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# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import time
import pytest
import requests
from tests.conftest import BASE_URL
from devplacepy.database import get_table, refresh_snapshot, set_setting
JSON = {"Accept": "application/json"}
_counter = [0]
@pytest.fixture(scope="module", autouse=True)
def _settings(app_server):
for key, value in {
"rate_limit_per_minute": "1000000",
"rate_limit_window_seconds": "60",
"registration_open": "1",
"maintenance_mode": "0",
"session_max_age_days": "7",
"session_remember_days": "30",
}.items():
set_setting(key, value)
yield
def _db_user(name):
refresh_snapshot()
return get_table("users").find_one(username=name)
def _unique(prefix="sen"):
_counter[0] += 1
return f"{prefix}{int(time.time() * 1000)}{_counter[0]}"
def _signup():
name = _unique("senmem")
s = requests.Session()
s.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/auth/signup",
data={
"username": name,
"email": f"{name}@t.dev",
"password": "secret123",
"confirm_password": "secret123",
Add the trust and safety subsystem and the App Store compliance work Implements the moderation and consent obligations a social platform carries, so the web version and any client that speaks to it enforce the same rules. Moderation core (services/moderation/, database/moderation.py): a reportable target registry, the content filter and its choke points, the report queue with atomic resolution, enforcement actions, consent tracking, maturity gating, and account deletion with a grace window. Surfaces: POST /reports plus the member report list, /admin/moderation and the per-report admin view, /workspaces, terms acceptance at /auth/terms, consent and account deletion under /profile, the report button and dialog partials, the maturity gate, and the moderation stylesheet and ReportDialog client. Every user-generated surface stays reportable by construction: new content tables are registered in REPORTABLE_TARGETS or listed in UNREPORTABLE_TABLES with a reason, and the registry test fails the suite on anything left unclassified. Docs: community guidelines, content moderation, intellectual property, privacy, terms, contact, and the admin-only moderation operations page, plus the moderation API group and the Devii moderation actions. Compliance record: applecomp.md is the requirement register, applechanges.md the gap analysis against this codebase, and appleimpl.md the implementation design they resolve to. Tests cover the report flow, admin moderation, consent, account deletion, terms acceptance, workspaces, and the registry invariant across the unit, api, and e2e tiers.
2026-08-09 00:18:20 +02:00
"birth_date": "1990-01-01",
"accept_terms": "1",
},
allow_redirects=True,
)
return name
def _key_session(name):
s = requests.Session()
s.headers.update({"X-API-KEY": _db_user(name)["api_key"]})
return s
def _alice():
return _key_session("alice_test")
def _promote(actor, uid):
actor.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users/{uid}/role",
headers=JSON,
data={"role": "admin"},
allow_redirects=False,
)
def _audit(session, **params):
r = session.get(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/audit-log", headers=JSON, params=params)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text[:300]
return r.json()["entries"]
def _denied(session, event_key, target_uid):
for e in _audit(session, event_key=event_key, result="denied"):
if e.get("target_uid") == target_uid:
return e
return None
def _junior_admin(seeded_db):
alice = _alice()
name = _signup()
uid = _db_user(name)["uid"]
_promote(alice, uid)
assert _db_user(name)["role"] == "Admin"
return _key_session(name), name, uid
def test_junior_admin_cannot_change_senior_admin_role(seeded_db):
junior, _, _ = _junior_admin(seeded_db)
alice_uid = _db_user("alice_test")["uid"]
junior.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users/{alice_uid}/role",
headers=JSON,
data={"role": "member"},
allow_redirects=False,
)
assert _denied(_alice(), "admin.user.role.change", alice_uid) is not None
assert _db_user("alice_test")["role"] == "Admin"
def test_junior_admin_cannot_disable_senior_admin(seeded_db):
junior, _, _ = _junior_admin(seeded_db)
alice_uid = _db_user("alice_test")["uid"]
junior.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users/{alice_uid}/toggle",
headers=JSON,
allow_redirects=False,
)
assert _denied(_alice(), "admin.user.active.disable", alice_uid) is not None
assert _db_user("alice_test").get("is_active", True)
def test_junior_admin_cannot_reset_senior_admin_password(seeded_db):
junior, _, _ = _junior_admin(seeded_db)
alice_uid = _db_user("alice_test")["uid"]
before = _db_user("alice_test")["password_hash"]
junior.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users/{alice_uid}/password",
headers=JSON,
data={"password": "hijacked999"},
allow_redirects=False,
)
assert _denied(_alice(), "admin.user.password.reset", alice_uid) is not None
assert _db_user("alice_test")["password_hash"] == before
def test_junior_admin_cannot_reset_senior_admin_quota(seeded_db):
junior, _, _ = _junior_admin(seeded_db)
alice_uid = _db_user("alice_test")["uid"]
junior.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users/{alice_uid}/reset-ai-quota",
headers=JSON,
allow_redirects=False,
)
assert _denied(_alice(), "admin.user.ai_quota.reset", alice_uid) is not None
def test_senior_admin_can_disable_junior_admin(seeded_db):
_junior, _, junior_uid = _junior_admin(seeded_db)
alice = _alice()
alice.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users/{junior_uid}/toggle",
headers=JSON,
allow_redirects=False,
)
refresh_snapshot()
assert not get_table("users").find_one(uid=junior_uid).get("is_active", True)
def test_junior_admin_can_manage_member(seeded_db):
junior, _, _ = _junior_admin(seeded_db)
member = _signup()
member_uid = _db_user(member)["uid"]
junior.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users/{member_uid}/toggle",
headers=JSON,
allow_redirects=False,
)
refresh_snapshot()
assert not get_table("users").find_one(uid=member_uid).get("is_active", True)