# CVE-2023-28642: runc AppArmor/SELinux confinement bypass via a symlinked or non-directory /proc inside the container **Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [COMPARISON](../../COMPARISON.md) · [docs/RESEARCH](../../docs/RESEARCH.md) Fixed in runc 1.1.5 (USN-6088-1), same release as CVE-2023-27561. ## Source - [Ubuntu Security Notice USN-6088-1](https://usn.ubuntu.com/6088-1) - [LWN coverage](https://lwn.net/Articles/932370/) ## Relevance to doos runc let `/proc` inside the container be a symlink, or let something be mounted over a non-directory in its place, which bypassed its AppArmor and (on the right distro) SELinux restrictions tied to the real `/proc`. doos has no comparable confinement layered on top of `/proc` to bypass (same caveat as `CVE-2019-16884`: no per-container AppArmor profile), but the underlying property, that `/proc` is a genuine, fresh directory mount and not a symlink an image could have planted, is exactly the same `/proc` doos sets up in `src/sandbox.cpp` and worth checking directly rather than only by analogy. ## What the check does From inside a container, confirms `/proc` is a directory and not a symlink (`[ -L /proc ]` must be false), on top of the mount-type check `CVE-2019-16884` already runs. ## Caveats Checks the filesystem property the runc bug abused (a symlinked `/proc`), not the AppArmor/SELinux bypass itself, since doos's hardening model (seccomp + capability drop, not AppArmor confinement of the container's own filesystem) is a different mechanism; see COMPARISON.md section 6 for that design difference. Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.