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moloapp/audit/MOLO-H2-003

MOLO-H2-003: HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood

Scope: audit · README · AGENTS

CVE-2024-27316 (Apache httpd, fixed 2.4.59) and the same-family CVE-2024-27983 (Node.js), CVE-2024-27919 (Envoy), CVE-2024-2653 (amphp/http); the class ("HTTP/2 CONTINUATION Flood"), not a MoloApp-specific CVE. Disclosed by Bartek Nowotarski to CERT/CC, April 2024.

Source

Relevance to MoloApp

A HEADERS frame without END_HEADERS opens a header block that is only closed by a later CONTINUATION frame carrying END_HEADERS. The 2024 disclosure found that many implementations cap the total header bytes accumulated across that run of frames, but not the count of CONTINUATION frames or the time spent collecting them, so a client can send an effectively unbounded number of empty (or near-empty) CONTINUATION frames, each costing a 9-byte frame-header parse and a dispatch through the connection's frame loop, without ever tripping the byte-count guard.

src/runtime/http/v2/hpack.cpp/connection.cpp cap the accumulated header block at kH2HeaderListMax (64 KiB) by bytes, confirmed in the audit; nothing there counts CONTINUATION frames or bounds how long one stream's header block may stay open.

What the check does

Opens one h2c connection, sends a HEADERS frame without END_HEADERS on stream 1 (leaving the header block open), then floods up to 200,000 zero-length CONTINUATION frames on that stream. PASS requires the connection to be cut before all of them are accepted; FAIL means the server parses an unbounded run of empty CONTINUATION frames with no byte growth and no cutoff.

Caveats

200,000 is the harness's own ceiling, not a claim about the attack's real cost at scale; a genuine attack sends far more, and this check is capped specifically so running it cannot itself become the resource-exhaustion attack it is checking for.

Run: make test in this directory, or make -C audit test from the repo root.