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# retoor <retoor@molodetz.nl>
import time
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import pytest
import requests
from tests.conftest import BASE_URL
from devplacepy.database import get_table, refresh_snapshot, set_setting
from devplacepy.utils import generate_uid, make_combined_slug
JSON_audit_log = {"Accept": "application/json"}
_counter_audit_log = [0]
@pytest.fixture(scope="module", autouse=True)
def _audit_test_settings(app_server):
# On a fresh DB init_db skips seeding the operational/upload settings (its
# `tables` snapshot predates site_settings creation), so those rows are
# absent and the admin settings form would INSERT them as "" - which both
# closes registration and makes consumers that do int("") crash. Seed sane
# values here so the form's empty submissions are skipped (existing key), and
# lift the per-IP rate limit since this file fires many mutating requests.
for key, value in {
"rate_limit_per_minute": "1000000",
"rate_limit_window_seconds": "60",
"registration_open": "1",
"maintenance_mode": "0",
"max_upload_size_mb": "10",
"allowed_file_types": "",
"max_attachments_per_resource": "10",
"session_max_age_days": "7",
"session_remember_days": "30",
"news_service_interval": "3600",
"news_grade_threshold": "7",
}.items():
set_setting(key, value)
yield
def _db_user(name):
# the user is created by the server subprocess; refresh the test-process
# SQLite snapshot before reading it back across the process boundary.
refresh_snapshot()
return get_table("users").find_one(username=name)
def _unique(prefix="au"):
_counter_audit_log[0] += 1
return f"{prefix}{int(time.time() * 1000)}{_counter_audit_log[0]}"
def _member():
name = _unique("aumem")
s = requests.Session()
s.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/auth/signup",
data={
"username": name,
"email": f"{name}@t.dev",
"password": "secret123",
"confirm_password": "secret123",
Add the trust and safety subsystem and the App Store compliance work Implements the moderation and consent obligations a social platform carries, so the web version and any client that speaks to it enforce the same rules. Moderation core (services/moderation/, database/moderation.py): a reportable target registry, the content filter and its choke points, the report queue with atomic resolution, enforcement actions, consent tracking, maturity gating, and account deletion with a grace window. Surfaces: POST /reports plus the member report list, /admin/moderation and the per-report admin view, /workspaces, terms acceptance at /auth/terms, consent and account deletion under /profile, the report button and dialog partials, the maturity gate, and the moderation stylesheet and ReportDialog client. Every user-generated surface stays reportable by construction: new content tables are registered in REPORTABLE_TARGETS or listed in UNREPORTABLE_TABLES with a reason, and the registry test fails the suite on anything left unclassified. Docs: community guidelines, content moderation, intellectual property, privacy, terms, contact, and the admin-only moderation operations page, plus the moderation API group and the Devii moderation actions. Compliance record: applecomp.md is the requirement register, applechanges.md the gap analysis against this codebase, and appleimpl.md the implementation design they resolve to. Tests cover the report flow, admin moderation, consent, account deletion, terms acceptance, workspaces, and the registry invariant across the unit, api, and e2e tiers.
2026-08-09 00:18:20 +02:00
"birth_date": "1990-01-01",
"accept_terms": "1",
},
allow_redirects=True,
)
return s, name
def _member_key():
_, name = _member()
return _db_user(name)["api_key"]
def _admin(seeded_db):
