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MOLO-H2-001: HTTP/2 Rapid Reset

Scope: audit · README · AGENTS

CVE-2023-44487 (CVSS varies by vendor, widely rated High; the class, not a specific MoloApp CVE). CISA/CERT advisory, disclosed October 2023.

Source

Relevance to MoloApp

A client opens a stream with HEADERS and immediately cancels it with RST_STREAM, over and over on one connection. Each cycle costs the server a handler dispatch but never counts against a concurrent-stream limit, because the stream is gone by the time the next one opens. This is the mechanism that drove the October 2023 multi-vendor HTTP/2 incident across nginx, Envoy, Go net/http2 and others.

src/runtime/http/v2/connection.cpp enforces kH2MaxConcurrentStreamsDefault (100, src/runtime/caps.h) by counting open streams, and OnRst (around line 535) erases the stream entry the moment an RST_STREAM arrives. There is no counter for how many streams a connection has opened-then-reset, and no backoff or GOAWAY triggered by a high reset rate, so the one cap this framework relies on for HTTP/2 concurrency never engages against this pattern.

What the check does

Starts build/bin/runtime_interop_server, opens one real h2c prior-knowledge connection, and sends 4000 HEADERS(END_HEADERS|END_STREAM)+RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) pairs for distinct odd stream IDs in one connection. PASS requires the server to push back (GOAWAY, or refuse to echo an RST_STREAM for all of them) while staying up; FAIL means every pair was accepted with no backpressure signal.

Caveats

This check measures whether a rate-limiting signal exists, not whether the process survives a sustained attack at scale; it stops at 4000 pairs (the harness's own flood() cap), far below what a real attacker would send, specifically so the check itself never becomes a denial-of-service tool.

Run: make test in this directory, or make -C audit test from the repo root.