# CVE-2022-27650: crun/Moby started containers with a non-empty inheritable capability set **Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [COMPARISON](../../COMPARISON.md) · [docs/RESEARCH](../../docs/RESEARCH.md) CVSS 7.5. Fixed in crun 1.4.4; related Moby advisory GHSA-wr4f-w546-m398. ## Source - [Alpine security tracker](https://security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2022-27650) - [Debian security tracker](https://security-tracker.debian.org/CVE-2022-27650) ## Relevance to doos crun (and, separately, Moby) could start a container process with inheritable capabilities still set in its capability set, rather than cleared. A program inside the container carrying file capabilities (`cap_setuid+ep` and similar) can raise an inheritable capability into its permitted set across `execve`, turning a leftover inheritable bit into a real privilege gain. doos drops to a fixed capability bounding set in `Hardening::apply()` before exec; the inheritable set specifically is the thing this bug class is about, and it is worth confirming directly rather than only checking the effective set (which is what the README and `docs/RESEARCH.md` already measure via `CapEff`). ## What the check does Attaches a container with default hardening and reads `/proc/self/status`'s `CapInh` line. Anything other than all-zero is FAIL. ## Caveats Only checks default hardening; `--hardening relaxed` is documented as removing capability restrictions entirely and is out of scope here, same as the other hardening-dependent checks in this audit. Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.