# Elicitation (client feature, 2025-11-25)

## Metadata

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Institute | Molodetz Institute - Research & Retrieval Division |
| Subject | mcp-client-support |
| Document type | Source Dossier |
| Tier | 1 |
| Source title | Elicitation (MCP Specification v2025-11-25) |
| Source URL | https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/client/elicitation |
| Source publisher / author | Model Context Protocol authors (Anthropic-donated open project; site docs) |
| Source type | standard |
| Source date (published) | 2025-11-25 (version stamp; no other publish date stated) |
| Date researched | 2026-10-18 |
| Researched by | tai (agent), model: Claude Sonnet 5, on behalf of retoor |
| Research method | gather-subagent direct page fetch, parent synthesis from evidence pack |
| Confidence | High (partial read: 30KB page, head section only, see Cons) |
| Status | Active |

## Summary

Elicitation has two modes: form mode for servers requesting structured data, and URL mode for directing users to external URLs for sensitive interactions that must not pass through the client. Clients declare the `elicitation` capability with `form`/`url` sub-capabilities (`{}` alone means form only; at least one mode is required), and servers must not send requests in unsupported modes. Every `elicitation/create` must include a human-readable `message`, `mode` defaults to `form`, and form mode must never request sensitive credentials.

## Key findings

- Two modes: "Form mode: Servers can request structured data… URL mode: Servers can direct users to external URLs for sensitive interactions that must *not* pass through the MCP client."
- "Clients that support elicitation MUST declare the `elicitation` capability" (`{"form":{},"url":{}}`); `{}` alone "is equivalent to declaring support for `form` mode only"; clients "MUST support at least one mode."
- "Servers MUST NOT send elicitation requests with modes that are not supported by the client."
- Every `elicitation/create` "MUST include… `message`" (human-readable reason); `mode` defaults to `"form"` if omitted.
- "Servers MUST NOT use form mode elicitation to request sensitive information such as passwords, API keys, access tokens, or payment credentials."

## Pros / strengths

- The form/URL split is a sound security design: sensitive interactions are routed to external URLs that bypass the client entirely, instead of flowing credentials through it.
- Capability granularity (`form`/`url` sub-capabilities with a form-only default for `{}`) lets clients offer exactly the modes they can render.
- Mandatory human-readable `message` plus the ban on credential solicitation in form mode give users context and a bright-line server rule.

## Cons / limitations / caveats

- The pack marks this page partially read (30KB page, head section only); the full elicitation response schema and deeper subsections were not read, so findings cover the retrieved sections only.
- No explicit author names or publish dates appear on the page; the date above is the version stamp in the URL.
- Needs a user interface (form rendering or URL handoff), which a headless minimal client has no use for; omission is the correct default.

## Relevance to tai

Optional user-interaction feature; a minimal client omits it (the formal `form`/`url` sub-capabilities matter only if elicitation is offered at all). Relevant to tai only if a future interactive client wants structured user input mid-tool-call.

## Changelog

| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-18 | Initial dossier created. |