diff --git a/taicpp/docs/whatsapp.md b/taicpp/docs/whatsapp.md
index 3fcbcfd..37dd69f 100644
--- a/taicpp/docs/whatsapp.md
+++ b/taicpp/docs/whatsapp.md
@@ -388,3 +388,108 @@ keys, signal and media total 5,231. The C++ size is not measured until it exists
   battle tested. whatsmeow stays the referee.
 - **Unverified here:** the full handshake (probe refused), XEdDSA verify via
   OpenSSL Ed25519, the 20-day re-auth claim, the 405 behaviour.
+
+## 13. Robustness against hostile input (incident WA-2026-10-27, and the standing rule)
+
+Every byte this module parses comes off a network socket we do not control.
+That makes the wire parsers (`WaBinary`, `WaProto`, and the Noise/Signal frame
+readers) a security and stability boundary, not ordinary code. This section
+records a crash that got through, exactly why, how it was fixed, and the rule
+and test that keep it from ever coming back. **We do not accept regressions
+here.**
+
+### 13.1 What happened
+
+Running `detz --whatsapp-link` on a real terminal, the wizard connected, showed
+the QR, and after the code auto-refreshed it aborted:
+
+```
+terminate called after throwing an instance of 'std::length_error'
+  what():  cannot create std::vector larger than max_size()
+Aborted (core dumped)
+```
+
+A core dump, not a handled error. The process died mid-session instead of
+logging a bad frame and carrying on.
+
+### 13.2 Root cause
+
+Two independent faults lined up:
+
+1. **An overflowable bounds check.** Both the protobuf reader and the binary-node
+   decoder guarded a length-delimited field with `pos + len > size`. `pos` is a
+   `size_t` and `len` was read straight from the wire (up to 2^32-1, or a
+   4-byte length sign-extended into a negative `int`). `pos + len` then wrapped
+   around past `SIZE_MAX`, computed a small sum, and the check passed. The code
+   went on to `vector::assign(begin, begin + len)` with a garbage `len`, and the
+   standard library threw `std::length_error` from inside `vector`.
+2. **An unguarded top-level loop.** `WaClient::dispatch` routed nodes straight
+   into `handle_pair_success` and the other handlers with no `try/catch`. The
+   decode path in `recv_node` was wrapped, but the handlers that re-parse
+   sub-messages (the ADV identity in pairing, for instance) were not, so a
+   `std::length_error` raised there propagated out of `main` and called
+   `std::terminate`.
+
+Either fault alone is survivable. Together they turn one malformed frame into a
+process abort. This is the classic C++ failure: an arithmetic overflow in a
+size computation silently defeats a bounds check, and an uncaught exception is
+not a logged error but a dead process.
+
+### 13.3 The fix (commit f16c5c6)
+
+- **Overflow-safe length checks everywhere bytes are sliced.** The comparison is
+  now `len > size - pos` (never `pos + len > size`). Because `pos <= size` is an
+  invariant at every call site, the subtraction cannot wrap, so no attacker
+  value can slip through. `src/whatsapp/wa_proto.cpp` (`ProtoReader::next`) and
+  `src/whatsapp/wa_binary.cpp` (`Decoder::need`).
+- **Lengths are read unsigned and range-checked.** The binary decoder reads
+  4-byte lengths into a `uint32_t` (never a sign-extendable `int`), rejects any
+  value larger than the whole frame, and `read_bytes` rejects negatives. A bad
+  length now raises `WireError`, a `std::exception` we catch, long before any
+  allocation.
+- **Dispatch can no longer abort the process.** `WaClient::dispatch` wraps all
+  node routing in `try/catch(const std::exception&)`; a bad node is logged
+  (`dropped node <tag>: <reason>`) and the client keeps running.
+
+### 13.4 The standing rule (project principle)
+
+The goal is to make C++ safe to use here, which means a hostile or buggy peer
+can waste our time but can never crash us or corrupt us. Three invariants, in
+order of importance:
+
+1. **No size arithmetic that can overflow a bounds check.** Never write
+   `pos + len <= size`. Write `len <= size - pos` against an established
+   `pos <= size`. Read lengths into an unsigned type wide enough to hold them,
+   and range-check before you allocate or slice. Treat every length, count and
+   index off the wire as adversarial.
+2. **No unchecked allocation from an attacker-controlled count.** A length field
+   is a claim, not a fact. Validate it against the bytes actually present before
+   `reserve`, `resize`, `assign`, or a range constructor. A caller must never be
+   able to make us ask for a 4 GB vector.
+3. **No exception may escape a top-level loop.** Any loop that reads and
+   dispatches untrusted input (`recv_node`, `dispatch`, the send and pairing
+   waits) wraps the per-item work in `try/catch(const std::exception&)` and
+   turns a failure into a logged, skipped item. An uncaught `std::exception` in
+   this module is a bug even if the parse that raised it was "impossible".
+
+These apply to any code that reads untrusted bytes, not just WhatsApp. When a
+new wire format is added (CAP, MCP, a new media type), it inherits this rule.
