Converge every account onto every policy agreement it has not declined
An instance kept production-identical for extended manual testing is otherwise taxed forever by its own safety controls: five consents, a versioned terms gate on every mutating request, and every account predating the trust and safety commit reading terms_version NULL because init_db deliberately never backfills it. AcceptanceService grants each agreement to each account that has not declined it, so the instance stays production byte for byte while nobody clicks the same dialog again. It is opt-in, dry run by default, and one switch per agreement type. The application is not allowed to know it exists. One registration line in main.py is the only import anywhere, there is no route, schema, template, Devii tool or environment flag, and a unit test greps the tree and fails the suite if a second importer appears. The decline register needs no storage: the ledger is append-only in effect, the service only ever grants, so any withdrawn row was written by a human and that pair is never touched again. No provenance column, nothing to observe. Satisfaction is the gate's own expression, never a proxy, which is why the ordering is created_at then id exactly as consent_state selects, and why the live-account clauses are built with has_column: init_db ensures terms_version and deletion_requested_at but not is_active, so a hardcoded reference raises no such column on an instance where nobody was ever suspended. Every write is one conditional statement decided on the real rowcount, proven with sixteen processes racing one account to exactly one ledger row and one audit row. The two existing audit keys carry it, with actor kind service, because a service that silently mutated consent state would be the worst possible exception to the append-only rule. lensfl.md is the source brief accept.md records the design against. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ and its full configuration are documented automatically - including future servi
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- **`GatewayService`** - OpenAI-compatible LLM gateway at `/openai/v1/*`, forwarding to DeepSeek (default) with optional vision augmentation; the single point of truth for AI that every other service routes through (enabled by default). Every chat request is made date-aware by injecting the current date in EU `DD/MM/YYYY` format into the system message when it contains no date already (date only, never time, to keep upstream prompt caching effective), and an admin-configurable system preamble (`gateway_system_preamble`) can be prepended ahead of the client's system message on every call. **Provider and model routing** (admin **Gateway** page, `/admin/gateway`) maps any number of requested model names onto named upstream providers and target models, each with its own pricing economy (input, output and cache-hit/cache-miss rates per million tokens) and an optional vision model that describes image content before forwarding, so text and vision models are merged transparently. Unmapped requests fall through to the default upstream unchanged, so existing clients are unaffected
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- **`JobService` / `ZipService` / `ForkService`** - generic async job framework (`services/jobs/`) for heavy, blocking work run off the request path; `ZipService` builds project zip archives in a subprocess, `ForkService` copies a project into a new project owned by the forking user
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- **`ContainerService`** - the admin container manager (`services/containers/`): a reconciling supervisor for container instances, all running one shared prebuilt image
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- **`AcceptanceService`** - grants every policy agreement (Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, third-party AI processing, activity recording, container credentials) to every account that has not declined it, so an instance kept production-identical for extended manual testing never interrupts with an acceptance dialog. Administrator-only, **off by default**, with a separate switch per agreement type and a dry run that reports what it would do without writing. An account that withdrew a consent is never granted it again, with no further action: the consent ledger itself is the decline register. It is not appropriate on a real production host
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### Container manager (admin only)
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