# authenticate via the seeded admin's API key (header auth) rather than a
# login POST - GET reads are exempt from the rate limiter, so reusing this
# across the file's many tests never counts against the per-IP write budget.
key = _db_user("alice_test")["api_key"]
s = requests.Session()
s.headers.update({"X-API-KEY": key})
return s
def _audit(admin, **params):
r = admin.get(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/audit-log", headers=JSON_audit_log, params=params)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text[:300]
return r.json()
def _find(admin, event_key, predicate):
data = _audit(admin, event_key=event_key)
for entry in data["entries"]:
if predicate(entry):
return entry
return None
def _new_post(session, body="audited post body here"):
return session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/posts/create",
headers=JSON_audit_log,
data={"title": _unique("aup"), "content": body, "topic": "devlog"},
).json()["data"]
def _new_project(session):
return session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/projects/create",
headers=JSON_audit_log,
data={
"title": _unique("aupr"),
"description": "audited project description text",
"project_type": "software",
"status": "In Development",
"platforms": "",
},
).json()["data"]
def _seed_news_audit_log():
uid = generate_uid()
title = _unique("aunews")
get_table("news").insert(
{
"deleted_at": None,
"deleted_by": None,
"uid": uid,
"slug": make_combined_slug(title, uid),
"title": title,
"external_id": uid,
"status": "draft",
"featured": 0,
"show_on_landing": 0,
"grade": 5,
"source_name": "AuditTest",
"synced_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"description": "audited news article",
}
)
refresh_snapshot()
return uid
from devplacepy.database import get_table
JSON_content_negotiation = {"Accept": "application/json"}
_counter_content_negotiation = [0]
def _session_content_negotiation(password="secret123"):
_counter_content_negotiation[0] += 1
name = f"cn{int(time.time() * 1000)}{_counter_content_negotiation[0]}"
s = requests.Session()
s.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/auth/signup",
data={
"username": name,
"email": f"{name}@t.dev",
"password": password,
"confirm_password": password,
Add the trust and safety subsystem and the App Store compliance work Implements the moderation and consent obligations a social platform carries, so the web version and any client that speaks to it enforce the same rules. Moderation core (services/moderation/, database/moderation.py): a reportable target registry, the content filter and its choke points, the report queue with atomic resolution, enforcement actions, consent tracking, maturity gating, and account deletion with a grace window. Surfaces: POST /reports plus the member report list, /admin/moderation and the per-report admin view, /workspaces, terms acceptance at /auth/terms, consent and account deletion under /profile, the report button and dialog partials, the maturity gate, and the moderation stylesheet and ReportDialog client. Every user-generated surface stays reportable by construction: new content tables are registered in REPORTABLE_TARGETS or listed in UNREPORTABLE_TABLES with a reason, and the registry test fails the suite on anything left unclassified. Docs: community guidelines, content moderation, intellectual property, privacy, terms, contact, and the admin-only moderation operations page, plus the moderation API group and the Devii moderation actions. Compliance record: applecomp.md is the requirement register, applechanges.md the gap analysis against this codebase, and appleimpl.md the implementation design they resolve to. Tests cover the report flow, admin moderation, consent, account deletion, terms acceptance, workspaces, and the registry invariant across the unit, api, and e2e tiers.
