# MOLO-H2-002: HTTP/2 "MadeYouReset" **Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md) CVE-2025-8671, disclosed August 2025 via CERT/CC. Affected a wide vendor list (Apache Tomcat as CVE-2025-48989, F5, Fastly, Netty, gRPC, Varnish and others); the class, not a MoloApp-specific assignment. ## Source - [CERT/CC VU#767506](https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/767506) ## Relevance to MoloApp Rapid Reset (CVE-2023-44487, [MOLO-H2-001](../MOLO-H2-001/)) is mitigated by many implementations by rate-limiting client-sent RST_STREAM frames. MadeYouReset sidesteps that by getting the *server* to send the RST_STREAM instead, for example via a protocol violation on the stream (an invalid WINDOW_UPDATE, a bad frame, a flow-control violation) that triggers a stream-level error. The handler dispatch and teardown cost is the same as Rapid Reset, but a mitigation that only counts client RST_STREAM frames never sees it, because the client never sends one. `src/runtime/http/v2/connection.cpp` has no counter for streams the server itself resets (confirmed in the audit of `OnRst`, the flow-control-error branches around line 446/524/610): each one frees the stream slot the same way a client-sent RST does, with no cap, matching [MOLO-H2-001](../MOLO-H2-001/)'s finding that the concurrent-stream limit never engages against a churn attack. ## What the check does Opens one h2c connection to `build/bin/runtime_interop_server` and, for 4000 distinct streams, sends HEADERS (no END_STREAM, so the stream stays open) followed by a WINDOW_UPDATE with a zero increment on that same stream, a flow-control violation that RFC 9113 6.9 requires the server to answer with RST_STREAM. PASS requires the connection to be cut (GOAWAY or close) before all 4000 are processed; FAIL means the server resets every stream itself with no backpressure, exactly the MadeYouReset shape. ## Caveats This is the server-triggered-reset mechanism, not a claim of in-the-wild exploitation (CERT/CC and vendor advisories note no known exploitation at disclosure time either). Capped at 4000 streams by the harness so the check itself cannot become the DoS it tests for. Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.