// MOLO-WS-001: WebSocket handshake accepts a cross-origin request with no // Origin check, enabling Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking. See README.md. // // There is no server binary that wires HandshakeValidator up to a live // socket (example/fw's /ws/chat route never upgrades), so this check // drives the real class directly, the same code every real upgrade path // in src/realtime/websocket/server calls, with no server loop needed: // HandshakeValidator::validate is documented as "Pure function of request // plus config: no I/O." #include #include #include "realtime/websocket/server/handshake_validator.h" using molo::realtime::websocket::server::HandshakeConfig; using molo::realtime::websocket::server::HandshakeValidator; namespace shared = molo::realtime::shared; int main() { shared::HttpRequest req; req.method = "GET"; req.path = "/ws/chat"; req.headers.emplace("Upgrade", "websocket"); req.headers.emplace("Connection", "Upgrade"); req.headers.emplace("Sec-WebSocket-Key", "dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ=="); // RFC 6455 example req.headers.emplace("Sec-WebSocket-Version", "13"); // The victim's browser would attach this automatically; a same-site // server has no business accepting it from an attacker's origin. req.headers.emplace("Origin", "https://evil.example"); HandshakeValidator v(HandshakeConfig{}); auto result = v.validate(req); if (result.ok) { std::printf( "FAIL: handshake for Origin: https://evil.example was accepted (status %d, " "Sec-WebSocket-Accept: %s); HandshakeValidator::validate " "(src/realtime/websocket/server/handshake_validator.cpp) never reads the " "Origin header and HandshakeConfig has no allowed-origins field, so any " "cross-site page can open this WebSocket carrying the victim's cookies " "(CSWSH, CWE-1385)\n", result.response.status, result.accept_key.c_str()); return 1; } std::printf("PASS: handshake for a cross-origin request was rejected (%s)\n", result.failure_reason.c_str()); return 0; }