links `#about` / `#devlog` / `#screenshots` (only when gallery images exist) / `#comments` / the Files page - server-rendered anchors, no JS tab state. The main column holds **About** (description + non-image attachments), the **Devlog** (every post whose `project_uid` points at the project via `_post_card.html` - the template loads `feed.css` for the card styles alongside `post.css`, the same rule as `news.html`) with `devlog_count` (`content.count_project_devlog`) and an owner **Post update** button (`.project-devlog-post-btn`) opening the shared composer preset to `topic=devlog` + this project (the form lives ONCE in `templates/_post_composer_form.html`, locals `_composer_topic`/`_composer_project`, included by `feed.html` and `project_detail.html` - never fork a second copy), a **Screenshots** gallery (image attachments minus the cover/logo, thumbnails, `data-lightbox`, capped at 12 rendered), and the comment thread; the sidebar holds Links (website/repository/files/fork source), the Stats card (5 `.project-stat` entries + a last-update line) and the Author card. Owners add gallery images via the More-menu **Add screenshots** modal: `_attachment_form.html` uploads, then `POST /projects/{slug}/screenshots` (`ProjectScreenshotsForm`, owner-only, audit `project.screenshots.add`) links the uids through the same `link_attachments` choke point; Devii action `project_add_screenshots`, docs id `projects-screenshots`. `comment_count`/`devlog_count` ride `ProjectDetailOut`; the new project fields ride `ProjectOut`; the page og:image prefers the cover attachment. **Locator discipline:** the page has several `Files` anchors (action row, tab bar, sidebar) and, for owners, a second hidden `textarea[name='content']`/Post button inside the composer modal - tests MUST scope (`.project-detail-actions a:has-text('Files')`, `.comment-form textarea[name='content']`).
**Action row overflow.** The detail page has more actions than fit one line, so `project_detail.html` keeps the engagement actions inline (Files, Share, star vote, bookmark, reactions) and collapses the rest behind a single **More** button (`.project-actions-more`) that opens the shared `app.contextMenu`. The secondary actions (Workspace, Containers, Download zip, Fork, the owner Edit/Private/Read-only/Delete controls) live as real elements inside a hidden `.project-actions-overflow` container, each tagged `data-menu-action` plus `data-menu-icon`/`data-menu-label`. `static/js/ProjectActionsMenu.js` builds the menu from those elements and each item's `onSelect` simply `.click()`s the real element, so all existing wiring is reused unchanged - `app.zipDownloader` (`data-zip-download`), `app.projectForker` (`data-fork-project`), `data-share`, the `data-modal` Edit trigger, and the delegated `data-confirm`/`data-confirm-danger` dialog on the owner forms. The open handler must `stopPropagation()` because `app.contextMenu`'s document-level close listener would otherwise dismiss it on the same click (every other caller opens it from a right-click `attach`, not a left-click). Reuse this pattern - a `More` trigger over `[data-menu-action]` real elements - for any future action row that overflows; do not duplicate controller logic into menu callbacks.
**Owner editing.** Mirrors post editing exactly: an owner-only **Edit** menu item (`data-modal="edit-project-modal"`) opens the `modal()` macro's `edit-project-modal`, a plain `POST` form to `/projects/edit/{slug}` (route `edit_project` in `routers/projects/index.py`, body `ProjectEditForm`, owner-gated through the shared `content.edit_content_item` which returns 403 JSON / redirect for non-owners and stamps `updated_at`). The modal is the create modal pre-filled from the `project` row (title, description, type/status radios pre-checked, dates via `format_date()` back to DD/MM/YYYY). `is_private`/`read_only` are NOT edited here - they stay on their dedicated toggles. The platforms tag widget reuses the create modal's `platforms-input`/`platforms`/`platforms-tags` ids; `ProfileEditor.initPlatformTags` now **seeds existing tags** from the hidden `#platforms` value on load, so both the empty create form and the pre-filled edit form work from the same code. Devii tool `edit_project`; documented in `docs_api.py` (`projects-edit`).

View File

@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
from fastapi import APIRouter
from devplacepy.routers.projects.containers import instances, schedules
from devplacepy.routers.projects.containers import instances, schedules, workspace
router = APIRouter()
router.include_router(instances.router)
router.include_router(schedules.router)
router.include_router(workspace.router)

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