2026-08-09 00:18:20 +02:00
"birth_date": "1990-01-01",
"accept_terms": "1",
},
allow_redirects=True,
)
return s, name
PUBLIC_PAGES = ["/feed", "/projects", "/gists", "/news", "/leaderboard", "/issues"]
def test_security_authz_denied_recorded(seeded_db):
requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/messages", allow_redirects=False)
admin = _admin(seeded_db)
event = _find(
admin,
"security.authz.denied",
lambda e: e.get("request_path") == "/messages",
)
assert event is not None
assert event["result"] == "denied"
def test_unauthenticated_json_request_is_401_not_redirect(app_server):
r = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/messages", headers=JSON_content_negotiation, allow_redirects=False)
assert r.status_code == 401
# browser guest still redirects to login
rh = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/messages", allow_redirects=False)
assert rh.status_code == 303
def test_messages_conversation_renders_presence_indicator(app_server):
sender, _ = _member()
_, other_name = _member()
other_uid = _db_user(other_name)["uid"]
r = sender.get(f"{BASE_URL}/messages?with_uid={other_uid}")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert "messages-presence" in r.text
assert f'data-presence-uid="{other_uid}"' in r.text
def test_messages_conversation_list_avatar_has_presence_dot(app_server):
sender, _ = _member()
_, other_name = _member()
other_uid = _db_user(other_name)["uid"]
sent = sender.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/messages/send",
data={"receiver_uid": other_uid, "content": "hi there"},
allow_redirects=True,
)
assert sent.status_code == 200, sent.text[:300]
html = sender.get(f"{BASE_URL}/messages").text
assert "conversation-item" in html
assert "presence-dot" in html
assert f'data-presence-uid="{other_uid}"' in html
Make the presence roster the single source of truth for online status Online status had three server-side candidate populations and two client-side deciders, so the feed roster and the /messages indicators could legitimately disagree. PresenceRelayService built its online set from whichever topics happened to be subscribed on a given tick: the roster candidates on /feed, only the per-uid dot rows on /messages. Different populations meant a different hysteresis baseline, so the same user could be online in one place and offline in the other. On top of that, PresenceManager re-derived online status client-side from a frozen data-presence-last-seen with a strict timeout and no hysteresis, re-evaluated every 20s, so any element whose relay frame was missed drifted grey after the timeout and stayed there. AppChat carried a third renderer with its own PubSubClient that only ever wrote online/offline, plus hand-built dot markup duplicating _presence_dot.html. The relay now collapses to one set on one topic. Each tick it reads the online population in a single indexed query (online_candidates, capped by the new PRESENCE_TRACK_LIMIT), applies hysteresis once, and publishes {count, online, users} on public.presence.roster only when the uid set changes. online is the authority for every avatar dot; users is the same set trimmed to PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT for the feed panel. The per-uid public.presence.{uid} topics are gone, which also removes one subscription per distinct author on a page. is_online(user) is now stays_online(seconds_since(last_seen), False), so the server-rendered initial state and the live set apply one formula. PresenceManager makes one subscription and renders every [data-presence-uid] element as membership of that set, with no clock and no expiry timer; before the first frame the server-rendered state stands. Relative "last seen" text is a <time data-dt data-dt-mode="ago"> handled by the shared LocalTime. AppChat lost its presence code entirely, and the new Avatar.badgeElement is the JS twin of _presence_dot.html, so dot markup now lives in exactly two places. Also fix the awards column ensure-block, which the awards tests exposed. backfill_api_keys opened with an "if users not in db.tables" guard, but on a brand-new database that is precisely the state at init_db time, so the whole users ensure-block was skipped. The first signup then created users with only the columns of that INSERT, leaving every ensured-but- unwritten column absent from the server's reflected metadata for the rest of the process lifetime. That is why the awards tab, the prominent award banner and the avatar award badge were invisible on a fresh database. It now calls get_table("users") unconditionally. test_avatar_badge_on_feed_when_prominent asserted that any online user carries an award badge while only awarding a user who was never active, so it passed only by accident. It now makes the awarded user active and asserts the badge on that user's roster entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 19:19:21 +02:00
def test_chat_presence_agrees_with_the_feed_online_roster(app_server):
sender, _ = _member()
# the roster is alphabetical and capped, so name the partner to sort first
other_name = _unique("0chat")
other = requests.Session()
other.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/auth/signup",
data={
"username": other_name,
"email": f"{other_name}@t.dev",
"password": "secret123",
"confirm_password": "secret123",
Add the trust and safety subsystem and the App Store compliance work Implements the moderation and consent obligations a social platform carries, so the web version and any client that speaks to it enforce the same rules. Moderation core (services/moderation/, database/moderation.py): a reportable target registry, the content filter and its choke points, the report queue with atomic resolution, enforcement actions, consent tracking, maturity gating, and account deletion with a grace window. Surfaces: POST /reports plus the member report list, /admin/moderation and the per-report admin view, /workspaces, terms acceptance at /auth/terms, consent and account deletion under /profile, the report button and dialog partials, the maturity gate, and the moderation stylesheet and ReportDialog client. Every user-generated surface stays reportable by construction: new content tables are registered in REPORTABLE_TARGETS or listed in UNREPORTABLE_TABLES with a reason, and the registry test fails the suite on anything left unclassified. Docs: community guidelines, content moderation, intellectual property, privacy, terms, contact, and the admin-only moderation operations page, plus the moderation API group and the Devii moderation actions. Compliance record: applecomp.md is the requirement register, applechanges.md the gap analysis against this codebase, and appleimpl.md the implementation design they resolve to. Tests cover the report flow, admin moderation, consent, account deletion, terms acceptance, workspaces, and the registry invariant across the unit, api, and e2e tiers.
