# CVE-2021-30465: runc symlink-exchange race during mount setup ("symlink-exchange attack") **Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [COMPARISON](../../COMPARISON.md) · [docs/RESEARCH](../../docs/RESEARCH.md) CVSS 8.5. Fixed in runc 1.0.0-rc95. ## Source - [Red Hat RHSB-2021-004](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2021-004) - [GitHub advisory GHSA-c3xm-pvg7-gh7r](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-c3xm-pvg7-gh7r) ## Relevance to doos runc resolved a mount target, then mounted it, with a window between the two where an attacker sharing a volume could swap the target for a symlink, redirecting the mount outside the container's intended root. doos builds its own container directories with `fsutil::mkdirs`, which calls `std::filesystem::create_directories`. That call follows an existing symlink at any path component rather than refusing it, the same general shape of bug (trusting a path component that could have been swapped for a symlink by something else with write access to the same parent directory), applied to `$DOOS_HOME/containers/` instead of a mounted volume. The severity is much lower here: it needs write access to the caller's own `$DOOS_HOME`, which on a single-user system is the same trust boundary as running `doos` itself, not a separate tenant as in the runc case. ## What the check does Plants a symlink at the exact path `get_or_create` would otherwise create (`$DOOS_HOME/containers/`), pointing at a sentinel directory outside `$DOOS_HOME`. Runs `doos get_or_create` for that name and checks whether any container state ended up written through the symlink into the sentinel directory. Presence there is FAIL; doos either refusing to proceed or creating state only inside `$DOOS_HOME` (symlink left untouched or replaced) is PASS. ## Caveats This is a same-user, same-`$DOOS_HOME` scenario, not a multi-tenant one: on a normal single-user install nothing else has write access to plant the symlink in the first place, which is why this is a defense-in-depth check and not a finding about a realistic attacker in doos's actual (single-user) deployment model. Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.