# CVE-2019-16884: runc AppArmor confinement weakened by incorrect mount-target validation for /proc **Scope:** [audit](../README.md) · [README](../../README.md) · [COMPARISON](../../COMPARISON.md) · [docs/RESEARCH](../../docs/RESEARCH.md) CVSS 6.5-7.5. Fixed in runc 1.0.0-rc9. ## Source - [Rapid7 vulnerability record](https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/redhat-openshift-cve-2019-16884) - [Debian security tracker](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2019-16884) ## Relevance to doos runc's root filesystem setup validated a mount target incorrectly, letting a crafted image mount something over `/proc` in a way that weakened the AppArmor profile runc otherwise applies. doos has no AppArmor profile that constrains the container's own filesystem view the way `docker-default` does (COMPARISON.md section 6 already states this as a design difference, not a bug), so the specific confinement this CVE weakens does not exist in doos to begin with. What is still worth checking directly is the thing runc's bug actually let an attacker do: substitute a non-`proc` mount at the container's `/proc`. ## What the check does Attaches a container and checks, from inside, that `/proc`'s filesystem type (via `/proc/self/mountinfo` on the real `/proc` doos mounted, read before the check's own command could remount it) is `proc`, matching `doMount("proc", ..., "proc", ...)` in `src/sandbox.cpp`. ## Caveats Confirms doos's own `/proc` mount is what it claims to be at container start; it does not attempt the image-controlled mount-target substitution runc's bug needed, since doos has no AppArmor profile for that substitution to bypass in the first place. Run: `make test` in this directory, or `make -C audit test` from the repo root.