2026-08-09 00:18:20 +02:00
"birth_date": "1990-01-01",
"accept_terms": "1",
Make the presence roster the single source of truth for online status Online status had three server-side candidate populations and two client-side deciders, so the feed roster and the /messages indicators could legitimately disagree. PresenceRelayService built its online set from whichever topics happened to be subscribed on a given tick: the roster candidates on /feed, only the per-uid dot rows on /messages. Different populations meant a different hysteresis baseline, so the same user could be online in one place and offline in the other. On top of that, PresenceManager re-derived online status client-side from a frozen data-presence-last-seen with a strict timeout and no hysteresis, re-evaluated every 20s, so any element whose relay frame was missed drifted grey after the timeout and stayed there. AppChat carried a third renderer with its own PubSubClient that only ever wrote online/offline, plus hand-built dot markup duplicating _presence_dot.html. The relay now collapses to one set on one topic. Each tick it reads the online population in a single indexed query (online_candidates, capped by the new PRESENCE_TRACK_LIMIT), applies hysteresis once, and publishes {count, online, users} on public.presence.roster only when the uid set changes. online is the authority for every avatar dot; users is the same set trimmed to PRESENCE_ONLINE_LIMIT for the feed panel. The per-uid public.presence.{uid} topics are gone, which also removes one subscription per distinct author on a page. is_online(user) is now stays_online(seconds_since(last_seen), False), so the server-rendered initial state and the live set apply one formula. PresenceManager makes one subscription and renders every [data-presence-uid] element as membership of that set, with no clock and no expiry timer; before the first frame the server-rendered state stands. Relative "last seen" text is a <time data-dt data-dt-mode="ago"> handled by the shared LocalTime. AppChat lost its presence code entirely, and the new Avatar.badgeElement is the JS twin of _presence_dot.html, so dot markup now lives in exactly two places. Also fix the awards column ensure-block, which the awards tests exposed. backfill_api_keys opened with an "if users not in db.tables" guard, but on a brand-new database that is precisely the state at init_db time, so the whole users ensure-block was skipped. The first signup then created users with only the columns of that INSERT, leaving every ensured-but- unwritten column absent from the server's reflected metadata for the rest of the process lifetime. That is why the awards tab, the prominent award banner and the avatar award badge were invisible on a fresh database. It now calls get_table("users") unconditionally. test_avatar_badge_on_feed_when_prominent asserted that any online user carries an award badge while only awarding a user who was never active, so it passed only by accident. It now makes the awarded user active and asserts the badge on that user's roster entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 19:19:21 +02:00
},
allow_redirects=True,
)
other_uid = _db_user(other_name)["uid"]
# the partner is active, so the feed roster - the single source of truth - lists them
roster = sender.get(f"{BASE_URL}/feed").text
assert f'class="online-user" title="{other_name}"' in roster
# ...and the chat header must say exactly the same thing
chat = sender.get(f"{BASE_URL}/messages?with_uid={other_uid}").text
header = chat.split('id="messages-presence"', 1)[1].split("</span>", 1)[0]
assert header.endswith("online"), header
assert f'data-presence-uid="{other_uid}"' in header