fix(realtime): reject WebSocket handshakes from unlisted Origins (CSWSH)
HandshakeValidator::validate never read the Origin header, so any cross-site page could open a WebSocket to the app and ride a victim's cookies (CWE-1385, the CVE-2024-23898 class). Add HandshakeConfig's allowed_origins exact-match list and reject the handshake when an Origin header is present but not allow-listed. Empty/unset allowed_origins is closed by default (any Origin present is rejected), matching CorsPolicy's closed-by-default convention. Requests with no Origin header (non-browser clients) are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ struct HandshakeConfig {
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// no protocol echoed.
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std::vector<std::string> subprotocols;
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bool require_subprotocol = false;
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// Exact-match allow-list for the browser-sent Origin header (CSWSH
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// defense, CWE-1385). Empty means closed: any request that carries an
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// Origin header is rejected, matching CorsPolicy's closed-by-default
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// convention (src/security/guard/CorsPolicy.h). A request with no
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// Origin header at all (non-browser clients) is not checked here.
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std::vector<std::string> allowed_origins;
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};
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struct HandshakeResult {
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