MOLO-H2-001: HTTP/2 Rapid Reset
Scope: audit · README · AGENTS
CVE-2023-44487 (CVSS varies by vendor, widely rated High; the class, not a specific MoloApp CVE). CISA/CERT advisory, disclosed October 2023.
Source
Relevance to MoloApp
A client opens a stream with HEADERS and immediately cancels it with RST_STREAM, over and over on one connection. Each cycle costs the server a handler dispatch but never counts against a concurrent-stream limit, because the stream is gone by the time the next one opens. This is the mechanism that drove the October 2023 multi-vendor HTTP/2 incident across nginx, Envoy, Go net/http2 and others.
src/runtime/http/v2/connection.cpp enforces kH2MaxConcurrentStreamsDefault (100,
src/runtime/caps.h) by counting open streams, and OnRst (around line 535) erases
the stream entry the moment an RST_STREAM arrives. There is no counter for how many
streams a connection has opened-then-reset, and no backoff or GOAWAY triggered by a
high reset rate, so the one cap this framework relies on for HTTP/2 concurrency never
engages against this pattern.
What the check does
Starts build/bin/runtime_interop_server, opens one real h2c prior-knowledge
connection, and sends 4000 HEADERS(END_HEADERS|END_STREAM)+RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) pairs
for distinct odd stream IDs in one connection. PASS requires the server to push back
(GOAWAY, or refuse to echo an RST_STREAM for all of them) while staying up; FAIL means
every pair was accepted with no backpressure signal.
Caveats
This check measures whether a rate-limiting signal exists, not whether the process
survives a sustained attack at scale; it stops at 4000 pairs (the harness's own
flood() cap), far below what a real attacker would send, specifically so the check
itself never becomes a denial-of-service tool.
Run: make test in this directory, or make -C audit test from the repo root.