MOLO-CLI-001: shell command injection in molo new <name>
Scope: audit · README · AGENTS
In-house finding (not a public CVE), CWE-78 ("Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command").
Where
src/cli/cli/cli_app.cpp, cmd_new:
opts.name = args.positionals[0];
...
std::string dir = opts.name;
ScaffoldResult result = scaffolder.scaffold(dir, opts);
src/cli/cli/scaffolder.cpp, Scaffolder::scaffold:
std::string cmd = "git -C \"" + dir + "\" init -q 2>/dev/null";
if (system(cmd.c_str()) != 0) { ... }
dir is the project name exactly as typed on the command line, checked only for
length (1-64 chars, kMaxProjectName). It is concatenated inside one pair of double
quotes and handed to system(), a real shell. A name containing a " ends that
quoted argument early; anything after it is ordinary shell syntax.
Relevance
molo new <name> is the first command in the README's own quickstart. Project names
are often copied from elsewhere (a ticket title, a client's brand name, a CI
variable) rather than hand-typed, which is exactly the kind of untrusted-but-looks-
like-a-filename input this bug class targets.
What the check does
Runs molo new 'x"; touch <marker>; echo "' --force in a scratch directory and checks
whether the injected touch created the marker file. PASS means it did not (the name
is now escaped or passed to git without a shell); FAIL means the command ran.
Caveats
This proves injection with a benign touch, not a demonstration of what an attacker
could do with it; system() runs as the invoking user with that user's full
permissions, so the practical impact is whatever that user could already do by hand.
Run: make test in this directory, or make -C audit test from the repo root.