+
+### 13.5 How we stop the regression
+
+Prose does not prevent regressions; a failing test does. `tests/whatsapp_test.cpp`
+has a `test_hostile` section (run by `build/whatsapp_test`, step `whatsapp.unit`
+in `tests/run_all.py`, and `make test`) that feeds the parsers exactly the shapes
+that used to crash and asserts they throw a *handled* exception and specifically
+**not** `std::length_error`:
+
+- a binary node whose content length claims 0xFFFFFFFF in an 11-byte buffer;
+- a protobuf field whose length varint is ~4 billion with no payload;
+- truncated and short frames;
+- 2000 random byte strings through both `WaBinary` and `ProtoReader` (surviving
+  the loop is the proof: a single unchecked allocation would abort the run).
+
+Each case `catch`es `std::length_error` and fails the test if it is thrown, so
+if anyone reintroduces a `pos + len` check or an unguarded slice, this test goes
+red. If you add a new parser, add its hostile cases here in the same pass; a
+parser with no adversarial test is treated as unfinished.
diff --git a/taicpp/tests/whatsapp_test.cpp b/taicpp/tests/whatsapp_test.cpp
index fbc2306..2086196 100644
--- a/taicpp/tests/whatsapp_test.cpp
+++ b/taicpp/tests/whatsapp_test.cpp
@@ -245,6 +245,82 @@ static void test_signal() {
   check(WaSession::deserialize(blob).has_value(), "session serialize/deserialize");
 }
 
+// ---- hostile / malformed input (regression guard, incident WA-2026-10-27) ----
+// Every parser of bytes off the wire must reject malformed input by throwing a
+// std::exception (caught upstream), never by an unchecked huge allocation that
+// aborts the process. A length field that overflows the bounds check used to
+// reach vector::assign and throw std::length_error, which aborted the client.
+// These cases must keep throwing a *handled* exception, never std::length_error
+// and never crash. See docs/whatsapp.md section 13.
+static void test_hostile() {
+  std::printf("[hostile input]\n");
+  bool ok = true;
+
+  // 1. binary node whose content length claims 0xFFFFFFFF in a tiny buffer.
+  //    flag(0) | LIST_8 size 2 | tag BINARY_8 "x" | content BINARY_32 0xFFFFFFFF
+  Bytes huge_len = {0x00, 0xf8, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x01, 'x', 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff};
+  try {
+    WaBinary::decode(WaBinary::unpack(huge_len));
+    ok = false;  // must not succeed
+  } catch (const std::length_error&) {
+    ok = false;  // the exact regression: an unchecked allocation
+  } catch (const std::exception&) {
+    // correct: a handled WireError / bounds error
+  }
+  check(ok, "binary decode rejects a 4GB length field without length_error");
+
+  // 2. protobuf field 1, wire 2, length varint ~4 billion, no payload.
+  Bytes huge_pb = {0x0a, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f};
+  ok = true;
+  try {
+    ProtoReader r(huge_pb);
+    ProtoReader::Field f;
+    while (r.next(f)) {
+    }
+    ok = false;
+  } catch (const std::length_error&) {
+    ok = false;
+  } catch (const std::exception&) {
+  }
+  check(ok, "proto reader rejects an oversized length without length_error");
+
+  // 3. negative/short-buffer node tags and truncations throw cleanly.
+  ok = true;
+  for (const Bytes& bad : std::vector<Bytes>{{}, {0x00}, {0x00, 0xf8}, {0x00, 0xfe, 0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+                                             {0x00, 0xf8, 0x04, 0xfc, 0xff}}) {
+    try {
+      WaBinary::decode(WaBinary::unpack(bad));
+    } catch (const std::length_error&) {
+      ok = false;
+    } catch (const std::exception&) {
+    }
+  }
+  check(ok, "truncated/short frames throw cleanly, never length_error");
+
+  // 4. fuzz: random byte strings must each return or throw a std::exception,
+  //    never a length_error and never a crash (surviving the loop is the proof).
+  ok = true;
+  for (int i = 0; i < 2000; ++i) {
+    Bytes r = WaCrypto::random_bytes(1 + (i % 64));
+    try {
+      WaBinary::decode(WaBinary::unpack(r));
+    } catch (const std::length_error&) {
+      ok = false;
+    } catch (const std::exception&) {
+    }
+    try {
+      ProtoReader pr(r);
+      ProtoReader::Field f;
+      while (pr.next(f)) {
+      }
+    } catch (const std::length_error&) {
+      ok = false;
+    } catch (const std::exception&) {
+    }
+  }
+  check(ok, "2000 random inputs: no length_error, no crash");
+}
+
 int main(int argc, char** argv) {
   DIR = argc > 1 ? argv[1] : "tests/whatsapp_data";
   test_crypto();
@@ -252,6 +328,7 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) {
   test_client_payload();
   test_noise();
   test_signal();
+  test_hostile();
   std::printf("%s\n", g_fail == 0 ? "whatsapp: ALL OK" : "whatsapp: FAILURES");
   return g_fail == 0 ? 0 : 1;
 }