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retoor 251c3dc2ba research: mcp-client-support subject (106 sources, 3 conclusions)

- wire spec: lifecycle, stdio + Streamable HTTP transports, tools,
  utilities, legacy SSE, versioning, changelog (14 Tier 1)
- client ecosystem: Claude Code/VS Code/Cursor/Codex configs,
  mcp-remote, Smithery, registries, Glama (12 Tier 1)
- security/ops: authorization draft, trust model, poisoning,
  rug pulls, production hardening (12 Tier 1) + 68 Tier 2 cards
- conclusions: minimal stdlib client on 2025-11-25, normalizer +
  resolver agent for pasted configs/GitHub URLs, untrusted-until-
  consent trust model; nothing built yet
- audit PASS (14 subjects, 797 sources, 32 conclusions)

2026-10-18 19:23:02 +02:00

3.5 KiB

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Elicitation (client feature, 2025-11-25)

Metadata

Field	Value
Institute	Molodetz Institute - Research & Retrieval Division
Subject	mcp-client-support
Document type	Source Dossier
Tier	1
Source title	Elicitation (MCP Specification v2025-11-25)
Source URL	https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/client/elicitation
Source publisher / author	Model Context Protocol authors (Anthropic-donated open project; site docs)
Source type	standard
Source date (published)	2025-11-25 (version stamp; no other publish date stated)
Date researched	2026-10-18
Researched by	tai (agent), model: Claude Sonnet 5, on behalf of retoor
Research method	gather-subagent direct page fetch, parent synthesis from evidence pack
Confidence	High (partial read: 30KB page, head section only, see Cons)
Status	Active

Summary

Elicitation has two modes: form mode for servers requesting structured data, and URL mode for directing users to external URLs for sensitive interactions that must not pass through the client. Clients declare the elicitation capability with form/url sub-capabilities ({} alone means form only; at least one mode is required), and servers must not send requests in unsupported modes. Every elicitation/create must include a human-readable message, mode defaults to form, and form mode must never request sensitive credentials.

Key findings

Two modes: "Form mode: Servers can request structured data… URL mode: Servers can direct users to external URLs for sensitive interactions that must not pass through the MCP client."
"Clients that support elicitation MUST declare the elicitation capability" ({"form":{},"url":{}}); {} alone "is equivalent to declaring support for form mode only"; clients "MUST support at least one mode."
"Servers MUST NOT send elicitation requests with modes that are not supported by the client."
Every elicitation/create "MUST include… message" (human-readable reason); mode defaults to "form" if omitted.
"Servers MUST NOT use form mode elicitation to request sensitive information such as passwords, API keys, access tokens, or payment credentials."

Pros / strengths

The form/URL split is a sound security design: sensitive interactions are routed to external URLs that bypass the client entirely, instead of flowing credentials through it.
Capability granularity (form/url sub-capabilities with a form-only default for {}) lets clients offer exactly the modes they can render.
Mandatory human-readable message plus the ban on credential solicitation in form mode give users context and a bright-line server rule.

Cons / limitations / caveats

The pack marks this page partially read (30KB page, head section only); the full elicitation response schema and deeper subsections were not read, so findings cover the retrieved sections only.
No explicit author names or publish dates appear on the page; the date above is the version stamp in the URL.
Needs a user interface (form rendering or URL handoff), which a headless minimal client has no use for; omission is the correct default.

Relevance to tai

Optional user-interaction feature; a minimal client omits it (the formal form/url sub-capabilities matter only if elicitation is offered at all). Relevant to tai only if a future interactive client wants structured user input mid-tool-call.

Changelog

Date	Change
2026-10-18	Initial dossier created.

3.5 KiB Raw Blame History