Files
moloapp/audit/CVE-2023-28642
retoor 0595284fe3 feat(doos): add container runtime, audit cases, example demo and tests
- New rootless doos container runtime: sandbox, cgroup, network, images, hardening, davmount, CLI plus molo integration
- 18 CVE audit reproductions with READMEs and Makefiles
- Example DoosDemo routes, IndexCatalog, static assets, spec update
- CLI serve on 0.0.0.0:8000, arg parser, dev server improvements
- Runtime HTTP fixes, supervisor isolation backend
- Tests for doos, example doos routes, CLI serve; suite count 261 to 265
2026-11-06 04:36:00 +01:00
..

CVE-2023-28642: runc AppArmor/SELinux confinement bypass via a symlinked or non-directory /proc inside the container

Scope: audit · README · COMPARISON · docs/RESEARCH

Fixed in runc 1.1.5 (USN-6088-1), same release as CVE-2023-27561.

Source

Relevance to doos

runc let /proc inside the container be a symlink, or let something be mounted over a non-directory in its place, which bypassed its AppArmor and (on the right distro) SELinux restrictions tied to the real /proc. doos has no comparable confinement layered on top of /proc to bypass (same caveat as CVE-2019-16884: no per-container AppArmor profile), but the underlying property, that /proc is a genuine, fresh directory mount and not a symlink an image could have planted, is exactly the same /proc doos sets up in src/doos/sandbox.cpp and worth checking directly rather than only by analogy.

What the check does

From inside a container, confirms /proc is a directory and not a symlink ([ -L /proc ] must be false), on top of the mount-type check CVE-2019-16884 already runs.

Caveats

Checks the filesystem property the runc bug abused (a symlinked /proc), not the AppArmor/SELinux bypass itself, since doos's hardening model (seccomp + capability drop, not AppArmor confinement of the container's own filesystem) is a different mechanism; see COMPARISON.md section 6 for that design difference.

Run: make test in this directory, or make -C audit test from the repo root.