fix(realtime): reject WebSocket handshakes from unlisted Origins (CSWSH)
HandshakeValidator::validate never read the Origin header, so any cross-site page could open a WebSocket to the app and ride a victim's cookies (CWE-1385, the CVE-2024-23898 class). Add HandshakeConfig's allowed_origins exact-match list and reject the handshake when an Origin header is present but not allow-listed. Empty/unset allowed_origins is closed by default (any Origin present is rejected), matching CorsPolicy's closed-by-default convention. Requests with no Origin header (non-browser clients) are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -58,6 +58,20 @@ HandshakeResult HandshakeValidator::validate(
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shared::set_header(r.response, "Sec-WebSocket-Version", "13");
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return r;
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}
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std::string origin = shared::header_first(req, "Origin");
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if (!origin.empty()) {
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bool allowed = false;
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for (const std::string& o : config_.allowed_origins) {
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if (o == origin) {
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allowed = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!allowed) {
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return fail("Origin not allowed-listed");
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}
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}
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std::string picked;
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std::string asked = shared::header_first(req, "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol");
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if (!asked.empty()) {
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