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# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import time
import requests
from tests.conftest import BASE_URL
_counter = [0]
JSON = {"Accept": "application/json"}
def _signup(password="secret123"):
_counter[0] += 1
name = f"tgpair{int(time.time() * 1000)}{_counter[0]}"
session = requests.Session()
session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/auth/signup",
data={
"username": name,
"email": f"{name}@t.dev",
"password": password,
"confirm_password": password,
Add the trust and safety subsystem and the App Store compliance work Implements the moderation and consent obligations a social platform carries, so the web version and any client that speaks to it enforce the same rules. Moderation core (services/moderation/, database/moderation.py): a reportable target registry, the content filter and its choke points, the report queue with atomic resolution, enforcement actions, consent tracking, maturity gating, and account deletion with a grace window. Surfaces: POST /reports plus the member report list, /admin/moderation and the per-report admin view, /workspaces, terms acceptance at /auth/terms, consent and account deletion under /profile, the report button and dialog partials, the maturity gate, and the moderation stylesheet and ReportDialog client. Every user-generated surface stays reportable by construction: new content tables are registered in REPORTABLE_TARGETS or listed in UNREPORTABLE_TABLES with a reason, and the registry test fails the suite on anything left unclassified. Docs: community guidelines, content moderation, intellectual property, privacy, terms, contact, and the admin-only moderation operations page, plus the moderation API group and the Devii moderation actions. Compliance record: applecomp.md is the requirement register, applechanges.md the gap analysis against this codebase, and appleimpl.md the implementation design they resolve to. Tests cover the report flow, admin moderation, consent, account deletion, terms acceptance, workspaces, and the registry invariant across the unit, api, and e2e tiers.
2026-08-09 00:18:20 +02:00
"birth_date": "1990-01-01",
"accept_terms": "1",
},
allow_redirects=True,
)
return session, name
def test_owner_requests_pairing_code(app_server):
session, name = _signup()
resp = session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/profile/{name}/telegram",
data={"action": "request"},
headers=JSON,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
body = resp.json()
assert body["ok"] is True
assert body["code"].isdigit() and len(body["code"]) == 4
assert body["ttl_minutes"] >= 1
def test_unpair_returns_ok(app_server):
session, name = _signup()
resp = session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/profile/{name}/telegram",
data={"action": "unpair"},
headers=JSON,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert resp.json()["paired"] is False
def test_other_user_cannot_request_code(app_server):
_, target = _signup()
attacker, _ = _signup()
resp = attacker.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/profile/{target}/telegram",
data={"action": "request"},
headers=JSON,
allow_redirects=False,
)
assert resp.status_code == 403
def test_request_without_json_redirects_to_profile(app_server):
session, name = _signup()
resp = session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/profile/{name}/telegram",
data={"action": "request"},
allow_redirects=False,
)
assert resp.status_code == 302
assert resp.headers["location"] == f"/profile/{name}"
def test_unpair_without_json_redirects_to_profile(app_server):
session, name = _signup()
resp = session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/profile/{name}/telegram",
data={"action": "unpair"},
allow_redirects=False,
)
assert resp.status_code == 302
assert resp.headers["location"] == f"/profile/{name}"