Files
moloapp/audit/CVE-2019-16884
retoor 0595284fe3 feat(doos): add container runtime, audit cases, example demo and tests
- New rootless doos container runtime: sandbox, cgroup, network, images, hardening, davmount, CLI plus molo integration
- 18 CVE audit reproductions with READMEs and Makefiles
- Example DoosDemo routes, IndexCatalog, static assets, spec update
- CLI serve on 0.0.0.0:8000, arg parser, dev server improvements
- Runtime HTTP fixes, supervisor isolation backend
- Tests for doos, example doos routes, CLI serve; suite count 261 to 265
2026-11-06 04:36:00 +01:00
..

CVE-2019-16884: runc AppArmor confinement weakened by incorrect mount-target validation for /proc

Scope: audit · README · COMPARISON · docs/RESEARCH

CVSS 6.5-7.5. Fixed in runc 1.0.0-rc9.

Source

Relevance to doos

runc's root filesystem setup validated a mount target incorrectly, letting a crafted image mount something over /proc in a way that weakened the AppArmor profile runc otherwise applies. doos has no AppArmor profile that constrains the container's own filesystem view the way docker-default does (COMPARISON.md section 6 already states this as a design difference, not a bug), so the specific confinement this CVE weakens does not exist in doos to begin with. What is still worth checking directly is the thing runc's bug actually let an attacker do: substitute a non-proc mount at the container's /proc.

What the check does

Attaches a container and checks, from inside, that /proc's filesystem type (via /proc/self/mountinfo on the real /proc doos mounted, read before the check's own command could remount it) is proc, matching doMount("proc", ..., "proc", ...) in src/doos/sandbox.cpp.

Caveats

Confirms doos's own /proc mount is what it claims to be at container start; it does not attempt the image-controlled mount-target substitution runc's bug needed, since doos has no AppArmor profile for that substitution to bypass in the first place.

Run: make test in this directory, or make -C audit test from the repo root.