Response to incident WA-2026-10-27 (the std::vector max_size() crash). Deep research archived under research/safe-cpp-practices (8 Tier 1, 37 Tier 2, 2 conclusions) on production-safe C++ that keeps development speed: OpenSSF compiler hardening, the C++ Core Guidelines bounds profile, integer-overflow practice, libFuzzer/sanitizer CI, the sanitizer overhead ladder, clang-tidy ratchets. The research prescribed an ASan+UBSan+_GLIBCXX_ASSERTIONS build of the parsers. Standing it up immediately caught a second, independent undefined-behavior bug that two manual reviews had missed: a protobuf varint loop that shifted by up to 70 bits (shift >= 64 is UB) on malformed input. Fixed and guarded by a deterministic test and the sanitizer net. - src/whatsapp/wa_proto.cpp: guard the wire-0 varint shift (the UB). - tests/whatsapp_test.cpp: add an overlong-varint hostile case. - tools/san-whatsapp.sh: the standing sanitizer net for detz::wa parsers. - WaClient frame capture: a frame that fails to decode/dispatch has its exact bytes recorded to <home>/whatsapp/last-error.log (bounded), so the still unreproduced live <iq> failure becomes a one-paste deterministic fix. Wired from the wizard and the whatsapp_send tool. - docs/cpp-safety.md: the project-wide playbook and design decisions (four layers: overflow-safe checked-reader parsing, cheap release hardening, the sanitizer test net, capture). docs/whatsapp.md section 13.6 records the follow-up and the honest open item. AGENTS.md makes it a standing rule; cap.md and mcp.md inherit it for their wire parsers. Verified: build, whatsapp_test (incl. hostile+fuzz), make lint, and tools/san-whatsapp.sh all green; research audit PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.0 KiB
2.0 KiB
Integer overflow and allocation-size checks in C/C++
Metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Institute | Molodetz Institute — Research & Retrieval Division |
| Subject | safe-cpp-practices |
| Document type | Source Dossier |
| Tier | 1 |
| Source title | Integer overflow and allocation-size checks in C/C++ |
| Source URL | https://offlinemark.com/int-overflow/ |
| Source publisher / author | offlinemark; Offensive360; Orbis AppSec |
| Source type | blog post |
| Source date (published) | Unknown — not stated |
| Date researched | 2026-10-27 |
| Researched by | tai (agent), model: Claude Opus 4.8, on behalf of retoor |
| Research method | web search synthesis |
| Confidence | High |
| Status | Active |
Summary
The canonical guidance for size arithmetic on untrusted input: check before the operation, never after, and never let a parsed count drive allocation or pointer math before its range and an application limit are both checked.
Key findings
- Addition overflow guard for size_t: test
a > SIZE_MAX - bbefore computinga + b(exactly thelen > size - posform detz now uses). - Multiplication guard:
b != 0 && a > SIZE_MAX / b. - Checking a signed result after the fact is too late: the overflow was already undefined behavior.
- A negative value converted to an unsigned size becomes huge; validate parsed numbers before the conversion.
- Keep the validated count next to the allocation so the allocation and the loop cannot use different counts.
Pros / strengths
Precise, copy-pasteable guards; names the signed->unsigned trap that caused the crash.
Cons / limitations / caveats
Blog-level sourcing, not a standard; no single authoritative citation.
Relevance to tai
This is the root-cause cure. detz replaced every pos + len > size with len > size - pos, reads lengths unsigned, and range-checks before slicing or allocating.
Changelog
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-27 | Initial dossier created (web search synthesis). |