# MOLO-CLI-001: shell command injection in `molo new ` **Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [AGENTS](../../AGENTS.md) In-house finding (not a public CVE), CWE-78 ("Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command"). ## Where `src/cli/cli/cli_app.cpp`, `cmd_new`: ```cpp opts.name = args.positionals[0]; ... std::string dir = opts.name; ScaffoldResult result = scaffolder.scaffold(dir, opts); ``` `src/cli/cli/scaffolder.cpp`, `Scaffolder::scaffold`: ```cpp std::string cmd = "git -C \"" + dir + "\" init -q 2>/dev/null"; if (system(cmd.c_str()) != 0) { ... } ``` `dir` is the project name exactly as typed on the command line, checked only for length (1-64 chars, `kMaxProjectName`). It is concatenated inside one pair of double quotes and handed to `system()`, a real shell. A name containing a `"` ends that quoted argument early; anything after it is ordinary shell syntax. ## Relevance `molo new ` is the first command in the README's own quickstart. Project names are often copied from elsewhere (a ticket title, a client's brand name, a CI variable) rather than hand-typed, which is exactly the kind of untrusted-but-looks- like-a-filename input this bug class targets. ## What the check does Runs `molo new 'x"; touch ; echo "' --force` in a scratch directory and checks whether the injected `touch` created the marker file. PASS means it did not (the name is now escaped or passed to `git` without a shell); FAIL means the command ran. ## Caveats This proves injection with a benign `touch`, not a demonstration of what an attacker could do with it; `system()` runs as the invoking user with that user's full permissions, so the practical impact is whatever that user could already do by hand. Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.