fix(realtime): reject WebSocket handshakes from unlisted Origins (CSWSH)

HandshakeValidator::validate never read the Origin header, so any
cross-site page could open a WebSocket to the app and ride a victim's
cookies (CWE-1385, the CVE-2024-23898 class). Add HandshakeConfig's
allowed_origins exact-match list and reject the handshake when an
Origin header is present but not allow-listed. Empty/unset
allowed_origins is closed by default (any Origin present is
rejected), matching CorsPolicy's closed-by-default convention.
Requests with no Origin header (non-browser clients) are unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-25 20:06:04 +01:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent 16a0bb0de4
commit 9733d63e6c
2 changed files with 21 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -58,6 +58,20 @@ HandshakeResult HandshakeValidator::validate(
shared::set_header(r.response, "Sec-WebSocket-Version", "13");
return r;
}
std::string origin = shared::header_first(req, "Origin");
if (!origin.empty()) {
bool allowed = false;
for (const std::string& o : config_.allowed_origins) {
if (o == origin) {
allowed = true;
break;
}
}
if (!allowed) {
return fail("Origin not allowed-listed");
}
}
std::string picked;
std::string asked = shared::header_first(req, "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol");
if (!asked.empty()) {