- wire spec: lifecycle, stdio + Streamable HTTP transports, tools, utilities, legacy SSE, versioning, changelog (14 Tier 1) - client ecosystem: Claude Code/VS Code/Cursor/Codex configs, mcp-remote, Smithery, registries, Glama (12 Tier 1) - security/ops: authorization draft, trust model, poisoning, rug pulls, production hardening (12 Tier 1) + 68 Tier 2 cards - conclusions: minimal stdlib client on 2025-11-25, normalizer + resolver agent for pasted configs/GitHub URLs, untrusted-until- consent trust model; nothing built yet - audit PASS (14 subjects, 797 sources, 32 conclusions)
1.0 KiB
1.0 KiB
How we moved prompt injection protections into the MCP server
Metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Institute | Molodetz Institute - Research & Retrieval Division |
| Subject | mcp-client-support |
| Document type | Source Citation Card |
| Tier | 2 |
| Source title | How we moved prompt injection protections into the MCP server |
| Source URL | https://www.infobip.com/developers/blog/how-we-moved-prompt-injection-protections-from-the-agent-into-the-mcp-server |
| Source type | blog post |
| Date researched | 2026-10-18 |
| Researched by | tai (agent), model: Claude Sonnet 5, on behalf of retoor |
| Research method | Search aggregator result listing (not independently opened or quoted) |
| Confidence | Not independently verified |
| Status | Active |
Why it's here
Item 27 of the pack's 35 unopened listings. A vendor account of moving prompt-injection protections into the MCP server: relevant as the server-side complement to client defenses.
Changelog
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-18 | Logged as consulted-but-not-analyzed. |